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Propositions 
Current problems in irrigation are often linked to civil engineering field, for 
being ignorant to social realities, but I wonder whether the problem is civil 
engineering or engineering not being civil? (This Thesis) 
Participation is not only a tool for interaction, but also a field of transaction 
and struggle—with arenas of conflicting interests and domains for negotiations. 
It is recognition of this transaction and conflict that can overcome accusations 
that participation is just another manifesto of post positivism. (This Thesis) 
The Polarized either/or approach to blueprint versus process is not the way 
ahead. Rather it may be a question of which form of blueprint or process, in 
which circumstances, and even of what means may be used to integrate 
blueprint and process approaches. (Hulme, 1995) 
Technology development process is not only about application of 
methodologies, but is also about developing effective networks and collations. 
(Biggs and Smith, 1998). 
Federated structure is more suitable for designing local organization, as politics 
of irrigation organization will be reshaped in federal linkages 
(Freeman et al., 1989). 
Do not embarrass with failures, they too are part of learning guiding to future 
successes. (A common saying in Nepalese society) 
Why does one need 4 years of engineering education just to make water flow 
in down slope, which a common villager can do? Engineers must make it flow 
upward. (An old women farmer to the researcher when a new canal 
failed to irrigate her fields lying higher than canal level) 
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Introduction 
1.1 Research Context and Objectives 
Irrigation Management Transfer1 is a world-wide phenomenon, and 
it is under this banner and many other tides that more than 25 
countries world-wide are now engaged in management transfer 
programs (Kloezen and Samad, 1995). Vermillion and Sagardoy 
(1999) defines irrigation management transfer as the relocation of 
responsibility and authority for irrigation management from 
government agencies to non-governmental organizations, such as 
water user associations. Such programs aim to achieve better 
service provision through users' involvement in system 
management In addition, reduction in public expenditure and 
empowerment to farmer groups are also often goals of these 
programs. 
In Nepal, the process of transfer of irrigation management in 
Agency-Managed Systems2 to new local organizations began in the 
1990s. The design of implementation processes for this 
management transfer and its outcomes has received little analysis 
so far, while its understanding is crucial for future irrigation 
management reform in the country. The reasons for pursuing 
reform in the irrigation sector in Nepal have been three-fold. First, 
there has been increased dependency on the government for 
system development and management, whereas the performance of 
the systems has remained relatively poor. Second is the dependency 
of water resources sector development on donor support, who 
now favour less government and more private-sector involvement 
in development activities. Thirdly, it is also inspired by the 
successful tradition of farmers' managed irrigation systems (FMIS) 
in the country. The process was formulated around decentralized 
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and user-centred approaches emphasizing participation and local 
organizational development 
The present study concerns the intervention program in the 
Terai Region of Nepal to transfer irrigation management functions 
to the users. The Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) program 
in Nepal involves both institutional reform and technical 
rehabilitation to facilitate decentralization of irrigation 
management. However the primary concern is that of a 
modernization approach to induce institutional innovation. The 
study critically studies the dynamics of the participatory processes 
behind this management reform and organizational change, and 
what and how changes were achieved. It draws on the experience 
of the author, who himself was part of these processes and 
explores how and why organization change has evolved in current 
practice. 
The research contributes to four inter-related themes in 
irrigation management reform: (1). the development and 
empowerment of WUAs as new form of governance (2) the 
support process to facilitate the management change and wider 
organizational transformation, (3) the role of technology in both 
these participatory processes and new management, and (4) the 
transformation of policy in projects and local practice. 
The first concern of this study is to understand the processes 
and outcomes of these reforms in local water management in 
Nepal Most studies about irrigation management reform so far 
have focused on the impact of reform (see for example Kloezen et 
aL 1997; Vermillion, 1997) or they are based on the policy 
conditions and organization structures of WUAs (Geiger, 1995; 
Johnson et al 1995; e- conference on IMT, 2001). Studies in Nepal 
have also focused mainly on the impact assessment of the 
intervention (Adhikari, S. 2002; Adhikari, B 2000; Shukla et al 
2000). Such studies tell about the management arrangements 
present as a result of the management change, but often fail to 
explain why and how these arrangements materialize in practice. 
Detailed accounts of the dynamics of the process of management 
transfer and change are rare in irrigation literature. 
The second concern of the research is about the support 
process to facilitate this management change. IMT in Nepal, as in 
most countries is program focused with clearly defined stages. 
Though the need for program/projects to implement the reform 
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has been questioned (Tumi, 1995), in practice it has been 
implemented in program mode with clearly defined stages 
employing supposedly participatory techniques. In this context, the 
details of participatory design approaches and tools and 
methodologies used to facilitate institutional reform have not been 
systematically documented. We also know little about the actual 
participatory technology development process when operating in 
an action research and development context. 
A third concern is to understand more about the role of 
technology both in shaping management and as a focus in the 
intervention process. Typically, technical improvement is a major 
part of the support in IMT programs. In this regard, the issue 
whether the improvement has to be done before or after the 
transfer has got considerable attention. However, the more 
important issue of how to promote service-oriented water control 
appropriate to local users and new local organizations facilitate 
management change has been less debated. 
So far policy and legal support, where it exists, has been focused 
on forming laws authorizing the formation of WUAs. These mostly 
focused on the dudes and responsibilities of WUAs and irrigation 
agencies, system operation and maintenance and transfer 
arrangements (less addressed in Nepal). However, the long-term 
sustainability of local organizations depends on their ability to cope 
with the changing physical and social environment. Policies are 
usually translated on the ground as programmes of support and 
local action proceed, but these can also show need needs which 
policy must translate. The further policy support needed for these 
WUAs to survive and mature (referred to as second-generation 
problem, Svendsen, 1997) has been given less attention. 
The aim of this study is not to suggest specific conditions to 
facilitate management change and assure achievement. Rather it is 
to improve understanding of change processes that translate 
policies on the ground, and the self-actualizing and evolution of 
WUAs - and how actions around technology and its transformation 
relate to this. It also hopes to contribute to better understanding of 
participatory processes, in how they can be practiced beyond just 
an instrumentalist perspective. The core concepts used in these 
fields of concern are reviewed in the following sections. 
The present study was carried out in three systems: Khageri 
Irrigation System (KIS), Panchakanya Irrigation System (PIS) and 
the Nepal West Gandak Irrigation System (NWGIS), which differ 
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in size, have different social and physical environments and 
different histories of water management organization. AH are 
gravity irrigation systems supplied by river diversions. Eleven 
projects were selected to begin the management reform in the 
country and these three systems were in the first phase of policy 
implementation. There were different reasons for their selection at 
the first phase. Khageri and Panchakanya were selected because 
farmers there were innovative and educated. They also have simple 
water control structures and a relatively water-scarce situation, 
which is considered to be favourable for inducing collective action. 
West Gandak was selected because of its potential to provide year-
round irrigation to farmers. 
The IMT programs in all the three systems were initiated in the 
mid-nineties. The size and location of the systems are shown in 
Table 1.1. 
FIGURE 1.1 Location of the 
three irrigation Systems 
TABLE 1.1 Area and location of 
irrigation systems 
System 
PIS 
KIS 
NWGIS 
CA 
600 ha 
3900 ha 
8700 ha 
District 
Chittwan 
Chittwan 
Nawalparasi. 
As I was a key actor in implementing the IMTP in two of the three 
irrigation systems selected for this study - Khageri and 
Panchakanya - 1 find it essential to describe my research journey. 
1.2 Beginning a Research Journey 
In December 1994, the department3 asked me to head the Narayani 
Lift Irrigation Office (NLIO), whose remit included the 
Panchakanya and Khageri irrigation systems. In early 1992, the 
government initiated the Participatory Joint Management Program 
(PJM) in the Khageri Irrigation system. Two years later, 
Panchakanya was also included in this program: ultimately the 
government was going to transfer the management of the Khageri 
and Panchakanya systems, beginning with this joint management 
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activity. I worked in the IMTP for almost four years from 
December 1994 to October 1998. 
I was recommended by the outgoing NLIO chief for his 
replacement, due to my previous experience in implementing the 
Irrigation Line of Credit (ILQ4 projects, which were based on a 
participatory approach. I had just returned from the Asian Institute 
of Technology, Thailand, with a Masters' Degree in Water 
Resources Development, after earlier graduating as a civil engineer 
in 1987, and had not been placed in any charge before then. I 
immediately moved to join the NLIO, unknowingly beginning my 
research journey. 
Paradoxically my professional career began not with design 
innovation of large structures, but with involvement in the 
formation and capacity development of WUAs, and designing 
systems through joint planning and supervision. I had neither 
training in this newly emerging 'social engineering' approach nor 
any knowledge in mobilizing users in this process. It was thus not 
only a new experience for me, but also one I never expected — 
uncharted terrain (Honadle & Cooper, 1989). The term "Peoples' 
Participation' was highlighted at that time. It was considered a 
mantra to heal the ailing irrigation sector. The field of civil 
engineering was blamed for most of the problems, criticized for 
adopting top-down and blueprint approaches, while engineers were 
criticized for being biased towards construction and ignorant of 
social realities. As I became further involved in the project, I 
started wondering whether the problem was civil engineering, or 
that the type of engineering was not being very civil? 
Being involved in complexity 
I was trained as a hard-core engineer and equipped with knowledge 
of hydraulics and civil construction, where innovations are brought 
through knowledge of science. My professional orientation thus 
began with a positivist perspective5. However, after being involved 
in the participatory rehabilitation of FMIS, I came to realize the 
complexity and dynamic processes of real-life irrigation 
intervention. There were multiple actors and multiple realities. I 
could further realize that the positivism perspective ignores the 
'civil' aspect of my engineering profession. I gradually shifted 
towards a construcuvist perspective. Our work in the IMTP was 
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characterized by conflicts and struggles between various actors and 
stakeholders. There was always a need to find ways to mediate and 
negotiate the conflicting interests between different group of 
farmers, as well as between farmers and other institutions. We 
ended with both intended and unintended outcomes. 
I also juggled different roles in this process of change as a 
facilitator, a project manager and an engineer. For the department, 
donors and consultants, I was a Project Manager responsible for 
implementing the IMT Project. My role here was to complete the 
project in time and perform administrative and financial activities 
in accordance with their requirement For farmers, I was the first 
port of call to negotiate and bargain their demands. In this respect, 
I was both a mediator and a negotiator between the government 
and the farmers, and between different farmer groups. This was the 
most painful part of the work, because, a win-win situation was not 
always possible, and failure to find a win-win situation meant being 
blamed by the losing side. 
As an engineer, I was to engage in design innovation of the 
structures and help my technical staff to carry out the construction, 
and also to help farmers understand the different aspects of system 
technology. This was the comfortable side of my job - I enjoyed 
designing with the users, especially when being able to translate 
their ideas and preferences into practical reality. However, my 
primary role was to facilitate the management change from the 
government to the farmers. This was not limited to a single aspect 
of my work, but included every dimension from the design 
innovation of structures to negotiation for turnover, and 
negotiation for future support and helping WUA to develop their 
future vision. As a facilitator, I had to engage at various levels. 
First, I myself was the facilitator directly engaging with the WUA 
and the government agencies including my own department. At 
another level, I was supporting my staff implementing the activities 
in the field. I was working both as an 'ordinary' facilitator and as a 
'meta'-racilitator' Groot (2002). 
These different domains kept me running from one place to 
another, even to the Supreme Court of Nepal. Participation, I 
realized, was not only a tool of interaction, but also a field of 
transaction and struggle - with arenas of conflicting interests and 
domains for negotiation. It is recognition of this transaction and 
conflict that can overcome accusations that participatory 
methodologies are just another manifestation of positivism. 
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Taking this view, I am not a pessimist on participatory 
development, and neither do I view it as tyranny (Cook and 
Kothari, 2001). In the latter part of the book, I will rather argue 
that it is promising but inevitably complex and messy and we 
should be prepared for both intended and unintended outcomes. 
Participatory approaches do have several practical limitations in 
irrigation but there is no need to rush to abandon the approach 
itself, as there is no alternative approach that pays better attention 
to users. 
Meeting with Prof. Vincent the journey continues. 
Meanwhile, in April 1998, Prof. Vincent was on a supervisory visit 
to two of her PhJD. students who were at their final stages of field-
work. I met her briefly and shared my views on the current reform 
process in Nepal, the ongoing IMT program and what we had 
learned after the implementation. I wrote a research proposal. 
Besides seeking explanations of my past actions, I was further 
interested to learn more about the management change over time. 
My proposal was accepted later on as part of the program on 
'Matching Technology and Institutions (MTI) in Land and Water 
management6. For this later part of the journey, I included another 
case of IMT where I was not involved as implementer. 
Is it appropriate to do research on a system where the researcher 
himself was a principal actor in the implementation? I took this as 
both an opportunity and challenge. It was an opportunity in the 
sense that I had the access to data, memory and documentation of 
many of the events that were important in shaping the 
management turnover process. I was familiar with the local 
environment and enjoyed close relationships with my previous 
staff. I had friendly relations with many farmers and WUA 
members, with whom any differences existing were more on policy 
matters than personal ones. For a study of an implementation 
process, I believe an implementer can provide more information 
than an outsider if he wishes to do this. 
I was committed to show the difficulties and challenges that 
others and I faced in facilitating irrigation management change. I 
was also convinced that it is not a story to tell about who did what, 
or judge the success or failure of an individual or of an 
organization. With this research, I am searching for explanations 
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on why and how particular outcomes have arrived through 
theoretical concepts. As Yin (1989) notes, case studies can produce 
explanations if they proceed from an adequate theoretical 
framework. My confidence to document the research journey grew 
as I discovered several authors describing their research journey 
through reflection on their own work on intervention (Auerbach, 
1999; Malkin, 1999; Uphoff 1992; Haggmann, 1999) and more 
recendy Groot (2002). 
This book shares as honestly as possible some of the challenges, 
obstacles, frustration, pitfalls and the lessons learned in the process 
of irrigation management reform in Nepal. Although every 
situation has unique elements, I believe that many of the difficulties 
encountered and rewarding moments experienced are in common. 
These perspectives and lessons learned and discussed here will help 
design intervention aiming to promote participatory management 
in irrigation. I make no apologies in presenting personal elements 
of my research journey: I think it important to document my 
situation, experiences and values as they also shaped the research 
study. They help show the struggles inside a participatory approach 
by key actors among farmers, engineers and program staff, which 
few studies document There is a known challenge in reporting and 
analyzing situations in which one is an actor, but this does not 
invalidate the analysis if it is done with critical awareness and 
openness. 
1.3 Restructuring Local Organisation 
An organization can be conceptualized as a social grouping of users 
involving a definite set of authority relations who meet regularly, 
may not have intimate ties with each other and normally come 
together for a specific practical purpose (Giddens, 1989). In 
irrigation they can be formal or informal organizations (the WUAs) 
depending on legal recognition. The resulting WUAs can be single 
or multi-tiered depending upon the type and structural complexity 
of the systems, and can be developed in unitary or federated 
models (Freeman eta/., 1989). In the unitary model, the structure is 
a pyramid-type, and the higher level is formed out of 
representatives of lower units, whereas in the federated model, the 
higher level committees are formed for different canal units with 
different selection/election processes. However, in both structures, 
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the WUA consists of different tiers, for example a main committee 
(MQ, branch committee (BQ or tertiary committee, depending 
upon the canal layout 
Freeman (1989) argues that the unitary structure is unresponsive 
to local farmer requirements, and that federated structures are 
more suitable for the efficient functioning of an organization. He 
sees the disadvantages of the unitary model - that the decision-
making tends to divert from local needs as the power is 
concentrated at centre level, the main committee is over- loaded 
and thus decisions are slow. Also, that power and formal authority 
tend to be concentrated with relatively few leaders and brokers. As 
membership of governing bodies and councils at each higher level 
is drawn from the membership at each lower level, power and 
influence rapidly concentrates among a few. On the contrary, in the 
federal model each organizational level is clearly responsible for a 
particular segment of canal, and needs can be quickly addressed. 
Power and influence will tend to be distributed among different 
canal sections, and the politics of irrigation organization will be 
reshaped in federal linkages. Solidarity may also be promoted as 
groups recognize interdependences in gaining water supply from 
year to year. 
The functional versus political model of a WUA 
Work on WUA design and development has generally followed 
two approaches to institutional design. Researchers like Ostrom 
(1992) emphasizes governance7 as a dimension of management 
involving the generation of rules for management practice. Another 
group is more focused in identifying conditions under which the 
WUA can perform irrigation management tasks (see for example, 
Vermillion, 1995, Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999, Groenfeldt, 1999, 
1996; Meinzen-Dick et al 2002). They are more focused on 
organizational type, size of organization, compatibility of structures 
and clear water rights. Both of these approaches are more 
concerned over finding appropriate conditions and generating rules 
to govern and manage irrigation water. However, they fail to 
understand governance as possible under divergence forms of 
regulation and control8. Participation, done well, helps build the 
process through which governance develops and to find ways 
where there is consensus. 
10 Engineering Participation 
Both of these discussions are based on the 'functional model* of 
the WUA, which describes conditions for the management to 
work It is guided by the assumptions that the WUAs are non-
partisan, non-political and homogeneous bodies, and perform the 
irrigation management tasks as designed. These discussions do not 
show the conditions under which accepted rules and organizations 
come into being. To understand the dynamics within a WUA and 
their functioning, their political character has to be recognized. 
The WUAs are also political bodies, through which the farmers 
aim to increase their political power to bargain and negotiate with 
the government and other agencies. Farmers use their social and 
political status to be representatives in the WUA and at the same 
time use these positions within the WUA to further increase their 
political and economic power. Though the members are selected 
through democratic election, attention can be diverted towards 
more vocal groups because of the pattern of socio-political 
dependence and lack of literacy among the farmers. Different 
stakeholders have competing and conflicting interests, different 
opinions and access to different knowledge and information (Vos, 
2002) which also shapes the outcome of the WUA structure. 
However it is not surprising that the discussions so far have given 
less attention to political aspects of the WUA. This is because the 
reform process is mainly guided by concerns over the financial 
sustainability of irrigation. 
To function well, organizations require resources as well as 
legitimacy, and these are often linked in political action. 
Organizations will continue to contest rights and seek resources 
externally for their own survival and preferred means of operation, 
which then further adds to the legitimacy and power. The WUAs 
thus exhibit as much a political character as a functional one, and 
the two cannot be separated. The difference is that where the 
WUAs are functioning well, their political dimensions are less 
visible, whereas when WUAs fail to function, their political 
characteristics are visible and often blamed for any program failure. 
In Nepal, there is also a dilemma that the government's version of 
the WUA is only the functional model: they view its political 
characteristics as a problem. The farmers' immediate attention is 
often the political front, and they can move away from the 
painstaking jobs of resource collection and system operation and 
maintenance (O&M). 
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Enabling management factors 
The functioning of the WUA depends on three factors: skills, 
resources and accountability. Skills needed are both of a managerial 
(organizational) as well as technical nature. Managerial skills include 
the daily administration, financial administration and mechanisms 
to collect resources and conflict resolution. Technical skills are the 
skills required to operate and maintain the system. They are thus 
related to the technology and physical environment of the system. 
Technology design and development should thus be based on the 
skill of the local organization to operate and maintain the system 
and operational procedures and decision making process in local 
social environment A WUA can buy in the necessary skills or 
develop these themselves. In this respect, we see two different 
WUA models: 'management models' and 'participatory models'. 
The WUAs which function in management mode, as in Mexico 
(Kloezen, 2002) and the USA, buy in most of the administrative 
and the technical skills; where irrigation management are carried 
out through hired professional staff. However, where WUAs are 
directly involved in management as in most of the Asian countries 
including Nepal, these skills have to be developed within the WUA 
body. 
However, there are two challenges in developing skills within 
the WUA. The first is that WUA members are not permanent, they 
change due to elections: it may be possible that an entire new body 
is formed without any of the skills developed by their predecessors. 
Also, skills cannot be developed with one instant of training and 
capacity development, but have to be built through experience and 
learning over time. Often the implementing agencies (both donor 
and irrigation agency) lack commitment to facilitate such change 
with a longer time framework. Efforts to get quick results without 
estimating the technical and organizational requirements of local 
organization can result in the collapse of the program in turn, 
resulting in demoralization of the local groups (Brett, 1996). 
A WUA, like any organization, requires resources to perform its 
activities, which are linked with both skill and accountability. 
Unless service is delivered according to the farmers' needs, and also 
payment mechanisms are structured to ensure payment, farmers are 
not encouraged to pay for irrigation. As mentioned earlier, this 
depends on the skills the WUA present in maintaining the 
irrigation sendee and setting up acceptable procedures. Failure to 
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maintain accountability would also result in the farmers' distrust of 
the WUA and result in poor resource mobilization. 
Accountability9 has different dimensions and is the key factors 
that strength or weakens the leadership within the WUA. The 
WUA loses its credibility at local level upon being failed to 
maintaining accountability. In irrigation, it is between the WUA 
and the users, and between the Irrigation Agency and the WUA. It 
is a two-way mechanism, not only that the WUA management 
should be accountable to the user farmers, but the users are also 
accountable to the Board. Likewise, both the government agency 
and the WUA are accountable to each other. Failure to maintain 
accountability from one side also results in failure on the other. 
The struggle to do this in a project context, and wider water 
management context, are shown in this thesis. 
1.4 Irrigation Technology, its Design and Management 
Technology commands a central role in transforming irrigation 
practices, mediating between society and the physical environment. 
Technology in its widest sense can be considered as the capacity to 
transform goods into desired things (Vincent 1997 b). It thus 
involves material objects, knowledge and skills to transform objects 
into goods. In this study, I consider technology as an artefact or 
material object (Hoogendam, 1994; Mollinga, 1998; Latimore, 
1986) and that can be studied as a hard system dependent on a soft 
system (the hard and soft systems are discussed in next sections). 
This allows for the practical study of design construction and 
operation of the irrigation technology. 
The social (soft) dimension of irrigation technology is best 
understood through recognition of the social shaping of 
technology, that it has social requirements of use, is socially 
construction and has social effects10 (Mollinga, 1998). This also 
provides new light for designing structures at the interface between 
the state and the users in joinny managed systems. 
Technology design and development is a social process where 
different actors involved interact continuously to shape technology 
outcomes. The important actors in this process are the agency 
engineers, WUA members, common farmers and politicians in 
some cases. In the process of design and construction these actors 
talk, negotiate and struggle with each other about the actual end 
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result Design and construction are thus formed in arenas in which 
there is social interaction between different social actors about the 
characteristic of the technology (Boelens, 2002). The arenas and 
the interaction are space- and time-dependent, conversation and 
negotiation may take different forms: conversations in the field, 
official meetings, but also obstruction of machines or refusal to 
participate in construction (Hoogendam, 1994). This requires that 
design process should be decentralized, and utilize users' needs, 
knowledge and skills. These concepts also form the theoretical 
approach to interactive design and participatory technology 
development (PTD) explained later. 
The service and technical characteristics of technology 
The issue of water delivery service through design management 
interactions have been well discussed in recent years and there has 
been concern to ensure that structures are designed to be 
appropriate to local knowledge and skill and local objective of 
water management (Lankford and Gowing, 1997. Lankford, 1998; 
Horst, 1998). To better understand the design of artefacts and their 
service delivery, I further operationlize technology in terms of its 
characteristics: the technical characteristic and the service 
characteristic11. The first describes the internal structure of the 
artefacts and the second implies the functioning or the service of 
the artefacts. However, certain types of service delivery emerge 
from certain types of technical configuration, and the two are 
related. For example in irrigation, the service delivery patterns of 
proportioning weirs and those of adjustable gates are different, and 
they have different technical configurations. Both serve the 
purpose of water delivery, but the service patterns are different 
The technical and service characteristics in irrigation structures can 
also be described in terms of their structural and hydraulic 
behaviour. The structural dimension describes the materials, their 
shape, dimensions, and the geometry of the structures whereas the 
hydraulic dimension determines the flow parameters, like flow 
discharge. 
The need for technical change to support institutional reform is 
decided by the compatibility of the existing technology to meet 
farmers' preferred service pattern. Technical change can be looked 
into two different ways: radical or incremental (Savioti, 1988). 
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Radical changes involves creation of entire new sets of technology 
abolishing the existing one, and are needed if there is no scope of 
meeting the service requirement of the users with modification of 
the existing technical configuration. Incremental change involves 
the change in technical characteristics of the existing technology, 
and is preferred if new service requirement can be put in place with 
modification in the existing technology. However, when 
technology change brings new options and conditions, these 
should be reviewed by users for acceptability of water delivery and 
operational requirement of new systems and there should also be 
space for new operational routines to be evolved and agreed. 
Halsema (2002) has emphasized how the need to define these new 
routines is often neglected. 
Participatory design of irrigation technology 
Papanek (1985) describes design in its widest sense, as the 
imposition of meaningful order. Thus one can ask who orders and 
meaning shape the structures and processes of artefacts and 
institutions introduced in irrigation. Technology design to support 
institutional reform for water management involves negotiation 
about the design objectives, the design methods and the process of 
implementation at every step in the process. The use of tools like 
Participatory Technology Development (PTD) has been advocated 
to support local water management, and have been used in Nepal 
and this study. 
PTD is a process of design shaped by the interaction between 
local users and external change agents and other relevant actors 
involved in water management This interaction is meant to 
increase understanding of the main characteristics and dynamics of 
that particular systems in its agro- ecological context, to define 
priorities, analyze problems and experiment locally with a variety of 
technical options. It systematically presents participatory tools and 
approaches in technology development from initial contacts up to 
the evaluation of activities and phase out of external support. 
Ashby and Spurting (1994) have given four characteristics of 
participatory design: client-driven, decentralized technology 
development, decentralized management and accountability. The 
limitation in the application of the tools like PTD has been due to 
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narrow focus and understanding of participatory development 
process in the current development discourse. 
Boelens (1998) mentions that because of the conflicts, 
negotiation and farmers' mediation process associated to real-life 
irrigation design, the outcomes can be quite different from the ones 
planned. Different actor groups can define their own strategies, call 
in the necessary capacities and resources and enter into the diverse 
political arenas at local, regional and national levels, in order to 
struggle for their interest, negotiate and exert pressure. In these 
formal and informal platforms-according to their point of 
departure, strategic alliances and the power that different groups 
are able to bring in these negotiation- farmers groups are in a 
position to inject their ideas into the irrigation design. The design 
results as an outcome of these ongoing negotiations (ibid). 
Irrigation management 
Irrigation involves the movement of water by people to crops 
through the use of technology. To make water available in the 
farmers' field, three factors are thus involved: water, people and 
technology. Technology is at the centre and mediates the two in 
transforming irrigation practices. Irrigation management then can 
be considered as the mechanism; that is; the actions, processes and 
institutions involved in getting water to farmers' field. 
Earlier works to define irrigation management include Coward 
(1980) and Uphoff (1985, 1986). These standard frameworks of 
management tasks have been critici2ed, especially in their failure to 
understand how particular management activities appear in the 
field (Van de Zaag 1992; Manzunga 1999; Wahaj 2001; Halsema 
2002). Manzungu pleads for better understanding and recognition 
of contingency management, with roles, rules and actions emerging 
from every-day necessities. Halsema demands that thinking about 
management takes stronger recognition of technology needs but 
also of the social environment: not just of what is possible but also 
how people choose to develop and use local organization. He also 
stipulates that it shall recognize not just functions but also process 
of decisions making, monitoring and direction. 
16 Engineering Participation 
Irrigation management as a form of water control. 
Mollinga (1998, 2001) defines three dimensions of irrigation 
management in the form of water control: technical, organizational 
and socio-political. The technical dimension relates the regulation 
of physical forces to control the flow of water, and technical 
control provides means to capture, convey and distribute water 
through the physical artefacts. The organizational dimension of the 
water control relates to the regulations of human behaviour in daily 
irrigation practices, such as a WUAs and different rules and 
regulations to make the WUA work The socio-economic and 
political dimensions refer to the wider societal conditions shaping 
the possibility for particular management practices to take place. It 
thus varies from the everyday struggle to get water at the local level 
to the changes in the relation and accountability between the state 
and users to make the management work. It also recognizes that 
water is politics, that water delivery often both involves political 
actions, and that WUAs are political actors. This sociotechnical 
approach is used in this study. To understand how irrigation 
systems are designed, operated and used by people to provide 
water for production. 
The three dimensions of water control are intimately related 
with each other, and policies that seek to achieve changes in the 
irrigation management therefore have to address all three 
dimensions. This is clearly reflected in the current irrigation 
management reform program in Nepal, where efforts to establish 
new management have involved technical intervention, 
organizational development and their legal and political support. 
This thesis examines how these different issues were addressed in 
Nepal, and also how the changing control in one dimension 
changes the other control mechanisms. 
The system environment and water distribution 
The sociotechnical nature of irrigation systems, where the 
technology of the systems shapes and is shaped by bio-physical 
system and society, shows the complexity of irrigation process 
situated between the domains of physical and social environment 
Both the social and physical environment are dynamic, and bring 
new situations and challenges in the management continuum, so 
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management, should be thus viewed as a process rather than a task. 
The interplay between the technology, physical environment and 
society requires understanding of the systems involved, as 
Checkland (1981) notes that untangling complex interrelationship 
requires an understanding of entire system involved. 
Designing for participation in irrigation water management has 
to address irrigation such that it translates the constraints and 
opportunities of the physical environment and provides a way to 
capture and transfer water to farmers' fields and at the same time 
address societal concerns in practical design. The physical 
environment is more tangible, and scientific approaches to 
irrigation design exist, which employ agronomic and hydraulic 
principles. However, despite available scientific knowledge for 
innovation12, irrigation systems still face challenges due to these 
variable characteristics of physical environment For example 
irrigation systems confront three different levels of physical (also 
managerial) domains: the watershed (catchment) level, the 
conveyance and distribution level and the water application level 
(Keller, 1990). The river regimes on an irrigation system often have 
intra- and inter-annual variation in water quantity and quality as 
rainfall varies. The extent of silt load depends on vegetation cover 
and land use practices in the catchment The same area that faces 
water scarcity in one season may suffer from inundation and 
flooding in next season. Within the system itself, the conveyance 
canals and water distribution structures confront several cross-
system streams and are vulnerable to them. They should not only 
be able to deliver the required irrigation service to the users but 
also be safe enough from the threat of physical environment like 
flooding and inundation, and be consistent with seepage patterns 
and problems. These situations give rise to particular challenge in 
irrigation management, which can be beyond the capability of the 
local managing units. 
The social environment is also critical to irrigation, and is equally 
dynamic. Studies have shown that irrigation is as much socio 
political processes as technical and how the processes to get water 
is shaped by values, interests, knowledge and capability of users, 
local rules and practices, socio-political condition (Mollinga, 1998; 
Wade 1982; Zaag 1992). This study focuses on the agrarian 
conditions and social forces shaping the water delivery process: it is 
especially concerned on the strategy and actions of people and the 
socio-political dependence in society and how they shape the 
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institutional arrangement and management regimes leading to both 
intended and unintended results in water management. 
To help understand these social and environmental dynamics 
the study adopts and agro-ecology perspective. To Altieri (1990) 
agro-ecology is an approach that allows a focus on the principles 
on which to base agro-ecosystem design, leaving the specific 
technological form to be determined by the agro-ecological milieu. 
It thus allows a focus on how farmers discriminate, adapt, and 
select technologies of use to them, while also validating older local 
practices. This helps understanding of the interventions to take 
water for irrigation and distribute it (but also problems from the 
water sources), and also of the agriculture and agrarian conditions 
that shape the agroecology of the systems. Manzungu (1999) has 
also described how water distribution is shaped by: the water 
source, irrigation technology, socio-political relations and 
commodisatizion effects. 
1.5 Participation, Development Intervention and Policy Reform 
The paradigms for rural development pursed and practised in 
developing countries have transformed greatly since the 1950s. 
Failure to achieve intended results through transfer of technology 
policies caused shift towards a more user-centred approach to 
development, and 'people first' development model based on 
popular participation gained popularity in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Brukley, 1993; Chambers, 1997; Cernea, 1991). Structural 
adjustment and neo-liberal polices of the 1990s further shifted 
attention from participation to local governance. The focus of 
water resources management has also shifted accordingly, from 
technology transfer towards decentralized and user-centred 
approaches emphasizing participation and local organizational 
development as explained by Clyma (1989), Uphoff (1986), and 
Korten (1984). This has changed the development problematic in 
two ways: Firstly, the focus has shifted to the promotion of local 
water management through user organizations; secondly, design 
approaches have also shifted towards participatory design 
processes to support organizational evolution. More recently, 
attention has been shifted towards promotion of local governance 
and transfer of irrigation management to user groups commonly 
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referred to as Water Users Associations (WUAs), has been central 
in the irrigation reform process (Vermillion, 1999; Meinzen-Dick et 
al, 2002, Johnson etal, 2002). 
Participation in irrigation engineering has thus become central 
concern, and also of this study, with focus on both the 
development of the WUA and the participatory development 
processes to support them, with a central focus on the role of 
technology in these processes. 
Conceptualizing participation and innovation and the relations 
between them 
Participation has become is a very broad concept, and has been 
debated not simply as action but as objective. It has be viewed in 
many ways; as a way of mobilizing people to solve their own 
problems or as process for releasing people from being subject of 
change to agents of modernization (Korten, 1983). People can 
come together or be forced to come together. Several authors have 
developed typologies of forms of participation13. Musch (2001) 
notes that though this ladder type of typology is appealing and 
simple, it is too simplistic to handle the issue of multiple farmer 
groups. 
Innovation here is considered as a new way of doing things or 
doing new things, and can only be considered innovation if it 
actually works in practice (Leeuwis 2002). Innovation is thus not 
only composed of novel technical devices or procedures but also of 
new or adapted human practices, including the conditions for such 
practices to happen (ibid). 
This study rather looks as the origins of participatory efforts and 
the methods used. Participation does not operate in vacuum, it is 
linked with certain development objectives. Another limitation in 
the debate so far is that participation is seen as transaction between 
the farmers and the engineers (or facilitators). It is argued here that 
there are different development contexts linked to participatory 
frameworks for intervention, and there are different domains of 
action in participation (Vincent and Khanal 2002, Vincent 1997). 
The different development context of participation do have 
different concepts of innovation and different sets of participatory 
methodologies linked with them. 
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Development context 1: Economic development and modernization 
In this context, participation is an approach (by agencies) to induce 
increases in performance or impact, through providing conditions 
or incentives that enable farmers to take on new responsibilities 
and opportunities. Participation here has moved beyond project 
execution to policy reform and self-governance, and even been 
considered the way to operationalize decentralization as the motor 
for democratic transformation (Cornwall, 2001) Innovation then 
concerns new activities that improve linkages between resource use 
and production - new techniques, artefacts or institutional 
relations. In irrigation, its primary focus is on institutional reform 
to both local organization and the irrigation bureaucracy, but also 
heavily focused to system modernization to provide better working 
conditions for farmers. It lays emphasis on participatory design 
processes to support evolving organization, and calls for 
accountability between the irrigation agency and the WUA and 
between the WUA and the farmers. Thus, participatory approaches 
that allow local negotiation and evolutionary change rather than 
blue-print models work best. However, it is vulnerable to blueprint 
ideas about WUA development and new technologies, and over-
expectation of what users can do. Bureaucratic reform is a time-
consuming process, and is often outside the framework of funding 
agencies. This context of participation is the backdrop to the IMTP 
and its policy tools and intervention approaches, and to my work 
Development context 2: Joint planning and problem solving 
Here, participation is a process through which stakeholders 
influence, share control and work together to achieve desired 
change. Innovation is shown through the changed behaviour of the 
people involved, and the sharing of knowledge and skills. This 
context focuses on the generation, transfer and exchange of 
knowledge as a means to beneficial change. It recognizes that 
technology is not neutral and technological change should reflect 
local needs and knowledge. Also that people have a right to self-
determination over their development In the field of technology 
development in this context, Participatory Technology 
Development (PTD) has got considerable attention as an 
approach. However, the technical biases of many engineers, and 
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their sense of status that makes them unwilling to accept farmers as 
partners and lengthy bureaucratic process often yields failure to 
make design process participatory. This context drove the choices 
of participatory methodology within the project framework, and 
the personal actions of many field-level actors described in this 
thesis. 
Development context 3: Social inclusion, improved equity and 
reduced vulnerability 
Participation here is organized efforts to increase control over 
resources and regulative institutions in given situations on the part 
of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded (a definition 
from an ILO program). Innovation is the delivery of different 
benefits to different people. This context recognizes the tensions 
and complex politics of negotiating change in many different 
arenas, but needs highly motivated and conscientized actors to 
empower change. It is committed to capacity development of the 
users groups and concentration on the certain marginalized groups. 
However, the danger may come from its conscientizaion and 
political action which may lead to collapse of existing management 
arrangements without new forms to replace it Very different levels 
of action in this context occurred in the three systems studied: 
political struggle brought improved equity within Khageri and 
Panchakanya, but has hardly improved any conditions in West 
Gandak. 
Domains of participation 
These contexts help explain differences in concerns and actions of 
key actors in the IMTP process at field level. In addition however, 
the interfaces with different stakeholders must be understood, in 
terms of their sphere of influence and local representation, their 
interests in participation, and their practice in relation to water 
supply and water users. In a large irrigation system, participation is 
not only with farmers direcdy. More commonly negotiation will 
also be done through water user organisations (whose 
representation often changes), as well as with system operators, and 
the contractors who often implement new construction. These 
different domains present different opportunities and challenges to 
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participatory approaches. Successes in some areas - like working 
with farmers to agree new designs and irrigation schedules - may be 
tempered by problems in other areas — like failing to get good 
quality construction under contracts. As a designer and 
implementer, I had to work across these domains and interfaces -
to get farmers' ideas put into practical reality and researchers have 
to see those domains and interfaces. 
The different development contexts of participation together 
with the different domains of interactions constitute a 
Tarticipation Complex' in which a facilitator works and actions are 
shaped. In a real-world situation, a program execution can involve 
all the different development contexts together, requiring 
understanding of the clashes these can bring between people with 
different aims and objectives in participation. These outcomes help 
explain policy as 'process' where people reshape water management 
with around new policy instrument and their own objectives, to 
give intended as well as unintended effects. 
While writers like Boelens (2002) have listed a wider range of 
contexts of participation, these three context are used here as they 
are clearly visible in the transformation sought in IMT in Nepal, 
and in the project dynamics discussed in this thesis. 
Participation, policies and project environments 
As noted in context 1, policies can be introduced to formalise both 
the forms of local governance envisaged and programmes of 
support to achieve policy aims on the ground. This study sees 
policy as a process (Grindle and Thompson, 1992) where policy 
directives and guidelines are adapted in use locally by a wider range 
of agencies and individuals, and where local dynamics can also 
feedback to reshape policies. This study also shows how the 
participatory processes used to effect new policies for WUA 
development both shaped and reshaped policy tools and outcomes. 
Projects and programs translating policies into action involve a 
complex environment involving various actors. Interventions 
seeking management change requires the bringing together of 
agencies and individuals together in the program process. Their 
participation in the process can be partial and conditional 
Intervention must thus be understood to take place in a complex 
highly populated landscape of human activity (Wield, 1999). 
Introduction 23 
Managing such a change process involves building of coalitions 
(Biggs and Smith, 1998), or networks (Mahanty, 2002) among the 
actors, learning lessons and feeding them back into practice. 
This political and interactive nature of the development 
intervention, has led a call to shift from conventional blue print 
models of project implementation to participatory process-based 
approaches to projects/interventions (Korten, 1980; Hulme, 1995; 
Rondinelli, 1983; Brinkenhoff, 1996). Though process approaches 
have been also looked upon in different ways14, they emphasize 
experimentation, learning, adoption, participation, flexibility, 
building local capacities and organic expansion (Bond and Hulme, 
1999). They have a common feature of joint planning, decision-
making and social learning. This was the proposed framework for 
the IMT project However, despite efforts, in reality, the rigid 
project process set by the donors, shorter time frame, and 
hierarchical bureaucratic structure still limited the outcomes of the 
learning process. In irrigation intervention, initiating intervention 
without initial learning about both human and physical/technical 
dimensions has often led the blueprint application of the methods, 
though participating staff are motivated and committed. 
Another weakness in current participatory interventions is in 
handling conflictive situations. It is guided by the notion that 
consensus is possible out of learning and negotiations among 
actors. However, people are not only rational choice makers but act 
purposefully guided by their interest and values. Long (1992,2001) 
shows that people possess 'agency*, or knowlegeability and capacity 
and their actions are shaped by strategic interactions in a network 
of social relationships. He views intervention as an arena of 
struggle and action, a multiple reality constructed by the ongoing 
social and political struggles taking place among the actors. This 
study also takes this view. 
Planning models aim to solve these problems by bringing 
different actors together in a common forum. However, as noted 
by Leeuwis (2000), it will not be easy to make actors set aside their 
conflicting personal interests during the process. Besides, different 
actors are located at different institutional layers and have different 
power positions, making it difficult to obtain favourable outcomes. 
Considering these weaknesses of participatory trajectories, Leeuwis 
(2000) argues for a negotiation theory in designing the participatory 
intervention. He pleads for integrative negotiation (see also 
Meegeren and Leeuwis, 1999), where stakeholders develop (new 
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and often wider) problem definitions and perceptions on the basis 
of a creative collective learning process, resulting in the 
identification of so called win-win solutions. This study shows that 
negotiation might guide the intervention. However, equally 
important is to adopt collaborative learning that demands reform in 
bureaucracy and donor agencies, such that learning is extended 
beyond local level. 
Locating the actors: Projects and their environment 
Interventions take place in a sea of linked activities that involve 
multiple agencies - where the objective of an individual 
organization do not necessarily add up to and coincide with those 
of the project or the target group and where issues are often 
complex, ill structured, interdependent and multi-sectoral (Wield 
1999). It is therefore essential to move beyond actors and locate 
them and their sphere of influence in the intervention process 
Smith et al. (1980) differentiates between three different 
environments of a project: the controlled environment, the 
influenceable environment and the appreciated environment The 
controlled environment is those elements which are inside the 
boundary of the implementing agencies for example the field staff, 
the budget etc. Actors in this environment are those involved in 
everyday implementation and management. The influenceable 
environment involves those activities and institutions that can be 
influenced by the projects and organization, but cannot be 
controlled by it. The appreciated environment involves those, 
whom the projects or the organization can neither control nor 
influence, but whose actions can still highly affect the outcomes of 
the project or organizational management activities. 
However, the term 'controlled environment' does not satisfy 
field level reality. It is true that actors in the field level are visible, 
and that certain actions can be controlled and put in to practice 
through consensus or negotiation at this level. However, actions 
and struggles are more dominant at field level, as here actors 
engage in daily management activities and have high stakes in 
control of the process. There can be thus no such a thing as a 
'controlled' environment A term like 'internal environment', is 
considered more appropriate. Actors in this environment are those 
involved in every-day implementation and are thus part of everyday 
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politics and struggle. This division of actors at different levels has 
the advantage that it locates the actors and their sphere of 
influence; it helps us to realize that actions and struggle take place 
beyond the local level, and influence the design of the program 
process and the policy outcomes accordingly. Project environments 
are dynamic too. As projects, interventions or other forms of 
management activities move on, they bring new situations with 
them. New conditions can also come through policy and legal 
changes. 
1.6 The Central Research Question 
Based on the research review and above theoretical discussions, the 
central research question of this thesis is set as follows: 
What participatory processes have been used in irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) in Nepal, how did they evolve, 
how has technology been addressed in these processes, and 
bow have these processes and transformations been shaped by 
their system and project environment? 
IMT here represents not only the event of management shift to 
the WUA from the government to the WUA and the support 
process for this, but also includes the changes in management 
under the WUA. The system environment refers to the system's 
social and natural environment 
1.7 Methodological Questions and Approaches. 
The hermeneutic challenge 
A critical concern came with my past role as an actor in the 
management transfer process. I had to interpret my past actions 
and past texts and procedures, and tried to do this honestly and 
straightforwardly. My past position brought me advantages and 
disadvantages. I had advantages because when working in IMTP, I 
was not assuming that I would write a thesis on this. So I did not 
have to juggle with the dual role of a Ph.D. researcher and that of a 
facilitator; the actions were not guided by the research objectives. 
I5Also, I was an insider, and there was no threat to me from others. 
However, like Groot (2002) I worried about uncovering the 
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weaknesses of our professional work, and making them known. I 
write about a Department where I work and people who are my 
colleagues, some senior in positions. However, I was never 
victimized for the questions I tried to answer. 
Shaping the knowledge base 
The thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative data, but 
qualitative data dominates the presentation. Data were generated 
from both direct involvement and secondary sources through 
different techniques. Data especially about the current management 
changes that appear in chapter 8 and 9 were collected between 
August 1999 to August 2001. The elements of data collection are 
described in the paragraphs below. 
Restructuring the process of action 
The principal data source for this is my own actions and my 
memories of ic the elements of joint actions for Khageri and 
Panchakanya are from this. I also revisited the past actions with the 
farmers and the WUAs, and my previous staff involved in the 
implementation. Data for West Gandak were generated from 
review of project documents, from interviews with the key 
informants, including WUA members, engineers involved in the 
implementation in West Gandak, and consultants and project 
officials working for IMTP in the central Irrigation Department 
office in Kathmandu. Documents reviewed included the detailed 
design reports, the minute books of the WUA, action plans and 
documents of agreement between the WUA and the Government. 
Studying local management action and evolution 
This was done by direct observation in the field and also through 
review of secondary literature. I observed the field level activities 
and irrigation water management practices of the WUA. To 
understand the WUA themselves, and decisions regarding their 
water management problems, I attended their meetings at all 
association levels. I also carried out some flow measurements to 
know how the improvement work has been able to control canal 
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seepage, and provide better water availability to the farmers. In 
West Gandak I measured the extent of silt deposition in the canal. 
I also reviewed secondary literature to study the management 
actions of the WUA: the constitution and by-laws of the WUA, and 
the minute books of the WUA, to understand the rules and 
regulations of water distribution, and their financial status and fee 
collection mechanism. Project progress reports also provided 
information on evolution of the new management, and had been 
prepared by donors, consultants and the DOI at various stages of 
implementation of the IMTP. 
Understanding the effect of change 
An asset survey16 of the canal system networks was another source 
of field data, made to understand the effect of the change on 
infrastructure management and farmer satisfaction. This survey was 
done jointly17 with a research team from HR-Wallingford and 
myself in Khageri and West Gandak, to find its current condition, 
and how system improvement had facilitated management change. 
Given my ongoing research and own plans to do an asset 
survey, the chief of research in the Irrigation Department (COR) 
included me in the team. In West Gandak, I had already selected 
MC-5, Mangharia and Germi Minor for this study, based on their 
geographical location as head, middle, and tailend minors. Another 
reason was that all had committees (although not functional) and 
farmers were familiar with the IMT program. In Khageri, branch 
canals 61, B5 and Bi were selected, also based on their geographical 
location (head, middle, tail location). They were also the first group 
of branch canals handed over to the WUA. By 2000, it was some 
four years since technical improvement works were carried out 
In Panchakanya, I undertook the asset survey myself, and a 
research assistant undertook the interviews with farmers. 
Otherwise, two other teams carried out this research. The COR 
and myself did the asset survey. An NGO was involved in 
interviewing farmers on their perception of the management 
change through structured interviews in both of these systems. 
This was an advantage as I wanted to avoid interviewing myself, 
especially asking farmers about the performance of the systems, 
given my prior involvement in Khageri and Panchakanya, and that 
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most key WUA and farmer members in West Gandak knew I 
belonged to the Irrigation Department. 
1.8 The Structure of the Book 
This chapter has given the research objectives, and the analytical 
framework and methodology for the study. Chapter 2 reviews the 
evolution of irrigation management and reform in Nepal and the 
key policy instruments used, which it shows is linked with the 
historical evolution of irrigation development, and to donor policy 
changes wodd-wide.. 
Chapter 3 introduces the irrigation systems studied: the 
Panchakanya, Khageri and West Gandak systems. It gives an 
historical account of their development and agroecological 
characteristics, and discusses their challenges of water delivery and 
key management problems. It concludes with a review of the 
opportunities and constraints for these schemes to take up 
irrigation management reform. 
Chapters 4 to 9 present the process of IMT in Nepal and thus 
forms the core of the thesis. Chapters 4 to 7 describe the joint 
actions involved to promote new management Chapters 8 and 9 
describe the evolution and change of the WUAs and the 
management 
Chapter 4 presents the beginning of the reform process. It 
describes the process of group formation, and negotiation for 
change and struggle therein. It shows how organizations come into 
being with different structures as a result of different societal 
dynamics despite being based on identical design approaches. 
Chapter 5 reviews the joint planning process, which is 
considered as the first and most important element of the 
participatory project process. It discusses the process of 
preparation of the technical inventory of the systems, setting a 
vision for the future and development of the plan of action for the 
future system development It shows that mere use of tools (canal 
walk-through in this case) is not sufficient to incorporate users' 
needs and preferences in the planning process. It is a question of 
who participates in the process, participatory processes used, and 
the context in which the interaction takes place. 
Chapter 6 examines the participatory design and construction 
process looking at the changes in infrastructure and irrigation 
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scheduling materializing through negotiation. It argues, in the 
context of management reform, that participatory design 
construction should not be taken on its own, but rather be taken as 
a way to help new management decide on and establish service 
oriented water control they can ensure. It also draws attention to 
some of its limitations of PTD and calls for a multi-actor 
negotiated learning process for future implementation design. 
Chapter 7 presents the dynamics of management handover to 
the WUA and shows how project environment and wider social 
environment shape the outcome of the organizational debut of the 
WUA. It also shows that shift in control of management from the 
government to the WUA also requires reform in other sectors of 
the political and administrative institutions of the government, 
besides reform in the irrigation sector. 
Chapter 8 describes the changing governance structure for local 
water management It shows how organizations become strong 
when supported in their administration and structural evolution. It 
argues that a WUA should also be viewed as a political body, 
against the common assumption that it should be a non- political, 
non -partisan functional body. Only in this way can it achieve both 
accountability to its members, but also create controls 
complementary to technical and organizational. 
Chapter 9 describes the evolutionary changes in management 
activities and show how they are shaped by the system 
environment of the irrigation system. It argues that project support 
to facilitate management reform should translate the constraints of 
system environment in practical design to provide better working 
condition to the farmers. 
Chapter 10 presents the conclusion of the study which 
summarizes the key learning from the research relating to 
organizational evolution, the participatory support process and the 
role of technology in transforming irrigation practices. It also 
explores the agendas for future study on participation and local 
governance. 
Notes 
'State disengagement, management devolution, privatization, turnover, 
handover, or more recently the term "Participatory Irrigation Management' 
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(PIM) are also synonymously used for IMT. However, PIM is an umbrella 
concept in which various forms of joint management arrangement can be 
devised between the users and government: the local organization may 
complement or replace the irrigation agency. When the local organization 
replaces the irrigation agency, it can be viewed as IMT. For a more 
detailed distinction, see Vermillion and Sagardoy (1999); Meinzen-Dick 
(1996). 
2
 Irrigation systems in Nepal are classified as Agency managed, Farmers 
Managed, Groundwater systems and private systems. 
3
 'Department' hereafter refers to the Irrigation Department of Nepal 
4
 From 1988, the government started rehabilitation of FMIS on a large 
scale, with World Bank funding for the pilot scale under the ELC project. 
Parallel with participatory design and construction activities, the ILC 
intervention also involved formation and capacity development of WUAs. 
See Pant (2000) for details about the ILC and FMIS intervention in Nepal 
5
 Positivism considers science as the source of knowledge. It treats human 
beings as objects. Development process are accordingly linear and 
mechanical, whereas constructivism considers reality to be socially 
constructed and no single party can control the process. See also Groot 
(2002). 
6
 The program is funded by the Ford Foundation for studies on relations 
between technology and institutions in Nepal and India 
7
 Governance is seen here as diverse forms of regulation and control used 
in management conceptualised by a governing institution: a WUA, is only 
one form of such regulation. Ostrom differentiates between three 
different layers of rules: the operational rules, collective-choice rules and 
constitutional-choice rules, which cumulatively shape an irrigation system. 
8
 Aggrawal (2001) and (Kloezen, 2002) discuss further the limitations of 
these approaches. 
9
 Accountability is defined here as an obligation to give a reckoning or 
explanation for one's action, in relation to expectations or agreements 
about that action. 
10
 For example, fixed structures provide low management intensity and a 
high level of transparency; the local organization may prefer transparent 
control system at the cost of flexibility. Gradually adjustable structures are 
complex to handle and need regular maintenance, but provide more 
flexibility. Organizations capable of providing high management intensity 
and strong social control may prefer this type of technology. In summary, 
we can say that the management structure is shaped by the irrigation 
technology (see also Horst, 1998). 
11
 This is adopted from Savioti (1988), where similar divisions are made to 
understand technical change in the industrial world. 
12
 For example, since 1885 efforts have been made to design canal to 
avoid silt and scouring, and regime theory has been widely used in the 
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canal design in Indo-Gangetic plain. However, systems continue to suffer 
from siltation problems, as wells as water-logging, inundation or flooding. 
13
 For example in a range that varies from manipulation to self-mobilizing, 
and from listening to sharing to empowerment of a group, or from non-
participation to degrees of citizen power (Arnstein, 1969, cited in Fisher, 
2001; Pretty, 1994; Van Vuren 1998). It can be pseudo-participation 
(White, 1994; Abler 1993, cited in Shukla and Sharma, 1997), where the 
decision-making power rests with managers and planners and the local 
elite. It can be free or forced participation or customary participation. It 
can be direct participation where all are participating, or indirect 
participation where specific groups participate on behalf of large groups 
(Dusseldorp 1993) 
14
 For example Korten (1980) argues to shift away from the project 
framework and emphasize on local institution building, whereas 
Brinkerhoff (1996)and Rondinelli (1983) plead for flexible and adoptive 
management under a project framework. 
15
 Chambers notes that outside agents for facilitating change are often 
considered a threat to insiders. 
16
 An asset survey in irrigation documents the amount and condition of 
physical infrastructure and equipment available for the operation and 
maintenance of an irrigation system. 
17
 At the midpoint of my fieldwork (May 2000) HR-Wallingford (a UK 
consultancy company) and the Irrigation Department planned to carry out 
research on the operation and maintenance status of the transferred and 
non-transferred irrigation systems in Nepal (also in India), to find out the 
operation and maintenance requirement of these systems, and gain a 
clearer picture on maintenance status in branch canals recently 
rehabilitated. The two-transferred systems selected were Khageri and 
West Gandak where I was also doing fieldwork. I was also planning to 
carry out an asset survey to monitor farmers' satisfaction with the system. 
Irrigation Development, Irrigation Policies 
and Irrigation Management Reform in 
Nepal 
The current irrigation management reform process in Nepal has 
not emerged all at once. It has emerged out of changes in 
development policy worldwide as well as the historical context of 
irrigation development in the country. The chapter begins with a 
historical review of modern irrigation development in the country 
and explains how the state gradually became involved in irrigation 
development, which used to be a farmers' affair. It will be shown 
that the state's expanded role in irrigation management was due to 
changes in local governance structures brought on by political and 
administrative changes, as well as the initiation of large-scale 
irrigation construction activities. The chapter then explains why the 
state's increased role in irrigation was problematic, and how 
attention then shifted towards participatory management, 
necessitating policy reform in the irrigation water sector. It then 
describes the current irrigation management transfer program and 
its implementation framework. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the key strengths and weakness of the reform process, 
which also come to shape the scope and nature of changes in the 
project and the WUAs. 
2.1 Modern Irrigation Development in Nepal: an Historical Overview 
Modern irrigation development in Nepal is said to have started in 
1922, when an irrigation system, later named Chandra Canal, was 
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designed and built by British engineers in India. I call it 'modern' to 
differentiate from the indigenously developed irrigation systems 
popularly known as Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS), 
which have been in existence in the country since time 
immemorial. The Chandra Canal was initiated after a severe 
drought in Kathmandu, upon the request from the then Rana 
rulers to the British rulers in India (Poudel 2002, personal 
communication). However, it is also said that the construction of 
the Chandra canal was not aimed at the public welfare to overcome 
the problem of drought, but at increasing the land revenue or 
irrigating the Maujhas (land grants) belonging to the Rana family. 
The British had already started construction of large irrigation 
systems in Indian areas bordering Nepal, like the Tirhut Canal in 
1911 and the Sarda Canal System in 19201. The Tirhut canal was 
constructed at the Indo-Nepal border in Nawalparasi district 
(where the present Gandak Barrage lies), whereas the Sarda Canal 
was constructed from the Mahakali River2 (called the Sarda River in 
India), the border between India and Nepal in the west So the 
construction of Chandra canal by the British is also said to be the 
start of large-scale irrigation works to fight any future drought and 
famine. 
Government involvement in large-scale irrigation development 
remained limited. In the next 30 years, only two more systems were 
added (Pradhan, 1996): Jagdishpur in the western Terai in 1942 
(1000 ha), renamed Banganga Irrigation system after being 
expanded in 1978, and Judha Canal in 1946 (2000 ha) later called 
Manusmara Irrigation System after being expanded in 1976. Even 
though developed by the government, their management 
responsibility lay with the farmers, who were to raise the costs of 
O&M 
Irrigation development remained in the farmers' domain until 
the start of the Democracy period in 19513 and except the few ones 
mentioned above, all of the country's irrigated areas were 
developed and managed by farmers. Many of these FMIS emerged 
out of the Birta and Jagir type of land tenure systems4 practiced in 
those days. Birta and Jagr were land grants awarded to individuals. 
The owners, called Jemdar (or Jamindar), had judicial and 
administrative powers over land use and were in a position to 
mobilize a labour force to construct the canal systems (Regmi, 
1978). The objective behind the land grant and subsequent 
irrigation development was to increase State revenue, the major 
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source of income in those days. The Jamindar (also called Dittba or 
jimmawala in different places, see Pant, 2000) were to collect the 
land tax, and submit it to the concerned land revenue office. 
Irrigation systems were also developed out of the 'Guthi' system. 
These are endowments of lands and other properties to support 
religious and charitable activities. Irrigation systems were developed 
by the Guthi to increase the productivity of the land. Some systems 
called 'Raj Kulo5' were initiated by the state. Though the patterns of 
resource mobilization in the development of these FMIS were 
different, they had common features of self-governance and strong 
community participation.6 These FMIS were regulated through the 
•Muluki Ain', the law of the realm, which guards the customary 
practices relating to irrigation and the traditional customs of 
different ethnic communities. It also specifies property rights and 
resource mobilization in irrigation systems development and 
management (Regmi, 1978; Pradhan, 1990). 
Irrigation development and management in Nepal was thus 
largely based in local land management before the 1950s. Although 
this was linked with a type of local political control, it was not 
always participatory. The state had a provision to provide interest 
free loans to the farmers if the damage of an irrigation system, or 
the construction of new ones, were found to be beyond their 
capacity. The Jamindar of the particular area was responsible for 
mobilizing the loans as well as paying them back. The Government 
used to formulate regulations from time to time regarding the type 
of support it could provide farmers for the management and 
development of the irrigation systems7. 
2.2 Agency Involvement in Irrigation Development 
The state's direct involvement in irrigation gradually increased after 
1951. After the introduction of the democratic movement there 
were radical changes in government administrative systems as well 
as in development approaches. Several Ministries and Departments 
were created to manage development programs. As the country's 
economy was mostly agriculture-based, the irrigation sector was 
also given the highest priority in the government. An Irrigation 
Office was established in 1952 (Sharma, 1983) to look after the 
irrigation sector, replacing the previous Agricultural Council. The 
office was established with technical assistance from India and was 
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upgraded to a directorate in 1958. It was further upgraded to a 
Department, to look after both irrigation and water supply. The 
water supply wing was later detached and the name was changed to 
Department of Irrigation (DOI): this has since remained the 
principal agency for planning and development of irrigation in the 
country. 
The DOI was first engaged in construction of small-scale 
irrigation schemes, due to financial as well as human resource 
limitations. These activities were supported by the Indian 
Government and by FAO in providing technical assistance 
(Sharma, 1983). Commencing in the Second Plan period (1962-
1965), a 'minor irrigation program' was started which aimed to 
develop small-scale irrigation systems with voluntary contributions 
from user farmers. The program continued until the third planning 
period (1965-1972). The objective of the minor irrigation program 
was to develop the systems with maximum user participation, and 
hand-over the system to the user farmers for O&M. However, 
there were no clear directives from the government: some of them 
were managed by farmers but others relied on continued 
government support for O&M activities. The government's role in 
irrigation gradually increased from the 1960s. This was due to two 
factors: change in local governance structure and priority for large-
scale system development. 
Changing local governance and irrigation management 
One reason for increasing government involvement in irrigation 
sector was the change in local government structure in the 
country8. The previous Birta and Jagir systems of land tenure that 
had overseen earlier management in most irrigation systems were 
abolished in 1964. This was done immediately after the political 
change of 1962, after which the partyless 'Panchayat' system was 
established by the King, overthrowing the multiparty political 
system. The abolition of the Birta system was targeted at land 
reform to bring agrarian transformation in the country, and the 
poMco-administrative changes were instrumental to the 
disintegration of the traditional irrigation institutions (Pant, 2000). 
Lands were then given to individuals after a cadastral survey was 
carried out all over the country. The land tax was now to be 
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collected by the Land Revenue Office directly from the individual 
owner. 
Under the new political system the local level government 
institution was the Village Panchayat (VP). The irrigation systems 
were now more dependent on the VP and also sought government 
support for their rehabilitation and expansion. However, the VPs 
had their own financial and technical limitations and sought 
support from irrigation offices. The VPs in fact became mediators 
between the DOI and farmers, as shown by Pant (2000). The 
Village Panchayat is now called the Village Development 
Committee (VDQ since the re-establishment of the multiparty 
democracy in 1990, and is one of the critical local actors shaping 
outcomes of the later IMT. As direct agency involvement in 
irrigation gradually increased, the irrigation bureaucracy expanded. 
By 1988, the DOI had offices at all regional and district levels9. In 
addition, there were also separate project offices to look after 
construction of large irrigation systems, which in most cases were 
separately administered through a development board10. 
Priority to large-scale scheme development 
The increased role of the government agencies has been also due to 
the construction of large and medium-scale irrigation schemes 
from the mid-1960s. This was after the bilateral agreement with 
India on the use of Koshi River water in April 1954 and on 
Gandak River water in December 1959 both for irrigation and 
power. This agreement initiated the construction of large-scale 
irrigation systems namely the Sunsari Morang, also called the 
Chatara Canal (66000 ha), the Narayani Irrigation system (29,700 
ha) and the Nepal West Gandak Irrigation system (8700 ha). The 
Sunsari Morang resulted from the Koshi Agreement and its 
construction began in 1964. The remaining two systems were 
linked to the Gandak River Agreement and their construction 
started in 1969 and 197311. According to the agreement, the major 
canals and associated structures of these schemes were constructed 
by the Indian Government and handed over to Nepal Nepal later 
on carried out farm-level development in these, systems with 
multilateral funding mainly from the World Bank (WB) and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
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From the 1970s, construction of large and medium irrigation 
schemes further accelerated due to funding from bilateral and 
multilateral donor agencies, both in loans and grants. Major lending 
agencies like the WB, ADB, United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and International Foundation for Agricultural 
Development (EFAD) became involved in irrigation development 
activities. 
With the DOI focusing its attention on the construction of large 
and medium-scale systems, other government institutions gradually 
took over responsibility of development of small schemes. The 
Farm Irrigation Water Utilization Division (FIWUD) of the 
Department of Agriculture (DOA) started irrigation development 
for schemes of less than 50 ha in the hills, and 500 ha in the Terai. 
Under this program, users were involved in making requests for 
technical assistance and in construction contributions. The Ministry 
of Local Planning and Development also started small-scale system 
development The Agricultural Development Bank, Nepal (ADBN) 
established in 1968, also got involved in small-scale system 
development Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) like 
CARE and the United Mission to Nepal (UMN) also focused on 
small-scale scheme development activities. However, the DOI 
remained the principal institution for irrigation development, and 
construction of large irrigation systems was given primary attention 
in government plans and programs. 
Poor performance of public sector irrigation systems 
Upon completion of the construction activities, the management 
responsibility for these systems was also kept by the DOI. Unit 
offices were established to look after the operation and 
maintenance (O&M) activities in the completed systems and users 
were expected to pay Water Tax to the Government The rate of 
water tax was increased more than six-fold in March 1979 from 
NRs. 9.75 (about $0.8 at that time) per ha to NRs. 60 per ha (about 
$5) (Sijapati et al. 1999). The water tax was to be deposited in the 
government treasury, and the O&M cost of the completed systems 
was to be provided by the government Contrarily, the 
performance of water fee collection by DOI remained poor, 
especially in gravity schemes (Barker and Lohani, 1987). The funds 
provided by the government were not enough for the O&M of the 
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systems. Table 2.1 shows the water tax collection and allotted 
operation and maintenance budget for the period of 1986 to 1990. 
There is no data regarding how much area was under the direct 
control of the DOI to estimate the collection efficiency of the 
water tax. However, command areas of the completed projects at 
that period show that about 150,000 ha were under the direct 
control of the DOI. Assuming this figure, the collection efficiency 
in this period never exceeded 40% (Table 3.1). Likewise the budget 
allocation for O&M was far lower than required cost of NRs. 200 
per ha at that time. Lack of financial resources resulted in poor 
maintenance, caused rapid deterioration of the structures and 
required rehabilitation within a very short period of time. 
TABLE 2.1 Water tax collection and O&M allocation 1986-1990 
Year 
1986/1987 
1987/1988 
1988/1989 
1989/1990 
1990/1991 
ISF collection in 
Million NRs. 
\2 
3.6 
3.5 
1.9 
1.0 
13.3% 
40.0% 
38.8% 
21.1% 
11.1% 
O&M allocation 
in Million NRs. 
6.9 
7.9 
8.7 
10.4 
4.6 
Source: Economic Survey of Nepal, 1998, (cited in Sijapati, 1999) 
Despite considerable investments in infrastructure development 
and a well-trained cadre of technicians for design, development, 
operation and management, the public sector irrigation schemes in 
Nepal have been constantly performing below expectations. A 
series of reports published by the Agricultural Projects Service 
Centre (APROSQ during the late 1970s were fundamental in 
drawing attention to this poor performance (APROSC, 1978a, 
1978b, 1978c). However, no effective solutions were proposed to 
solve this poor performance of large-scale irrigation systems, and 
more investment for command area development and other 
rehabilitation programs continued. 
2.3 Searching for Solutions: Management Reform with Farmer 
Participation 
The wodd-wide interest in user participation in development in the 
1980s also changed the course of irrigation sector development in 
Nepal. The attention now shifted towards management 
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improvement in completed systems, rather than new construction. 
Irrigation interventions were then directed at promoting local 
management, and participatory design processes were adopted to 
support the evolving organizations. The USAED started the 
Irrigation Management Project (IMP) in 1986, which worked as the 
foundation for future irrigation management reform in the country. 
The major aim of the IMP was to improve irrigation management 
practices in both agency- managed and farmer-managed irrigation 
systems. It aimed to develop and sustain irrigation management 
activities by improving the capacity of both DOI professionals and 
water users through training and research activities (Shukla and 
Sharma, 1997). The IMP activities were facilitated by a joint team 
of Consultant firms - Louis Berger International Inc. (American), 
East Consult (Nepali), and Cornell University (American)12. The 
objective of the IMP was reformulated in 1989: to support the 
DOI in implementation of the participatory management program. 
The scope of the work was reduced, and a new consulting firm the 
Computer Aided Design Inc (CADI) was hired by the USAID to 
support the IMP activity. 
The IMP later supported the joint management program that 
began in 1992, including both Khageri and West Gandak systems. 
The IMP ended in 1994, but the USAID continued to support the 
new project, the Irrigation Management Transfer Project (EMTP) 
hiring the same consulting firm, CADI. The IMP also carried out 
pilot programs in the two agency managed irrigation systems, 
Sirsiya Dudhaura13 in the Terai and Handetar in the Hills The 
objective behind these two pilot experiments was to utilise the 
experience and lessons learned to implement similar programs in 
other parts of the country. The IMP formed the base for further 
implementation of participatory programs in irrigation. The IMP 
was the major player in formulating the new policies, acts and 
regulations that began in the 1990s, as will be discussed in next 
section 
Another important event that helped initiate reform in irrigation 
sector was the Basic Needs Policy (1987) of the Government. The 
irrigation sector was one of the most prioritized sectors in this 
policy, as food security was its prime concern. The government 
introduced a Working Policy on Irrigation Development (1989) 
focusing on user participation. This document provided new 
directives to Nepal's irrigation sector, mandating participation of 
user farmers at all levels of irrigation development, from project 
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identification, design and construction to operation and 
management This policy specified a cost-sharing arrangement 
between the farmer and the government in development of both 
gravity and pumped schemes. This policy also set out an action 
plan for joint management and management turnover of the AMIS. 
The Basic Needs policy also led the widespread expansion of the 
irrigation bureaucracy in the country, establishing the district level 
offices in 1988. Previously, there were only divisional offices at 
required places. The need to expand the irrigation bureaucracy was 
recognized because there were no other government agencies to 
look after the irrigation development at district level. 
The Working Policy was immediately followed by the Irrigation 
Regulation (1989). The regulation for the first time prepared the 
legal basis for WUA formation and registration. The strategy of 
increasing farmer participation mainly stemmed from recognition 
that government resources alone were inadequate to meet the 
country's irrigation development objectives and sustain the 
management of government irrigation systems after their 
completion (Pradhan, 1996). 
With these ongoing changes, both the priority and approach to 
irrigation development in Nepal took a new direction. Priority now 
shifted to management improvement of large-scale public irrigation 
systems and the rehabilitation and extension of existing FMIS, 
rather than on the construction of new large systems. Intervention 
in FMIS received a major thrust The majority of the FMIS had 
been considered outside the Government's domain, although they 
irrigate more area than the government-built systems. Even at 
present, some 70% of the total irrigated area of 1.12 million ha is 
managed by FMISW. It was believed that much of the country's 
food production could be generated from the rehabilitation and 
extension of these FMIS as studies had shown that many of them 
were performing below their potential, especially due to technical 
problems (ADB, 1988). 
Intervention programs implemented since then include the 
Irrigation line of Credit (ILQ pilot project (1989); the Irrigation 
Sector Project (ISP in 1990) and the special public work program 
of ILO. Out of these the ILC and ISP were funded by the WB and 
the ADB, with long-term commitment for irrigation development 
The two projects are now at their second stage and called Irrigation 
Sector Support Project (ISSP) and the Nepal Irrigation Sector 
Project (NISP). Both these major funding agencies abandoned the 
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individual project approach to development, and adopted the 
program mode such that learning from one site could be used for 
another. These programs mainly involved the physical 
rehabilitation and expansion of FMIS as well as capacity 
development of user farmers. It was based on a demand-driven 
approach, and users were required to pay part of the construction 
cost, based on scale and type of development varying from 5% to 
25%. User involvement during design and construction was also 
made mandatory, including the prioritization and approval of the 
construction works. Users were also allowed to execute the 
construction work by themselves if the cost was below NRs. 1 
million. 
Despite this, large-scale AMIS remained untouched by the 
reforms. The Command Area Development Project (CADP) 
initiated in 1982 planned to involve users in project 
implementation. The CADP was started in three irrigation systems 
including the West Gandak, but it could not succeed as users were 
organized at a very late stage of project implementation (see 
chapter 3). However, these groups vanished in most cases as soon 
as the project ended. These groups were created at the end of the 
project period when construction activities were over and did not 
feel responsible for later operation and maintenance. These groups 
also did not receive continued support from the DOI to improve 
their canal management capacities. Byrnes (1992) observes a similar 
situation in Pakistan. In India, the CADA15 experience is similar 
(Narain, personal communication). 
2.4 The New Policies and their Legal Context 
In 1990, the Panchayat system was overthrown and the Basic 
Needs policy also ended. By 1992, the newly elected government 
was in charge, with a multiparty democracy and a constitutional 
Monarchy established. The government initiated neo-liberal 
policies, curtailing the role of the state and promoting private-
sector involvement, which still continues. In the agricultural sector, 
first the subsidy on fertilizer was removed and the private sector 
allowed to import and market fertilizers. By 1997, the government 
also started to withdraw subsidies from shallow tubewell 
development These changes were a response to the policies of 
major donor agencies like the ADB and the WB, who were 
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pressing for more market-oriented economies with less 
government involvement. In the irrigation sector, the O&M of the 
AMIS was known to be poor, and users participation in 
management was seen as a viable option (Irrigation Master Plan, 
1990; CMS 1992). Several policy reforms and legal changes were 
thus made in 1992 affecting water sector development. These 
policy reforms were shaped to promote participatory management 
in the irrigation sector. 
The Irrigation Policy formulated in 1992 was a continuation of 
the previous Working Policy with a major focus in the participatory 
approaches in irrigation development and management The policy 
classified irrigation systems into four categories: Farmer-Managed 
Irrigation Systems (FMIS) developed and managed by farmers; 
Agency-Managed Irrigation Systems (AMIS), which are to be 
transferred to the WUA or jointly managed; Groundwater Systems 
including both shallow and deep tubewells; and Privately Owned 
Systems. Under the policy, the responsibility for supporting the 
first three types of systems was kept with the DOI whereas the 
responsibility for the private systems was left with ADBN. All 
systems with less than 10 ha area (changed to 25 ha after an 
amendment was made in 1997) were considered private systems. 
The policy also set out the conditions for joint management, or 
full transfer, of the AMIS, depending on the size of the project 
Accordingly, AMIS of up to 500 ha in the hills, and 2000 ha of 
irrigated are in the Terai, are to be gradually turned over to the 
Water Users Associations. However, the policy does not bar 
handing over even bigger systems if feasible, based on WUA 
capacity and structural complexity of the irrigation systems. In 
general, projects larger than 500 ha in the hills and 2000 ha in the 
Terai which cannot be turned over to the WUA, are to be jointly 
managed by the concerned irrigation office and WUA. 
The policy also encouraged the WUA to be self-reliant and 
granted them the status of a full autonomous body. It states "His 
Majesty's Government shall not realize irrigation service charges on 
the turned-over surface and groundwater irrigation systems. The 
concerned water users may realize service charge for the 
maintenance, rehabilitation, improvement and operation to be 
carried out themselves. The WUA itself may, as required, 
determine the rate of such charges. In cases where joint system 
management has been introduced an exemption shall be given to 
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the water user to the extent of 50% of the irrigation service charge 
as prescribed by His Majesty's Government". 
The DOI was also restructured after this policy reform, and a 
separate unit - the Irrigation Management Division (IMD) - was 
created especially to look after the O&M of the large systems, as 
well as to facilitate the IMT programs. 
Soon after the promulgation of the Irrigation Policy in 1992, a 
new Water Resources Act16 was enacted in 1992 replacing the 
previous Canal and Electricity Act (1967). The Act sets out 
provision for building the WUA, and handing over systems 
developed by the government to such WUAs. It states that "His 
Majesty's Government may, on terms and conditions as are 
necessary, turn over to the users association any water resources 
project developed pursuant to Subsection 1 or 2 of Section 10 after 
its completion." The Subsections 1 and 2 of Section 10 reserves the 
right of the government to take over any water resource projects 
developed privately with necessary compensation if required, 
considering the wider public interest 
The Act also states that all concerned users associations shall 
have the ownership of the system turned over, and the concerned 
user association shall operate such systems as if it has a licence 
under this act As per the Act, the WUAs are an autonomous and 
corporate body having perpetual succession (see Box 2.1). The Act 
has kept ownership of water with the state. However, it has made 
provision to transfer water rights by issue of a licence. Persons or 
corporate bodies are required to obtain a licence to carry out a 
survey, as well as for the utilization of water. The licence requires 
payment of annual fees, and it can be sold or transferred upon 
prior approval of the authority issuing the licence. However, it is 
not required to take a licence for domestic purposes and for 
irrigating individual land. The Act also sets out priority for water 
use with first priority given to drinking water before irrigation. 
Subsequent priorities in order are for other agricultural purposes, 
hydropower development, industry and mining, navigation and 
recreational use. 
Two provisions in the Act greatly influence water sector reform. 
First, although the water right is vested with the state, it can 
provide concessions through licensing, such that the licence holder 
gets a right over the water it licensed. Second, it recognizes a WUA 
as an autonomous body with legal authority. It empowers the 
WUA to decide their operation and maintenance pattern, as well as 
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to charge users for the service delivered, granting them the status 
of an individual licence holder. 
Box 2.1 WUA as an 
Autonomous Body 
• A Users association shall 
be an autonomous and 
corporate body having 
perpetual succession. 
• A Users association shall 
have seal of its own for 
the purpose of all its 
business. 
• A Users Association may 
as a person have the right 
to acquire, enjoy, sell, 
dispose or arrange of 
movable and immovable 
property by any means. 
• A Uses Association may 
sue as a person or be sued. 
However, the Act is unclear on 
three aspects. First, the 
provision for joint 
management is not clear. 
Second, the Act says nothing 
about the conditions of the 
transfer, like the obligations 
and duties of both government 
and WUA after transfer, and 
what properties and resources 
of irrigation systems owned by 
the government are to be 
transferred. Third, the 
procedures for issuing the 
licence and the conditions to 
obtain the licence are missing 
in the Act. 
Following this Act, a Water Resources Regulation was enacted in 
199317. The main feature of this Regulation is that it formed a 
District Water Resource Committee (DWRC) to issue licences for 
water use for private sector actors seeking to develop water 
resource projects. It also simplified the WUA registration process, 
making the DWRC responsible for the registration of the WUA. 
The DWRC is headed by the Chief District Officer of the 
concerned district. The other members include the chief of 
concerned District Irrigation Office, Local Development Officer 
and Agriculture Development Officer. Previously, the registration 
of the WUAs was regulated under a separate Act called the 
Institution Registration Act (1976), which is more related to the 
registration of NGOs. Though the 1993 regulation cleared some of 
the limitations of the 1992 Act, it also failed to mention anything 
about the conditions for turning over irrigation systems to WUAs 
In addition, all these policies and Acts have failed to address an 
important factor, considered crucial in the reform: the issue of an 
Irrigation Service Fee (ISF). In fully transferred systems, it is 
understood that the WUA can set the fees and collect them under 
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the rules set by them, because of their autonomous status. 
However, there are no legal provisions by which the newly 
established WUAs can enforce collection of fees. In jointly 
managed systems, it is unclear who will fix the ISF rate, or who will 
collect it. The Irrigation Policy was amended in 1997 to clear up 
some of these confusions. It allows the WUA in jointly managed 
systems to collect the ISF and fix its rate. Under this revised policy, 
farmers' payment to government decreases, as farmers take control 
of the larger part of the irrigation. (Table 2.2). Previously, only 50% 
of the collection could be retained. The policy also sets the 
percentage of contribution to be made by the WUA in the 
construction activities as given in Table 2.3. 
TABLE 2.2 Division of ISF between government 
management situations 
Situation 
WUA management of whole system 
WUA manage whole system except the 
head work 
WUA manage whole system except the 
head work and main canal 
WUA manage only up to the blocks 
WUA manage only the tertiary canal 
and DOI under varying 
WUA Share 
(%) 
100 
90 
75 
50 
25 
Government 
Share (%) 
0 
10 
25 
50 
75 
TABLE 2.3 Minimum contributions to be borne by the users in different 
scheme development 
WUA managed systems (FAUSs) 
New Improvement 
construction 
Hills Terai Hills Terai 
5-7% 10% 7-12% 15% 
Systems under IMT 
New Construction 
Hills Terai* 
5% 
Improvement 
Hills Terai 
10 10 
Source: Irrigation Policy, 1992 (as amended in 1997) 
*In the Terai, under new construction, users are required to build watercourses 
below 10 ha on their own and contribute 25% of the cost for construction of 
ternaries serving 10 to 30 ha. 
The problem is that these policy guidelines are not supported 
through new Acts and Regulations, and have no practical 
dimensions, as policy documents are not legally binding. So the 
question of ISF remained unclear among all the parties (both 
farmers and engineers) working in the field. In addition, the 
problem of transfer conditions from the government to the WUA 
also remained unclear. As will be seen in chapter 7, these created 
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several problems at the time of handing over of the system 
management to the WUA Realizing these difficulties, a separate 
Irrigation Regulation was proposed, and the process for it began in 
1998. The regulation was finally passed in 2000, but instead of 
solving the field level problems, it created more confusion. This 
regulation actually seems directed towards more bureaucratic 
control (as will be shown in chapter 7). 
2.5 From Irrigation Policy to Irrigation Management Transfer Program 
The present policy of IMT originates out of the 1992 Irrigation 
Policy. With this policy, management responsibility for the AMIS is 
to be transferred to the WUA. The Agriculture Perspective Plan 
(1996) further plans to have all AMIS to be handed over to farmers 
or joindy managed by 2015. The framework of IMT in Nepal is 
shown in Figure 2.1 (Laitos, 1992). 
FIGURE 2.1 Framework for management transfer process by the DOI 
Irrigation Management Transfer 
H H 
Agency 
Management 
Joint 
Managemen 
w 
Farmers 
Management 
+H-
Joint Management Turnover 
The turnover program aims at the complete transfer of O&M 
responsibilities of small and medium scale irrigation systems to 
legally recognized water user groups. Turn-over' is said to occur if 
the whole system is transferred to the WUA, as will be studied for 
the Panchakanya system. Joint management can follow several 
forms depending upon the size and technical complexity of the 
system. The most general form for the joint management is that 
the irrigation agency operates and maintains infrastructure to a 
certain point of delivery, after which a local organization takes over 
responsibility of water delivery (Molden 1998). However, joint 
management can also be achieved without partial turnover of the 
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system. In this, a shared responsibility is defined between the state 
and the users for the OM of part or whole of the system. The Joint 
management domain in Figure 2.1 may be an intermediate stage to 
achieve full turnover (as will be studied for Khageri), or a final 
destination for the management of large-scale irrigation projects (as 
will be studied in the Nepal West Gandak system). 
Following this policy statement and Water Resource Act, joint 
management programs were started in 1992 in five selected 
irrigation schemes covering 33,600 ha, including the Nepal West 
Gandak irrigation system (8000ha) and the Khageri irrigation 
system (3900ha)18 studied here. They began with the formation and 
capacity development of WUAs in these systems. These activities 
were supported by the IMP, and the consultant firm CADI was 
involved in WUA formation and training them (see chapter 4). 
However, farmers in these systems showed their concern over the 
poor condition of physical infrastructure and asked for system 
improvement together with the institutional development program. 
According to engineers involved in the survey of these irrigation 
systems before beginning the joint management program, most of 
these systems irrigated only about 50% of their targeted area. This 
was mostly due to lack of proper O&M practices and poor 
condition of physical infrastructure. 
The DOI then planned the rehabilitation of these systems 
together with the organizational development activities. According 
to some engineers, there were two different opinions within the 
IMD of the DOI, whether to carry out system rehabilitation 
together with the joint management program or after it The first 
group was of the opinion that if the rehabilitation were attached 
with the IMT, it would be a time-bound activity, and participatory 
management could be jeopardised. They also feared that it might 
end up with 'construction as usual'. The other group argued that it 
would not be possible to encourage farmers to take up 
management responsibility unless system efficiency was increased. 
On the other hand, farmers were also not ready to take-over the 
management responsibility without proper repair and maintenance 
of the systems. Finally, the DOI decided to carry out early 
rehabilitation of the systems selected for the IMT program, as the 
majority of DOI engineers and the farmers favoured the system 
improvement together with organizational development activities. 
A loan request was then made by the government with the ADB 
to finance the rehabilitation of the systems selected for 
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management reform. The ADB, after a feasibility study in 1994, 
agreed to finance the rehabilitation of the identified schemes, under 
the Irrigation Management Transfer Project (IMTP). This loan 
request did not involve much discussion, as the necessary 
conditions for the management transfer program were already in 
place. The policy of the management reform was consistent with 
the ADB policy. The Irrigation Policy 1992 was in feet designed to 
address donor concerns regarding user participation in irrigation 
management. Likewise, the USADD was long involved (and a key 
actor as explained in earlier sections) in irrigation sector reform in 
Nepal through the IMP, and was interested to continue further 
support the process of management reform in Nepal. The DOI 
was desperately in need of funds to improve the system conditions. 
The match of interest of the key actors in the IMT program thus 
made the loan process much smooth. 
The IMT policy ultimately changed into program action through 
the Irrigation Management Transfer Project (IMTP). The IMTP 
included seven more projects, among them Panchakanya (600ha), 
besides those selected for joint management earlier, but dropped 
one project, the Kankai19. So altogether there were 11 sub-projects 
at the start of IMT of the country. Only one out of these 11 sub-
projects, the Chaurijahri, is in the hills: the remainder are in the 
Terai. These systems are scattered in all five-development regions 
of the country. These systems were irrigating 32000 ha against their 
target command area of 67000 ha in total (efficiency of less than 
50%) because of physical and operational constraints (GITEC 
1992). These systems cover about a third of irrigated area under the 
control of the DOI. The three case studies are selected from them. 
The ADB was to finance the physical rehabilitation component 
of the IMTP whereas USAID agreed to provide the Technical 
Assistance (TA) to the program. The ADB loan was US$11 million, 
which is 59% of the total project cost of the IMTP. The remaining 
41% of the costs were to be borne by the government and through 
farmers' contribution. In Chapter 5,1 will show how the 41% cost 
was divided to 15% for the government and 26% to the farmers. 
The USADD assistance of US $ 3 million came in the form of 
grants and was meant to provide consultancy services to the 
program, and support capacity development of the DOI and the 
WUA. The ultimate aim of the IMTP was to transfer the O&M 
responsibility and/or ownership of the schemes in accordance with 
the farmers' capacity to mobilize local resources. 
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It was planned to implement the program in two phases over a 
period of seven years (1995-2002). In the first phase, three systems, 
namely the Khageri (3900 ha), Panchakanya (600 ha) and the West 
Gandak (3900 ha) were selected. No reasons are given for their 
selection in the first phase, but discussions with DOI officials and 
the consultants involved show that their selection was based on the 
previous levels of institutional development, water supply 
conditions and topographic location. In both West Gandak and 
Khageri, the WUA formation and its capacity development were 
already taking place since 1992 and farmers were already engaged in 
canal operation and maintenance activities. Besides, Gandak was a 
water-abundant system, with apparently no limit to water supply at 
the source throughout the year20. 
Khageri and Panchakanya were selected because of their 
relatively simple water control structures, and because the farmers 
in the area are known to be innovative. The government was 
expecting rapid institutional change in these two systems so that 
they could be models for other systems Panchakanya was specially 
selected because of its smaller size and its previous history: it was 
developed by the farmers and was a FMIS before agency 
intervention in 1974. Another reason for their selection was that 
both are relatively water-scarce systems21 with opportunities for 
improvement through collective action. 
2.6 The Framework oflMTP Implementation 
The project framework for implementing the IMTP as adopted by 
me DOI is shown in Figure 2.2. The process has been developed 
on the basis of experiences from previous participatory 
intervention programs like IMP, ILC and ISP. It consists of four 
stages: the program initiation and institutional development phase; 
the action plan preparation phase; the action plan implementation 
phase; and post-turnover support phase (ADB, 1995). The action 
plan forms the basis of program implementation. It specifies the 
activities to be carried out during implementation, and the roles 
and responsibilities of different parties involved in the process. 
As seen from this framework, the IMT process mainly involves 
the formation of the WUA and further support to them through 
participatory design innovations. It also requires new arrangements 
between the government and the WUA for the system 
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management. This model of policy implementation for 
management reform is similar to those widely mentioned in 
irrigation literature (for example Vermillion and Sagordoy, 1999; 
Gei2er, 1996; and Groenfeldt, 1998). It is influenced by the idea of 
designing irrigation policy to create conditions under which desired 
institutions would successfully emerge, for example that would 
ensure functional infrastructure, debate type and size of 
organization and allow user involvement at all stages and levels of 
project implementation. 
FIGURE 2.2 Project framework for IMTP implementation 
Program 
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Action plan 
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Implementation 
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Action Plan Agreement to 
Implement the Action Plan 
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Operation and Maintenance 
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Water Measurement and 
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Handover of Management 
Legal and Technical Support 
Performance Evaluation 
The framework shows a top-down approach to designing and 
implementing policy reform, which Kloezen (2002) refers to as 
institutional engineering. Farmers were not involved in die design 
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of this framework, neither were they informed about the policy 
reform. The reform itself was not demand-driven, and was induced 
by the government, as explained earlier. Farmers were told by the 
DOI that they had to participate in the reform. 
However, it is not only dominated by instrumentalist 
perspectives. The elements mentioned in the framework also refer 
only to the tasks, and the actual implementation process in the field 
is not laid down in the framework. Subsequent chapters of this 
thesis will show how the actors at local level involved in the 
process design, redesign, negotiate, adopt and transform these 
guidelines in practice in line with the prevailing environment 
surrounding the intervention. At the end of the book, I argue that 
these policy steps help in 'kicking off the process', and should not 
be treated as a rigid method for policy implementation. The actual 
processes have to be worked out and adopted through negotiation 
and learning during the implementation itself. 
The program design also directs all aspects of water control: the 
organizational, technical and the socio-political. The major focus of 
the program is on the organizational component, where a multi-tier 
WUA depending upon the size and technical complexity of the 
system would be formed. This would be trained and provided with 
the necessary legal and technical support to carry out the 
management activities. The rehabilitation is a technical 
intervention, but its objective is to facilitate the new organization 
by providing better working conditions for farmers, with 
technology compatible with their management The handing over 
of the system management with new laws and rules and regulations 
and conditions under which they can operate brings a new socio-
political environment to the irrigation system. However, the means 
to enable complementary evolution of these elements were not 
really defined. Rather they were just expected to develop through 
the different phases defined for project implementation of the 
IMTP, as outlined in the following sections. 
Initial Organizational Phase: The process begins with the 
formation of the WUA matching with the hydraulic boundary and 
structural complexity of the system. An introductory workshop is 
organized to explain the process and discuss with farmers, the 
objective and processes of management transfer. The structure of 
the WUA is finalized after several rounds of discussions with the 
farmers, to make the organization relevant to the prevailing 
sociotechnical complexity. The constitution of the WUA is also 
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drafted in parallel with the WUA formation. The WUA is finally 
brought into being through democratic elections, and registered 
with the District Water Resources Committee. Agency personnel -
which generally includes a sociologist, engineer and consultant -
play a facilitating role in organizing these activities. The team 
carries out its activities through the Farmers Organizers (FOs) who 
are selected from the farmers' community on the recommendation 
of concerned farmer groups. Necessary training to the FOs and the 
newly developed WUAs is also carried out The role of the FO is to 
prepare baseline data of the system such as household details, 
irrigated area, and problems in water delivery. They act as an 
intermediary between the irrigation agency and the farmers at the 
initial stage of WUA formation. Once the WUAs are registered, the 
FOs are discharged. 
Parallel with WUA formation and capacity development 
activities, appropriate project orientation courses and training 
programs are also conducted for the agency personnel involved in 
these implementation activities. The objective of this training is to 
ensure people understand the project's guidelines and procedures, 
and are committed to attaining the project's goals and objectives. 
After completion of WUA development activities and the training 
of agency personnel, a Sub-project Management Committee (SMC) 
is formed. The SMC is chaired by the project manager concerned, 
and includes the officers of the WUA Executive Committee. The 
SMC is responsible for the implementation of the project activities 
ahead. The idea of involving the SMC is to make activities 
transparent to the farmers and to involve them in the decision-
making processes, and also to coordinate between the WUA, 
farmers and the implementing agency staff. 
Action Plan Preparation Phase: The second phase of activities 
includes the preparation of an action plan and agreement over it 
DOI technical staff, together with WUA functionaries, carry out 
several diagnostic walkthrough activities along the entire system, to 
identify problems obstructing the smooth functioning of the 
system. The results of this joint walkthrough are then prioritized 
under five different headings: emergency maintenance; essential 
structural maintenance; deferred maintenance; catch-up 
maintenance and system improvement works22. Tentative designs 
and estimates of structural improvement works are prepared, and 
possible user contribution is also discussed. With the completion of 
these surveys and activities, the plan of action is prepared jointly by 
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the WUA and respective project start". The plan will describe the 
elements of technical improvement activities and institutional 
development activities. It thus includes: additional training to be 
provided to the WUA and farmers groups; rehabilitation and 
improvement works to be carried out with cost- estimates; the cost 
sharing agreement between the DOI and the WUA; the WUA's 
plan to raise its cost share; and the responsibilities of both the DOI 
and the WUA during the implementation. 
After the preparation of the Action Plan, a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) is prepared and finalized by the D O I staff and 
WUA representatives. The MOA will also specify. I) the bench 
mark indicators that must be satisfied before rehabilitation and 
improvement work can be undertaken; II) procurement, 
disbursement and quality-control procedures to be followed in 
connection with rehabilitation and improvement work; IH) record-
keeping and resource mobilization responsibilities of the WUA; IV) 
conditions for transfer of O&M and or ownership transfer to the 
WUA; V) the scope of transfer contemplated (including the case of 
ownership transfer, precise description of the facilities, land and 
equipment to be transferred) and VI) ongoing rights and 
responsibilities of DOI and WUA. The MOA is then signed, which 
opens the path for further program implementation. The MOA as 
used in IMTP is presented in Annex 1. 
Implementation of the Action Plan: The third stage is the 
implementation phase, where the action plan conceived and agreed 
by the concerned irrigation agency and the WUA is implemented. 
It thus includes both physical rehabilitation activities, and 
strengthening the WUA through training and field-visit programs. 
It begins with detailed design and cost estimates of the elements 
identified during the action plan preparation phase. These activities 
are carried out in close co-ordination with the respective WUA or 
farmers groups. Any changes from the previous study are 
accommodated here and user contributions are negotiated again. 
Once the detailed design is over, tendering and awarding of 
construction contracts is carried out Such a contract is awarded to 
either the WUA itself, or a contractor depending upon the WUA 
priority. Under the financial regulation WUAs are also allowed to 
execute the construction work if the construction cost does not 
exceeded 1.5 million rupees ($20,000) and the WUAs can mobilize 
the workforce. Among different types of construction work 
emergency work is carried out first The remaining work is carried 
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out linked with the institutional development of the WUA. The 
construction may take to two five years depending on the 
complexities of the physical work. 
The construction is joindy monitored by the SMC, DOI and the 
WUA to ensure the quality of construction. Regular meetings 
between the DOI staff and the WUA initiated through the SMC 
are held to discuss and assess the progress of the work, to agree on 
any change /revision in the design or manner of undertaking the 
work, and to reconcile records of individual farmer contributions 
and project expenditure. Once the construction is complete for a 
particular contract, the WUA and DOI staff will run tests, review 
the work and correct die deficiencies noted during these tests. 
Parallel with the construction activities, various types of capacity 
development programs for the WUA are organized by the DOI, as 
mentioned in the action plan. Such training is mostly on 
construction quality control, leadership development, canal O&M 
and resource mobilization. Such training is directed at different 
levels of WUAs such as the main committee and the branch 
committee. Field visit programs to successfully running FMIS are 
organized. The WUA will also, with support from the DOI prepare 
and test the O&M plan it intends to implement after taking over 
management responsibility. Actual progress depends in project 
supports and vision, as will be shown in later chapters. 
Upon completion of the foreseen structural improvement and 
institutional activities stated in the MOA, O&M responsibility and/ 
or ownership of the irrigation system, as specified in the MOA, is 
transferred to the respective WUA. At this stage, farmers are 
required to carry out the agreed post-turnover activities. The DOI 
will provide the WUA with appropriate evidence of the transfer 
and shall take all other necessary steps to make the transfer 
effective. The role of the agency at this stage is limited to providing 
technical and back-up support. 
Post-Transfer Activities: After the transfer of management 
responsibility to the WUA, the government's other job is to 
establish effective monitoring and evaluation, besides providing 
other technical support to the WUA. The necessary data and 
feedback for this should be provided by the WUA. Further training 
programs to the WUA also continues as demanded by the WUA. 
The government will continue to provide technical assistance, and 
if required provide financial assistance in the case of system 
damage from natural disasters. If the system is under joint 
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management, the O&M responsibility for the main canal and the 
head work remains with the government, and they are required to 
perform management activities at these levels in co-ordination with 
the WUA. 
2.7 The Organisational Structure of Project Implementation 
The project organizational structure for the IMTP implementation 
in Khageri, Panchakanya and West Gandak is shown in Figure 2.3. 
There were two levels of authority in the project execution: field 
level and central level. The field level actors included the project 
staff of the concerned irrigation offices, the WUA and the external 
consultants deployed in for the IMTP. The concerned field offices 
were responsible for the implementation of the project. For 
Khageri and Panchakanya, the NLIO was responsible for 
implementation whereas West Gandak had its own separate project 
office. Both these offices were headed by senior engineers of the 
DOI (like myself), who were at much lower position in the national 
hierarchy of the DOI structure. 
At the central level, there was a co-ordinating office headed by a 
project co-ordinator to supervise the implementation of the field 
level project activities. The co-ordinator was responsible for dealing 
with both the donor agencies in getting funds released and 
furnishing project progress. He was also responsible for carrying 
training and other capacity development activities to the WUA in 
the field upon request from the field-level project offices. He was 
personally committed towards participatory approaches in 
irrigation management. The co-ordinator was supported by the 
System Management Branch (SMB), Research and Technology 
Development Branch (RTDB) and the Human Resources 
Development and Training Brach (HRDTB) of the IMD in 
executing the activities. The co-ordinator was again accountable to 
the Deputy Director General (DDG) of the Irrigation Department 
looking after the Irrigation Management Division (EMD)23. The 
DDG of the IMD was also the project director of the IMTP, but 
was not responsible for everyday project execution. His job was to 
oversee the overall implementation. The actors at the central level 
were at higher position in the DOI bureaucracy as compared to the 
field level project managers. 
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FIGURE 2.3 Organization of IMTP implementation in Khageri, 
Panchakanya and West Gandak 
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Consultancy to the project was provided by the Colorado-based 
American company Computer Aided Design Inc. (CADI). The 
consultants included an American expert and three local 
professionals: two irrigation management experts and an 
institutional development specialist The consultants worked for 
both field and central level project authorities. One of the irrigation 
management experts had previously been chief of the HRDTB of 
the DOP4. Two local professionals, the institutional development 
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specialist and one management expert (previously with HRDTB) 
were based in Chittwan to assist all three systems where 
management reform were being implemented at first stage. The 
remaining two consultants (one American and one local) were 
based in Kathmandu to assist the central coordinating office. In 
addition, a few professionals (both local and foreign) were hired for 
a limited period for specific services as required. 
The consultants worked as an independent team, and were not 
involved in daily implementation of the IMTP. In this way, they 
were not dominating and dictating in the project activities. 
However their role was also not clear. They were mosdy engaged in 
preparing evaluation reports, supporting WUA establishment and 
providing advice when asked by the field level offices. 
Besides these irrigation institutions, two other important 
agencies were involved in the implementation: the USAUD and the 
ADB, but not at the field level. The ADB was mosdy concerned 
with the physical progress of the project. There was one mission 
visit every year from Manila to review the project progress. There 
were also other several political and administrative institutions who 
were involved directly or indirectly in the process including the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), the National Planning Commission 
(NPQ, the office of the Auditor General, the Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), the District Development Committees 
(DDCs), and the District Administration Office (DAO). They had 
a limited but important role in the process as will be seen in the 
ensuing chapters. The MOF is responsible for releasing the funds 
annually and the NPC is responsible for approving annual plans 
and programs. The Auditor General is responsible for the final 
auditing of the project expenditure. The VDCs and DDCs are 
local-level political institutions and the DAO is responsible for the 
over-all administration of the district. These organizations are 
always engaged in local-level intervention, although their roles are 
not specific. 
This presentation of the organizational structure shows the 
multi actor environment of the IMTP. For the field-level 
implementation offices, the central project office and its supporting 
units are part of their 'influencing environment'. likewise, the 
DDCs, VDCs, and the DAO are also as part of their 'influencing 
environment'. However, the MOF, NPC, USAID, ADB are the 
elements of the appreciated environment However, the actors are 
not always visible, especially those in the 'appreciated 
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environment'. They can be unpredictable, shifting and highly 
turbulent, as mentioned in chapter 1. 
2.8 Conclusions 
The IMT program in Nepal is a comprehensive one, trying to 
address all forms of water control: the technical, organizational and 
the socio-political. This differs from past efforts to promote 
participation in water management in several ways. The major 
difference is the inclusion of the socio-political dimension, with 
changing rules and regulation to support the new management 
Past efforts to promote participation in irrigation were directed to 
technical intervention and organizational development activities 
only, like the CADP of the 1980s. They were more focused on on-
farm development activities inside the command area (see chapter 
3). The emphasis on a participatory design process to support new 
evolutionary organizations is another major difference in current 
IMT programs. In the past, design implementation was 
conventionally based on top-down approaches without user 
involvement. Another major change is in the concept of the 
organization itself. In the past, local organizations were seen as a 
unit to complement to the government agencies, co-ordinating in 
water distribution activities below the outlet level (see for example 
Hunt, 1990). But now efforts are towards governance change, 
replacing the government partially or fully depending on the scale 
of the irrigation systems. At the same time, organizations are being 
formed at system level without being limited to the outlet level as 
in the past. 
The reform program also includes all the different development 
context of participation as mentioned in chapter 1. The current 
IMT program originates from the context of economic 
development and modernization and is driven both by die fiscal 
deficits in the country and donor influence. However, its 
implementation is based on a joint planning process, employing 
participatory tools like PTD, to arrive at locally specific design 
compatible with users' management. At the same time it aims to 
increase the capacity of the WUA to manage the system through 
training and field visit programs. It also aims to empower the WUA 
through legal support and bring benefit of irrigation to the people, 
which the}' were deprived of earlier. The inclusion of these 
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different development contexts in the program also shows its 
comprehensive nature. 
The chapter has also shown the framework of chapters 4-7, 
which are based on the elements of the project framework 
presented in Figure 2.2. These include: the development of WUA; 
joint action plan preparation; implementation of this action plan; 
and handing-over, monitoring and evaluation of the new 
management Subsequent chapters examine how actors involved in 
these processes translate them in practice given their system and 
project environment 
Though the reform is a comprehensive one, design of its 
implementation has several practical limitations. While the design 
tried to locate conditions for collective action to emerge, laws are 
not always that clear. They especially fail to consider how to sustain 
the reform beyond the launching phase, both socially and 
financially. The implementation of the reform is thus seen as an 
isolated activity, without any connection to broader development 
objectives of organizational evolution and participatory water 
management The program design has also failed to bring the 
actors at different project environment levels (or different sub-
systems) together in the program process, which is essential, both 
to facilitate the change process as well as to sustain the reform 
beyond the launching phase. As seen in Figure 2.3, the program 
involves a complex project environment, but actors at higher 
institutional layers are considered as either constraining or 
supporting factors rather than as a part of the change process. 
Participation has been limited to interaction between the engineers 
and the farmers (and the WUAs) at local level with very different 
ideological norms of participation are present in the different 
project domains. The remaining chapters will show how both the 
process and outcomes of the reform were constrained due to this 
failure to bring different elements of the project environment 
together in the program process, and allow for the struggle to 
achieve participatory management as promoted by different actors. 
The program is heavily focused towards technical improvement 
works to support organizational evolution, but failed to consider 
the influence of choice of technology in water management 
Besides, systems themselves are not always amenable to 
improvement in water delivery as supposed, as the thesis will also 
show. 
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In addition, the new laws and regulations give norms without 
reference to past practices of local water management as they have 
evolved under complex shifts in local government and agency 
control, with which new organisations have had to struggle to 
assert their new roles and rules. Also possible choices of 
organisational structure, rules and roles are left to be shaped by key 
external actors and not just the farmers themselves. These 
strengths and weaknesses help to define the struggles of new 
organisations and their members, an ephemeral project structure, 
and old agencies to enable participatory irrigation management. 
Notes 
1
 These systems were initiated after the famine of the late 1890s in 
Northern Bihar. 
2
 The British had constructed the Sarda Canal after entering into an 
agreement with the Rana Rulers. Nepal was allotted 460 cusecs (13 
cumecs) of water during the monsoon season and 150 Cusecs (4.3 
cumecs) during the dry season as per the agreement. Nepal developed the 
Mahakali Irrigation system (see Pradhan, 1996) utilizing water from this 
allocation. It is not clear whether the construction of Chandra Canal was 
in exchange of the Mahakali Agreement. 
3
 The Rana Rulers were overthrown in 1951, establishing democracy in 
the country. However, due to political instability, elections were held only 
in 1959. The elected government was overthrown by the King in 1961, 
and a party-less political system called the Panchayat was established. The 
Panchayat system was again overthrown in 1990 by a people's movement 
and a parliamentary democracy system with a constitutional monarchy 
was established in the country. 
4
 For different types of land tenure see also Poudel (2000), Regmi (1978). 
5
 Kulo means a canal in Nepali 
6
 See Pradhan (1989) for details of FMIS development in Nepal 
7
 See for example the regulation of 1935 and 1942 (Regmi 1979, cited in 
Pradhan, 1996). 
8
 For a detailed account of the changes in local governance and irrigation 
governance, see Pant (2000) 
9
 Administratively and politically, the country is divided into seventy-five 
districts, 14 zones and five development regions. 
10
 In 2000, the government enacted the Local Decentralization Act Under 
this Act the local political bodies, the District Development Committee 
(DDQ and the VDC are empowered to control natural resources within 
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their boundary. Under this Act, all the development activities at local level 
are to be overseen by DDC through its own technical office. This has also 
limited the role of the DOI, and a new structure was proposed to DOI 
reducing the 75 district offices to only 42 divisional offices (with reduced 
start): while writing this thesis, I came to know this structure has been 
now put in place. However, because of the Maoist insurgency and political 
instability in the country, the Act is yet to be fully implemented and its 
impact in irrigation governance is yet to be seen. 
11
 For these agreements see Sharma (1983). 
12
 For a review of the research of Cornell University in irrigation, with its 
strong focus on both the interface between agency staff and water users, 
and on FMIS, see Levine (1992). Levine notes how the Cornell 
programme in Nepal, was designed to increase the institutional capacity of 
the Government of Nepal to enhance water user participation in system 
design, construction, operation and maintenance. It drew on their work in 
The Philippines and Sri Lanka, and also bought in professionals from 
these countries (Levine, 1992, p.29). 
13
 The 1600 ha Sirsya Dudhaura system was constructed by USAID in 
1957. 
14
 It is believed that there are about 1700 FMISs in Terai and 11000 in the 
hills of Nepal (Poudel, 1992). By the late 1980s, there were many studies 
by the government (WECS, 1981) and other independent researchers 
(Martin, 1986; Yoder, 1986; 1987a; Pradhan, 1989) on the FMISs and 
their contribution in the agriculture development was found to be 
considerable. 
15
 CADA stands for Command Area Development Authority in India. 
16
 The Act is meant for the hydropower sector as well as for the 
implementation of the irrigation policy. 
17
 In Nepal, Acts generally set broad guidelines for the rules. The 
provisions of Acts are further explained and clarified by the Regulations 
following the acts. Both Acts and Regulations are law. Policy guidelines, 
however, are not law. 
18
 The other systems were: the Kankai Irrigation System (8000 ha), the 
Banganga Irrigation system (6200 ha) and the Manusmara Irrigation 
System (6200 ha) 
19
 The ADB refused the Kankai system because it had recently been 
completed with its own funding and ADB was not convinced to finance 
its rehabilitation soon after. The other six additional projects were 
Hardinam (2000 ha), Chaurijahri (800 ha), Pathraya (2100 ha), Kamala 
(25,000 ha), Chandra Canal (6800 ha) and Mohana (3500 ha). 
20
 However, subsequent chapters will show there were water distribution 
problems in West Gandak. 
21
 Relative water scarcity is a situation, in which water availability slightly 
fall short to the actual requirement such that there is scope of improving 
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water management situation through collective action. The argument is 
that when water is plentiful, there is no incentive in organizing as they 
have already enough water. At the same time where the water is very 
scarce, only strong leadership can resolve the situation, which is beyond 
resolution by co-ordinated exchange and collaboration between farmers. 
Areas with moderate water scarcity are thus likely to succeed in collective 
action. 
22
 These are the improvements to be made in order of priority. 
Emergency maintenance includes those, which are in a position to damage 
the system if not improved immediately. Essential maintenance includes 
those activities which have severely affected the systems' functioning. 
Deferred maintenance includes those that have not been done due to lack 
of funds (like canal desilting). Catch-up maintenance includes regular 
maintenance. System improvements are meant to improve the efficiency 
of the system (like canal lining and re configuration of gates). 
23
 There are five DDGs in DOI: Planning, Groundwater, Surface Water, 
River Training and Irrigation Management divisions. The DDG of IMD 
looks after the operation and maintenance of completed systems: the 
IMTP was thus under the IMD. The DOI is headed by a Director 
General (DG) and is responsible for overall administration of the DOI. 
The DOI is under the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR). 
24
 Most of the consultants working in irrigation sector in Nepal are retired 
DOI professionals. 
The Research Sites, their Evolution and 
Agroecology 
This chapter uses an agro-ecology approach (Altieri, 1990) to 
understand how the technological forms of Panchakanya, Khageri 
and West Gandak systems evolved with choices and adaptations of 
farmers and agencies. It used this approach to trace the evolution 
of the three irrigation systems, and the interventions to take water 
for irrigation and distribute it, and resultant agriculture and agrarian 
conditions that shape the agroecology of the systems. Manzungu 
(1999) has also describes how water distribution is shaped by: the 
water source, irrigation technology, socio/politdcal relations and 
commodisatizion effects: these are also described here, in relation 
to river regime, social dynamics after settlement, and the land 
tenure and agricultural patterns in the systems studied. This chapter 
thus shows the history of their technical and organisational 
development up to the period of the IMTP. From this, the 
conclusions discuss the opportunities and constraints faced in the 
IMT project, to initiate and help evolve new systems of effective 
water control with complementary technical, organisational and 
socio-political control. 
3.11rrigation in the Tend and Farmer-Agency Interfaces Before IMTP 
The Terai is one of the three main physiographic zones of Nepal, 
and is the zone of low-lying plains, ranging in elevation from about 
60-500 metres. It is also divided, to distinguish the Terai proper 
south of the Siwalik hills (where the West Gandak system lies) and 
the Inner Terai between the Siwaliks and Mahabharata hills — a 
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zone of large valleys like the East Rapti of Chittwan district (where 
the Panchkanya and Khageri systems lie). Critical differences for 
irrigation between the two include the regimes of their rivers. 
Chittwan District lies in the inner Terai, where the Panchakanya 
and Khageri systems lie, 139km south west of the capital 
Kathmandu. It is also referred to as the Chittwan Valley1, as it is 
formed between the Mahabharat and the Churia Hills. Chittwan 
District is divided into two sections: Eastern and Western parts 
divided by a narrow corridor of dense forest (Mahendra Aaraskha, 
see Figure 3.1) which links the Royal Chittwan National Park 
(RCNP) and the Mahabharat forest The Forest is the main 
corridor for the movements of the RCNP wildlife. The 
environmental importance of this forest zone eventually came to 
limit some options for the Khageri irrigation system (as will be 
explained in Chapter 7). Most of the valley was uninhabited jungle 
forty years ago, but there were a few Tbaru and Darah2 setders 
since ancient times. There are numerous small and medium streams 
in the eastern part of the valley, from which the Tbarus could 
develop irrigation schemes to support their livelihood. 
Panchakanya is one such system developed in the eastern part of 
the district by the Tbaru community in the past. However, the 
western part of the valley had no such irrigation facility. The whole 
valley was then the preserve of wildlife like rhinos and tigers, and 
part of the valley is still covered by the National Park. 
Once uninhabited jungle, Chittwan has now been converted into 
a green valley after the implementation of a planned resettlement 
program and subsequent irrigation development Government 
policy in Nepal during the 1960s encouraged resettlement by 
clearing forest in flat Terai and Inner Terai areas3 of the southern 
plains to boost agricultural production in the country. In Chittwan, 
a planned resettlement was implemented under a high-level 
government authority, called the Rapti Valley Multipurpose 
Development Board. Besides implementing the resetdement 
program, the board was also responsible for malaria eradication 
programs4 and rural road network development The board was 
supported by the USAID in carrying out its activities. The settlers 
in the area were mostly from the nearby hill districts. The new 
settlers were given five bigha (3.3 ha) land for cultivation. 
There were actually two groups of migrants. The first group was 
the victims of floods and landslides in 1953. They were encouraged 
by the government to resettle in the valley by clearing the forest 
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and cultivating the lands of which they eventually become the 
owner. The second group of people came under the government's 
planned resettlement program in the valley through the Board. The 
planned resettlement program began in the mid-fifties and 
continued until the mid-sixties. Even after the completion of the 
resettlement program, migration from the nearby hill districts 
continued but at lower rate through individual initiative. Out of the 
total migrants to Chittwan, about 42 % migrated in 1960s, whereas 
27% migrated earlier. The migration rate later declined sharply, 
with only about 10% migrating between 1980 to 1995 (ICON, 
1996)5. The beginning of the National Highway through the district 
in the late 1960s also increased its attractiveness. 
Parallel to the re-settlement program, irrigation needs were 
identified especially in the western part of the valley, due to non-
availability of water sources. This led to the birth of the Khageri 
irrigation system in the 1960s, which was completed by 1967. 
Chittwan continued to be a major focus for irrigation development, 
as it could provide food for the growing population in Kathmandu, 
due to its fertile soil from decayed forest material and water supply. 
The migrant community had a strong agricultural background and 
knowledge of irrigation management In 1972, the government 
formed a separate board, the Chittwan Irrigation Development 
Board (CIDB) to direct the irrigation development in the valley in 
recognition to its potential. Under this board, an executing agency, 
the Chittwan Irrigation Project (CIP) was set up to construct 
irrigation projects in the district The Board was chaired by the 
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, as the Irrigation Department 
was under this Ministry that time (it is now with the Ministry of 
Water Resources). The project manager of the CIP was the 
Secretary of the Board. 
The major focus of the CIP was to construct a lift irrigation 
system by pumping water from Narayani River to irrigate an 
additional 4700 ha of land adjoining to the Khageri command area. 
The CIP was funded by the ADB. With the CIP now taking 
responsibility of irrigation development in the district, the O&M of 
the Khageri system was also put under the CIP authorities: 
previously it was managed by a separate division office. The CIP 
also carried out some improvement works like drainage 
improvement, canal lining and a service road network in Khageri 
between 1980 and 1985. The lift system was also supposed to 
augment the Khageri water supply by 2.4 cumecs6, to overcome the 
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water shortage in Khageri However, owing to several financial and 
technical problems, the lift system could not reliably augment 
Khageri water supply, although it occasionally supplements it, in 
times of scarcity. The O P also carried out rehabilitation and 
expansion of the Panchakanya system from 1974, and took over its 
management responsibility from the farmers. This rehabilitation 
and expansion was carried out under the influence of newly 
migrated communities who were dominant in the area by then. 
The construction activities of the CIP were completed in 1989. 
However the body continued to manage the three irrigation 
systems it had been involved with, namely the Narayani lift system, 
the Khageri and the Panchakanya, until it was dissolved in 1994. 
The layout of these three systems is given Figure 3.1. The lift 
system is not part of the current study. 
FIGURE 3.1 Irrigation systems under the NLIO in Chittwan Valley 
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It has been a practice in Nepal that large construction projects are 
implemented through an autonomous development board, to keep 
it outside the regular bureaucratic processes such that smooth 
project execution is possible. Once the major construction 
activities are completed, the board is dissolved and a smaller unit is 
established to look after the O&M of the system. In this case, a 
smaller unit called the Narayani lift Irrigation Office (NLIO) was 
established to look after the O&M of the three irrigation systems 
previously under the authority of the CIP. The number of staff was 
reduced to 64 from more than 250 persons as a result There was 
major conflict between the government and the retiring staff over 
this staff reduction. The problem was finally settled by offering 
additional benefit to staff losing their jobs. I was transferred as 
Chief of NLIO in December 1994. 
The Nepal West Gandak Irrigation System (hereafter called 
West Gandak) was constructed under an Indo-Nepal agreement, 
and later on expanded under the Command Area Development 
Project (CADP). The system is located in the Nawalparasi district 
in the Western Development Region of NepaL It is located 22 km 
south east of District headquarters and 8 km south of the East-
West Highway. West Gandak emerged out from the Indo-Nepal 
agreement on the use of Narayani River water (in India it is called 
Gandak River, in Nepal both names are used). The construction 
started in 1963 and took about 7 years to complete. It now 
provides irrigation to about a million hectare of land in India 
through two large canals: the Gandak Western Canal, which 
irrigates areas in Uttar Pradesh State of India and the Eastern 
Canal7, which irrigates areas in Bihar. Under the agreement, Nepal 
receives 300 cusecs of water8 to irrigate about 8700 ha of land, 
through an offtake structure placed 600m upstream of the barrage. 
Additionally, Nepal also receives water to irrigate 1600 ha land 
drawing water directly from the Western Main Canal going to 
India, through two offtake canals called Piparpati and Parsauni, 
which are not discussed in this study. 
Before the agency's intervention to develop the West Gandak, 
there were some FMIS taking water from small drains and rivers 
lying within the present command area. Farmers say that they used 
to build diversion weirs with earthen bunds and woodbrush, which 
were repaired after each flash flood in the rivulets. Canal networks 
were earthen, short in length and were cleaned out before the 
irrigation season. Their main problem was maintaining the 
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diversion weir throughout the irrigation season. Due to the absence 
of flow in winter and spring, irrigation was possible only for 
monsoon rice. The exact numbers of FMIS that existed in this area 
is unclear, but local farmers say that about 1000 ha of land were 
under such FMIS. 
Unlike Chittwan, the command area of West Gandak is not a 
newly settled area. Much of the command area was already used as 
agricultural land even before the construction of the NWGIS. 
However, there has been an influx of outside migrants from across 
the Indian border as well as from the hills of adjoining districts 
over time. The Indian migrants came to settle in the area after 
several harvest failures and widespread famine in the 1930s and 
1940s in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Shukla et al, 2000). Migration 
from adjoining hill districts however started only after the malaria 
eradication program in the 1960s, and after the beginning of the 
national highway construction. So, most residents of the command 
area have been there since before the construction of the West 
Gandak that started in 1973. 
The present scheme was originally constructed with the aid 
provided by the Indian Government. In 1982, the DOI launched 
the CADP9 in this system, as a lack of farm level structures and 
support services were identified as the major constraints in 
effective water utilization. The CADP was funded by the ADB, the 
IFAD and the UNDP. The CADP's objective was to increase crop 
production and increase farm-level income through providing year-
round irrigation facilities and providing other agricultural support 
services. 
The CADP was completed in the NWGIS in 1989 at a cost of 
$11.2 million, and was also under a Project Office. As well as 
extensive construction, the project also developed water user 
groups (WUG), and federations of WUG, to whom they envisaged 
handling over the project, which became defunct almost 
immediately, for reasons explained later. The changes brought 
about by the CADP could not be sustained after its withdrawal in 
1989. During the CADP, a high level of service was possible due to 
massive funding, not available thereafter. After the end of the 
CADP in 1989, there was no proper repair and maintenance in the 
system, and lack of desilting work in the main canal reduced the 
main canal's capacity considerably. The Project Office was also 
scaled down to a much lower unit and a new Project Manager 
joined for the IMTP work. 
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3.2 The Panchakanya Irrigation System 
The Panchakanya Irrigation System (PIS) is believed to have been 
started some 200 years ago10 by the then local Tbaru community 
inhabitants to provide supplementary irrigation to 100 ha of land. 
Later the government took over its control after rehabilitation and 
expansion. This shift in control resulted from in migration of 
outsiders, who became dominant in irrigation affairs. The migrant 
community outnumbered the natives, and had access to better land 
and local economic opportunities. However, the management take-
over by the government could not provide the service as planned 
due to poor quality of construction. Despite two attempts of 
rehabilitation and expansion, the targeted command area of 600 ha 
was never met The poor condition of the system made farmers 
again interested to take over the management responsibility when 
the management transfer policy was started by the government in 
1994. The layout map of the Panchakanya system is shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
The evolution of the system 
In the past, most of the present command area including Debauli, 
Golhauli, Baghmara, Mohana, Bhedi, Gadauli and Nippani 
Maiffban (see Figure 3.2) was irrigated by a separate canal called 
Budi Ku/oi12 (not shown in Figure 3.2), which had an intake in Kair 
KbokP. According to local farmers, in a major flood in Kair Kbola 
in 1967, the intake of Budi Kulo was completely destroyed and the 
river altered its course, rendering subsequent irrigation from Budi 
Kulo impossible. The users of these Maujhas then approached 
Panchakanya farmers for access to irrigation, as Panchakanya had 
ample water at the source. A proposal was made in 1968 to dig a 
canal 150m upstream from the current intake site, but the 
Panchakanya farmers rejected the proposal claiming their prior 
right over water However, the native Panchakanya farmers could 
not resist the pressure for long to expand the system to serve these 
Maujbas as: 
• The flood affected Maujbas had no alternative for irrigation and 
Panchakanya had ample water to irrigate monsoon rice. 
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The massive influx of migrants had left the existing Tharu 
population a minority. The new settlers who were the majority 
had already gained control in economic and political affairs. 
FIGURE 3.2 The layout of Panchakanya System 
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The farmers of the flood affected Maujhas were mostly the new 
settlers. They approached to the CIP for expansion of 
Panchakanya. The CIP finally took control over the project and 
started rehabilitation and expansion activities in 1974. 
After the expansion of the system by the government, there 
were two major changes in the system. Firstly, the new migrants 
became dominant in irrigation affairs and in leadership14. Secondly 
the government now took over the management control of the 
system from the farmers. However, even with this rehabilitation 
and expansion program, the targeted 600 ha area could not be 
supplied with irrigation due to physical deficiencies, massive canal 
losses and lack of branch and tertiary canals. The canal operators of 
that time say that the maximum irrigated area was about 300 ha 
after this expansion. The major works during this rehabilitation 
were construction of a permanent weir at the intake and 
enlargement of the existing canal section to accommodate the 
increased discharge in the canal. 
The second phase of rehabilitation and improvement was again 
carried out by CIP between 1982 and 1983, and aimed to provide 
irrigation to 600 ha. The construction activity this time mostly 
included canal lining work and development of branch and tertiary 
canals. Local farmers say that the irrigated area increased to 400 ha 
during the monsoon season after this second phase of 
rehabilitation and expansion program. Due to the poor quality of 
boulder masonry lining, the canal sections cracked soon after the 
construction, which rapidly increased leakage and seepage from the 
canal section. In 1994 November, I was involved in a discharge 
measurement activity in Panchakanya under a training program for 
the engineers where we found as much as 50% seepage loss within 
the first 1.4km reaches of the canal section. At this time the 
irrigated area had already decreased to 265 ha. 
There were two reasons for the poor performance of the 
Panchakanya. First, poor construction quality meant rapid 
deterioration of structures and lined canals, resulting in heavy 
seepage and leakage from the canals. Secondly, the budget 
allocation was low after the funding to CIP from the ADB was 
stopped in 1989. The average annual requirement for regular O&M 
then was Rs.120, 000 (Rs.200 per ha, $5 at that time), but the 
budget allocation were quite low as shown in Table 3.1. According 
to technicians, except in 1993, the budgets were only enough to pay 
for the labourers operating the canals and cleaning of the main 
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canal In 1993, they were able to repair some of the seepage-prone 
canal sections. Farmers tried to improve system performance by 
forming a WUA in 1989 of their own initiative. The WUA used to 
help the CIP by providing voluntary labour for canal cleaning, and 
also in co-ordinating the water distribution activities. According to 
the then chairman of the WUA (who is still Chairman), they could 
not increase the command area beyond 265 ha during the monsoon 
season because of the poor condition of the main canal. 
The water supply regime 
The source of irrigation water of Panchakanya is Panchanadi 
(meaning five rivers), which is formed by the confluence of five 
natural springs. The total catchment area of these springs is about 
40 ha. Part of this area is wetland, and a small reservoir has been 
formed as a result of the construction of the permanent weir. The 
Panchanadi joins Battar Khola 100m downstream from the intake 
weir of Panchakanya. These again join with Khageri Khola, source 
of Khageri Irrigation system 500m downstream (see Figure 3.2). 
The water is free from silt, even during monsoon season, except 
during heavy rainfall. One of the major concerns of the 
Panchakanya farmers was the decreasing water supply. According 
to the farmers, the reasons were changing land use pattern, 
encroachment of reservoir area and lack of silt flushing 
mechanisms in the weir 
TABLE 3.1 Budget allocation for O&M in the systems after the ADB 
withdrawal 
Year 
1990/1991 
1991/1992 
1992/1993 
Panchakanya 
Total Per 
Budget ba 
NRs. NRs. 
40,000 66.6 
50,000 83.0 
297,000 478.0 
"Khageri 
Total 
Budget 
NRs. 
254,000 
158,000 
500,000 
Per 
ba 
NRs. 
65.0 
40.0 
128.0 
West Gandak 
Total Per ba 
Budget NRs. 
NRs. 
400,000 69.0 
1,500,000 172.0 
2^00,000 253.0 
Source: Account sections of NLIO and West Gandak Project Office. 
Previously, the catchment area of Panchanadi was totally covered 
by forest, and according to farmers, this was gradually changed into 
cultivated land. Farmers claimed that over the last 25 years 
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(beforel997), as much as 50 % of the forestland had been 
converted into cultivated and grazing land affecting water supply. 
However, there were no measurements available on the variation in 
water availability over the years. 
Another problem was that farmers with land adjoining the 
reservoir had encroached on part of the reservoir, converting it 
into cultivated land. Farmers had great concern on how to take 
back this land and convert it back into reservoir space. Generally, 
taking back these lands causes much confrontation and can quickly 
become politicised. However, the first challenge for the 
Panchakanya farmers was to allow no further encroachment on the 
reservoir. 
The Panchakanya weir had no silt flushing arrangement15, so the 
silt load carried by the river during floods piled up in the reservoir. 
The silting of the reservoir was further accelerated by the 
cultivation in adjacent fields. Farmers feared that this 
sedimentation could close down the five springs supplying water to 
the reservoir. Farmers felt they needed a silt flushing arrangement 
in the headwork. They also believed that if the silt build-up was 
cleaned away, there could be an increase in the water supply from 
the springs. 
Water conveyance and distribution technology 
Panchakanya is a gravity scheme designed mostly to irrigate the 
monsoon rice. Before 1974 the system had no permanent intake 
and consisted of an unlined canal under the farmers' management. 
The successive rehabilitation and expansion by the CIP in 1974 and 
1985 brought changes in the infrastructure and the command area. 
A permanent weir was constructed, most of the main canal sections 
were lined with boulder masonry, and networks of branch canals 
were developed. The aim of these improvements was to increase 
the command are from 100 ha to 600 ha by means of new water 
control structures. The system, however, had no tertiary 
development and associated water control structures and was thus 
an extensive type of development16. The features of the system as 
of 1994 (before IMTP intervention) are presented below. 
The headworks consist of a solid concrete weir, with a side 
intake with a head regulator constructed during the first 
rehabilitation in 1974. It was in sound condition, but lack of an 
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undersluice had created problems of upstream silt build-up, 
explained previously. There were minor problems of leakage from 
the embankment walls. 
The main canal is 4.94km long and lined in most of its sections. 
It was designed to carry 1200 lps of discharge. Interestingly, there 
were all types of canal sections that were geometrically possible, 
except the triangular section. There were circular (pipe), 
rectangular, trapezoidal, and combinations of these canal sections. 
At the same time, every type of construction material- cement, 
concrete, stone, gabion wires and bricks- were used. I do not think 
one can find such a combination of different canal sections in any 
other canal systems of this scale. The various types of canal 
sections of the main canal are shown in Figure 3.3. 
I was very much surprised to see these different canal sections at 
the time of walkthrough for planning rehabilitation during IMTP in 
Aug 1995, and could not imagine why this was so. The main canal 
was constructed on depressed land, filling the ground with earth, 
which necessitated canal lining to control the seepage as well as to 
provide stability. But just a few hundred meters away, higher 
ground levels (the ridgeline) was available where the canal could 
have been constructed entirely on earth cutting eliminating the 
costly lining. That could have been the best alignment Discussion 
with the local farmers and the engineers of the time reveals that 
this option was discussed, but rejected by farmers mainly for two 
reasons. First, it required new land to be acquired, which farmers 
were not willing to contribute and would add extra cost for the 
government Second, if the alignment were shifted, a greater area 
would have been brought under irrigation on the upstream side, 
whereas the present tail end areas would have been left out from 
the irrigation service. However, the rehabilitation and expansion 
programs were done through the initiation of the downstream 
farmers. These factors restricted any change in canal alignment 
during the previous programs. The different types of section and 
material used were due to interventions at different times and with 
different actors17 involved and also due to absence of standard 
design practices in the DOI. 
There are 8 branch canals and 10 direct outlets from the main 
canal. The branch canals are shorter in length and are mostly 
unlined except branch 1, which is lined in most of its length, The 
eighth branch canal was already abandoned by 1994 as water never 
reached there. The branch canal had no major problems in water 
Research Situ tbar Evolution andAgroecobgf 75 
conveyance and were free from inundation and flooding problems. 
The details of canal sections are shown in Table 3.2. 
FIGURE 3.3 Canal sections in Panchakanya 
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Water distribution arrangement 
The system used to be operated on a rotational basis. The main 
canal was usually divided into three different sections for the 
purpose of rotation among the branch canals. The duration of 
rotation used to be decided by the then informal WUA, depending 
upon water availability. According to farmers, despite the rotation, 
branch canals below the fourth branch hardly received water in the 
spring season because of the massive seepage. They used to receive 
water in monsoon season, but at a much lower rate compared to 
upstream farmers. There were three cross regulators in the main 
system - in front of branch 1, branch 3 and branch 5 - with 
manually adjustable steel gates. According to farmers this was 
enough to maintain the rotational schedule, but their condition was 
poor, for example the spindle was missing or the gate plates were 
broken. On the other hand many of the branch canals and direct 
oudets from the main canal had no gates and were vulnerable to 
water theft. There was a need to redesign and adjust these control 
structures to facilitate the rotational practices 
TABLE 3.2 The features of canal networks in Panchakanya 
Branch Canals 
Main Canal 
Direct Oudets 
Branch 1 
Branch 2 
Branch 3 
Branch 4 
Branch 5 
Branch 6 
Branch 7 
Branch 8 
Total 
Length 
inm 
4920 
1359 
645 
1101 
735 
1126 
1180 
827 
820 
Command 
Ana in ba 
-
51 
100 
45 
41 
22 
72 
45 
65 
80 
521 ha 
Rffltarfcs 
In total 10 outlets. 
Not functional 
441 ha, deducting the 8th 
branch 
Source: baseline study 1994, Shukla ttaL (2000) 
Water distribution within the branches was usually through on-off 
gates made of concrete, or open-close type of adjustment using 
mud and grass, arranged by the farmers themselves. There was 
again a practice of rotation between the oudets, and each hectare of 
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land used to have 4 to 6 hours' supply depending upon the 
rotational interval from the main canal to the branch canal. There 
were no gated check structures inside the branches. Tertiary and 
field channels were not developed, and were temporarily 
constructed during the irrigation season. Field-to-field irrigation 
was dominant throughout the command area. 
Land topography 
Water management in Panchakanya also faces particular challenges 
due to its land topography. Farmers here classify the land in two 
different categories: Tandi and Ghol. Tandi refers to higher land and 
the GboA* refers to lower land. The situation is described by the 
diagram in Figure 3. 4. 
FIGURE 3.4 Terrain Situation in Panchakanya 
. _ Tandi Khet 
Ghol Khet 
Diainag 
Tandi farmers have to rely on canal water year-round, irrespective 
of the cropping season. Ghol farmers do not need canal water in the 
monsoon season, as rainfall and seepage from the higher lands and 
canal are enough to meet the irrigation demand. According to Ghol 
farmers, they get higher production in low rainfall years. In the 
spring and winter season, the Ghol farmers partly depend on canal 
water as there is only seepage from the higher land or canal: this 
can not fulfil the irrigation need and there is no effective rainfall 
during the spring and winter season to meet the water demand. 
The area between the Ghol and Tandi fully relies on canal water in 
winter and spring season, whereas in monsoon season, they are 
only partly dependent on canal water. 
The above situation is due to the fact that water applied to 
Tandi area ultimately reaches the Ghol area as overland flow and 
underground seepage, and joins the drainage. This gives Ghol 
farmers an advantage compared to Tandi farmers. As will be seen 
later, this situation has been one of the reasons for the low 
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collection of the litigation Service Fee (ISF) in the monsoon 
season. In many cases, Gbol farmers even try to avoid being a 
member of WUA, as nobody or no method can prevent them from 
getting water. At the same time, for the farmers having land 
between the Tandi and the Ghol, there is always a way to evade 
paying of service fee as access to seepage and rainfall can fulfil the 
irrigation demand. 
Agriculture and land tenure 
Among the irrigators, 88% are owner cultivators whereas tenants 
account only for 1%. (ICON, 1996). The rest are the owner-
tenants. Small farmers with 1 ha or less land19 account for 81% 
whereas only 19 % are large farmers holding more than 1 ha. The 
average land holding in the system is 0.67 ha. The average land 
holding in small farm category and large farm category is 0.4 and 
1.75 ha respectively. The much smaller landholding given the 
original allocation has been due to division of land among the sons 
(after the death of father) and also due to high transactions in land 
induced by increasing economic activity in the area. 
As in other parts of the Terai there are three agricultural 
seasons: the monsoon season (June/July-September/October), 
winter season (October/November-January/February) and spring 
season (Feb/March-May/June). The average rainfall is more than 
1600 mm, more than 80% of which falls during the monsoon 
season between June and September (the mean monthly 
hydrological and meteorological data are presented in Annex 2). 
Paddy is the dominant crop in the area during the monsoon 
irrespective of access to irrigation water. The monsoon paddy is 
mostly followed by lentils and wheat in winter. The area under 
wheat is very low. In spring, maize and spring paddy are cultivated 
depending upon the water availability situation. The cropping 
pattern as of 1996 (at the beginning of IMTP) is given in Table 3.3. 
3.3 The Khageri Irrigation System 
The system lies in the western part of the Chittwan valley, and was 
developed to provide supplementary irrigation for monsoon rice in 
3900 ha land. Since its construction it has been a water-scarce 
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system, as flow in the Khageri River is highly variable both within 
the season and across the season, which is the major constraint to 
the system. However, from an O&M point of view, it is an ideal 
system requiring low management input. Its main canal is almost in 
regime condition, that is, with no problems of silting or scouring. 
Its canal networks are safe from risks of flooding and inundation, 
common in other large irrigation schemes in Nepal. It is again an 
extensive development, with few water control structures and canal 
networks inside the command area. At the beginning of IMTP, it 
did not have any technical constraints in water delivery. Its only 
major challenge was the limiting supply at the source. The canal 
layout is shown in Figure 3.5 
Season 
Crops 
Coverage 
Tields 
(t/ha) 
TABLE 3.3 Cropping intensity and crop yields 
Monsoon 
Paddy 
91% 
3.21 
Winter 
Wheat Ofl 
seed 
9% 26% 
1.44 0.33 
Spring, 
Puis Paddy Maize 
es 
47% 3% 46% 
0.34 3.6 0.62 
Total 
222% 
Source (ICON, 1996, NLIO crop cutting survey reports) 
System design shortfalls 
The design of the Khageri System was conceived in 1960 by the 
Department of Irrigation (DOI). There were two objectives behind 
the development of the KIS: to support the livelihood of newly 
settled people and to supply surplus food grain to feed the growing 
population in the capital city of Kathmandu. The project was 
approved in June 1960 by the government and then by the Rapti 
Valley Multi Purpose Development Board. The original planning of 
the project was done by an FAO irrigation expert and the proposal 
was submitted to the Government in September 1960 (according 
to available design report). Construction began in 1961 and was 
completed in 1967 at a cost of NRs 7.3 million (some $1.2 million 
at the 1967 exchange rate). 
The development of the Khageri system shows how system 
design in the eariy days was constrained by the absence of 
agrometrology data as well as by the limited experience of designers 
at that time. The DOI at that time had no experience of 
constructing irrigation scheme of this scale; it was mostly engaged 
in the development of small-scale schemes. It was supported by the 
FAO in carrying out its activities. The external experts were not in 
favour of construction of this system: they argued that the KIS 
command area had a highly porous soil, not suitable for rice crops. 
It was suitable only for maize cultivation. The design report cited 
that the Khageri would need a higher water requirement due to the 
porous nature of the sandy loam soil. Other reports had a similar 
view, suggesting that this type of soil needed comparatively more 
water than that of the Indo-Gangetic plain. However, the 
construction proceeded later with support from the Chairman of 
the resetdement committee. 
FIGURE 3.5 Canal Layout of Khageri System 
At that time, there were no data available on the duties20 of the 
crops nor any data for their estimation. Likewise, there was no 
reliable data on available water flow in the river. In the original 
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design, a duty of 54 acres per cusec at the head of the rice crop was 
assumed. The duty at the main canal head and branch canal head 
were assumed to be 58 and 60 acres per cusec21 allowing the 
conveyance and other types of losses. Likewise the measurement in 
the river over short period (discharge was measured in the 
monsoon season from 1959 for a period of five years) showed that 
about 280 cusecs could be available during the monsoon season. 
With this basic assumption, the area for rice cultivation was 
assumed to be 15120 acres (6123 ha). During the winter periods, it 
was assumed to provide irrigation to about 7000 acres (2800 ha) 
acres for wheat cultivation considering a duty of 100 acre per 
cusec. 
As construction proceeded, the command area was drastically 
reduced to 10000 acres (4000 ha) from the planned 15000 acres. 
The design report of 1967 mentions two factors for this reduction 
in the command area. First, the designers realized that the crop 
water requirement could be much higher than anticipated due to 
high percolation losses. Second, because of erratic monsoon 
rainfall with respect to its onset and amount, water supply to the 
system was highly variable both from season to season and within a 
particular season. A survey by CIP later on found that the potential 
irrigable area in the system was 3900 ha. 
Construction was completed in 1967 and its management 
responsibility was transferred to the CIP from the existing Khageri 
Canal Division in 1974. The CIP also carried out canal lining work 
in selected branch canals and added cross regulators in the main 
canal in 984 to 1985. As in Panchakanya, with the termination of 
the loan period to the CIP in 1989, the maintenance budget to KIS 
was also drastically reduced as shown in Table 3.1. According to 
the technicians, the budget was low as compared to its requirement 
of NRs. 200 per ha that time. However its performance was not as 
poor as in Panchakanya because of relatively simple water control 
technologies, functional canal networks and silt free water. 
However, its targeted command area was never met, because of the 
variable flow at the source. 
River regime and water availability 
The water source of the KIS is the Khageri River, which is a 
tributary of the Rapti River in the Narayani River Basin. The 
82 ton 
annual rainfall in the catchment averages 1600 mm, about 80% of 
which falls during the monsoon months of June to September but 
can be highly variable. Water supply in the rainy season is mainly 
from the runoff produced in the catchment and springs flow, while 
the dry season flow is entirely dependent on the base flow seeping 
from groundwater of the catchment. Water measurement activities 
in later years show that Khageri flow is highly variable across the 
years and across the seasons. Its average flow from August to 
October is more than 6000 litres per second, which drastically falls 
to 700 litres per second towards the end of May. The main 
problem with the source is that flow in the month of July is highly 
variable as seen from Table 3.4, which makes the planning of rice 
transplantation problematic. 
According to farmers, it is also uneconomic to supplement the 
canal water through groundwater because of the deeper 
groundwater table (more than 30 m) and poor discharge available. 
Except in the month of July, paddy cultivation is not a problem, as 
the river discharge becomes stable. There is a saying in the Khageri 
area that if you are able to transplant the rice, then your crop is 
guaranteed. The observed discharge between July to October from 
1992 to 1999 is presented in Table 3.4. The Table also presents the 
average water requirement for each month for the rice crop. 
TABLE 3.4. Observed monthly discharge and monthly water requirement 
Year 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Discharge and monthly water requirement for monsoon rice (for 3900 ha) 
inlps 
Jul 
3840 
3620 
2960 
6840 
3920 
5740 
7520 
7930 
6750 
AFR 
6103 
Aug 
6270 
7260 
6460 
7350 
6580 
5620 
7000 
8680 
7260 
AFR 
7468 
Sip 
6660 
NA 
6280 
7570 
7590 
6080 
7460 
8680 
6750 
AFR 
7176 
Oct 
8550 
NA 
6970 
8140 
8210 
6750 
8140 
6220 
5740 
AFR 
6103 
Source: Kalu et aL (2000); RTDB, DOI and CEMECA consult (2001) 
AFR: Average flow required 
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Due to water shortage and variable flow in the river, water delivery 
has always been on an adhoc basis in Khageri, and irrigated area also 
varies accordingly. The farmers' first concern was about the 
limiting source, when discussions to start joint management began 
in 1992. 
System configuration and water distribution 
The Khageri Irrigation System is a typical medium-sized, 
extensively developed surface irrigation system. It consists of a 
barrage, a 23km long main canal, 8 branch canals and 4 minor 
canals (see Figure 3.5). These minor canals also receive drainage 
water to supplement the canal irrigation. 
The beadworks and canal networks 
The headwork consists of two gates spanning 10 m each separated 
by a 2m thick pillar. It was originally designed to pass 6000 cusecs 
of flood water. In order to pass the excess flow, a causeway was 
proposed alongside the headwork barrage which was replaced by a 
permanent bridge later. A sluice has been put on the right-bank of 
the barrage to divert water in the canal. There have been no 
problems associated with the headwork. 
The main canal can be considered as a regime canal, with no 
problem of silting and scouring. It was developed as a contour 
canal to irrigate the area south of this canal. Its original designed 
capacity was 7850 lps. However, flows of more than 8500 lps have 
been also observed in this canal (see Table 3.3). It was designed to 
collect water from both the Khageri River (7000 lps) and the 
surrounding drainage (850 lps). The main canal in its head reach is 
9km long and passes through the forest The topography of land in 
the jungle reach is full of ridges and valleys, where several small 
reservoirs have been formed like 'melons in a vine' as the result of 
the construction of the main canal. These reservoirs act as 
intermediate storage for the main canal, and have been of great 
importance to maintain the water delivery in the system. The canal 
reach after this jungle involves several cross drainage structures. 
All the nine branch canals and four minor canals are aligned on 
well-defined ridges. In an earlier report by the FAO expert, it was 
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proposed to line the branch canals, but this was rejected due to 
financial limitations. It was also assumed that the porous canal 
would become lined by the silt over time, so lining may not be 
required in future. The canal networks and their respective length 
and command area are shown in Table 3.5. 
TABLE 3.5 Description of canal networks 
Canals 
Main Canals 
Outlets 
BC1 
BC2 
BC3 
BC4 
BC5 
6 Main 
BC6East 
BC6West 
BC7 
BC8 
Minor 1 
Minor 2 
Minor 3 
Minor 4 
Total 
Length in Km 
23.20 
3.77 
4.98 
7.30 
2.90 
2.30 
1.44 
4.S2 
3.00 
Z80 
4.8 
3.6 
5.5 
3 
1.4 
Command Area 
ha 
-
483.0 
266.0 
505.8 
392.1 
127.5 
194.0 
165.0 
429.5 
341.9 
238.1 
177.3 
189.9 
256.7 
99.9 
60.8 
3927.5 
Remarks 
-
Total 41 outlets 
Source: NLIO office records 
Water distribution 
Water distribution from the main canal is carried out by means of 
cross regulators with manually adjustable steel gates. There were 
five such structures along the main canal in front of Branch 1,2,3, 6 
and 7. Branch canals offtakes are overflow weirs and also have 
manually adjustable gates. Inside the branch canals, there are no 
gated structures, and water delivery takes place through piped 
outlets. The CIP had started a pilot experiment with construction 
of cross regulators inside two branches (1 and 2) with the aim of 
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providing flexible distribution, but the program was later cancelled 
after strong objection from tailend farmers. 
So, the water distribution arrangement was relatively simple in 
this system. There were no gated structures inside the command 
area, and gate operation was required only in the main canal, which 
were also few in number. Due to the limiting and highly variable 
flow, rotational distribution was practiced. Most common was the 
weekly rotation, in which branch canals were divided into two 
groups. However, during very low flow situations, there was 
another type of rotation, called the sectional rotation. More details 
about negotiations of these rotations are discussed in chapters 5 
and 8. Khageri had also similar problems in water management 
inside the command area due to the characteristics of its land 
topography, as explained in Panchakanya. 
Agriculture and land tenure 
About 97% of the farmers in the Khageri are owner-cultivators 
(Wallingford and DOL, 2001), whereas tenants make up less than 
0.5% of the total population. The remaining are owner-tenants. 
The average land holding here is 0.87 ha, slightly higher than in 
Panchakanya. The population with more than 1 ha of landholdings 
here also account for only at 19%, with remaining landholdings of 
less than 1 ha. The average landholding for farms of less than one 
hectare is 0.6 ha, whereas for farms larger than 1 ha that figure is 
1.9 ha. Like in Panchakanya, this shows that social differentiation 
due to landholding status is limited. 
The major crops grown in the area are rice in the monsoon, 
wheat and pulses in winter and maize and spring paddy (only in the 
first branch canal, Bi) in Spring. Except for rice, these crops are 
grown under rainfed cultivation. The intensity and yield as in 1995 
are presented in Table 3.6. The yields are similar to those realized 
in Panchakanya. 
3.4 The West Gandak Irrigation System 
The system was initially constructed by India according to Indo-
Nepal agreement and handed over to Nepal in 1979. However, 
canal networks at field level were not developed and irrigation 
86 Engineering Participation 
could only take place in part of the command area. The CADP 
feasibility report (1982) mentions that there was only one 
temporary turnout for every 300 ha, and only 900 ha land was 
under irrigation. But the government reports of same period 
mentions an efficiency of 50% for monsoon rice and 30% for 
winter crops (Silt Consult, 1989). This means about 4000 ha was 
under irrigation during monsoon and 2500 ha during winter crops. 
The lower figure mentioned in the CADP feasibility report might 
have been cited to justify the CADP investment. Whatever the case 
may be, it can be concluded that irrigation provision at this time 
was far less than the potential area. Its layout is shown in Figure 3.6 
Seasons 
Crops 
Coverage 
Yields 
(t/ha) 
TABLE 3.6 Cropping intensity anc 
Monsoon 
Paddy 
92% 
2.9 
Winter 
Wheat Oil Pulses 
seed 
30% 12% 25% 
1.46 0.33 0.34 
crop yields 
Spring 
Paddy 
5% 
3.45 
Mai 
ze 
40% 
0.62 
Total 
206% 
Source: NLIO crop cutting survey reports. Other crops cover about 2% area. 
Command area intervention and operational change 
In 1982, the DOI launched the CADP a in this system, as a lack of 
farm level structures and support services were identified as the 
major constraints in effective water utilization. The CADP was 
funded by the ADB, IFAD and the UNDP. The CADP's objective 
was to increase crop production and increase farm-level income 
through providing year-round irrigation facilities and providing 
other agricultural support services. 
The CADP was completed in the system in 1989 at a cost of $112 
million. It was an intensive type of development with irrigation facilities 
extended up to the 7-12 ha blocks. In the hierarchy of canal networks, 8 
different types of canal networks were developed, depending upon 
irrigated area and canal discharge capacity. The CADP also carried out 
drainage improvement activities by constructing embankment dykes to 
control the problem of flooding inside the command area. The CADP 
also provided rural village road networks of more than 122km to facilitate 
transportation of the agriculture produce in the area. 
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FIGURE 3.6 Layout of West Gandak system 
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The changes in the livelihoods of the people brought on by the 
CADP were considerable. Silt Consult (1989) mentions that yields 
of major crops like rice, wheat and sugarcane increased by 61%, 
100% and 56% after the command area intervention. The changes 
in cropping pattern over time in the system are shown in Table 3.7. 
The report also mentions that the amount of chemical fertilizer use 
also increased from 51 kg/ha to 93.3 kg/ha in the same period. 
Local farmers say that with the availability of irrigation water, 
they also started cultivating improved varieties (especially paddy 
and wheat) bringing the seeds from India. Extension activities by 
the District Agriculture Office (DAO) and credit facilities by the 
ADBN had also a major role in improving productivity. According 
to the farmers, the newly established large-scale Lumbini Sugar Mill 
in the vicinity had a greater role in increasing sugarcane production. 
The factory had carried out several programs to increase the 
productivity of the sugarcane. 
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Crops 
Paddy 
Wheat 
Maize 
Oilseeds 
Pulses 
Sugarcane 
TABLE 3.7 Changes in the crop yields 
Cbangf in Crop Yields, t/ba 
1982/1983 
137 
0.62 
-
0.3 
0.32 
21.97 
after CADP 
1988/1989 
2.2 
1.24 
1.2 
0.53 
0.38 
34.17 
1993/1994 
3.4 
1.54 
2.06 
0.56 
0.63 
47.7 
Source: Silt Consult (1989); CADI and APTEC (1999) 
During the CADP, a high level of service was possible due to 
massive funding, not available thereafter. One engineer who 
worked in NWGIS during the CADP intervention told that there 
were more than 100 supervisors and gate operators to operate the 
system. Water delivery even up to the tertiary level canal was 
carried out by these operators. Likewise, canal cleaning, including 
at tertiary level was done by the project office. After the end of the 
CADP in 1989, there was no proper repair and maintenance in the 
system, and lack of desilting work in the main canal reduced the 
main canal's capacity considerably. The Project office was also 
scaled down to a much lower unit There were now only 18 
operators to look after the operation of the system. Available funds 
were very low to provide maintenance activities as compared to a 
required O&M cost of NRs. 300 per ha, shown in Table 3.1. 
The CADP had carried out radical changes in the infrastructure 
to provide an adequate and reliable supply of water to farmers. It 
had planned continuous flow at all canal levels during the monsoon 
season for rice, and continuous flow up to the tertiary level canals 
and four-day rotation among the farm ditches for wheat (CADP 
Design Main Report, 1982). Each turnout was provided with check 
structures employing manually adjustable gates. There were more 
than 1000 gates added in the system to achieve flexible distribution. 
But this water delivery arrangement proved useless in the absence 
of manpower and funds. The assumed flexible O&M plan as 
envisaged by the CADP could not be retained in practice. 
The system deteriorated rapidly and by 1992, only about 50 % 
of the area received water. The discharge in the main canal fell to 
2200 lps against the design discharge of 8500 lps due to heavy 
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sediment build up. GITEC (1992) mentions that the actual irrigated 
area declined to 2200 ha for monsoon rice by 1992, and several of 
the tertiary- and farm-level canals and related structures were either 
abandoned or dysfunctional. Both farmers and the canal operators 
say that such rapid deterioration of the structure was not only due 
to the budgetary constraints, but also due to faulty design of canals 
and structures. They also say that much of the damage involved 
lower-order canals, rather than on the Main Canal and the Branch 
canals. Farmers were never consulted in the design and 
construction of these canals and associated water control 
structures. In many cases farmers found the location of the check 
structure and field channels inappropriate, and they dismantled the 
control structures and started irrigation after constructing the 
checks and field channels they felt appropriate. Canal operators 
told that within two years after construction most of the gates 
inside the command area were either removed or made 
dysfunctional by the farmers. Damage to lower- order canals and 
associated structures done by farmers had also been cited in the 
post- evaluation study of CADP (Silt Consult 1989), which was 
carried out immediately after the completion of CADP. 
System maintenance was not given required attention after the 
CADP. According to the Project Office, about 70% of the Main 
Canal was silted up by 1992. The situation inside the command 
area was no better. The Project Office expected the farmers to 
clean the lower-order canals, but farmers expected the government 
to clean up them like in the past. Some groups who used to clean 
their canals also lost the interest due to unreliable flow, in turn the 
consequence to decreasing flow in the Main Canal. 
Effort to involve farmers 
One of the objectives of the CADP was to involve farmers in 
system O&M activities. Water user groups were set up to: ensure 
proper distribution of irrigation water in farm ditches; promote 
proper and effective communication and co-ordination between 
irrigation personnel and water users; assure financial and 
organizational incentives to fellow farmers; and form and 
strengthen existing village co-operatives23. It had envisaged handing 
over the O&M responsibility of lower-order canals like MFD and 
MCs and SFDs (the details of this lower-order canal appear in next 
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sections) to Water users groups (WUGs). According to the Impact 
Evaluation Study of CADP (Silt Consult 1989), three levels of 
water user groups were set up: the farm ditch group, to serve farm 
ditches of on average about 7.5 ha; the WUG to serve MFD canals 
(an average area of 50 ha) and the Federation of Water Users 
Groups (FEWUGs) to serve supply-level canals like the Minor 
(average area of 200 ha). However, this activity started towards the 
end of the project when the construction activities were almost 
over. A total of 132 WUGs and 11 Federations of WUGs 
(FEWUGs) were formed, most of them within a very short period 
of time, as shown in Table 3.8 
TABLE 3.8 WUGs Formation During CADP 
Year of 
Formation 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Total 
Number 
WUGs 
3 
12 
72 
45 
132 
of Number of Total numbers oj training 
FEWUGs sessions to WUG 
16 
11 
11 
Number of 
Participants 
763 
Source (Silt Consult, 1989). 
Such groups were formed from gatherings of farmers, and the 
consultants and Project Office staff were jointly responsible for 
forming these groups. The groups became defunct as soon as they 
were created mainly due to the following reasons (according to 
interviews with farmers and engineers who worked during CADP): 
• Farmers had seen massive investment during the command 
area development project and felt that government would 
continue to provide support They were not involved during 
the whole project implementation, and thus were not 
convinced that they should involve themselves at the later 
stage in operation and maintenance activities. 
• Even the Irrigation Department had no framework for users' 
involvement in irrigation development and management at that 
time. So the project officials at that time also did not pay 
attention. 
By 1992, there were only a few WUGs remaining, and neither 
the agency nor the farmers were performing their required 
maintenance jobs. The agency could not provide the service, as the 
annual fund provided by the government was too low. On the 
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other hand, farmers saw no sense in maintaining the farm ditches, 
as water delivery to their fields was unreliable. Each party was 
blaming the other for the declining performance of the system. 
Government blamed farmers for damaging the structures, the gates 
and destroying the tertiary and field channels and drainage 
network, while farmers blamed the agency for not cleaning out the 
main and branch canals which decreased the main canal flow 
considerably. This lead to an accumulation of the deferred 
maintenance works, and early rehabilitation became inevitable. 
With the beginning of IMT Policy in 1992, the government 
initiated the Joint Management program in this system, aiming to 
stop further deterioration. According to the IMD engineers the 
main reasons for its selection was the abundance of water at the 
source. Besides, it had tremendous potential to increase agricultural 
productivity because of the strong agriculture community, fertile 
soil and easy market access. Many farmers told that they were very 
enthusiastic to participate in the new program, for several reasons. 
They were faced with the declining performance of the system after 
the withdrawal of CADP due to a lack of repair and canal-cleaning 
activities. Even with radical changes in technology and 
infrastructure by the CADP, the two major problems in the system 
the inundation and flooding and silting of the main canal had 
remain unresolved (details appear in the next few sections). They 
expected a new program could bring better water supply 
conditions. The Gandak system, its physical features, and the 
challenges it presented to its operators, managers and the farmers 
in 1992 are further explained below. 
River regime and associated problems 
The system draws its share of water from a reservoir formed by a 
huge barrage built across the Narayani River along the Indo-Nepal 
border. The intake point of the West Gandak lies about 600m 
upstream of the barrage. Out of the three gated openings, each 
with a capacity of 300 cusecs (8430 lps) at the offtake point, only 
one was in use with the others closed off with concrete walls. 
There was no need to open the remaining two gates, as the canal 
downstream was designed only for 8500 lps. Farmers in the area 
say that they had heard that initially there were plans to irrigate 
about 27,000 ha land, and the provisions of three gate openings 
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were made accordingly. However, only 8,700 ha was developed 
afterwards diverting 8500 lps of water. The reasons for this massive 
reduction in the area and hence in water diversion remain unclear. 
Operational problems 
West Gandak does not face any water shortage problem at the 
source as its diversion requirement is only 300 cusecs whereas the 
expected low flow in the Narayani river is 20,000 cusecs, which 
occurs during the month of February /March (as per the original 
design report). The system can have full discharge year-round if 
infrastructure downstream are in proper condition. However, due 
to operational constraints resulting from occasional floods and silt-
laden water, water availability during the monsoon season is always 
variable. The control of barrage operation is with the Indian 
authorities, and farmers also feel that they are not sincere in 
maintaining the required pond level at the barrage location. 
Silt problems: Silt intrusion in the main canal is another major 
problem in the system. The Narayani River carries a tremendous 
amount of silt during the monsoon which directly enters into the 
main canal of the NWGIS. There are no mechanisms to control 
the silt load entering the main canal. According to the project 
technicians, the average silt deposition is 45 cm in the head reach 
section which gradually falls to 20 cm at the tail end after each 
monsoon irrigation season. A good design of channel however, 
should allow the silt to be transported with the flow, and be 
deposited in the field so that canal is not silted up24. However the 
CADP ovedooked this criterion, providing large numbers of check 
structures in the main canal which retards the flow, encouraging 
sediment build up. 
The major portion of the main canal thus requires de-silting 
work annually. This work is not only costly, but also requires 
mechanical equipment like excavators and dump trucks. The 
desilting process is also difficult, as both sides of the canal 
embankment consist of Sisoo tree forest In the 1980s, all of the 
canal networks in Tend were planted with Sisoo trees by the Forest 
Department (DOF) under the Terai Community Forestry Program 
funded by the WB. The forest have now become one of the major 
problems in canal cleaning and maintenance activities in all of the 
irrigation systems in Nepal There are three problems relating to 
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this plantation. First, they hamper the canal- cleaning activities as 
trees restrict the movement of heavy machines. Second, the roots 
of dead trees upon decaying have been responsible for weakening 
the canal embankment This not only increases canal seepage, but 
also makes canals susceptible to breaching. Thirdly, upon falling on 
the canal, dead trees obstruct the flow, which disrupts the canal 
operation and increases the frequency of canal breaching. 
Problems of flooding and inundation: The West Gandak also 
faces particular challenges from problems of flooding and 
inundation. The problems are more dominant in the upper part of 
the command area, where there are several rivulets flowing from 
north to south which are blocked by the big canal embankment 
going to India (see Figure 3.6). Though siphon structures have 
been constructed at many places to drain flood water, they are not 
found sufficient and are less effective due to lack of proper and 
timely repair and maintenance. This causes part of the command 
area to be always inundated during monsoon period, destroying 
whole crops. According to the Indo-Nepal agreement, the 
responsibilities to clean and maintain these siphon structures lies 
with the Indian Government However, according to project 
technicians, these problems are given low attention by the Indian 
Authorities. In many cases, at the time of flooding, farmers of the 
area orgamze and dismantle the embankment of the irrigation canal 
running into India in order to pass the floodwater. The different 
letters exchanged between the Project Office and the Indian 
authorities show that there are one or two incidents every year, and 
this is one of the major problems for the concerned authorities of 
both the governments. 
According to the Indo-Nepal Agreement, damage to crops is to 
be compensated by the Indian Authorities. In 1992, the West 
Gandak project office had asked for NRs. 893038 (about % 20,000 
that time) in compensation from India for crop damage in that 
year. Several letters exchanged between the West Gandak, the 
Indian Authority and the DOI show that this compensation was 
never given25. Since then, the project engineers in West Gandak 
lost their interest in calculating the degree of such damage. There is 
also a Standing Committee between India and Nepal to look after 
the issues of floods and inundation between the two countries. A 
review of the minute book of this committee shows that West 
Gandak problems are always on the agenda of discussions. 
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However, such discussions have always ended with recommending 
further study on the matter! 
These problems were there even before the CADP, and resulted 
from the construction of the canals and the bund by the Gandak 
project, which obstructed the natural flow of drainage causing 
flooding and inundation. The CADP had tried to solve this 
problem by constructing the dykes at the riverbank, as well as by 
constructing cross-drainage structures and drainage channels at 
several locations. It was expected that the dykes would confine the 
flow along the river channel and save the cropland from 
inundation. However, the dykes became less effective in controlling 
the flow over time due to: erosion of the dykes and rise in the 
riverbed level due to confined water width. This has resulted in a 
situation such that the riverbed is higher than the adjoining farms, 
which has further increased the risk of crop damage upon failure of 
the dykes. Farmers of the West Gandak systems have been thus 
suffering from the same problems; flooding and siltation since the 
initiation of the project. Radical changes in technology by the 
CADP could not bring any change in these problems. These 
problems require continuous attention and many of the issues 
cannot be addressed by the concerned local agency only. It also 
requires good understanding and co-operation by higher authorities 
in the Government of Nepal, and also co-operation by the Indian 
authorities. 
Water conveyance and distribution system 
The CADP aimed to increase system efficiency by means of radical 
improvements in the system technology by implementing: 
rehabilitation and improvement of the existing main canal, 
construction and/or improvement of major drains, collector drains 
and associated structures and improvement of access roads. The 
resulting conveyance network is complex, owing to the presence of 
different sizes of canals at different locations. In its hierarchy of 
canals there are eight different levels of canals: the Main Canal, the 
Sub Distributary (SD), Minor Canals (MQ, Minor Canal Blocks 
(MOB), Water Course, Special Farm Ditches (SFD), Main Farm 
Ditches (MFD), Farm Ditches (FDs). The Sub-distributors, 
Minors, MC blocks and SFD draw water directly from the main 
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canal whereas the MFD and FD and watercourse are lower-order 
canals of the sub-distributary and the minors. 
This type of terminology for canal networks had never existed in 
other irrigation systems in Nepal (and even today exist only in the 
three systems where CADP intervention took place) and were 
introduced by the consultant involved in the design and 
construction. The design supervision of the CADP was carried out 
by the International Engineering Company (American) and NIA 
CONSULT of the Philippines, and the nomenclature was 
borrowed accordingly. The schematic diagram of the canal network 
in NWGIS is shown in Figure 3.7. There are four sub-distributaries 
with a total length of 46.07 km and 6 minor canals with a total 
length of 20.43 km. 
The total length of lower order canals like MFD, and FD is 
more than 650 km. The FDs are the lowest-order constructed 
canals which deliver water to seasonally prepared water courses, to 
finally deliver the water into the fields. The features of the canal 
networks are presented in Table 3.9. 
SJXo. 
1 
2 
a 
b 
c 
d 
3 
TABLE 3.9 Details of West Gandak canal 
Name of Canal 
Main Canal 
Sub-distributary 
canals 
Bishnuganj 
Majhariya 
Bhujahawa 
Piparhawa 
Minor 
Distributaries 
Nandapur 
Shankarpur 
Palhi 
Gctma 
Bhagatpur 
RagarganR 
Lenpb 
in Km 
32.0 
18.15 
8.60 
9.80 
9.52 
420 
5.80 
2.88 
3.45 
2.05 
2.05 
29.43 
Command 
Area in ba 
1686.77 
1310.81 
1241.8 
1147.62 
1347.67 
372.49 
456.99 
189.10 
259.58 
2403 
24723 
8700 
Capacity 
in m*/s 
8.5 
1.31 
124 
1.15 
136 
0.37 
0.45 
0.19 
025 
024 
025 
8.5 
system 
Remarks 
termed as 
branch canals 
in the thesis 
inclusive of 3 
sub branch 
including 1 sub 
branch 
including 2 sub 
branch 
including 1 sub 
branch 
Source: Silt Consult (1989) 
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FIGURE 3.7 Canal Network details of West Gandak 
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The main canal and other canal networks 
The main canal was extended to 32.7km from 25km by extending 
the tail end portion, and four more minor canals were added to the 
system during the CADP. The designed capacity of the main canal is 8500 
Ips (300 cusecs). The main canal has 25 check regulators and 41 head 
regulators of different capacity. It is primarily an earthen canal with 
both cut and fill sections. There is dry boulder pitching in deep 
cuts and sandy zones, and in areas adjacent to structures. The canal 
slope for the first 30 km is 0.00018, and 0.00023 for the remaining 
2km section. The designed diversion water requirement is thus 
about 1 litre per second per ha. A minimum free-board of 60cm 
has been provided in the original designed section. It is a contour 
canal and thus irrigates only one side of its alignment (in this case 
only the left side). 
The construction of the main canal has blocked many of the 
natural waterways. The canal systems thus include several cross 
drainage structures like aqueducts, canal siphons, and drain 
siphons. Provisions for interceptor drains to connect the natural 
waterways into these cross drains were developed during the 
CADP. The main canal includes all kinds of structures that are 
mosdy found in supply-oriented gravity canal irrigation network as 
given in Table 3.10. 
TABLE 3.10 Major structures of the main canal 
Type of structures 
Aqueduct 
Cross regulators 
Head regulators of major off taking canals 
Canal escapes 
Canal siphons 
Drain siphons 
Village road bridges 
Numbers 
3 
25 
7 
3 
16 
9 
44 
The designed carrying capacity of the Sub Distributary canal varies 
from 0.34 to 1.25 cumecs while a minor canal has a capacity up to 
300 lps. The same applies for each MFD and FD are 90 and 30 lps 
respectively. A FD commands 4 to 10 ha or an average area of 7.5 
ha, depending upon the topography. A MFD commands a 50 ha 
irrigation block. The SD, MFD, and FDs are earthen canals. Some 
portions of SFDs and MFDs pass through depressions and weak 
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sandy zones and are fortified with boulder lining. The network of 
tertiary canals (MFD), farm ditches and associated water control 
structures are shown in Table 3.11. 
The intensity of these structures show the extent of 
development CADP had carried out in the system. As mentioned 
previously, most of the farm ditches and their turnouts were 
already damaged or made dysfunctional by 1992. This section has 
thus highlighted the high amount of infrastructure to be operated 
and maintained by the WUA and DOI as well as problems of 
flooding and inundation beyond local capacities to resolve. 
TABLE 3.11 Details of tertiary canals and farm ditches and associated 
structures 
191 km of MFD 
446 km of ED 
173 MFD tum-out gates 
305 MFD cross regulators 1884 FD turnouts 
375 MFD culverts 
443 FD culverts 
Water distribution technology 
The West Gandak system was designed as a highly flexible system 
in terms of water distribution and consisted of check structures at 
every turnout, which can be clearly seen from the Tables above. 
The gates used in the division structures were manually adjustable 
gates. It was assumed that with introduction of this flexible supply-
oriented water delivery, farmers could receive the desired amount 
of water in accordance with their need at any moment But this 
requires more than 100 operators and a relatively large maintenance 
budget The designers overlooked the operational reality, as this 
level of management input was hardly possible in the Nepalese 
context 
The large numbers of check structures were also the cause of silt 
deposition in the main canaL Interviews with the engineers 
involved in the design and construction of the NWGIS revealed 
that there was no discussion about the design prepared by the 
consultant The construction was carried out as designed by the 
consultant The design did not pay any attention to the silt problem 
and operational problems of the future. Pradhan (1996) has 
reviewed a similar design in the Banganga Irrigation system which 
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was also under the CADP and designed by the same consultant. 
His study also shows how such technology causes problems in 
canal O&M, and he considers this type of intensive development 
unsuitable to encourage self-management by farmers. 
So the West Gandak had two major challenges at the beginning 
of the management reform. The first was the challenge posed by 
the physical environment (the problem of inundation, flooding and 
silt) and the other was the constraint of the technology which 
demanded higher and skilled management input and a large O&M 
budget However, it did not have the water scarcity problem at the 
source that the Khageri and Panchakanya schemes had. 
Agriculture and land tenure 
As in the previous two cases, more than 95% of the farmers are 
owner-cultivators where as tenants account for less than 1%. The 
rest are owner-tenants or practice share-cropping. The average 
landholding here is 1.89 ha (Everest Research Centre, 1993). Based 
on the records of the three branch canals studied in depth (the 
MC5, Mangharia and the Germi minor), the percentage of farmers 
with more than 1 ha of land is 18% and they cover 49% of the total 
land, whereas those with less than 1 ha constitute 82% and cover 
51% of total land holdings. The average holding on the smaller 
farm size is 0.45 ha whereas for the large landholding range it is 
2.10 ha. The land holding size is slightly higher here as compared 
to the previous two cases with a wider social differentiation 
between irrigators. 
Monsoon rice, wheat and sugarcane are principal crops grown 
here. Maize is not grown here, whereas sugarcane is gaining 
momentum because of number of sugarcane factories around the 
area. Table 3.7 has already shown the change in crop production 
over the years. 
3.5 Conclusions: Opportunities and Constraints for Irrigation 
Management Reform 
This chapter has provided a background to why management 
reform has become essential in the irrigation sector in Nepal As 
shown in the cases of West Gandak and Panchakanya, successive 
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attempts to improve service delivery and area expansion failed to 
meet the expected targets. Besides, all the systems were totally 
dependent on government funding, which was insufficient to meet 
the operation and maintenance cost Though the Panchakanya 
farmers tried to improve their situation by forming an association, 
it was not effective because of the poor condition of the 
conveyance system. Top down approaches in project design and 
implementation, and lack of farmers' involvement in operation and 
maintenance after the project launch, made successive intervention 
programs ineffective to deliver the intended benefit to the farmers. 
The system features described here also show they have 
different opportunities and constraints to encourage farmers' 
participation. Both Panchakanya and Khageri are relatively water-
scarce systems, which is considered as a positive factor to induce 
collective action (Uphoff et al., 1992; Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002). 
The power to resolve water scarcity is a positive role for a WUA, 
which operates alongside the more difficult tasks of fee collection 
and conflict resolution. However, the scale of scarcity is different in 
different seasons. Panchakanya has enough water at the source for 
monsoon rice, but has been facing water shortage because of heavy 
seepage in the main canal. Khageri faces scarcity in monsoon too, 
but it does not have the potential to irrigate in winter and spring. 
The Gandak system has plentiful water at the source, but for 
farmers, this too has become a water-scarce system because of the 
technical and operational constraints. The thesis will further show 
that considering only the linear relation between water scarcity and 
collective action is not helpful: it needs broader understanding of 
how water availability is influenced by several technical and 
physical factors. 
The technology in both Khageri and Panchakanya is relatively 
simple. Inside the command area, there are no gated structures to 
operate and maintain in these two systems. That means operational 
and maintenance requirements of these systems are low. Whereas 
in West Gandak, there are networks of canals extending up to 7.5 
ha irrigation blocks, which also contain associated water control 
structures, requiring high levels of management input Besides, the 
Gandak also faces severe challenges from the chronic problem of 
inundation and flooding. The solution to these problems requires 
the co-operation and support from the Indian authorities across 
the border. The scale of work required to overcome these 
constraints, however, is daunting to a WUA. 
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The pattern of system evolution has also brought different socio-
political structures in these systems. Both Khageri and 
Panchakanya are newly settled community from adjoining hill 
districts, and were provided with uniform land holdings. At the 
same time, they also have past knowledge of collective action in 
irrigation development and management The society here is more 
homogeneous in this respect, which is often considered as 
favourable situation for collective action to emerge (Meinzen-Dick 
et al. 2002). Because of its proximity to the capital Kathmandu, and 
its central location in the country, Chittwan has developed rapidly 
over the years with increased economic and political opportunities 
to the local communities. However, in NWGIS, there are three 
different communities with different origins, and at the same time 
have more dominant caste relationships. The different 
communities speak different languages and many of the farmers do 
not speak the official Nepali language. Because of better access to 
economic, political and educational opportunities, farmers in 
Chittwan are more politically conscious and economically better off 
than in West Gandak. The socio-political dependence of local 
farmers on locally powerful people is thus greater in West Gandak 
as compared to Khageri and Panchakanya. One similarity in all the 
systems, however, is that all of them pose similar land tenure 
pattern, as more than 97% of the farmers are owner-cultivators. 
The following chapters of this thesis will show how these 
opportunities and constraints were analyzed, debated and adapted 
during the implementation of the management reform in these 
systems and how they influenced the water management change 
after subsequent management transfer. They will show how 
understanding these opportunities and constraints is an important 
part of strategizing participatory processes in irrigation 
management, for both farmers and professionals involved. 
Notes 
1
 The valley also consists of part of the adjacent district, NawalparasL It is 
also called the Rapti Doon Valley, a name derived from the major river in 
the valley, the Rapti. 
2
 These are the local tribes of Nepal. 
3
 Nepal is divided into three main geographic areas: the Himalayan, Mid-
Hills and the Terai Regions. 
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4
 . Owing to malaria, people were initially afraid to settle in the area, which 
was popularly known as Malaria hell (Belder, 1972, cited in Shukla and 
Sharma, 1997). The countrywide eradication programmes in the 1960s 
and 1970s attracted many migrants to the Terai. 
5
 These figures are from the Panchakanya system, but reflects the 
temporal variation in migration in the Chittwan valley 
6
 One Cumec equals to 1000 liters per second (lps) 
7
 There was already an inundation canal without any permanent diversion 
structure in the eastern part constructed by the British Rulers in India in 
1911 (see Chapter 2). 
8
 The agreement does not specify the amount of water. Nepal also 
receives 1000 cusecs of water to irrigate 29000 ha under the Narayani 
Irrigation project from the Eastern Main canal at a location 90Km 
downstream from the barrage. At the Western Main Canal, a 15 MW 
powerhouse has also been constructed for Nepal. 
9
 There were three irrigation systems under the CADP, the Mnausmara, 
Banganga (Pradhan, 1996) and the West Gandak. All these systems had 
more assured water supply and potential of providing year-round 
irrigation as compared to others irrigation systems in Nepal. 
10
 The exact date of construction of the system is unclear: GITEC (1992) 
puts it as 1933 in the IMTP project appraisal whereas Adhikari (2000) 
mentions a construction date of 1923. According to many native Tharu 
settlers, the Chittwan valley was divided into four different administrative 
zones called 'Praghanna' in the past The Panchakanya was in the 4th 
Praghanna and the irrigation system was constructed under the directive of 
Ratan Chowdhary who was the official representative of the Praghanna 
some 215 years ago. The WUA's annual report (Devkota, 2001) also 
mentions that the system is already 218 years old. 
11
 Maujba refers to a land grant, as mentioned in Chapter 2. 
12
 Ku/o refers to small canal constructed by the farmers. 
13
 Kbola means stream. 
14
 Tbarus were a majority until the mid-late sixties but by 1992, were only 
25% (Gitec, 1992). A Baseline Study by ICON (1996) shows the ratio of 
migrants to natives as 59% to 41%. 
15
 Generally a weir contains a gated opening at its side adjacent to the off-
taking canal The crest level of this gate is kept at a lower level than that 
of the offtaking canal bed, so that water with higher silt content passes 
under the sluice gate and relatively silt-free water passes through the canal. 
During floods the sluice gate is kept open to prevent silting up of the area 
upstream of the weir. 
16
 Pradhan (1995) distinguishes two types of development of irrigation 
systems: the extensive and intensive. In extensive development, canal 
networks are not developed at the lower level and have relatively fewer 
water control structures. In intensive development, canal networks are 
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developed at the lower field level (say up to 7. 5 ha block) and include 
large numbers of water control structures. 
17
 DOI staff are transferred to new locations at every 2 to 3 years. So both 
contractors and engineers were different during the two different 
rehabilitation and expansion programs. 
18
 Gbol generally means a submerged area in monsoon season 
19
 There are different farm size classifications between Nepal Rastra Bank 
(the national bank of Nepal), National Planning Commission (NPQ and 
other institutions. The Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP) has set a land-
holding of lha as the size below which the average income is below the 
poverty line (ICON, 1996). The same criteria is used here for land holding 
classification. 
20
 Duty is the area irrigable by a cusec ( or cumec, if expressed in metric 
system) 
21
 I have put the data in imperial units as they appeared in the initial 
design report The duties of 54, 58 and 60 acre per cusecs represents a 
design flow of 1.30, 1.19 and 1.17 liters per second (lps) per ha 
respectively. One cusec represents flow of 28.6 liters per second and 1 
acre is 0.4 ha. 
22
 There were three irrigation systems under the CADP, the Mnausmara, 
Banganga (Pradhan, 1996) and the West Gandak. 
23
 Village cooperatives were being promoted by the government 
throughout the country to provide agricultural support services to the 
farmers. There are hardly any such cooperatives operating successfully 
these days. 
24
 Canals in the Indo-Gangetic plains are designed on the basis of Lacey's 
regime theory, which assumes an ideal situation of canal section, which 
allow neither scouring nor silting in the canal. Details of Lacey's regime 
theory can be found in most of the Indian text books in irrigation 
engineering (see for example Bhart Singh, 1988; Varshney eta/, 1983 ) 
25
 At the time of writing of this Thesis there were three incidents of 
flooding in West Gandak (between July to September 2002) and 
according to newspapers, the canal is not operational The Water 
Resources Minister from Bihar State visited the system and has promised 
to compensate the damage this time. 
Initiating New ljocal Organisation: 
Forming the WUAs 
This chapter is about the initial organizing processes of the WUA. 
It first presents farmers' reaction to government decisions to 
transfer management responsibility to them, and then describes 
how the WUA development proceeded. It shows how the 
outcomes of group formation process is shaped by existing societal 
conditions, although they are based on similar design principles and 
follow similar approaches. This shows that the organization design 
should not be confined to structural design of the organization 
only, but also consider the social and political relations within the 
irrigation systems, as well as the technical demands and inequities 
of the water distribution. My own involvement in the IMT 
program in Khageri and Panchakanya came after these group 
formation activities were over. 
The first case, that of Panchakanya shows how the previous 
tradition of collective action shaped the negotiations and the 
processes of group formation. The second case, that of the 
Khageri, shows how farmers struggled within their own domain in 
negotiating their water rights and representation in the 
organization. The third case, the West Gandak shows very different 
outcomes from the other two. It is an example of how the 
powerful local elite captured the process, to provide continuity of 
their interests. In this case, politicians used the WUA as a platform 
to demonstrate the strength of their political parties. It also shows 
how a few selected people capture the WUA in a unitary 
organizational model. 
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4.1 Reviewing the Organit^ng Process 
The development of the WUAs in IMTP in Nepal is steered by the 
concerned irrigation project office looking after that system, usually 
with support from external professionals. The DOI has its own 
Association Organizers (AOs) in all the district-level offices and a 
Senior Sociologist at Regional Offices. The idea of using an AO 
was borrowed from Philippines, and was first introduced in IMP 
(see chapter 2) and other participatory management programs of 
the DOI that began at the end of the 1980s (Gautam, 1990; Pant et 
al, 1992). The AOs and sociologists were initially hired on a 
contract basis, but were later given permanent positions within the 
DOI structure: it was found that they lacked motivation with a 
short span of contact and lack of long-term career security. By 
1992, all the positions of the AOs were converted into permanent 
positions, and their status was also upgraded later on from the Non 
Gazetted II class to Non Gazetted I class1. Permanent posts of 
senior sociologists were also created to provide career opportunity 
as the next higher position of the AO. Besides the involvement of 
the AOs and the sociologists, Farmers Organizers (FOs) are also 
recruited from among the farming community to work as an 
intermediary between the irrigation agency and the local farmers. 
The use of FOs was also started by the American consultant firm 
involved in the IMP. The FOs are involved in preparing the 
inventory of the system, to establish the boundary of the irrigation 
system and also to find out system constraints in water delivery. 
They are temporarily hired, paid, and relieved after the formation 
oftheWUA. 
With the rapid expansion of IMT programs worldwide, 
government agencies are often directly involved in organizing local 
groups. In Mexico, the staff of the National Water Commission 
(CNA) along with staff from the Institute for Water Technology 
(IMTA), which is the sister organization of the CNA, are used for 
organizational development (Kloezen, 2002). In India, states like 
Harayana (Narain, 2003) and Andhra Pradesh (Mollinga, 2001) use 
agency staff, such as the technical staff of Command Area 
Development Authority (CADA) for organizing the WUA. Some 
states on the other hand use NGOs for organizing purposes, for 
example in Maharastra (Narain, 2003). The Indonesian IMT 
program also uses agency staff, the Canal Inspectors, for organizing 
purposes (1990; Brims and Atmanto, 1995). 
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The use of agency staff in establishing the WUAs, however, has 
been also subject of debate (Groenfeldt, 1998). The argument in 
favour is that the staff are already within the bureaucratic structure 
of the agency so the lines of authority is clear, there is litde 
additional expense and the staff are already familiar with the 
physical systems and with the local farmers. Arguments against are 
that they lack necessary training and incentives, and they may not 
be interested as they started their job under a different job 
description. At the same time their superiors need to be trained and 
re-oriented so they understand and appreciate the new role to be 
played by their field staff (ibid). However, forming the WUA is not 
end in itself, but the beginning. The functioning of the WUA ahead 
depends largely on the cooperation and support from the irrigation 
agency. So the issue is not who organizes, but how the program is 
accepted within the irrigation agency. A WUA design requires 
understanding of the irrigation system, its network, the social 
structure, and users' familiarity with the irrigation system: outcomes 
are highly shaped by how the facilitators perceive these contexts 
and act upon them. 
The basis of organizational design 
The WUA design in Nepal is based on the same criteria as defined 
by Freeman (1989) and Ostrom (1992). It involves: defining the 
boundary of the system, the membership criteria, type and size; and 
the rules and regulations of the WUA. The organization usually 
exhibits a combination of both the unitary and federated 
characters. It is single-tiered or multi-tiered depending on the scale 
and network of the system and us usually based on hydraulic 
boundary. The membership is linked with land ownership. 
However, tenants or sharecroppers can get membership, with the 
approval from the landowner. In IMT, the membership is defined 
in terms of a 'Share System Administration' (Freeman, 1989, Wilkin 
Wells, 1994). The origins of this concept of a share system can be 
clearly identified. The consultant of the IMTP (and also in previous 
IMP) were the Colorado-based organization, Computer Aided 
Design Inc (CADI), and Wilkin-Wells, a proponent of the Share 
System, was himself involved in training the DOI officials and the 
WUAs at the beginning of the program. I was also given training in 
'Share System Administration' before I joined the project later. 
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The Share System links the right to use water in an irrigation 
system with payment of cost to maintain the system. Freeman 
defines two essential components of the Share System: (i) it confers 
legitimate access to the water resource within certain pre-arranged 
rules and (ii) it imposes on the users a specified obligation to share 
in paying the water management costs. Therefore the concept of 
'share' unites two essential aspects of organizational operations: 
resource allocation and resource acquisition2. However, materials in 
this chapter shows that the concept of share as envisaged by the 
program has not developed in reality, and farmers practice sharing 
principles their own way. The reason is simple. The share system 
links the volume of water given with the payment for a share. 
However, fanners are used to payment on the basis of area under 
cultivation irrespective of the level of water use. It is more 
transparent to them. Volumetric measurement is difficult to put 
into practice in Nepal. The amount of water one receives is never 
fixed, and can change year-to-year and throughout the irrigation 
season depending on the rainfall. Irrigation systems are also not 
equipped for water measurement and the farmers are not trained to 
perform water measurement activities. 
4.2 Organising the WUA in Panchakanya 
Panchakanya was a FMIS irrigating some 100 ha of land until 1974, 
after which it was taken over by the government to expand the 
irrigated area upon the influence of newly migrant groups. They 
formed their own committee to get involved in canal operation and 
co-ordinate with the irrigation agency (CIP) in the matters relating 
to O&M. The WUA also became involved in providing voluntary 
contribution for canal cleaning. The CIP staff also had a feeling 
that Panchakanya belonged to the WUA, and although the WUA 
was informal, it was recognized by the CIP and its meetings were 
attended by the CIP officials. 
The WUA of the Panchakanya were told about the management 
transfer program by the then CIP3 officials in April 1994. A 
meeting between the water users and the CIP officials was then 
organized to discuss the implementation of the program. The 
meeting was held at the Khageri headwork site (the Khageri 
headwork is at the highway, adjacent to the Panchakanya, and is 
suitable for holding meetings with Panchakanya farmers). It was 
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attended by WUA members, local water users4, the local VDC 
chief, the institutional development specialist from the consultant 
(who was based in Chittwan), the CEP Project Manager and CIP 
engineer looking after the Panchakanya system. In this first 
meeting, which was called by the CIP, a 13-member 'Constitution 
Draft Committee' (CDC) was formed from among the users. Most 
of the members of this committee were the members of the then 
existing WUA. The institutional development specialist and 
engineer of CIP looking after Panchakanya system were assigned to 
support the CDC. 
The technical officials from the CIP, together with WUA 
members, then carried out a base line survey of the system to 
establish the area under irrigation in each branch /tertiary canal, 
number of users and their landholdings to design the structure of 
the WUA. This team found that the system was only irrigating 265 
ha of land against the target command area of 600 ha during the 
monsoon, whereas only 13 ha land was under early paddy. The 
survey team also found that the potential area of the Panchakanya 
was only 450 ha against the previously designed area of 600 ha, due 
to limitations of water supply. The team registered the membership 
on the basis of then irrigated area (265 ha), but kept it open to the 
farmers of remaining area, who could receive irrigation in future. 
The CDC drafted the constitution of the WUA by the end of 
same month (April) of the first meeting. They proposed a two-tier 
organization. A Main Committee (MQ for the system level and 
Branch Committee (BQ for the branch canal level. The MC had 13 
members altogether, 9 representatives from the seven branch 
canals and 10 outlets, and four executives: the Chairman, Vice 
Chairman, Secretary and the Treasurer. In fact there were eight 
branch canals in Panchakanya (see Figure 3.2) but the last, the 
eighth branch canal, was not functioning and was not represented 
in the MC. The 10 outlets were divided into two groups and each 
group was given the status of a BC to be represented in the MC. 
The total area served by these 10 direct outlets was 51 ha: 
individual representation in the MC from these outlets was 
impossible because of the smaller area irrigated as compared with 
the branch canals. By dividing the 10 smaller outlets into two 
groups, small outlets from the main canal were also represented in 
theMC. 
The General Assembly (GA), as an apex body of the WUA, was 
proposed to have 45 members, one per area of approximately 10 
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ha, as the potential irrigable area after the field survey showed only 
450 ha. They were to be elected in the elections of the BCs 
concerned. The BCs were to have 5 to 9 members depending on 
the area served by the branch canals. The Chairman of the BC also 
acts as the member representative in the MC. The organisational 
structure of the Panchakanya is shown in Figure 4.1. The basis for 
the organizational design is the hydraulic boundary, but equal 
geographic representation in the WUA was also considered. The 
structure mosdy exhibits the unitary character, as the MC is not 
separately -formed, but formed out of the branch canal 
representatives. 
FIGURE 4.1 The WUA structure of Panchakanya 
Four executives out of 
45 GA members 
BQ and BC» are formed dividing 10 outlets into two groups 
The first election of WUA was held in May 1994 after the 
formation of the draft constitution. It began from the branch canal 
level. Registered farmers of the respective branch canals formed 
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the BC and also selected the GA members (on the basis of one 
person per 10 ha). With the completion of this election at branch 
level, the GA and the MC representatives were also selected (as the 
MC representatives were the BC chairman). The GA then selected 
the four executives of the MC. The whole election process took 
three days (two days for branch committees, and a day for MC 
executives). The election was co-ordinated by the CIP engineer. 
According to this engineer, all the functionaries both at BCs and 
MC and in the GA were selected through consensus, without 
balloting. Except the Chairman, all the members in the MC were 
different from the previous informal WUA. The newly formed GA 
passed the constitution6 of the WUA and the association got 
registered in the District Water Resources Committee (DWRQ. 
Thus the initial process took only two months time. 
One interesting feature of the WUA here is that it ignored the 
some of the provisions of the Acts and Regulations concerning the 
formation of the WUA. The Water Resources Regulation (1993) 
requires that the MC should be limited to 7 members: however the 
total membership here was 13. Likewise, the Regulation requires 
that at least 20% of the total seats in the WUA has to be reserved 
for women members. But there was not a single women 
representative either in the MC or in the BCs. This was also not 
feasible, according to the constitution of the WUA: the 
membership is attached to land ownership, and the majority of 
land ownership lies with the male members of a household (see 
chapter 8). The DWRC knew these field level realities and did not 
raise any objection against the violation of the rules and registered 
the WUA. 
After the election was over, the WUA drafted the operational 
rules and regulations at the beginning of June, and by August, the 
rules were already in place. It also introduced the concept of a 
'Share System Administration' in the WUA. They defined share on 
the basis of area: one share per Kattha (0.033 ha), that is, a farmer 
with 1 ha owns 30 shares. By December 1994, the WUA also 
started collecting the Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) of Rs. 60 per ha 
(Rs. 2 per share) in the command area. Farmers found it difficult to 
allocate the share in terms of volume of water as they were not 
aware of flow measurement and the system itself was not equipped 
with flow-measuring devices. Chapter 9 will show the WUAs have 
maintained this tradition, even after their increased experience in 
system management, without changing to a volumetric share. 
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The preceding discussions show that the process of organizing the 
WUA in Panchakanya was smooth, and without any conflict and 
struggle. The whole organizing process was over within a few 
months. The CIP engineer involved in the WUA formation and 
development told me he had no major problem in constructing 
WUA and holding its elections. The main reason underlying this 
rapid response from the farmers was that the Panchakanya farmers 
had a long tradition of user involvement in operation, maintenance, 
decision making and resources mobilization. 
The process here was directed at turning the WUA into a 
'formal' organization from its previous 'informal' status, with 
registration and written rules and regulations. Before this, the 
WUA had no written rules and regulations, and was not formed by 
election. They were selected on an ad hoc basis, selecting a few 
individuals from different parts of the system to make up the 
executive committee. So for Panchakanya farmers, the present 
exercise was just a process of legalizing their status and 
participating in management transfer was regaining the old status 
of FMIS (the situation prior to 1974). They knew about collective 
action and had been practising it even under the previous agency 
management. Farmers in Panchakanya saw the management 
transfers an opportunity to make the WUA formal and empowered 
to perform irrigation management activities. Another reason for 
the fast institutional change was that the farmers here already knew 
about the Irrigation Policy and the management reform process 
from the adjoining Khageri System. In Khageri, the WUA 
development had started in 1992, immediately after the formulation 
of the Irrigation Policy. All these factors contributed to the rapid 
institutional change in the system. 
4.3 The Organising Process in Khageri. 
The organizing process in Khageri was not as smooth as in 
Panchakanya, for several reasons. First, it is a large system with 
complex canal networks, and hence the large numbers of water 
users enjoyed different levels of water supply. Secondly, the 
farmers here were not involved in canal operation and maintenance 
activities as Panchakanya farmers were7. They were less aware 
about their system network and water delivery pattern, as the 
system had been operated and maintained by the government until 
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then. A common aspect, however, was that a majority of the users 
here belonged to the same group: migrants from nearby hill 
districts. The Khageri farmers, like the Panchakanya farmers, also 
had knowledge of collective action in irrigation development and 
management because of their past experience in the hills. 
The organizing process here faced several challenges, because of 
the conflicts and struggle between different groups of farmers 
regarding the rights and representation in the WUA. The Khageri 
organizational development case shows how farmers struggle 
within their own domain to establish their rights when their 
governance structure changes. However, because of the relatively 
educated status and political consciousness of the farmers, and 
their past knowledge of collective action, the conflict arena 
provided them an opportunity to learn about their system. Finally, 
farmers were able to setde their disputes and craft the organization 
over time. 
Initial negotiation 
In Khageri, a discussion program was organized at the agency 
(CIP) office in August 1992 to disseminate information about the 
1992 Irrigation Policy, and the management transfer program. The 
meeting was attended by the farmers of different branch canals and 
local politicians. The fanners who participated in the meeting were 
those who used to co-ordinate with the CIP technicians in matters 
of water allocation and distribution. These farmers were clearly 
known to the canal operators of the concerned branch canals. In 
addition, farmers who were already active in other parts of village 
life also participated in the meeting. The canal operators working in 
the Khageri system were also farmers belonging to the irrigation 
system, and knew the active farmers in the area. The local 
politicians participating the meeting were the Chief of the VDC 
and the members of the DDC representing the command area. The 
participants were briefed about the irrigation policy 1992 and the 
irrigation management transfer program by the CIP project 
manager and the engineer responsible for the system. 
The participants displayed different responses regarding the 
management reform. Their main concern was about the water 
shortage and variable flow in the river source. They questioned the 
engineers briefing the program how under such conditions it would 
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be possible for them to maintain the water delivery sendee to 
farmers. According to the engineer involved in organizing the 
meeting, some farmers even argued that the government was trying 
to dump their responsibility on them. Some were in favour of the 
program, considering it empowering, but asked the government for 
system improvement before transferring the system management 
to them. 
There was no decision in the first meeting. The news about the 
IMT program quickly spread around the command area. According 
to local farmers, the idea of WUA formation and the IMT program 
was discussed informally around the Khageri command area for 
several days among the farmers groups. The majority of them 
finally were in favour of WUA development and management 
transfer because of the reasons described in below paragraphs. 
The transfer program also coincided with the period of 
democratic reform in the country. The party-less political system 
was overthrown by a people's movement and a constitutional 
monarchy with multiparty democracy was established in 1990. With 
this political change, several local-level NGOs and workers' unions 
were evolving throughout the country during this period. Under 
these circumstances, farmers also adopted the governments' 
program to promote WUA in the system without resistance. The 
change was seen as empowering, through which they could 
increase their political power to bargain and negotiate their agendas 
with the government and other institutions. 
Farmers had experienced poor system operation and 
maintenance over the years with the lack of funding after 
withdrawal of ADB funding (see chapter 3. They saw advantages in 
being involved to obtain system improvements and ensure their 
water rights. 
There was also a compelling reason to participate. So far the 
government was managing the system and farmers enjoyed a free 
service, whether good or bad. Now the government wanted to 
share the responsibility. The Irrigation Policy specified that if a 
system did not participate in the reform program, the government 
would not provide any kind of support to it in the future. There 
was thus a risk of losing government support in future by not 
participating in the program. Under these circumstances, farmers 
saw no choice but to accept the program. However, as explained 
earlier, their acceptance was not only due to this compelling reason, 
but also motivated by several other factors. 
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After fanners agreed to participate in the reform process, several 
rounds of discussion were made with different farmers groups on 
how to proceed further to implement the program. The organizing 
process here was facilitated by an institutional development 
specialist (local) from the consultant, CADI. She was supported by 
AO and technicians of the CIP. According to fanners, she was 
highly motivated and committed in organizing activities. Following 
these discussions, it was decided first to select a farmer 
representative in each branch canal, to work further in organizing 
activities. These representatives were selected on a consensual basis 
by farmers gathering in each branch canal. After the selection of 
the representatives, a seven-day training program was organized for 
them to help carry out their job as Farmer Organizer (FO). They 
worked in their respective branch canals in carrying out the 
organizational development activities. 
The FOs were involved in carrying out the baseline survey of 
each of the branch canals to collect data about the household 
membership, status of the canal system and constraints in the water 
delivery. The FOs were supported by the facilitating team. The CIP 
technicians also prepared the details of the canal conditions 
together with FOs through diagnostic walkthrough activities. 
Discussion sessions between the CIP personnel and the farmers 
about the process of joint management were also organized at 
concerned branch canals, to share information on the management 
transfer program with wider group of farmers. When these 
discussions at the wider scale were over, a Constitution Draft 
Committee (CDC) was formed with members from each branch 
canal to draft the constitution of the WUA. The members were 
selected by the farmers' gathering in respective branch canals. The 
facilitators supported the CDC in preparing the draft constitutions. 
The constitution development process here met resistance due to 
two major problems: a water-rights dispute between two groups, 
and the issue of who gained the representation in the MC. 
Dispute over water right and representation in the WUA 
A major problem in this early phase of WUA development (and 
subsequent management transfer) concerned the rights to water 
among different branch canals. So far, the responsibility of water 
distribution had lain with the government, and some branches were 
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getting better water distribution than others. Farmers wanted equal 
shares of water to be guaranteed before management 
responsibilities were transferred. The main concern was over the 
first branch canal, the Bi, which used to enjoy continuous delivery 
during the monsoon rice season whereas others had rotation 
between them. Likewise, it also used to enjoy irrigation facilities for 
early paddy, which no other branch canals did. Early paddy was 
being transplanted in the whole command area of Bi and parts of 
B2. The Bi farmers wanted no change in their status. 
The other branch canals, especially the tailenders, were 
dissatisfied with the current status of water supply. But the Bi 
farmers insisted that their canal section was smaller as compared to 
other branch canals (in relation to the irrigated area) and that 
seepage losses were high in their canal. It is true that seepage loss 
was high in this canal but given its area, it has no smaller section 
compared to others. Local farmers say that Bi had access to better 
water supply because of the influence of some influential persons 
and powerful administrators in this branch. It was upon their 
influence that this branch used to enjoy better water delivery as 
compared to the others8. They also had the advantage of their 
topographic location, being the first off-taking canal from the main 
system. This provided them with relatively better water delivery as 
compared to the others. 
Besides enjoying continuous water delivery in the monsoon 
season, the Bi also had access to irrigation during the spring season 
to cultivate early paddy. There is an interesting story behind how Bi 
started early paddy transplantation. During spring, water supply is 
very low in the Khageri river as explained in chapter 3, and farmers 
never cared for water in the winter and spring seasons. Most of the 
command area used to grow wheat and maize in winter and spring 
seasons under rain-fed conditions, but Bi had problems in 
cultivating wheat and maize. Its area is joined with the National 
Park (RCNP) and the crops were damaged by the wild animals 
(mosdy rhinos), so they used to leave the field barren in the winter 
and spring. Once a farmer started a local brick factory bringing 
water from the canal. He could not run the factory and as he had 
already cleaned the canal to bring water, he thought he should 
utilize it. He started early paddy cultivation upon advice from 
farmers of nearby area who had experience of eady paddy 
cultivation. It was highly successful and with this initial move the 
area under early paddy expanded over the years: by 1992 all of the 
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Bi command area and part of B2 were cultivating the early paddy9. 
As they were at the head, none of the other canals objected and the 
Bi established its right over water during the spring season. 
On the other hand the four minor canals at the tailend had a less 
equitable water share. In the original construction plan of the 
Khageri system, there were no provisions for the construction of 
the four minor canals that presently exist. The areas currendy being 
irrigated by them were supposed to get water from the branch 
canal Bs (according to the engineer in charge during design and 
construction) through the construction of tertiary canals called 
'minor canals'. But later on, it was found impossible to irrigate the 
tailend areas by constructing minor canals from the Bs, due to 
topographic limitations. Four separate canals were then designed 
and constructed as exist presendy. However, their names remained 
as 'minors' although two of them (Mi and M2) are actually branch 
canals10 (see Figure 3.3), and irrigate more areas than some of the 
branch canals (Table 3.3). These minors have access to drainage 
water during the monsoon and are less dependent on Khageri canal 
water. 
The upstream canals were of the opinion that these minors had 
a right over the surplus water only, and they should be given 
secondary status (lower representation in the WUA) in the 
constitution. For the minor canal farmers, this was the only 
opportunity by which they could claim their full right to water. The 
Minor farmers argued that they were also part of the Khageri 
system, and they should not be deprived of water rights equal to 
those of other branch canals, just because of their name as 
'minors'. Another issue was that, out of the four minor canals, 
minor 3 and 4 had smaller command areas (99 ha and 60 ha, see 
Table 3.3) resulting in questions whether they should have 
representation in the MC. These canals bifurcate from M2 and 
head-end farmers could not agree to recognize them as a branch 
canal. The farmers on these minor canals feared that if they failed 
to achieve representation in the MC, the head end canals would 
have a majority position there. The head-end farmers, on their part 
feared to lose their relatively better water supply condition. 
According to farmers, the conflict situation was helpful 
afterwards, because it gave them an opportunity to learn about 
their system and search for solutions. Accordingly, a solution was 
found. The first point agreed by all the parties was that all the four 
minors and the 9 branch canals would have at least one member 
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representative in the General Assembly. Considering the area 
irrigated by each branch and minor canal, it was decided that there 
would be a GA member from every 50 ha command area. By doing 
this, the smallest minor 4, which has a 60 ha command area, would 
also have one representative in the GA. Another point of 
agreement was that all the branch canals and the minor canals were 
considered branch canals. There would be a separate committee on 
each of them to look after irrigation management inside their 
respective canals. Thus- thirteen branch committees were proposed, 
one for Bi, B2, B3, B4, B5, B^, B6W, B7, Bs, Mi, M2, M3 and M4 each. 
However, M4 was not given representation in the MC, it was 
combined with M2 to be represented in the MC (M4 bifurcates 
from the M2 and the CDC could not agree to give it an 
independent seat in the MC, see Figure 3.5). So the MC was 
proposed to have 15 members: 12 representatives - 9 from branch 
canals and 3 from minors and - the three executives. The three 
executives, the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Secretary were to 
be elected by the GA. The issue of representation was over. The 
only thing the tail-end farmers lost was that M4 did not have its 
representative in the MC. The tailend farmers were more vocal and 
conscious - many are retired Army personnel, and thus able to 
retain comfortable position in the MC. 
Regarding the water right, the tail end farmers now did not 
object the B1 having its right over water in spring. They realized 
that there was no sense in bringing limited water to tailend areas in 
spring, as it would be lost during its conveyance. In addition, they 
could establish better representation in the main canal. On the 
other hand Bi agreed to co-operate for rotational distribution 
under scarcity situations in the monsoon seasons. However, this 
point was to be further negotiated in the WUA by-laws to be 
formed later on, not in the constitution. The parties agreed that this 
would be taken care of when preparing operational rules. 
In all these processes, there was no involvement of the 
politicians or any third parties. The facilitating group and the 
constitution draft committee members carried out the discussions 
and negotiations. The setting of the 50 ha land unit to be 
represented in the GA was the first unifying element The 
committee had fixed this considering the fact that each canal unit 
would have at least one representative in the GA. This took care of 
the tail-end farmers. At the same time, all the minor canals were 
also given equal status of the BC having rights to establish their 
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own office and form their own rules and regulations. The group 
was able to settle disputes, as farmers here were educated, they 
were aware of this kind of needs and there was a political 
consensus. Fanners also said that the institutional development 
specialist involved was competent in bringing the different 
conflicting parties together. 
Approval of the constitution, and election processes. 
With the draft constitution completed, a farmers' meeting was 
again organized in Shivanagar (where the present WUA office is 
located) by the CDC to discuss the structure of the WUA and the 
draft constitution. The CDC had designed the WUA as a two-tier 
organization: the MC at system level, and BC at branch canal. 
Above the MC would be a GA, a policy-making body for the MC. 
The GA would have 85 representatives. Of this, 73 members 
would be elected by the farmers of respective branch canals in 
proportion to their command area on the basis of one member for 
each 50 ha area. The remaining 12 members were the member 
representatives of the MC, one from each branch canal. 
The MC would have 15 members in total: twelve representatives 
from the 12 branch canals and the three executives: the Chairman, 
Vice-Chairman and the Secretary. The three executives were to be 
elected out of 73 GA members. The 12 representatives were not 
the representatives of the branch canals as in Panchakanya, but 
were to be elected separately by the branch canals farmers. The 
chief of CIP was also an ex-officio member of the MC, but his 
attendance would not be included in the quorum of the MC 
meeting. The BC would be formed by the farmer members of the 
respective branch canals, who are also the GA members of that 
particular branch. Each BC was also proposed to have a Chairman, 
Vice Chairman, Secretary and four members. By forming the MC 
and BC separately through direct elections from the farmers, the 
Khageri WUA takes on a federated character. 
Besides the branch canals, there are also 41 direct outlets 
withdrawing water directly from the main canal having an average 
area of 10 ha. Instead of forming separate groups for them as done 
in Panchakanya, the outlets here were merged with the nearest 
branch canals for organizational development purposes. According 
to the farmers, this was done to make the organization simple and 
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equally representative. The responsibility of water allocation to 
these outlets was also given to the concerned BC to which the 
outlet belonged. 
The gathering at Shivanagar approved the proposed structure of 
the organization. In the same meeting, it was decided that any 
change needed in the draft constitution would later be reviewed 
and approved by the GA to be formed after the election. This 
opened a path for the WUA formation. The proposed structure of 
the WUA organization is shown in Figure 4.2. 
FIGURE 4.2 The WUA structure of the Khageri System 
85 members 
GA 
12 persons 
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The meeting in Shivanagar, after accepting the proposed structure 
of the WUA, asked all the farmers to organize elections in their 
respective branch canals. By December 1992, the elections in the 
branch canals were over, and members were mostly selected by 
consensus. With the completion of elections at branch canal level, 
the GA was also automatically formed, as its representative were to 
be elected by them on the basis of one representative per every 50 
ha. The 12 representatives in the MC were also already there, who 
were also elected together at the time of BC elections. The only 
vacant posts were for the posts of the Chairman, Vice Chairman 
and the Secretary of the MC, which were to be elected by the GA 
members. 
The election for these posts was held in January 1993. In 
accordance with the constitution, the candidates for these posts 
were selected from the 73 GA members: the 12 members from 
branch canals were not allowed to compete for the post. The post 
of the chairman was selected from branch canal B^, which is in the 
middle of the command area and is also the largest branch canal in 
the system. The Vice-Chairman was from Mi in the tail portion, 
and the Secretary from branch canal Bi in the head portion. The 
selection clearly showed farmers' determination to balance the 
power within the WUA for equitable water distribution by selecting 
key officials from head, middle and tail reach of the canal sections. 
The BCs had also a similar composition, where at least one of the 
key positions in the committee was elected from the tail-end 
portion of the command area. 
4.4 The Organising Process in West Gandak 
West Gandak is a large system with communities of different 
composition. There are three different groups of settlers here: the 
Indian migrants, the native Tharus and the hill migrants. It has a 
complex and challenging ecological environment as explained in 
chapter 3. The majority of farmers here were unused to collective 
action, and past efforts to involve users in management could not 
succeeded as explained in chapter 2. When IMT was discussed 
here, it did not face any disputes. The process was as smooth as in 
PIS. But the reasons were different Here, political leaders took 
over the process. The area overlaps to two parliamentary 
constituencies, out of four constituencies in the district (it also 
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slightly touches the third one) and the WUA could provide a 
platform to increase (party) political activities. 
The beginning of WUA formation 
The process of initiation of management reform here was similar to 
that in Khageri. It started with the formation and capacity 
development of the WUA. Upreti (1999) has documented the 
detailed process of this initial WUA development activities. 
According to this report, a meeting was called on 17 July 1992 by 
the West Gandak project office to inform and discuss about the 
joint management program and the 1992 Irrigation Policy. The 
meeting was attended by 256 people including the two MPs of the 
area. The MPs and other political figures like the VDC chief were 
personally invited by the West Gandak project office, whereas the 
VDCs were requested to pass the information to common farmers 
about the gathering. As the joint management program started 
from this project (in Khageri it started a month later), the higher 
officials from the Irrigation Management Division QMD) of DOI 
in Kathmandu also attended the meeting. The meeting welcomed 
the idea of involving farmers in the irrigation activities. Some of the 
participants showed their concern whether this would be again 
another WUA formation, as in the past during CADP. The IMD 
officials and the West Gandak project manager explained the 
gathering about the newly adopted Irrigation Policy, and how the 
department was committed towards the participatory management 
as per the irrigation policy. They also said that the WUA 
development this time would be at all levels of the canal system, 
not only in the lower order canals as in the past. 
The organizing process here was facilitated by the West Gandak 
project manager and a sociologist (institutional development 
expert) supplied by the consultant, CADI. A second meeting was 
again called in September 1992 in which 160 people participated, 
discussing how to proceed for development of the WUA. The 
meeting decided to select Farmer Organizers (FOs) to work further 
in the development of the WUA. For this purpose, the command 
area was divided into 12 divisions and separate meeting were held 
in these divisions to select the FOs. The division was made 
considering an area of 700 ha per FO as an appropriate unit for 
organizing purposes. In Khageri, the FOs were selected based on 
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hydraulic boundary: one FO per branch canal. Here, they decided 
to select FOs on area basis, due to complexity of canal networks 
(see Figure 3.7). A meeting between the facilitating team and the 
farmers was then held in each divisions to select the FO. The FOs 
here were required to have 10th grade education, and were selected 
by the gathering. Whenever there was more than one candidate, 
one of them was selected by voting. A total of 715 persons 
participated in the FO selection activity in total. 
As in Khageri, the FOs were hired on a temporary basis and 
were paid11. They were used to collect necessary data like 
household numbers, and status of canal alignment in their 
respective divisions. They were also to explain to farmers how joint 
management program works. They worked as intermediaries 
between the DOI and farmers groups during this early stage of 
WUA development. They were given basic training for carrying out 
these activities. Parallel with the FO activities, two more meetings 
were organized to discuss about the development of the 
constitution of the WUA which were attended by 146 and 106 
interested farmers respectively. The final meeting, held in February 
1993 decided to form a 15-member committee, one from each 
division to draft the constitution for the WUA. 
Proposed WUA structure 
The CDC recommended a four-tiered organization based on the 
hydraulic boundaries and structural complexities of the system. The 
four levels are: (i)) the main committee at the system level (ii), 
branch committee to serve branch canals (iii), tofi for tertiary level 
canal and (iv) upa-toli (sub-tertiary level groups) below the tertiary. 
The UpatoU, the lowest tier of the WUA, would be formed at the 
tertiary level canals that irrigates approximately of 50-150 ha area 
like the MFD, main canal blocks (MC blocks) and SFD (see Figure 
3.7). There were 172 such blocks and thus were 172 UpatoHs. The 
Tolis would be formed out of the UpatoB representatives and 
represent the minor canals. There are 19 Tolis in total, out of which 
8 are directly connected with the main canal. The BC would also be 
formed out of the representatives of the UpatoBs and ToHs inside 
the Branch. Three BC were proposed each for the Bishnujung, 
Piparhawa and Bhujawa branches. The Mangharia branch canal was 
not considered for a branch committee. The reason for this was 
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that in designing WUA, only those branch canals that bifurcate into 
two or more divisions downstream were considered branch-level 
committees. The Mangharia does not have a major bifurcation 
downstream and was thus given Toli committee status (se Figure 
3.7). 
The MC was to be formed out of the representative of the 
Upatoli, Toli or Branch that directly off takes from the main canal. 
As seen from Figure 3.7, there are 24 main canal blocks and 6 
SFDs, which together would claim 24 representatives in the MC 
(the SFDs were merged with the nearest main canal blocks owing 
to their smaller size). Likewise, the 8 minor committees and 3 BCs 
would have 11 representatives in the MC in total. The MC would 
thus have 35 members. The executives of the MC - the Chairman, 
Vice Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer - would be elected out of 
the 35 members of the MC by the GA members. The GA was to 
have 172 members, one from each upatoL The WUA configuration 
as proposed by the CDC is presented in Figure 4.3. 
The WUA structure is a perfect example of the unitary model as 
defined by Freeman. It is highly concentrated towards the MC and 
has highly unequal representation. There were two major defects in 
this structure. First, it is solely based on hydraulic boundaries. In 
doing so, it gave representation to each and every offtake from the 
main canal irrespective of their command area. This led to a 
situation where the small offtake canals (24 MC blocks and 6 
SFDs) irrigating 1686 ha had 24 seats in the 35-members MC 
whereas the four large branch canals totalling 5047ha had only 
four seats. That is, canals irrigating about 19.4. % of the area had 
68.5% of the membership in the MC, whereas areas serving 58% of 
the land only had 11.42 % of the membership. As we have seen in 
the previous cases of Khageri and Panchakanya, farmers chose 
different strategies to make the MC equally representative. In 
Khageri, the small outlets were merged with the branch canals for 
representation in the MC. In Panchakanya, the 10 outlets were 
divided into only two groups so that the the MC is equally 
represented from different canal reaches. 
Another serious limitation was that the executive posts were to 
be elected out of the 35 representatives only, and the GA members 
were not allowed to stand for these posts. Whereas in Khageri and 
Panchakanya, these representatives were not allowed to stand for 
these posts, instead they were to be selected from the wider group, 
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the GA. By the structure itself, the power of the committee could 
be kept in the hands of only a few individuals in West Gandak. 
FIGURE 4.3 The WUA structure of the West Gandak 
The GA elects the Chairman, 
Vice Chairman, Secretary and 
Treasurer of the MC out of 35 
representatives 
GA 
172 
I asked the then project manager of the West Gandak and the 
consultant involved in preparing the constitution of the WUA why 
the MC was designed with such an unequal representation. They 
told me that it was done so that MC decisions could be passed to 
all the off-taking canals. The then project manager of the West 
Gandak said that small canals were given equal status to the larger 
ones as any disturbances by these small canals would also affect the 
main canal operation, which ultimately would affect the functioning 
of the large canals. But this is a minor operational problem, 
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whereas the new WUA configuration could have great impact on 
WUA functioning. 
Regarding the second issue of not allowing the GA members to 
be elected in the executive posts, they had no precise answer. There 
are reasons to believe that this was deliberately done by the 
involved actors facilitating the WUA development to promote 
selected people to the leadership. Many of the farmers in the area 
also share the view. They say that it was due to influential persons 
from the small canals, the main canal blocks, that the WUA 
structure was designed that way and that GA members were 
stopped from standing for the executive posts. The two successive 
Chairmen of the WUA were in fact from these small canals, which 
also suggests some truth in farmers' views. 
However, the ordinary farmers were not aware of the WUA 
structure and the constitution. Because of low political awareness 
and literacy, they were not very active like the earlier systems 
discussed, and were dependent on their leaders whom they had 
selected to form the constitution. 
The election process 
After the completion of the draft constitution, the election process 
started from the upatoli level. The constitution draft committee 
worked as the election commission for the purpose of conducting 
the elections. However, it was supported by the West Gandak 
project office. The Upatoli committee was formed out of the 
meeting of the farmers of that upatoli. They were informed about 
the time and venue of the election by the concerned FO of that 
area. The size of the upatoli varied from seven to eleven members, 
depending upon the size of the particular canal. The committee 
members then selected a Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary 
and selected one member to be represented in the GA. The 
members also selected another member to be represented at the 
next level up in the organization, the Toli, branch or main canal 
level depending upon whether the upatoli is located. The ToS and 
the BC were formed out of the members sent from the upatoli levd. 
The members selected the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson and 
Secretary from among themselves. 
With the completion of the election of the ToS, Upatoli and BCs, 
there were already 35 members for the MC, as well as the 172 
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members of the GA. The only remaining job was to elect the 
executives of the MC. Before the election of the executives, the 
candidates were allowed to speak and campaign on their behalf. 
The time and venue of the election was notified to the GA 
members and the MC members in advance. There was no ballot: 
the executives were selected by census within the GA. As in 
Khageri, the key posts of the MC was shared by the head-enders 
and tail-enders. The Chairman was from the tail of the canal, the 
Vice-Chairman from head, and the treasurer from the tail and 
Secretary form the middle section. The whole election was over by 
June 18, 1993. The process documentation report also shows that 
the WUA development process here took seven months and cost 
US$3925, excluding the cost of the consultant and the West 
Gandak staff involved. There were four farmer gatherings, 15 
regional meetings, and 146 discussion programs. In total, 7784 
persons participated in this whole process. 
Once the election was over, the GA ratified the constitution 
prepared earlier by the constitutional draft committee. The WUA 
was registered in the District Administrative office on June 29, 
199312 The WUAs were given training on Share System 
Administration and other capacity development training. Field visit 
programs were also organized to selected successful FMIS. 
However, the case here questions the value of those interaction 
programs. Ultimately they resulted in an organization, which was 
highly unequal in its representation, and was concentrated towards 
a few individuals. There can only be two reasons for this. Either 
the actors, the engineer, consultant and the constitution draft 
committee were less aware of the WUA development process, and 
just followed the routine procedures, so that the structures came 
into being by coincidence, or these people deliberately designed the 
organization favouring particular groups of people to emerge in 
leadership. 
Election politics in West Gandak 
Both farmers and NWGIS project officials say that the first WUA 
election in NWGIS was heavily influenced by party politics. Nepal 
entered multiparty democracy in 1990: the new emerging political 
parties tried to influence every sector, and irrigation was no 
exception. Organizational development activities in the West 
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Gandak also coincided with this period. In the first election, the 
political influence and connections dominated the dynamics of 
election process. However, there was no dominance by a particular 
landlord or rural elite. People having connections with political 
parties and contractors were the frontrunners in the election. The 
reasons for this were: 
• People had seen massive investment during the CADP period. 
They had heard of another rehabilitation program coming in 
future to support the organizational development activities. 
They had heard from the visiting IMD officials and the West 
Gandak staff that a project named 'Irrigation Management 
Transfer Project' was about to be implemented in the system 
under the funding from ADB. It was thought that ADB was 
again going to make huge investments, and contractors and 
local politicians sought to be elected to gain access to future 
project resources. 
• For contractors, representation in WUA would provide easy 
access in getting the construction contract. 
• The NWGIS includes two constituencies for the election of 
Member of Parliament So for politicians, it could provide a 
platform for their political career. Political parties also used the 
WUA election to measure their popularity among the voters. 
The WUA thus elected was a mix of politicians, contractors, and 
other local powerful men. They had their own vested interests to 
be elected in WUA, as mentioned above. The contractors were 
there to get opportunity in construction activities. Politicians were 
for measuring the strength of their respective political parties. 
Many farmers whom I interviewed said that the election was based 
on party politics. Interestingly, landlords were not interested to sit 
on the MC. Instead, they preferred to be in the branch or toH 
committee. They said that they were interested in getting water in 
their canal rather than being part of the wider politics in the MC. 
My discussions with the technicians involved in the NWGIS and 
several other informants shows that the composition of the WUA 
was as shown in Table 4.1 
The Table should not be read in terms of exact figures, but 
reflects discussion with various farmers and technicians involved in 
the election. The objective here is to indicate that the WUA was 
dominated by party politics. The question is thus: what enabled the 
political parties to become so dominant here? 
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The West Gandak has a different social setting than that of the 
Khageri with three different immigrant groups. More than 52% of 
the population here is from lower castes whose exploitation by the 
upper castes is dominant. The literary rate stands at 39% and 
political awareness like that the Chittwan farmers do not exist here. 
The majority of the population depends on the local elite and 
politicians for jobs and other economic opportunities. This 
situation allowed local leaders to exploit the farmers with ease. 
TABLE 4.1 Percentage of WUA representation by different political 
groups 
Politicians holding Affiliation with political Contractors Common 
position in local parties, hut not in farmers 
government posts government posts 
35% 25% 20% 20% 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter began by describing how farmers reacted to the 
government policy when they were told about the shift of 
management responsibility to their domain. In all the three cases 
farmers did not object to this, except for showing some local 
concerns facing the irrigating systems. There were three main 
reasons for their non-objection to participating the management 
transfer. The first was that farmers had no alternative, because they 
feared that the government might withdraw support to their system 
if they did not participate in the program. The irrigation policy 
specifies that for those systems not willing to participate in the 
management transfer, would not receive any kind of government 
support in future. So there was a danger of losing the government 
support if not participating, whereas there was scope of improving 
system condition by participating in the program. 
The second reason was that the WUA development almost 
coincided with the political change in the country. This also 
motivated farmers to form the WUAs, as similar organizations 
were being formed in other sectors of the society as a way of 
empowering themselves. Farmers in these irrigation systems also 
recognized the WUAs as a means to increase their political power 
to negotiate and bargain for their cause with the government and 
other institutions. Thirdly, all the systems were physically 
Initiating New Local Organisation 129 
deteriorated and farmers did not want to lose the opportunity of 
system improvement offered by the reform program. Farmers 
participation in the reform was thus not only from the compelling 
factors of the Irrigation Policy, but also due to their own individual 
interest too. 
The chapter then described the process of group formation and 
the struggles therein. The discussion on these cases show how the 
organization design is shaped by the existing socio-political 
structure. This is illustrated by the different outcomes of the 
organization design in the three systems. In PIS, the process was 
shaped by the existing practices of the collective action. There was 
already an existing organization, established and recognized in the 
system and farmers knew about collective management. So farmers 
designed the WUA in accordance with their prevailing practices. 
In the case of Khageri, there were negotiations between the 
farmers groups regarding water rights and representation in the 
organization. The conflictive environment at the beginning gave 
farmers an opportunity to learn about their system and find 
solutions. In this case both parties got what they wanted finally. 
The tail-end farmers got equal representation in the GA as well as 
in the MC, except that M4 had no representative in the MC. 
However, all the minor canals, including the M» got the status as of 
branch canals and could have their own committee. By agreeing 
this, the head-enders had nothing to lose. On the other hand, the 
tail-enders came to realize that there was no advantage to objecting 
the first branch canal using the water in spring, as they could not 
access it. So the head-end canal was able to keep up its relatively 
better water availability. Because of relatively greater education and 
political consciousness, Khageri farmers were in a position to craft 
their WUA as demanded by their context 
But in NWGIS, a few were able to capture the process and the 
rest were silent because of the pattern of social and political 
dependence. The WUA was used as a platform to monitor the 
strength of the political parties. One of the reason for high level of 
(party) political influence has been also due to its scale. The area of 
West Gandak overlaps with two parliamentary constituencies. It is 
a rural area and other forms of economic and political activity and 
related forums are almost non-existent here. So the WUA was the 
first and only organization in the area where political parties could 
enter to increase their influence. Whereas Chittwan was already a 
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developed area and there are several other economic and political 
platforms to represent the political parties. 
The organizational structure of all the three systems was based 
on hydraulic boundaries. But in Panchakanya and in Khageri, 
farmers also took care of geographical boundaries to arrive in a 
balanced WUA. Interestingly this factor was overlooked in the 
West Gandak, resulting in highly unequal representation in the 
WUA where 68.5% of the MC members are controlled by farmers 
cultivating 19.4% of the land, whereas farmers holding 58% of the 
land has only 11.42 % representation. Another interesting feature is 
that the posts of the executives were limited to only for the 
representatives of the MC, not to the wider group the GA. To my 
knowledge, the executives in the MC are always elected out of the 
GA. This resulted the Gandak WUA being a perfect unitary model 
with power concentrated on few key political figures. 
The chapter has also shown how the prescriptive views on 
organizational design can clash with local concerns at 
implementation. Farmers discarded the rules set by the Water 
Resources Regulation, on the other hand, the DWRC set up to 
register the WUA also did not pay attention to violations of the law 
by the WUA. Likewise, a 'Share System' with volumetric 
measurement was highly advocated in the design. Farmers did not 
reject the concept of share, but practiced it the way they found 
compatible with their water availability scenario and canal 
networks, linking irrigated area with payment, not with the volume. 
If the water delivery pattern is acceptable to farmers (as decided by 
their WUA), then linking cropped area with the payment is the 
same as linking it with the water volume. Farmers avoided shares 
being based on volumetric basis because of the highly variable flow 
and difficulty in establishing water measurement mechanisms. The 
Share System did not materialize the way it was designed, just 
because it was not designed on the basis of what was already there 
in practice or what people were familiar with. Instead it started with 
prescriptive design which farmers found new and complicated. 
WUA cannot be designed just by following a set of routine 
activities. The chapter has shown how the actors in the project, 
their actions, and their understanding of the irrigation system 
environment shape the outcome of the organization. In Khageri, 
the facilitators made several efforts to bring different conflicting 
parties together and finally succeeded to find a win-win situation to 
both the parties. In West Gandak, despite several interaction 
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meetings and group discussion activities, the organization finally 
resulted in a highly unequally representative system, concentrated 
towards a few individuals, which gave further room to capture the 
process by political parties. Another point is how the Colorado-
based Consultant remained unaware of the unitary model, while 
Freeman had warned about its danger of being captured by a few 
influential people13. 
The critical question in developing the WUA is thus not who 
organizes it and what process are to be followed, but is what values 
and interests the actors have, their understanding of irrigation 
systems and its environment (both physical, technical and social) 
and how they translate the opportunities and constraints of these 
environments into their actions. 
Notes 
1
 Civil servants in Nepal are appointed at two levels: Gazetted and Non-
Gazetted. Non-Gazetted positions are the junior officers, and are further 
ranked into three classes, I, II and III. 
2
 A share can be also obtained by initial investment on system 
development and can be sold and exchanged and this practice exist in 
many FMIS in the hills of Nepal (see Martin and Yoder, 1986) 
3
 The CIP was dissolved only in August 1994 establishing NLIO as 
mentioned in chapter 3. 
4
 The WUA had informed all the water users about the meeting, but only 
those who were active in water management and other parts of their 
village life (teachers, Red Cross members) participated the meeting. 
The constitution prepared earlier is only the draft constitution formed for 
the purpose of holding the election, and according to this constitution, it 
requires to be passed by the newly formed GA of the WUA (who can also 
change provisions of the constitution prepared by the CDC). Only then 
can the constitution be registered to the District Water Resources 
Committee. 
The constitution prepared earlier is only the draft constitution formed for 
the purpose of holding the election, and according to this constitution, it 
requires to be passed by the newly formed GA of the WUA (who can also 
change provisions of the constitution prepared by the CDC). Only then 
can the constitution be registered to the DWRC. 
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I
 However, this does not mean that farmers were not aware about the 
system at all. This was relatively a water scarce system, and farmers and 
local politicians were generally in contact with canal operators and 
engineers to know about their irrigation turn. According to operators, 
they also used to help in coordinating the water distribution. 
8
 During the Panchayat System (before 1990), there were provisions for a 
zonal commissioner to look after the administration and development 
affairs in each of the zone. There were 14 such commissioners in the 
country for the 14 zones. Part of the command area of the Bi was owned 
by one such commissioner. In addition, a large portion of the land was 
also owned by one of the influential politicians in the country. 
9
 Local farmers say that the rhino does not damage the rice crop, so this 
cultivation was possible. 
10
 Minor canals are the one which bifurcates from the branch canal, 
whereas the branch canals are the ones which bifurcate from the main 
canal. 
II
 Payments to temporarily hired persons differ from district to district. 
Payment to the FOs are slighdy lower than those to AOs. 
12
 Before water resources Regulation (1993) was enacted forming DWRC, 
the WUAs were registered in the DAO. 
13
 Freeman from Colorado University has discussed about different 
models of the WUA while the consultant, CADI, is a Colorado-based 
firm and also has an affiliation with the university (to my knowledge). 
John Welkin Wells, the researcher of the Colorado University himself was 
also involved in training the WUAs in Shares system administration. 
The Joint Planning Process 
The next two chapters of the thesis present the participatory design 
construction process to support organizational evolution. This 
chapter concerns the joint planning processes, which is the first 
activity of any PTD process, whereas the next one describes the 
implementation of the Action Plan (AP) prepared out of these joint 
planning exercises. Before describing the joint action planning, I 
introduce how I began work in Khageri and Panchakanya, and 
what values, knowledge and perceptions our project team had, as 
these also affected the outcome of the process, and affected our 
struggle to make the process stable. It then describes how the 
different actors have perceived the context of management reform 
and how they struggled to gain control over the process. The 
chapter then documents the AP development process. The chapter 
concludes with a description of issues in facilitating the 
participatory development process, as well as the limitations and 
scope of the methodologies used. 
The objective behind the joint planning process is to identify 
local problems and needs to be prioritized by the users; to find 
workable solutions; and to find and agree upon the implementation 
regimes after discussions and negotiation with the farmers or their 
organization. The planning process is based on incorporation of 
local knowledge and skills, and also combines the technical and 
scientific knowledge of the external agents. For this purpose, it 
utilizes range of methodologies like Participatory Rural Appraisal 
(PRA) and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and other group 
discussions (Gill, 1994). In irrigation, especially in the planning of 
maintenance and in the rehabilitation process, Diagnosis 
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Walkthrough Activities' (Neupane, 1992) are the mostly advocated 
and used tools, as a first step in a PTD process. This involves the 
joint survey of the functional condition of the structures and the 
problems in delivering the services, with a main objective to find 
agreed options for change. 
The PTD process should be client-driven, such that knowledge, 
needs, criteria and preference of farmers are given weight in 
decisions about technical innovation. Addressing client needs 
means that designs should be site-specific and locally adaptive. The 
design should be _ interactive, evolving through time with users 
participating at an early stage of development. Interactive designs 
that utilize the local knowledge and skills also form the basis of 
learning process approaches (Scheer, 1996; Korten, 1980) where 
changes are discussed and integrated throughout the intervention 
process. Interactive design implies a dialectic action-reflection 
process in which users, as well as assisting support teams mutually 
investigates with each other and learn from each other, through the 
actions they undertake jointly and from the reflections on these 
actions (Boelens, 1998). Decentralization is another key feature of 
the PTD, in which end users (or their representative situated at 
different organizational levels) are directly involved in adoption and 
testing of the developed technology. 
It will be shown here that mere use of walkthroughs as a 
methodology is not enough to appreciate the users' needs and 
preferences in the planning of rehabilitation process. The most 
important element is the question "who participates in the 
process", as the knowledge and values of the participating team 
strongly determines the outcomes of these diagnostic processes. In 
large-scale irrigation, there is also another risk, as only a few 
individuals (the WUA members) participate on behalf of larger 
groups: the outcomes thus depend on how accountable and 
knowledgeable (about the system) these individuals are. The 
process of local knowledge sharing is also shaped by the project 
structure as well as by the activities of the key actors within it. 
5.1 First Meetings with WUAs: Frustrations and Encouragement 
When I came to NLIO in December 1994 as its project manager, 
the initial WUA development process discussed in Chapter 4 was 
already over. Before leaving Kathmandu, I was briefed by the 
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coordinator of the IMTP about my future role to facilitate the 
management change in Khageri and Panchakanya Systems. I was 
assigned three specific tasks. First was the development of an AP 
to facilitate the management change. This AP was to be developed 
both for technical improvement and further capacity development 
of the already established WUAs. Together with this AP, the terms 
and conditions for the future transfer of responsibility were also to 
be negotiated with the WUA. The second job was to implement 
the AP joindy with the users and the third was to hand over the 
system management after the implementation of the AP. 
I began my work both with both encouragement and frustration 
and some personnel decisions. On the second day of my arrival in 
December 1994, a training program was being held in the 
Panchakanya system. This program was organized by the co-
ordinator office in Kathmandu and I was told to join the training 
session to introduce myself to the farmers. The trainer, an 
engineering colleague come from Kathmandu, introduced me with 
WUA members. At the end of the program, the trainees were given 
their daily allowance of NRs 60 (75 US cents). The participants 
however did not keep the money but donated it to the WUA to 
open the bank account for the association I was very much 
encouraged to see the kind of understanding the Panchakanya 
farmers had between themselves. 
After the training session, we had a discussion about the system 
and its problems. I was also impressed by their knowledge of the 
irrigation system and its constraints, and that they were even 
discussing possible solutions. I also came to know a litde about 
history of the system and how farmers had struggled so far to keep 
the system running. Farmers were cooperative, knowledgeable and 
willing to work jointly. When I had left Kathmandu, I was not so 
confident on whether I would be able to take up the challenge of 
management transfer. Due to my study in Bangkok, I was less 
aware of the recent policy changes, and was also not involved in 
field-level implementation activities for the past two years. My 
brief encounter here helped to boost my confidence. On the way 
back to my office, I thought it would be exciting to work with this 
group of people. I also came to know that there was mutual trust 
and understanding between the project office and the WUA. 
But the project's relation with the WUA of the Khageri was 
strained. This was due to a dispute between the project office and 
the WUA over the authority regarding tendering and contracting 
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procedures. Just after the WUA formation, the government had 
allocated some funds for the financial year 1993/1994 for system 
O&M. The money was specifically meant to carry out maintenance 
work that had been deferred for many years: this mosdy included 
de-silting of the main canal and some structural improvement 
works. The project office had made a tender call to carry out this 
maintenance work without consulting the WUA. When the WUA 
heard about this, they seriously objected, arguing that they should 
have been consulted on how to carry out the work: and if the job 
were to be done by the contractor, the decision should have been 
taken jointly. The WUA vigorously protested to the DDG of the 
IMD in Kathmandu. The tender call was finally cancelled. The 
matter was then discussed with the WUA. The WUA decided to do 
the job itself, as it mosdy involved earthwork. The WUA hired 
different labouring groups to carry out the job and completed the 
work in time. They were also able to save Rs. 356,000 (about $7000 
in 1993) out of total contract funds of Rs.l,300,000 (about 
$20,000). They deposited the saving in the bank, which worked as 
seed money for further orgaruzational development to be followed 
in the future. 
The then project manager told me that this situation came about 
due to lack of understanding about the duties and responsibilities 
between the agency and the WUA at the beginning. However 
because of this incident, the WUA was very suspicious about 
project activities and had little faith in us. The first challenge for me 
was to bridge this gap between the Khageri WUA and our office. 
The office environment 
The environment inside the project was also frustrating. There 
were 64 staff to look after the three irrigation systems. They were 
from different disciplines including civil engineering, mechanical 
engineering, electrical engineering, sociology, finance and 
administration. Except for the electromechanical group, which 
worked only for the lift system (not part of IMT), the remaining 
staff worked for both Khageri and Panchakanya. Out of these 64 
people, only 21 were permanent: the remainders were hired 
temporarily on a yearly basis. With IMT now being implemented in 
Panchakanya and Khageri, the number of staff was going to be 
reduced in future. There was no planning for this, but it was clearly 
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understood that many of the staff, especially those working on a 
contract basis, would lose their job in the years to come. Those 
who were on contract started asking me whether their position 
would be retained next year. Even though I knew some of them 
would lose their job, I had to be diplomatic, and used to tell them 
that I would try my best to keep their position. Otherwise this 
would not only hamper our work, but could be a threat to my life1. 
Beside myself, there were two engineers and four overseers 
(juniors to engineers) working for IMT implementation in Khageri 
and Panchakanya. All of them worked for Khageri, but in 
Panchakanya only one engineer and an overseer was assigned due 
to its smaller scale. The problem was that none these project staff 
had any prior experience in participatory projects or had any ideas 
of participatory tools and methodologies. My own expertise was 
only from previous work. I was equipped with practical experience 
but less aware of the theoretical insights behind the tools and 
methodology. For the rest of the team it was almost a new 
experience. The two engineers however were very committed and 
motivated to work with farmers. We were told by the co-ordinator 
office that there would be training programs in the future (but to 
my surprise such training never happened) for the field level staff 
to train on tools and methodologies. Training and capacity 
development activities of the field level project staff were directly 
handled by the co-ordinator office, and the field- level project 
offices had to depend on them. 
There were two (local) consultants: an irrigation management 
specialist and institutional development specialist to support the 
project implementation. However, they were not involved in 
everyday project implementation. They were involved in capacity 
development activities of the WUA, providing logistic support to 
them, and monitoring progress and preparing progress reports of 
the project implementation. 
Confronted with the poor relations with Khageri WUA and the 
uncertain environment of the project office, at once I told the 
D D G of IMD that I did not intend to stay in NLIO and briefed 
him about the office environment and the project relation with 
farmers. I was not confident I could facilitate management changes 
in this situation. However, the D D G insisted I stay and assured me 
of any help that I needed from the department I could not say no 
to him for two reasons. The first was about the discipline of being 
a civil servant. I was not supposed to run away from an assignment 
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given to me. The second was about my own personal reasons. 
Chittwan was a good place to stay. It is near to Kathmandu and 
centrally located in Nepal, where all the major highways meet. 
There was a good residence facility. For me it would be the best 
place to live next to Kathmandu.2 
I also realized another advantage in working here. In the past I 
had enjoyed working with farmers in design innovations, and 
always believed in working together. But my previous works was in 
small farmer-managed irrigation systems where groups were small, 
mostly homogeneous, and farmers were already familiar with 
collective management and with their agroecology. The present 
systems were large and the context was different. It was a context 
of disengagement from the state to the farmers, whereas in 
previous cases the systems were already farmer-managed. I thought 
working in IMTP would help me discover new learning, provide 
new experiences and insights, and build up my capacity and 
confidence to implement participatory interventions like IMT 
which was gaining world-wide attention. I thus preferred to take up 
the new challenge and decided to continue the journey in Chittwan 
with encouragement, frustration, confusions and self-doubt. 
5.2 The Struggle over Project Control 
Committing myself to facilitate the management reform, I moved 
to the first activity: the preparation of the action plan. In the 
project design guidelines, it was mentioned that the AP would 
include the elements of both technical improvement and also 
capacity development of the WUA. Likewise, a Subproject 
Management Committee (SMQ3 to oversee the implementation of 
the AP at field level was also to be formed in each of system (see 
framework presented in Figure 2.2). But neither the WUA nor 
myself had any idea how to prepare this, what elements should be 
included, and what would be our roles and responsibility. We also 
did not know the status of SMC, who was to form it and how it 
was to be formed. Our project colleagues in the West Gandak had 
a similar dilemma. 
This situation developed because die field level project actors 
(both WUAs and the field project mangers) were not involved in 
the design of the implementation framework. It was design and 
developed by the actors at higher institutional levels: the Co-
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ordinators office, donors and consultants. The field level actors 
were neither aware of this framework, nor were they satisfied with 
some of the content of the framework when they were asked to 
implement it. We put our concerns to the project co-ordinator in 
Kathmandu, and a workshop was organized in Kathmandu to 
discuss the preparation of AP and an SMC to oversee it. 
The meeting was held in July 1995, and all the relevant 
stakeholders and the project actors participated. These included: 
the co-ordinator of the IMTP, the D D G of the IMD; 
representatives of the major donors the ADB and the USAID; the 
Chairman and Secretary of the WUAs of all three systems where 
IMTP was being implemented at first stage; the project manager of 
the concerned irrigation projects (but the West Gandak Project 
manager was not present in this meeting); and the project 
consultant firm. The objective of the workshop was to discuss and 
finalize the details of design implementation of the action plan. 
The project co-ordinator briefed us about the different stages of 
project implementation and the activities to be carried out (the 
implementation framework is presented in chapter 2). The WUA 
leaders had two major objections to this framework: the formation 
of the Sub-project Management Committee (SMC) and the WUA 
contributions to the rehabilitation process. I also had different 
concerns regarding the proposed SMC. 
The farmer leaders were not satisfied with the concept of the 
SMC presented. As per the loan agreement with the ADB, a SMC 
was to be formed to supervise and execute the overall 
implementation procedure. It was to be headed by the concerned 
sub-project manager with four farmers' representatives other than 
the WUA executive members. The four farmers' representatives 
however were to be selected by the WUA themselves. The SMC 
was designed to bridge the gap between the WUA and the 
irrigation agency. The idea was also to involve farmers into 
decision making process, through representation in the SMC. So 
far farmers were mostly involved in providing contribution in labor 
or cash, and in prioritizing the type of improvements with in the 
system. Now efforts were made to empower farmer groups by 
involving them in decision making process. 
The WUA leaders had three major concerns regarding the SMC. 
Their first concern was on the Project Manager being the chief of 
the SMC. They did not express it openly, but it could be 
understood that they did not want this. They were in favour of a 
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SMC headed by the WUA chairman. Another objection was against 
disallowing the WUA executives to be in the SMC: they wanted the 
SMC members to be from within the MC of WUA. Some WUA 
leaders were comparing the SMC with the "Polit Bureau4" of the 
communist parties, with all the powers vested to i t They feared 
that non-representation of WUA executives on the SMC would 
reduce their influence over the farmers. They argued that SMC 
would bypass project execution to the WUA and said that they did 
not want the SMC. Instead they suggested that the concerned 
irrigation agency and the WUA should implement the project 
jointly. The third concern of the WUA leaders was about restricting 
the numbers of farmer members to four. 
My own argument against the SMC as presented was that the 
roles and responsibilities, as well as the accountability of the SMC 
members including the project manager, were not clear. So far, 
according to the prevailing financial rules and institutional 
arrangements within the DOI, the project managers were 
responsible for the financial expenditure they made and the quality 
of the work in any project Now the SMC was made responsible 
for the project execution, and the responsibility was to be shared. 
But there was no clear mention about this in the SMC framework. 
The rest of the participants were silent on these issues, as the 
provisions were designed by themselves. Also, they were not to be 
involved in the every day project execution processes at field level 
to which the issue being raised were related. 
What to do with the SMC? The question was put to the farmers' 
side by the project co-ordinator. The farmer leaders were in 
difficulties: they could neither reject nor accept the SMC in its 
present form. They did not want to reject it as they realized that it 
tried to involve farmers in the decision making process. Some of 
the farmer leaders also did not object to the concerned project 
manager being the Chairman of the SMC. Their view was that the 
chairman must have good knowledge of the financial and 
administrative management Farmers are not very familiar with the 
bureaucratic process of project execution. All the farmer leaders 
knew this. After discussion with each other, they agreed about the 
need for the SMC and also agreed on the concerned project 
manager heading the SMC. However, they demanded that the 
WUA executives themselves be allowed to become members of the 
SMC, and that the numbers should not be limited to four. This was 
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acceptable to donors and the DOI. The issue over the SMC was 
resolved. 
Farmers agreed to have a SMC because they realized its 
importance. They also thought that a small group would be more 
effective for day-to-day execution of the project. Farmers' 
acceptance of the Project Manager as a SMC chairman was a 
compromise. They did not want to confront the managers with 
whom they had to work beforehand. Besides, the majority of 
funding was from the project, and farmers themselves were less 
aware of the bureaucratic processes and procedures of the project 
administration. Regarding the representation in the SMC, The 
WUAs got what they wanted. 
Higher contribution from users: another cause of disagreement 
Another disagreement over the project framework was over the 
users' contribution in the technical rehabilitation. The IMTP 
required a contribution of 26% from the fanners. In fact this was 
not clear from the loan agreement with the ADB, which only states 
that 59% of the total cost of the IMTP would be borne by the 
ADB. The general trend within the DOI regarding its own 
contribution is usually 15% of the total cost of the project. So, 
there was a deficit of 26%, which was proposed to be generated 
from farmers' contribution. None of the projects so far in Nepal 
had targeted this scale of contribution from the farmers side. The 
WUA leaders attending the meeting vehemently opposed this. The 
Irrigation Policy requires a minimum of 10% contribution under 
such circumstances. They said that they would be unable to 
generate this 26% contribution and therefore would not participate 
in the program. 
Farmers had two objections regarding the higher contribution. 
Farmers' contribution in construction work is generally voluntary. 
Mobilization of voluntary labor is easy and effective in construction 
activities involving earthworks (like canal digging and land filling). 
However in the rehabilitation of these irrigation systems, most of 
the construction activities included structural renovation with less 
earthwork. The scope for farmer mobilization was thus limited. 
That meant the farmers' leaders had to convince fellow farmers to 
contribute in cash, which they found impossible. The problem was 
also that management transfer was not demand-driven, and farmers 
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were not told at the beginning of the group formation (chapter 4) 
that they had to contribute a higher percentage during system 
improvement work. 
Another reasons for the WUA leaders' objection was that in the 
adjoining East Rapti Irrigation Project, the amount of contribution 
to be borne by the farmers was about 10%, and it was also funded 
by the ADB. The WUA leaders questioned the donors, the 
coordinator of IMTP and the DDG why should they pay so much, 
when other users in the vicinity were contributing less in the 
construction program implemented by the same department with 
financial assistance from the same funding agency. This was not an 
invalid argument by the WUA leaders. The WUA leaders knew that 
there was no way in which they could convince their fellow farmers 
to agree with 26% contribution back in the field. I also believed 
that this would be difficult, as it had not been communicated to the 
farmers at an early stage of group formation. I told the project 
coordinator that it would not be possible to generate a 26% 
contribution in this context and it was necessary to adopt a flexible 
approach, he agreed with me. The farmers were ready to agree to a 
10 % contribution, but above that they would not decide on their 
own and had to consult with farmers back in the field. I felt that 
the best way to compromise was not to insist on a 26% 
contribution in strict sense, and at the same time to convince 
farmers to contribute the maximum possible. This was acceptable 
to both the government and the WUA. Finally, farmers' 
contribution to the project was stated like this: 'efforts shall be 
made to achieve maximum contribution from the farmers without 
limiting to 26% in strict sense. This satisfied the WUA, donors and 
the DOI. (Chapter 6 explains the ways in which WUAs later dealt 
with this contribution issue in the field). 
With our concerns and confusion cleared up after the workshop, 
we came back to the field and started preparing the AP. Before 
this, SMC were formed in both Khageri and Panchkanya. In 
Khageri, the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary and two other 
members of the WUA were nominated by the WUA main 
committee to represent in the SMC. likewise, in Panchakanya also 
the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary and two additional 
members of the WUA were nominated as members of the SMC. In 
West Gandak, the Chairman and Vice Chairman stayed away from 
the SMC, and five other members, from within the WUA main 
committee, were selected to sit on the SMC. 
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5.3 Back to the Field: Preparing an Action Plan in Panchakanya 
The major objective and content of the AP was to evaluate the 
system constraints and find options for change such way that the 
WUA could manage the system after transfer. In the Panchakanya 
system the fundamental problems were mostly at the main canal 
and head works. There was massive seepage and leakage from the 
main canal which had drastically reduced system efficiency. The 
problems in the headwork concerned the encroachment of the 
reservoir area and lack of silt flushing arrangements. There was also 
a problem of depleting water resources due to environmental 
change in the upstream catchment. Farmers in Panchakanya were 
saying that if these problems were solved, they could manage the 
system on their own. They were not worried about the branch 
canals, as they said that inside the branches, they could manage the 
affair themselves owing to shorter canal lengths and limited 
technical problems. It was thus decided that the walkthrough 
activity would be carried out along the main canal only. 
Walkthrough activities in the PIS 
Before the process could start, we formed a joint team to carry out 
the Walkthrough. The team consisted of Chairman, Secretary and 
one member from the WUA, one member from the SMC, one 
engineer and one overseer from our office, who were assigned to 
Panchakanya. The WUA and SMC members were not fixed, but 
selected on the basis of who had access to information at a 
particular reach of the canal. However, any members were 
welcomed to participate in this process. Due to parallel activity in 
Khageri and other work schedules in the lift irrigation system, I 
could present myself only partly in the walkthrough processes5. 
There were no standard questionnaires prepared in collecting the 
information. The key information to be noted were: the existing 
condition of the structures; whether they were able to provide the 
intended services; what type of changes (incremental or radical) 
were required to provide the services; the water allocation and 
distribution methods; and the WUA's future plan on water 
distribution. 
We had several advantages in PIS in forming an AP. The users 
had several years of experience in canal O&M and thus had good 
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knowledge of the system. There was already a common working 
background between our technicians and the farmers. In the past 
too, the CIP and the then WUA (though informal) used to co-
ordinate with each other in matters relating to O&M. More 
importantly - local people had faith in the WUA and in its leaders. 
Farmers said that the Chairman and the Secretary had worked hard 
for the past several years to keep the system running to its capacity. 
This was an ideal case for using their skills. However even in this 
ideal situation, when we completed our survey, we still missed 
many elements as some of the problems were outside our domain 
and some were due to a lack of awareness in using this diagnostic 
tool. The results of this walkthrough were: 
• The visible problems were noted down- the canal breach 
section, the damaged structures, silted canal sections etc. The 
wider causes of these problems did not come up. For example, 
everybody in the team pointed to the reservoir silt deposition 
and its encroachment as a major problem. But the reason for 
this, and how we could solve it was missing. We also realized 
that we needed to talk to farmers in the catchment, who were 
not users of the Panchakanya system. 
• We carried out the walkthrough with 'canal closed' conditions 
assuming that problems would be visible to our eyes. This gave 
us an idea of structural problems. However, we missed another 
equally important factor: the hydraulic performance. For 
example, we noted seepage areas based on farmers' 
information, but not the intensity of the seepage at different 
sections. 
• We also missed an important person during the walkthrough: 
the gate operator. When we discussed our data with him, he 
pointed out many new problems regarding gate operation and 
canal seepage. 
The project team remained highly instrumental in this process. 
We prepared the technical inventory to find the problems, and 
prioritized the options for change. The real diagnosis part was 
missing. For example, we listed down where the seepage was, but 
not whether the seepage water was lost or used again elsewhere. 
We did not discuss the why and how of the problems. Another 
limitation was that we did not discuss any social and legal issues 
affecting water delivery. At this stage we even did not comprehend 
this aspect We were more focused on technical problems and 
finding the best possible options. 
The Joint Planning Process 145 
However, we did not limit ourselves to this first attempt, and use 
the walkthrough only. We decided to carry out several meetings 
between our joint survey team and local leaders, with farmer 
groups of different canal reaches, and with other farmers who were 
not users but farmed adjacent to the reservoir. The walk through 
was again repeated in canal-running conditions to observe the 
hydraulic performance. These exercises not only provided the 
physical condition of the canal and its structures, but gave a 
broader picture of the system constraints, including the historical 
changes. 
The fundamental technical and physical problems resulting in 
poor service in Panchakanya were then clear to us. The first major 
problem, as identified by the WUA was massive seepage from its 
4.92km long main canal. This had resulted in a water scarce 
condition especially in the tail-end areas. Otherwise, the 
Panchakanya had ample sources to irrigate monsoon rice in its 450 
ha area. Another major constraint of PIS was reservoir 
encroachment by the adjoining farmers, and massive silt deposition 
of the reservoir at the intake due to lack of a silt-flushing device in 
the intake weir. We then made a topographic survey and found that 
more than 40 % of the area was already encroached on by the 
adjoining farmers and converted into fields. Farmers also claimed 
that this had also resulted in a decrease in water flow in the stream 
and hence in the canal itself. All these problems had contributed to 
the decreasing command area of Panchakanya. Also problematic 
were water distribution processes because of the poor condition of 
the gates and the outlets. 
Analyzing the constraints setting future targets 
When all of these constraints were discussed, the following 
objectives were set for the future technical improvement work: 
• to cover the targeted command are of 450 ha 
• to improve the equity and reliability of the water delivery 
system 
• to reduce the operation and maintenance cost of the system 
To eliminate these constraints, the WUA set the following 
priorities for technical intervention: to improve the seepage 
condition in the main canal; to solve problem of reservoir 
encroachment and siltation in the headworks; and remodelling the 
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outlets and the gates which were dysfunctional. It was also agreed 
that no new water control structures would be added in the main 
canal system. Improvements in the branch canals were given the 
least priority as the farmers thought these were under their control. 
The WUA was then left to decide where to prioritize the 
improvements and what kind of innovation would be appropriate 
to solve the problems. As expected, they came up with a shopping 
list of demands, because they were not given any limitations. 
Farmers favoured radical changes in the existing technology. They 
asked to replace the existing canal sections with another cross-
section type, the vertical brick wall, over the whole of its length. 
But this was not only going to be very cosdy, but was also difficult 
to justify to the donors, and even to my own seniors in the 
department On the other hand these canal sections were 
structurally safe and stable, but leaking heavily due to poor 
construction materials used in the past. The WUA's proposal was 
highly shaped by the project structure: because they thought that 
most of the cost would be borne by outside funding agencies, they 
did not focus on finding the appropriate solution under the given 
situation, but instead favoured an entirely new one, considering it 
to be better and superior. Tiffin (1987) also documents similar 
cases where farmers came with an extravagant list of desirable 
demands for improvement, when not presented with any 
limitations on the costs and budgetary provisions. 
There was no way this change could be justified. We then 
decided to discuss the matter together, between project technical 
team and the WUA. In the discussion, I came to reali2e that it was 
. not only the outside funding that had resulted in the extravagant 
demand, there were also other reasons: 
• They had over-expectations on what technology could do for 
them. They had observed several canals being constructed in 
nearby projects utilizing brick lining. They thought this was the 
best option. They had also a feeling that lined canals were 
better than unlined canals, and that gated outlets could provide 
a better service than ungated ones. 
• It was also due to the usual trend in our bureaucratic process, 
which attempts to consider all demands irrational and what we 
get is always less than what we ask for. So people ask more, 
even if their need is less. The farmers had also deliberately 
included extravagant demands knowing that at the time of 
negotiation there would be reductions in them. 
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• The system was going to be turned over to them and they did 
not want to confine their demands, as they do not know when 
they would get further support 
After the discussion, our technical team and the WUA again 
inspected the canal sections and discussed the problems. I was not 
in favour of dismantling the existing canal section, but the WUA 
insisted on new brick lining and dismantling the old one. Despite 
several efforts, I could not convince the WUA to change their plan. 
We were told by the project co-ordinator of the IMTP that the 
average cost of rehabilitation should not exceed about Rs 14,000 
($200 per ha). Within this limit, it was possible to construct only a 
1.2km of new lined section. However, the WUA agreed to continue 
the discussion on the type of lining, to find better options, if 
possible during the detailed design work, as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The experience in Panchakanya shows that it is essential for 
walkthrough activities to be carried out in both the conditions: 
canal closed and in running conditions. We found many 
differences between what we were told by the farmers, and what 
we observed while the system was running. But this is not really the 
fault of the farmers, as their knowledge is localized and they cannot 
usually discuss the situation of the whole system. Another problem 
is that common farmers generally do not participate in these 
exercises, they feel that it is the WUA's job, and they are selected 
for this. Within the WUA too, generally, only the key figures like 
the chairman and the secretary participate regularly. So discussion 
with wider groups of farmers (at appropriate intervals) is essential. 
The evidence here also shows one should not depend on the 
efficacy of a particular participatory tool to generate information: at 
the same time one must recognize how the project structure shapes 
the planning process. 
Priorities in institutional development activities 
With the technical inventory over, another element required was to 
prioritize the institutional development activities. However, this did 
not involve a joint exercise. There were already standard training 
modules developed in the Irrigation Department for the capacity 
development of the WUAs. Such training was on both technical 
and non-technical aspects of irrigation management. It included 
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training on construction quality control, flow measurement, system 
maintenance, system operation, share system administration 
(chapter 4), leadership development, and basic training on 
participatory approaches and methodologies. The same training 
was proposed here too. The training sessions were to be carried out 
throughout the implementation period. 
The field level project offices were not responsible for most of 
these training programs. They were to be carried out by the Co-
ordinator's office at central level and the consultants were 
responsible for facilitating the training programs. Beyond training 
programs, field visit programs to different groups of farmers and 
WUA were also identified. Such field visit programs were proposed 
to places where there were successful FMIS, and to areas where 
farmer could learn about agricultural innovations. 
5.4 The Joint Walk Through in Khageri 
The management situation was more complex in Khageri than in 
Panchakanya. Farmers here were less aware of the system 
problems, as they were not direcdy involved in canal O&M in the 
past The WUA here was formed in 1993. When the walk through 
started in August 1995, the WUAs had been involved in canal 
operation for only two irrigation seasons (the monsoon seasons of 
1993 and 1994). There was an election of the WUA in January 
1995, and as a result about 50% of the representatives in the WUA 
body were new. The new members were less familiar with the 
operational problems in the system. 
Khageri was a larger system, and the walkthrough activities were 
to be carried at two different levels: at the main system level and 
branch canal levels. It was not possible to carry out the activity by a 
single team, where there was a 23.2 km long main canal and 13 
branch canals totalling more than 50 Km length. Furthermore, the 
farmers in Khageri already had exaggerated expectations of the 
upcoming project, making their demand based on what the project 
could offer, rather than actually analyzing their needs. However, we 
had also some advantages here. We had experience from the 
Panchakanya case that a walkthrough should be done in both canal 
operating condition as well as in closed condition. Also that we 
needed to include the canal operators in the process. Canal 
operators in Khageri were highly knowledgeable and some of them 
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were very popular among the farmers. Another experience from 
Panchakanya was that only one walkthrough was not enough in 
understanding the problem situation: there was a need to discuss it 
among different groups of farmers as only limited numbers of 
people participate in the walk through exercise. 
Trying different options 
An alternative way of joint working was tried in KIS: beginning 
from the farmers themselves. That is, the concerned BC members 
were asked to discuss the problems and probable solutions with 
their farmer groups, and prioritize the necessary changes. This 
would then be jointly discussed between the WUA and the 
technical team. This was especially done because of the time 
limitation. We targeted to complete the walkthrough by December, 
such that we could enter the Agreement with the WUA by January 
1996. There were no fixed targets for the project, but we were told 
by the project co-ordinator to complete the technical improvement 
work in three years time. Considering this, we were targeting to 
complete the technical inventory by the end of December 1995. 
Beside time limitations, this option had two advantages. First, the 
problems would be discussed within farmers group themselves at 
the beginning, so that more farmers would participate in the 
process. Second was that it would also avoid walking through 
unnecessary places and detailed investigations could be 
concentrated on the identified problem areas only. 
This approach proved disappointing. About half the BC 
members were new as a result of the recent election. Many of them 
had not walked along their canals. They knew about the problems 
in general, but not in particular. Those who were members in the 
previous committees had only one year of experience of canal 
O&M. So when they were asked about what support they needed, 
their reply was general: they wanted canal lining, widening of canal 
crossing bridges, concrete pipes for road crossings and 
construction of tertiary canals. There was a huge list of demands 
from the branch committees. There was no advantage in going 
further with this approach, and we started the walkthrough directly 
as we did in Panchakanya. 
The joint team here again included our technicians, including the 
canal operators and WUA members of the concerned BC. Being a 
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large system, there were two technical teams and I could participate 
only in some of the canals due to my time limitation. However, at 
the final priority setting between the concerned WUA and project 
staff, I was always present. In branch canals, together with the 
concerned BC members, the member representing the branch in 
the MC was also assigned for the walkthrough. All the BC 
members were asked to participate in these joint exercises. 
However in most cases, only the Chairman and Secretary of the 
committees were present from the WUA side. This exercise proved 
useful to both the parties as in most of the cases even the 
Chairman and Secretary of the branch canals had not studied their 
system in detail6! 
The walkthrough in each branch (and also in main canal) was 
done in three steps. At the first stage, the joint team, used to carry 
out detailed walkthroughs and prepare the inventory. At the second 
stage, tentative cost estimates were made, and discussions with the 
larger group of farmers were carried out. After this discussions, a 
revisit to the field was made to incorporate the suggested changes. 
The third stage was the final negotiation stage, where the tentative 
designs were further discussed and changes made as per the cost 
available. As the activities in the different branch canals overlap, it 
usually took a month to complete the walkthrough in four branch 
canals. 
Analyzing the constraints setting the priorities 
The Khageri canal network was not in as bad a condition as in 
Panchakanya. Its major problem was the limited supply at the 
source. So the major focus here was to increase water availability in 
the field, especially at the tail-end areas. The major priorities of the 
farmers were: 
• Reuse of seepage water by diverting drainage water back in 
canal wherever possible. 
• Lining the canal sections 
• Improvements in the gate configuration 
• Development of tertiary canals 
• Widening the canal crossing bridges and construction of new 
bridges. 
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The farmers' first priority followed the problems in land 
topography (see chapter 3), where seepage water immediately joins 
the drainage and was a loss to the system. Farmers had known 
about this since the construction of the system back in 1967. They 
had also tried to reuse the water, but with limited success so far. 
The reason was that this required land acquisition to dig a new 
canal, which farmers were unable to do because of financial and 
bureaucratic processes. Reuse of this lost water got immediate 
attention to farmers who expected to succeed this time through 
government support. Canal lining was also targeted to reduce the 
canal seepage, and to reduce the annual maintenance burden of 
reshaping and remoulding of canal sections. 
The Khageri system used to operate on a rotational basis. With 
their short experience of canal operation and their interaction with 
the canal operators, farmers in Khageri favoured a strong rotational 
practice to be put in place in the future. For this they demanded 
additional cross regulators in the main canal, and changes in the 
design of existing gate configuration. The present gates were easily 
tampered with, and the problem was more with fishing by 
outsiders than water theft by the farmers. In a certain section of 
canal reach, outside people used to block the gates in the night for 
fishing, affecting irrigation. So they sought tamper-proof gates. But 
the farmers' demand for change in water control structures was 
only at the main canal, not inside the branch canal. They related 
that inside the branch canal, 'social control' (rules, regulations and 
social relationships) was enough to regulate the flow. But along the 
main canal, they needed better technical control as well, to guide 
the high volume of water as well as to control the vandalism and 
interference by fishermen. 
The problems identified, and the suggested priorities after the 
joint exercise, were in line with the future management plan of the 
WUA. The WUA wanted to utilize every available water source 
inside the command area, control the seepage and have a strong 
rotational plan. However, we (from the project side) could not 
agree over demands for canal lining. Farmers demanded almost 
50% of their canals be lined. As in Panchakanya, extravagant 
demands were due to higher expectations generated by the project, 
but were even higher here, and generated by project activities. 
There was high mobility of the consultants and project staff in 
the field. Farmers had seen consultants (both foreign and local) 
with white Toyota jeeps in the field more often during the WUA 
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development and training programs. There were also frequent visits 
by the higher authorities from the IMD, as well as by donor 
agencies. I also learned that one local consultant involved during 
the WUA formation had told the WUA that money would not be a 
problem in future7. These activities made farmers expect a big 
construction project to be launched in the area. There was a strong 
feeling among the WUA and farmers that the participatory process 
was meant for the implementation of the construction activities. 
This feeling existed among our own technical staff too. They were 
less aware of the management reform, and IMTP was seen more as 
a construction project, not a part of broader process of 
management reform. Bruns (2002) notes similar situation in 
Indonesia, where management reforms has often ended up 
discussing only issues of technical rehabilitation. 
In one of the WUA meetings, I tried to convince the WUA 
members that the ultimate objective of IMTP was to further 
accelerate the process of participatory management that begun in 
1992. Technical rehabilitation was just to bring the infrastructure 
up to a level that they could operate and maintain. It was meant for 
incremental change, to provide them with better working 
conditions. I told the farmers that we needed to look at better 
alternatives for the lining, as it could increase the maintenance 
burden in the future. Farmers thought that lined canal would 
reduce their maintenance burden (exaggerated expectation of 
technology). This was only partly true. Lining could reduce 
immediate maintenance burdens and eliminate the task of canal 
reshaping, but its maintenance in future would be more cash-
intensive. 
In Kathmandu, the project co-ordinator and the DDG were not 
in favour of canal lining. From the experience of previous 
operators and as well as from the result of walk through, there were 
advantages of canal lining at certain places. Most of the Khageti 
branch canals as explained in section 3.3 were constructed with 
filling sections and there were moderate seepage losses from these 
canals. There was no measurement of the seepage loss so far, but 
the drainage flow downstream of the canals indicated that seepage 
amounts were high. There was no prospect of re-using lost water 
due to topographic limitations and wherever it was possible, 
farmers had already taken action. But the scale of demand was 
high. For me it was essential to address both farmers' concerns and 
the co-ordinator's. 
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According to farmers, seepage loss had increased in Khageri since 
its construction. Farmers themselves knew the reason why: initially 
the canal embankments were wide (2.0m), and well compacted. 
Over the years, farmers had encroached on the canal embankment 
(now less than 1 m) in many places, and converted space into fields 
which had increased the seepage. I suggested that instead of canal 
lining, its embankment be re-widened back to its original shape, or 
slighdy wider. I preferred slighdy wider embankments than the 
previous section so they could be used as village roads, besides 
controlling the seepage. But this had a practical limitation. It 
required taking back the encroached land, and the WUA feared 
that these farmers could be hostile towards the WUA. 
For many WUA members, this was innovative: they were 
especially attracted by the idea of the village road, which could 
control the seepage and also provide local transportation. This had 
also another value. This involved mostly the earthwork and it 
would be easier for farmers to contribute to this activity. Farmers 
agreed with this plan, and agreed to cut their demand, favouring 
lining at selected places only. With further negotiation, it was finally 
agreed to line the canals for 6.2 km out of the total length of 50km 
(considering all the branch canals). 
However, the higher authorities in the co-ordinator's office were 
still not satisfied with the lining proposal, as it involved more cost. 
Later on, in one of the field visits, one ADB official during his field 
visit even said that the canals were being 'silver-plated'. However, I 
now had to defend whatever we had agreed with farmers, and 
argued that lining was essential as it could save considerable 
amounts of seepage and provide a better service especially to tail 
end farmers. I explained that the need for canal lining was also 
mentioned in the earlier project design report of 1967 (chapter 3). 
The designers then had assumed that the soil pores would be filled 
up by the incoming silt and that canal lining may be avoided in 
future, but this did not happen. There was still heavy seepage loss 
within the branch canals. With the available data to support my 
argument, the project co-ordinator was finally convinced for the 
lining work. 
The total amount for the rehabilitation here was NRs. 52.5 
million (Rs. 13, 400 per ha) out of which 26% was expected from 
farmers side. Farmers' contribution was expected to generate out of 
voluntary contribution. The total cost was also under the limit of 
Rs. 14,000 per ha cost as suggested by the co-ordinator. 
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Training and field visit programs 
The training and field visits programs here too were similar to 
Panchakanya. This was already set by the project co-ordinator 
office in Kathmandu. The WUA here was initiated in 1993, and the 
members were already supported by training on 'leadership 
development', 'share system administration', and 'flow 
measurement activities'. The chairman of the WUA also had the 
opportunity to visit the Philippines to gain experience in early 1994. 
This field visit program was funded by the USAID as part of the 
capacity development program of the WUA, and was participated 
in by the WUA leaders from Khageri, Panchakanya and West 
Gandak systems. Additional training on 'construction quality 
control', 'office administration', 'financial management' was 
proposed for the future. In addition to the MC, the training was 
also targeted at the BC. Because of its relatively smaller system, 
training had not been targeted at the branch canals in Panchakanya. 
5.5 Action Plan Preparation in West Gandak. 
The West Gandak is an intensive-type development system, with 
canal networks and associated water control structures up to field 
level. For farmers, the immediate need was to test its compatibility 
with their management, rather than addition of the new water 
control structures. Farmers were more concerned with two major 
problems, flooding and inundation, and the problem of silt 
intrusion, which was not resolved so far despite huge investment 
during the CADP. 
Flooding and inundation had been a problem since the 
construction of the Gandak Barrage and it was especially due to 
inadequate cross drainage structures, and poor maintenance of the 
associated drainage canals. The maintenance of the drainage canals 
however was the responsibility of the Indian Government, which is 
beyond the authority of Gandak Project Office. These were no silt 
exclusion mechanisms to control the silt entry in the main canal 
which used to result in quick sediment build-up in the main canal, 
drastically reducing its capacity. 
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The walk through process in West Gandak. 
Both the minute book of the SMC, and discussions with the then 
project manager of the West Gandak show that the process here 
also began with several rounds of walkthrough activities inside the 
command area. In the branch and minor canals, first demands 
from these particular canals were collected for the type of 
improvement required in their system. They were notified to 
submit their demands by the West Gandak project office. After the 
demands from all canals had been collected, they were discussed in 
the SMC, which then decided to carry out the walkthrough activity 
on the canals. The branch/ minor committees were then notified 
about the walkthrough date in their canals. The committee 
members of the respective canal were asked to join the 
walkthrough, and show the problems which they had asked to 
solve. The respective committee was also asked to discuss the 
problems in their canal networks with local farmers. Any new 
problems identified during the exercise were also noted down. At 
the time of the walkthrough, the project manager of the West 
Gandak, and other technicians, one of the SMC members and the 
members of the respective branch or minor committee were 
present When the Project Manager could not be present, another 
engineer was present on his behalf. The Project Manager told me 
that from the WUA side, only key position holders like the 
Chairman or Secretary were present during the walkthrough 
activities. The final lists of demands and probable solution were 
finalized in the field itself. 
Once the final lists of the improvement needed was completed, 
a discussion was again made between the walkthrough team 
members and farmers of the canal. The date and venue of such 
meetings were jointly decided by the SMC and the respective 
committee: common farmers were notified later on by the 
respective branch/minor committee regarding the date and venue 
of the meeting. In these meetings details of the demands made 
were again discussed, and the final checklist for the improvement 
works was prepared. The finalized items of works were separated 
into five different headings, namely: Emergency Repair and 
Maintenance, Essential Structural Maintenance, Catch up 
maintenance, Rehabilitation and Expansion. 
Farmers demands in the branch and minor canals mainly 
involved the remodelling of old and damaged structures and 
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cleaning, shaping and reshaping of earthen canal sections. At the 
system level, flood control structures, and construction of a silt 
ejector8 to remove silt load from the canal were prioritized. 
Considering the intensity of structures the system has and the 
system constraints, it can be said that very limited improvement 
works were identified while preparing the AP, especially in the 
branch canals. There were no debates about the problems 
regarding water delivery structures or any type of conveyance 
structures as occurred in both Khageri and Panchakanya. My 
discussion with the then project manager, SMC members and some 
branch committee members reveals that 
• The whole WUA team was new as a result of recent elections. 
The team had neither the experience of canal operation, nor 
had they received knowledge about the system, except around 
their own locality. They did not know about appropriateness 
and compatibility of the technology for their management. 
This resulted in limited participation from the WUA side. In 
West Gandak, farmers were not involved in day-to-day 
operation of the canal and thus lacked the knowledge regarding 
operational constraints. 
• Farmers knew that there is abundant water at the source, and 
their major problem was the heavy sediment build up in the 
canal. They believed that if the silt intrusion is limited and the 
canal is regulady cleaned, the system could be efficiendy run. 
• Very few persons were involved in the problem identification 
process. For example in branch canals, one or two members of 
the WUA, technicians from NWGIS and one SMC members 
were involved in the walkthrough activities. It was thus a group 
of four to five people involved in the walkthrough and among 
them, only one or two were from that particular canal. While 
preparing the initial demand, most often it was the Chairman 
of the committee who prepared the list and submitted to the 
project office, without even discussing it with the committee. 
The BCs were to discuss the operational problems with the 
farmer groups before joining for walkthrough. Farmers told 
me that they did not know about these activities. In Khageri 
and Panchakanya too, it was only the key figures who used to 
participate in this exercise. But these people used to discuss the 
problem (both formal and informal) with the fellow farmers in 
parallel. 
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• In group discussions (which occurred in the discussion of main 
canal), and meetings, the process was dominated by one or few 
influential people. Farmers say they mostly agreed with what 
these people said. 
The CADP had carried out radical changes in the system 
infrastructure and technology. Construction of additional structures 
was thus not required in West Gandak. According to the project 
manager, West Gandak problems, especially the silt and the 
flooding, were chronic and require continued attention, and one 
event of rehabilitation had thus limited scope to offer. But one 
cannot deny that there was very limited discussion and study during 
the walkthrough. Both the WUA and some of the project 
technicians agree that if farmers had had more experience of canal 
operation and maintenance, a wider debate on the type of 
improvement in technology could have taken place. 
Besides the elements of technical change, types of support 
needed for the institutional development of the WUA were also 
discussed. The training programs were designed by the consultant 
involved with the project. As the types of proposed training were 
similar to KIS and PIS, they are not presented here. 
5.6 Signing the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
When elements of both technical rehabilitation and institutional 
development activities were finalized, a MOA to implement the AP 
was signed between the WUA and concerned project office (on 
behalf of the government). This was the binding document for 
both the government and the WUA for the implementation of 
IMTP in the system. The MOA is a legal document that includes 
the terms and conditions of the transfer arrangement, the level of 
transfer (whether it is a full system transfer or joint management) 
and other specific concerns of the particular system. It also 
specifies roles and responsibilities of each party involved (the 
WUA, the SMC and the concerned project office) in the 
implementation process and type of the support that the system 
would get after the turnover. The actual turnover would take place 
after the completion of the technical rehabilitation and institutional 
development activities identified in the AP. 
In Panchakanya, it was not necessary to negotiate with the WUA 
on the level of the transfer. It was dictated by the Irrigation Policy 
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itself. That is, its command area is less than 2000 ha, and the whole 
system was to be transferred to the WUA. Farmers had participated 
in this program knowing this provision (chapter 4). Regarding the 
condition of the transfer, such as what properties to transfer, what 
would be government's role and responsibilities after the transfer, 
we decided that these would be further negotiated after the 
implementation of the AP. The reason was that so far there were 
no policy guidelines for this. For the execution of the AP, the 
following principles were agreed after a meeting between the 
consultant, the WUA and the project: 
• The WUA would mobilize and execute the construction work 
to be provided as part of its voluntary contribution. The 
project office would provide necessary technical support for it. 
• The SMC would execute remaining work in collaboration with 
the project office and the WUA. This point was already made 
clear during the workshop in Kathmandu, that the SMC would 
be responsible for the execution of the project at field level, 
and there was no disagreement over it at this stage. 
• The WUA and the project office would jointly supervise the 
construction work. 
• The WUA would decide who would implement the 
construction work (contractor or the WUA itself). As per the 
financial rule the WUAs are also allowed to carry out the 
construction work. So a contractor would be employed only if 
the WUA decided not to carry out the construction work on its 
own. 
• Payment to the contractor would be made after the joint 
commissioning of the construction work. 
• Any disputes between the project office, SMC and the WUA 
would be resolved by the co-ordinators office in Kathmandu. 
• The project office and the coordinator office in Kathmandu 
would carry out all the necessary training and field visit 
programs as identified in the Action Plan. 
• The system would be handed over to the WUA after the 
implementation of the action plan, prepared. 
• It was also agreed that legal issues regarding the transfer would 
be dealt at the time of handing over after the completion of the 
AP (see chapter 7). 
The AP and the above-mentioned conditions were then 
discussed and passed in the GA of the WUA. A ceremony was 
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organized to sign the MOA between the WUA and the project 
office in January 1996. It was held in the headwork of the system. 
The ceremony was also attended by the D D G of IMD and the co-
ordinator of the IMTP. The document was signed by the WUA 
chairman from the farmers' side (witnessed by two others) and by 
the project manager (myself) from the government side. 
The MOA agreement in Khageri was similar as in Panchakanya. 
However, since the command area is above 2000 ha, only the 
branch canals were to be transferred to the WUA, in accordance 
with the Irrigation Policy. So the signing of the MOA document 
was done by both the Chairman of the MC and the Chairman of 
the concerned BC. The ceremony was held in Shivanagar where the 
MC office is located. It was attended by both MC and BC 
members. Before the agreement was signed, the AP was approved 
by the GA of the WUA (for the whole plan, including for main and 
branch canals) and the GA of the concerned branch committees. 
The conditions and processes were similar in the West Gandak 
too, but with one big difference. The agreement was for the 
transfer of the whole system. Among the three systems, it is the 
largest and most complex one with a command area of 8700 ha 
(chapter 3). The Irrigation Policy specifies that only systems below 
2000 ha are to be transferred to the WUA. For larger systems, only 
the branch canals are to be handed over and the main canal is to be 
joindy managed by the agency and the WUA. But the policy does 
not prevent from handing over a larger system, if the WUA 
demonstrates its technical and financial capacity to manage the 
systems. How did the WUA, which was only two years old and so 
far not involved in canal O&M, got interested in taking over the 
whole system, and why did project office and the DOI agree on 
complete handover of the system? Project officials say that a few 
aspiring leaders in the WUA were in favour of taking over the 
management of the whole system, whereas the key leaders involved 
at that time say that they were encouraged by the project officials. 
The WUA here was formed in July 1993, and the MOA for transfer 
was signed in January 1995. Within this short period, how much 
maturity can the WUA have earned who still had not establish 
proper mechanisms of fee collection, and so far was not involved 
in canal operation in such a complex system? This point leads one 
to believe that the full transfer of the system was constructed from 
the government side, because of their aspiration for IMT. 
However, a few WUA leaders were also attracted to full transfer 
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because of the resources (forest, road tax) the West Gandak could 
provide (see chapter 7 for details). 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the processes of joint problem analysis for 
the technical improvement work, and capacity building of the 
WUA. In addition, I described my own involvement in the 
facilitating process. My intention here was to present the working 
environment, and the kind of challenge managers face in managing 
the project process, the continuity of which depends as much on 
managing these externalities as on actually being committed 
towards the program itself. Another objective was to show how 
personal agendas also get embedded into professional life, which 
ultimately determines people's commitment to be involved in 
particular problem situation. My commitment to work in the IMTP 
was as much shaped by my personal belief and personal factors, as 
by being an engineer of the Irrigation Department. 
The chapter shows prescriptive designs of norms for a project is 
problematic, and how they clash with actors, when external 
agendas are put to them for implementation. Though considered 
participatory, the design of the IMTP began in the usual top down 
fashion, norms of which were set by the actors at higher 
institutional layers: the project co-ordinator office, the consultant 
and the donors. The actors at the local level, who were responsible 
for the project implementation, remained unaware of the 
implementation framework. The project design also fails to bring 
different elements of the project environment together in the 
program process, instead each actor were seen as independent 
from each other. The actors at central level consider themselves as 
a controlling or supporting authority and hold the decision making 
power. Field level project offices were asked to implement the 
project as designed, and had less authority to accommodate 
changes in the plans and programs. 
The chapter presented the three different cases of Action Plan 
preparation and agreement over its implementation. It mainly 
focused on the walkthrough activities to prepare the technical 
inventory to find options for change. The materials here shows that 
the outcome of this exercise is highly shaped by the experience of 
the facilitating group in performing the tasks as well as the 
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understanding of the system features by both facilitators and the 
users participating the processes. It shows that farmers are 
knowledgeable actors: however, projects generally raise the level of 
expectation on the part of local people. This usually limits the 
scope of self-analysis of problems and probable solutions. People 
can construct their ideas based on what project can offer (see also 
Moose 2001), without actually diagnosing the problem situation 
and probable means of solution. Instead they can be biased 
towards a set of new technologies, considering it to provide better 
water delivery. The demand for the technical change in the cases 
presented was highly shaped by the belief that some outside 
funding agency would bear most of the improvement cost, without 
detailed discussions about the problems. 
Likewise, unfamiliarity with tools and lack of experience on the 
part of the technical team can lead to 'blue printing' with no real 
diagnosis of the problem, as happened in Panchakanya at first trial, 
despite committed and motivated staff. Problem diagnosis is the 
crucial element in the walkthrough. Such a diagnosis has to 
incorporate both hydraulic and structural considerations, and their 
social dimension, and include the experience of canal operators and 
others who are familiar with system opportunity and constraints. 
The participating team should thus be trained on how to diagnose 
the problems, rather than on what steps to follow in the process. 
Participatory methods therefore should not be limited only in 
consultation over what things are to be included for change, but 
also in subsequent negotiation for change. They should be 
practiced iteratively, with detailed diagnosis of the problem and be 
based on future operational strategy of the local organization, for 
which understanding of technology and its requirement of use 
plays a key role. It is essential that the information generated be 
discussed by broader circles, as well as through group discussions 
at different fora. At the same time the project activities should not 
create unrealizable-expectations by the local groups. 
A planning exercise shall not limit itself to only one type of 
methodology, and needs different approaches to show people's 
needs priorities and preferences regarding future water use. It is 
essentially a learning process, where people come to learn about the 
physical environment, the technology they use and the actors 
within it. The outcome of the process is highly dependent on how 
these actors learn about their system and themselves. At the same 
time, the knowledge generated is only the raw material, which has 
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to be refined in due course to transfer it to the actual products for 
action. The next chapter will explore this. 
Notes 
1
 When the CIP was dissolved, and the NLIO established, staff were 
reduced from 250 to 64, a big problem was created in the office: the then 
project manager was threatened with his life. 
2
 In many other cases, an engineer's work in Nepal is based in remote hilly 
locations, which involves walking even up to 4,5 days depending on 
location. So I favoured staying here. 
3
 As the IMTP was being implemented in different projects, the central 
project coordinator office termed the different projects at field level as 
sub-projects and accordingly the term sub-project management 
committee is used. 
4
 Communist parties were (still are) also major political forces in Nepal 
and farmers are familiar with the word Polit Bureau. 
5
 That is I was not always present in this process. I used to get 
information from the engineer participating the Walkthrough. But I was 
always present in the discussion afterwards. 
6
 Although they were from the same area and had observed the canals for 
several years, they had not diagnosed problems, as they were not involved 
in its operation and maintenance. 
7
 Once the system was also visited by the then US Ambassador to Nepal 
as the management transfer was also supported by USAID. During the 
visit, one local consultant happened to tell the farmers that there would be 
enough money for the project in future. His intention perhaps was to 
keep farmers happy, such that farmers would tell the visiting dignitaries 
only positive aspects of the organizational development on which they 
were involved. 
8
 A silt ejector is a structure constructed at the canal which helps to reduce 
silt in the canal downstream by diverting the silt-laden bottom layer of 
water to a flushing channel 
Joint Action Continues: Participatory 
Design and Construction 
Chapter 5 presented the process of joint analysis to find options to 
improve technical water control. This chapter further describes the 
process of design and construction and looks at the key actions and 
process involved in the PTD: the process of iterative discussions 
and negotiations, copying, majority priority setting, confiictive 
negotiation and quality control. It gives much detail about 
discussions and choices, to show what levels of negotiation, 
support and patience must go into participatory planning. The first 
three sections of the chapter review the design processes for new 
water control structures as selected during the action plan phase for 
each irrigation systems. The chapter then presents the construction 
process and reviews the challenges in maintaining construction 
quality: it concludes with a discussion of the scope, issues, and 
challenges of PTD in large irrigation systems. 
The chapter shows how the project environment guiding the 
technology development processes shape the outcomes of these 
actions and processes. The chapter also draws attention that PTD 
is not only a means of finding appropriate technology what people 
want, but also building a stable project environment, which is 
essential not only to facilitate the participatory change process, but 
also to sustain future water management locally. Likewise, it has to 
think of building accountability with the WUA for future 
governance and management. 
Another argument in this chapter is that PTD in the context of 
management transfer should be viewed as a way of establishing 
service-oriented water control. I argue here that service-oriented 
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design must be based on future operational plans of the users. This 
requires, together -with the users, the involvement of the previous 
operators and experience of the designers. The design should 
proceed only after the WUAs are in a position to formulate 
performance-oriented action plans based on these experiences. 
This will allow for different operational strategies to be followed in 
the future rather than freeze the infrastructure into a specific 
inflexible distribution pattern. This requires that the agency adapt 
an iterative and interactive process of design, take into account the 
feedback from canal operators, invest in initial training of the 
WUA, accept departures from the design standards to meet the 
farmers' requirement, and allow sufficient time for the process to 
take place. 
6.1 The Design Process in Vanchakanya 
The Panchakanya case shows how design is constrained when there 
are already different types of water control in use. It also shows 
how continuous interaction between the users and designers helped 
arrive at the most feasible solutions to the local problems in water 
supply and that participatory design requires a series of innovative 
actions from both users and the facilitators to make the action 
situation truly participatory. 
The technical rehabilitation work in PIS was targeted to control 
the seepage from the main canal section, and resolve the silt 
deposition and encroachment problem at the headwork. The 
ultimate goal was to increase the command area, and provide better 
water supply for the farmers. The major areas for improvement 
identified were: 
• Improvement in the existing headwork configuration 
• Main canal improvement for 1.2km through new lining works 
by dismantling the old ones 
• Re-configuration of gates and outlets matching with the 
rotational plan 
The same team was involved from both the project and WUA 
side as in AP preparation. But this time, I was present in every 
discussion while finalizing the design. 
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Finding options for headwork improvement 
To resolve the problem of reservoir encroachment, non-technical 
measures were required. It was decided to carry out a survey to find 
the boundary of the reservoir, and put a fence around it to prevent 
encroachment in the future. At the same time, it was also decided 
that the Panchakanya farmers would talk with the farmers of the 
upstream area, to ask them not to encroach further on the area. 
The sedimentation problem could be solved, partly by constructing 
a silt flushing structure. The PIS headwork is a solid-mass concrete 
weir without any arrangements to flush the silt accumulated 
upstream. This had resulted in silt deposition in the upstream 
section. There was thus a need both to stop further siltation and 
also to clean out existing silt. 
There were several discussions (informal) among the WUA 
themselves and also between the project staff and the WUA about 
the probable solutions, and there were different solutions put 
forward by the different parties. A final discussion was held at the 
headwork itself, to select the appropriate design, in which 
advantages and disadvantages of different proposals were discussed 
in detail. The different proposal are presented in Figure 6.2 and 
discussed below: 
Proposal 1: Gate at the middle of the weir dismantling part of 
the weir. This proposal was put forwarded by the WUA. All of the 
WUA members and fanners were in favour of this proposal. 
According to this the middle of the weir body would be dismantled 
up to the floor of the riverbed and replaced by a gate, such that 
once the gate is opened, it takes away the silt load. This would also 
help them in cleaning the reservoir. They demanded this from their 
experience of Khageri head works, which is near to them, and 
which they had observed for many years. The Khageri headwork is 
a gated barrage, without any problem of upstream siltation. From 
the technical aspect of the headwork, the gates are at the side of the 
weir with the head regulator of the canal. The farmers' idea of 
putting gates in the weir body was right from a technical point of 
view. However, it was abandoned later on because of construction 
difficulty. 
This change required the dismantling of the middle portion of 
the weir, which could destabilize the weir body. The weir had not 
created any problems and was stable during the past 23 years. It 
had no maintenance costs so far! Farmers also thought that 
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dismantling of the weir body could cause cracks in other parts of 
the weir body, which could cause seepage from the weir. It also 
required constructing a gate-operating platform above the weir 
body, to operate the gate. So they agreed not to risk the 
dismantling of the weir body, which had provided them service for 
so long. 
FIGURE 6.1 Different proposals for headwork improvement 
Canal 
Reservoir 
Proposal 2: A side channel. One of the consultants involved had 
suggested a side channel linking the upstream body of the reservoir 
to the downstream of the weir, during his past field visits1. With 
this arrangement it was not necessary to alter the existing weir 
body. This proposal was rejected outright both by WUA and the 
design team. Farmers could not imagine how this arrangement 
works. This also required construction of a long flushing channel. 
The construction burden was greater than the first option but its 
capacity to flush the silt could be far less. 
Proposal 3: An escape structure2 just at the beginning of the 
main canal. This was the idea of the design team. It required 
minimum construction, and no disturbance to the existing weir 
body. This option was finally agreed upon. It was accepted mainly 
because it did not involve dismantling the existing weir body. It 
required construction of two gates one for checking the flow at the 
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main canal, and another to open the escape channel. This was a 
compromise between the available options. The first option was 
the best from the functional (to flush silt) point of view. Farmers 
could also see by its alignment that it was the better option. But its 
application was constrained by the pre existing conditions. 
Designing for change in conveyance structures 
This was the most difficult part- to decide how to reduce the 
massive seepage from the main canal, given that there were already 
so many different types of canal sections made of different 
construction materials, as already shown in Figure 3.3. During the 
AP preparation we had agreed to dismantle existing boulder-lined 
canal walls and replace them with vertical brick wall sections at 
seepage-prone sections. Of the two canal banks, the left bank 
(facing downstream) included a canal service road, and seepage 
from this bank was relatively less due to the thicker embankment 
section. On this side, no new wall was proposed, except in high 
seepage zones with weak service road embankments. The other 
side was to be dismantled and replaced completely. Hence, two 
different types of section were proposed as shown in Figure 6.2. 
FIGURE 6.2 Proposed canal sections at the time of AP 
Partly new sections 
with new vertical wall 
Entirely new section 
dismantling the old one 
The idea of a vertical brick wall lining had emerged from what 
farmers had seen in other systems, including one nearby. When I 
asked farmers why they preferred lined sections with vertical brick 
walls, they replied that they see it as more stable as compared to 
trapezoidal sections and they see the same type of section in most 
of the systems3. At the same time, in Panchakanya, they had a very 
particular bad experience with boulder lining and concrete works. 
Contractors can easily create large voids in boulder masonry (due 
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to their irregular geometry) whereas in brick masonry there is less 
chance of this. 
The feasibility study of the IMTP (Gitec, 1992) had proposed a 
similar types of canal section in its design reports. Under this 
arrangement, only 1.2km out of a 4.9km canal section was 
proposed to be lined. The remaining sections were to remain as 
they were. The proposed 1.2km length was the most seepage-prone 
zone with cracked canal sections at several locations. 
After the signing of the AP there were already discussions 
among different fanner groups that the remaining sections should 
not be left in its same condition, as they also displayed seepage, 
though less than those sections identified for improvement. The 
gate operator also was of the opinion that entire lengths of canal 
needed treatment if the seepage was to be controlled. The system 
was going to be transferred to them and they would not have any 
government support to carry out these activities in future years, 
except after natural disasters. Now the WUA asked if more funds 
could be arranged and new sections to be included. We had 
allowed an additional 10% of the total cost for likely changes and 
variations in the AP, but this was not sufficient for this purpose. 
Changes in design were allowed, but increases in cost were usually 
not entertained either by project Co-ordinator and donors, except 
in exceptional circumstances. 
So there was no possibility of additional funding. I was not in 
favour of dismantling the existing canal sections. I insisted on the 
treatment of existing sections trying different options. Knowing 
that there would be no increase in funding over the amount agreed 
in AP, the attention of the WUA then shifted to finding solutions, 
without dismantling the existing canal sections. There were already 
different canal sections with different masonry work, as explained 
in chapter 3. They had been dysfunctional due to the poor quality 
of the construction work. They were structurally safe, farmers also 
agreed this. So we decided, instead of dismantling them, to trying 
find alternatives keeping the existing section. One such alternative 
was to have a thin layer of concrete lining over the existing canal 
sections. I was in favour of this approach because of its simplicity 
and low cost, and proposed i t When the idea was discussed in a 
wider group meeting, there were differences of opinion. Two 
difficulties with this proposal were seen. First, it would reduce the 
flow area, hence reducing the canal capacity. Second, if such thicker 
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masonry sections were not able to control the seepage, how could a 
thin concrete lining control it? 
The first point was valid. Laving concrete over the existing 
section would reduce the flow area. But it would not create 
problems. The Panchakanya was designed to carry 1200 lps of 
water. This design flow assumed that water from the Butter khola 
would also be diverted to Panchakanya (see Figure 3.2). But after 
the disputes over water rights on the Butter Khola with the 
Khageri farmers, no water diversion from the Butter Khola was 
made. The Panchakanya farmers knew this history. The maximum 
water flow Panchakanya could accommodate was 1000 lps only. So 
a reduction in canal cross section would not create problems. Our 
design calculations also showed that even with this reduction, new 
lined canals could carry 1000 lps. Farmers' awareness of these 
historical disputes could help solve these concerns and difference 
of opinions. 
It was difficult to make farmers understand how a thin layer of 
concrete could control the seepage. Many farmers would not 
believe this because they had seen seepage from their lined canals. 
However, the problem with the existing canal sections was with the 
quality of the work, rather than the work itself. To give an example, 
I told the farmers that an 8 cm thick concrete slab is used for a 
roof, which effectively works in protecting the houses from rain. 
Why can not a similar thing control the seepage here? With this 
example, they realized that the existing canal sections were 
structurally sound (strong enough to take care of any likely force 
or pressure) and the seepage could be controlled by means of thin 
concrete lining. With these discussions, we finally abandoned the 
idea of dismantling the existing canal and replacing it with new 
brick wall sections: in favour of thin (5-7cm thick as required) 
concrete lining over the existing sections. This shift would give no 
problems to the higher authorities and the donors, as it would not 
increase the costs. With this new design, we could improve a 4km 
long section, instead of 1.2km as identified earlier. 
Gates and outlets 
It was agreed in the AP that no new control structures would be 
added, and only reconfiguration of the existing gates and outlets 
were proposed. There were already three cross regulators in the 
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main canal and according to farmers' experience, these were 
sufficient to maintain the rotational distribution already practised 
and to continue it in future. Likewise, there were already gates in 
the offtake structures in all of the branch canals. However, while 
there was no need for new control structures, they needed to be 
rectified. Farmers were asking for a tamper-proof gate. Demand 
for such a gate was also extensive in Khageri, where we had 
developed a gate which farmers termed a 'lock system' gate. I shall 
discuss how this gate came to be designed in the Khageri case. The 
same design was used here, as demanded by the farmers. 
The design of outlet structures posed particular challenge, for 
various reasons. First, it was the concern of more than one group. 
Second, the flow variations across the outlets are not linear to their 
diameter, and is difficult to make farmers understand this. One 
such case of outlet design is presented in Box 6.1. 
The design cases presented here show how the interactive 
design translate farmers ideas and preferences into practical reality 
and help to arrive at a desirable solution despite constraints 
imposed by the existing infrastructure conditions. Farmers are 
knowledgeable, and share their experience and historical factors in 
the process of design. When the problem situation is beyond their 
experience or knowledge, they compare with similar situations, 
which they have observed and can realize. Scale models and 
diagrams are also used to explain and discuss the problem situation 
with farmers in the design (Sheer, 1996) process. However, in large 
and medium scale irrigation systems, such a possibility does not 
exist and making comparison with similar phenomenon as well as 
building their capacity through field visit to similar examples 
remains only the option. 
6.2 The Design Process in Khageri 
It would be unwise to assume that farmers have complete 
knowledge sufficient to shape the design process. As expressed 
earlier, and again here, farmer's knowledge is based on their 
experience as well as historical memory. In large systems an overall 
knowledge of the system is often lacking among farmers, and even 
if they have this knowledge it is mostly localized. However this 
does not limit the scope of the PTD, if the design is incrementally 
carried out to allow learning by both users and designers. This fact 
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draws attention to the need to make a program flexible to allow 
learning and change. The Khageri case also shows that replication 
of successful designs of one place to another can be disastrous. 
Box 6.1 Outlet design in Pancbakanya 
The branch no 1 of Panchakanya had three piped outlets, of 
diameter 40 cm and 30 cm and 10 cm each, as offtakes from main 
canal. When the system was first rehabilitated in 1974, there was 
only one offtake, the 40-cm diameter pipe. The farmers 
complained about the water shortage and the CIP had added 
another pipe of 30 cm. The last 10-cm was added under the 
influence of particular farmer of the area1. The gates of these pipes 
were also damaged, and the WUA wanted to replace them with a 
single oudet for easier operation. It was designed to be replaced by 
a 50-cm diameter pipe. We had discussed the design with the 
WUA members. But the farmers of the branch objected to it 
saying that they needed an 80-cm pipe. Their demand was based 
on simple calculations that they had in total 80 cm pipe openings. 
Some of the WUA members had understood that flow across an 
outlet is not linear with the oudet diameter. Together with these 
members, we tried to convince the farmers of branch 1 telling that 
the canal discharge is proportional to square of its diameter, ant 
thus it was not necessary to provide 80-cm diameter pipe. They 
were not convinced by arguments by the Chairman and Secretary 
of MC, a dispute started among them. The farmers told us that 
they would never agree to the 50cm diameter pipe. So we started 
to bargain, and the final compromise was to put a 65cm diameter 
pipe, and with a condition that that it would be replaced if proved 
too small for their canal downstream. Later on, when the 
construction activity was over, there was full discharge in their 
canal downstream but the flow depth in pipe oudet was less than 
30 cm! 
As Khageri was a large system with a large-scale rehabilitation 
program, we decided in the SMC meeting that design and 
construction activities would be carried out in a phased manner, so 
that earlier experience could be utilised in later designs. This 
approach had several advantages. First, it could allow learning to 
proceed further. The farmers here did not have a long experience 
of canal operation as in Panchakanya. Farmers knew problems in 
and around their ternaries and oudets, but the problems in the 
branch and main canal were less known to them. Secondly, most of 
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the branch canal of Khagrei had similar design characteristics so 
any feasible solution at one place could be replicated. Thirdly, it 
would provide enough time for planning budgets and their releases. 
Construction budgets are released annually in Nepal. This requires 
the submission of budget proposals well in advance to the DOI, 
which after review passes them to the National Planing 
Commission for approval and them to MOF for fund release. If 
design constructions were carried out incrementally, it would 
provide time for proper planning and implementation. 
First phase design and construction 
With these ideas, we first began to carry out detailed design and 
construction on branch canals Bi, B5 and Mi. This selection was 
based solely on their geographic location i.e. canals from head, 
middle and tail-end portions were selected at the first stage (see 
Figure 3.4) to avoid any conflict among the branch canals. The 
major priority for change in all the above three branches were 
similar for: 
• Canal lining 
• Re-design of water control structures to suit rotational pattern. 
• Outlet/tertiary canal development 
• Widening or new construction of Village Road Bridges (VRBs). 
There were several reasons for the demand for lining work. 
First, it was meant to control seepage. Canals of Bi and Mi were 
constructed by higher earth filling, which was more prone to 
seepage. In Bi, the land topography is such that the canal seepage 
water immediately joins the natural drainage. For farmers of Bi, it 
was a total loss, even though downstream farm areas utilize this. 
The seepage water exempted many farmers from needing 
membership of the WUA and paying ISF, as they had free access 
to this seepage water. Thus farmers demanded canal lining, as they 
thought lining would control the seepage and those farmers 
enjoying free water would ultimately join the WUA and pay the 
ISF. As discussed earlier, they also thought, wrongly, that it would 
reduce maintenance. Farmers believed that if quality of 
construction was properly controlled, maintenance requirements 
would be small even in the lined canals. They said this from their 
experience of lined canals in their system itself. Bi had a lined canal 
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section in part of its area. This had no maintenance requirement 
over the last few years. At the same time, they knew that future 
rehabilitation would be done by the government. So they favoured 
a lined branch canal. 
Selecting the desired lined canal section 
Canal lining can be done in various ways, as shown by the canal 
sections of the Panchakanya in Figure 3.3. It can be made of 
concrete; concrete with steel; boulder lining, brick lining or 
combination of brick and concrete. It can have different 
geometrical shapes, like trapezoidal or rectangular. However, from 
a technical view, the choice and type of lining in general is dictated 
by: existing canal geometry, purpose of the lining availability of 
materials locally and cost Considering these factors, we decided to 
discuss the following canal sections with the WUAs (Figure 6.3): 
trapezoidal section having bed with concrete and sides with bricks 
(type I), same section but sides also with concrete (type H) and 
rectangular section with brick masonry (type III) 
FIGURE 6.3 Different lined canal sections discussed with the WUA 
Type I Type II Type 
Bi had a narrow canal section with an existing lined section mostly 
of Type HI, and this section was proposed for i t In B5 and Mi, 
lining Type I and III were proposed. However, opinions differed in 
choosing the section in Mi and B5. One group of farmers were in 
favour of Type III, for reasons explained for Panchakanya. 
Another influence has been the massive construction activity in 
and around the East Rapti Irrigation Project, where Type HI lining 
was widely used. On the other hand, another group was in favour 
of Type II, which they had seen in Bfe of Khageri where Type II 
lining had been working satisfactorily for the last 10 years. This site 
was nearby B5, so farmers had observed it for many years. Finally it 
was decided to try with both Type I and II sections. There were 
two reasons for this. First the existing canal geometry of both B5 
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and Mi were more suitable for type lor II lining (already in 
trapezoidal shape). The second was that this was cheaper than the 
Type III lining. The only danger with these two types was that they 
were liable to damage (by cracking) if there were any settlement in 
the embankment. Farmers also asked about this possibility. 
However, the canal was more than 30 years old (as Khageri was 
constructed in 1967) and no such problems existed as already 
shown by in B6.Considering all these factors, it was decided to 
proceed with the type II and III type of the lining in Bs and Mi. 
Changes in gate configuration 
Khageri farmers wanted to put a rotational water delivery in their 
system. For this, it was agreed during the preparation of AP that 
two more cross-regulators would be added in the main canal 
(downstream of B4 and B5) and relocation of one cross regulator 
which was just downstream of B7. It was also agreed that no gated 
control structures would be added inside the branch canals. Inside 
the branch canals, farmers told that the existing ungated piped 
oudets had worked well and there was no need to change and 
adjust them. The two new cross-regulators were added, but the 
relocation of one cross regulators was not possible due to 
opposition of B7 farmers. The farmers of B7 strongly objected to 
this as they thought they would lose the control they had if they 
allowed to shift the cross regulator. The relocation of this cross 
regulator was then abandoned . 
Another demand by the farmers was to redesign the gates as 
tamper-proof, as the existing gates were manually adjustable types 
and were dysfunctional, for two reasons. First, they wanted more 
technical control in the main canal. The WUA chairman said it 
would take several years for farmers to adapt to the new rotational 
practice and rules and regulations between the branch canals. So 
until they obtained maximum control in water distribution socially, 
they needed tamper-proof gates, to achieve control technically. 
Inside the branch canals, however they told that they could achieve 
control socially through rules and regulations because of smaller 
areas, so no such gates were needed. Panchakanya farmers gave a 
similar answer to the need for tamper-proof gates. 
The second reason for tamper-proof gates was to control fishing 
in the canals. Khageri canal brings in a various varieties of fish, and 
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at.night, people come and close the canal gates for fishing. This has 
been one of the major problems in some of the branch canals: Bs 
suffered most from this problem. The Bs farmers used to guard the 
canals the whole night to avoid this and once they caught the 
persons involved in fishing at 3 O'clock in the morning. They 
brought that person into the project office at 7 in the morning to 
take legal action. Even the project office had no authority to punish 
such persons. Later, we thought of a gate that could not easily be 
dismantled. In conventional gates, the spindle (iron rod attached to 
lift the gate) is fitted at the top of the gate body and move upward 
when the gate is lifted. The handle of the gate is attached with the 
spindle. Instead, we designed the gate such that the spindle does 
not move upward but sticks with the gate body. The handle of the 
gate was not fitted with the spindle, and could be separated from 
the gate body and placed in the WUA office. This gate worked 
quite well in Khageri and Panchakanya farmers also wanted similar 
design for their gates. Later, farmers and engineers from other 
irrigation systems also visited Khageri and Panchakanya systems 
and favoured this type of gates. 
Other design configuration 
Changes to the road crossings over canals were of less interest to 
farmers, as they did not affect the hydraulic performance of the 
canal flow. Most of these village road bridges (VRBs) had been 
constructed for bullock carts in the past, which were now unfit for 
trucks and tractors. They were designed at right angles to the canal 
and were thus skewed with the road alignment. This made 
movements of the trucks and tractors difficult. In most cases, 
widening a bridge on one side could solve this problem and this 
was agreed without further discussions. 
The implementation of these designs provided valuable learning 
to both our technical team and the WUA and formed base to 
proceed ahead: 
• The brick masonry for lining, Type I was problematic due to 
doubts over quality (to be discussed in section 6.4). The type 
m section proved to be costlier than the other two. So its 
application would be limited in other areas. 
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• Type II cross sections would be promoted wherever possible, 
as it was the cheapest among the three. It was also easier in 
construction . 
• According to farmers, seepage control was also more effective 
by Type II lining as compared to other types. 
• Farmers found the tamper-proof gate effective in its 
functioning 
The second phase in Khageri: design and re-design continued. 
The learning from the first phase of design formed the base to 
proceed for the second phase. At this stage, we prepared detailed 
designs and cost estimates for the remaining nine branch canals 
and also for the main canal. The same approach was followed in 
the design of the structures. In all the canal sections, linings were 
now to be done utilising the Type II section. Gates would be 
remodelled into lock system gates as in the previous cases. 
However, the uniform application of these concept developed 
earlier did not work here in two of the branch canals M2 and M3, 
due to their different water supply situation and topography. In 
these canals, there were two parallel canals serving the same part of 
the command area as (see Figure 6.4). The lower canal was also 
augmented by the drainage of nearby area. The lower canal was 
developed by the farmers in response to the water shortage in the 
area, whereas the upper one was developed by the government. Its 
objective was to collect seepage from the upper canal and to utilize 
the drainage water from nearby area. The lower canal was 
constructed at a lower level than the upper canal, to allow the 
seepage water from the upper canal to be collected here. 
The design team together with the concerned WUAs had 
proposed canal lining in the upper canal (government) with type II 
sections. Accordingly tendering and contracting was done for the 
construction. When the actual construction was about to begin, a 
group of farmers strongly opposed the proposed development 
plan. They said that they get more reliable water from the lower 
canal built by them. They also argued that since seepage from the 
government canal is automatically collected to the lower canal, 
which is again used for irrigation, lining in the upper canal would 
make no sense. So, the farmers proposed an alternative design: 
construction of a side-wall on the lower canal so that seepage from 
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both the canals is not lost as shown in Figure 6.4. The lower canal 
had been constructed by farmers buying land from their fellow 
farmers, with a very narrow embankment. Due to this, there was 
heavy seepage from the side of the lower canal. The farmers' 
arguments were reasonable. 
FIGURE 6.4 Design change by the farmers 
Farmer canal 
Design change proposal Initial design with type II lining 
from the farmers in Government canal 
This situation materalized due to a lack of detailed design 
discussions with the local farmers group. The discussions were 
limited to technical team and the WUA only. Both were influenced 
by the success of Type II lining section in other canals. So they 
simply copied the earlier design without analyzing the field 
situations and discussing with local farmers. I too was heavily 
influenced by the previous success and did not explore the 
conditions! I thus realized the danger behind copying a successful 
design to another environment without exploring its applicability in 
detail. 
However under prevailing financial rules and regulations, a 
change in design was not easy, as they were already contracted for 
construction. According to the rules, costs variation above the 10% 
of the total cost, as well as quantity variation of any construction 
items beyond 25% need to be approved by the Director General 
(DG) of the DOI7. That is, even the project co-ordinator and the 
D D G had no authority to approve such variations. These 
bureaucratic processes are not only lengthy, but also sometime 
questionable, especially at the level of Auditor General Office, who 
finally approves the expenditure. In this case, the design change 
was not going to increase the cost, but the variation in construction 
items were beyond 25%. 
As the farmers' demand for the change in design was technically 
reasonable and at the same time it was not going to increase the 
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total project cost, I decided to take the matter to the Project Co-
ordinator in Kathmandu and convinced him for the change. He, 
too, had no authority for this, but assured me to supply the help 
needed. He was also personally committed to the participatory 
design process, and visited the site himself during an interaction 
workshop, and became convinced for the change needed to be 
made. Back in Kathmandu, he explained to the DOI who had 
authority to approve such change about the field-level problems 
and convinced him to approve the design change and the 
construction proceeded in the field with changed design. 
Despite interactive and iterative design cycles, implementation 
of the design were still constrained due to dynamic nature of 
institutions. The design interactions were mostly with the WUAs, 
which changes in every two years (now changed to three years) due 
to election. The new people often changed the idea of their 
predecessors, and wanted additional construction works to increase 
their popularity among the farmers. Likewise, the problem of over 
designing of the structures, due to lack understanding of hydraulic 
behaviour by the farmers, also appeared here. However, these 
should not be seen as a limiting factor of the participatory design, 
instead, designers need to be aware of these factors, and act upon 
the problem situation accordingly. 
The design cases here show the need to follow an iterative 
design process together with interactive discussions to allow both 
experimentation and learning. This help build up knowledge to 
both the designers and the farmers, on which future actions can be 
built on. Learning at smaller scale, and expansion over a wider scale 
has been one of the key approaches in participatory learning 
process. This works welL but one has to be careful especially in 
replication of the successful design without detailed understanding 
of the particular system environment. 
6.3. The Design Case of West Gandak 
The design case presented here is quite different to the others 
because of the nature and scale of the problem dimension. Farmers 
here had preferred to solve two major problems: to control 
flooding in the command area and to control silt intrusion in the 
main canal, by constructing a flood diversion weir and a silt ejector. 
The design and construction of these are presented below. Due to 
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conflict among different actors involved and difficulty of work 
across different domains, the final result of the design was very 
different than planned. 
Construction of the silt ejector 
As mentioned previously, silt intrusion in the main canal had been 
a major problem in the efficient management of West Gandak 
main canal. Farmers were of the opinion that construction of a silt 
ejector would alleviate much of the problem captured in canal 
operation. For the government, it would be a great incentive for 
the farmers to take up the future responsibilities of canal O&M if 
the silt intrusion could be reduced. A discussion was then made 
within the SMC for its construction. Later on, an appropriate site 
was selected after several rounds of site visits by the joint team of 
SMC, WUA and some interested farmers of the area. It was 
proposed to construct the silt ejector at 900 m downstream of the 
intake site (See Figure 6.5). It was an ideal site for the construction 
of such a structure, as the ejected silt could easily be flushed 
through the adjacent drain. 
FIGURE 6.5 The layout of silt ejector design 
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However, the idea to construct the silt ejector at this location was 
bluntly rejected by the farmers adjoining the drain (Farmers from A 
and B) fearing flooding of their lands. The responsibility of clearing 
the siphon structure at the Indian main western canal and the 
drain downstream until it joins the Gandak River lies with the 
Indian government. But this had not been carried out (or poorly) 
in the past resulting in occasional inundation in this area. Farmers 
from A and B believed that flushing the silt here would further 
choke the siphon and increase the inundation problem. Besides 
this, fanners of Area A objected as they are not receivers of the 
irrigation service. After several rounds of discussions with the 
farmers, the Project Manager and the MC members succeeded in 
convincing the farmers to allow the construction work. But when 
the construction was about to start, there was again disturbance, 
but this time from the farmers of area C. 
Both the project office and the WUA had not expected this 
opposition, as this area had no impact from the construction work. 
The farmers of area C started their opposition because they had 
encroached on the drainage area and converted it into farmland. If 
the silt ejector was constructed, the drainage area would be cleared 
and they would lose the occupied land. Farmers from C were able 
to convince the farmers from A and B that maintenance of siphon 
structure and the drainage downstream had not been carried out in 
the past by the Indian Government and there was no guarantee 
that it would be done in the future. The SMC, WUA and the 
project office were just misleading the people. In the end, all 
opposed the construction work. The idea to construct the silt 
ejector at this location was finally abandoned in spite of having 
several rounds of discussions. 
It was then decided to construct the ejector at 400m 
downstream from the intake, where the implementers did not 
expect to confront anybody. But it required the construction of a 
new flushing canal, which had to cross the Indian Main canal 
before finally discharging the silt into the Gandak River. This also 
required to pass the navigation canal (see Figure 6.5). Even though 
both WUA and project office knew that there would be some 
objection from the Indian authorities, they decided to go ahead 
with the construction. The ejector was constructed and flushing 
channel excavated until the point where it meets the navigation 
channel. At that moment, the Indian authorities complained to the 
West Gandak project office about the construction. They also 
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complained to the Liaison offices in Balmikinagar and 
Kathmandu. 
However the construction was already over. Later on, this 
matter was raised in the Standing Committee meeting in New 
Delhi10. Higher authorities in the Ministry of Water Resources and 
DOI who attended this meeting were angry about the incident after 
returning from Delhi. The Project Manager of the West Gandak 
was questioned by them to justify the construction. The Project 
Manager justified his intention, saying that he had discussed 
(verbally) about the construction with the concerned authorities in 
India. He also argued that it was not going to pose any threat to 
structures in the Indian Main Canal. The Ministry then sent a high-
level team to investigate the matter. They too found that there was 
no problem with its construction. All the farmers of West Gandak 
were also behind its construction. Later on, nobody paid any heed 
to it, as all knew that this would do no damage, and the matter 
faded away. Even though the construction of the silt ejector has 
helped reduce the silt problem in the canal, the maintenance 
burden to the farmers has not reduced much as they have to clean 
the flushing channel. Another problem is that they have always to 
be in close coordination with the Indian authorities for its cleaning. 
The case of flood diversion weir 
The Jharahi river switched its course (b) to a new one (a) (see 
Figure 6.6) during the flood of 1964. Since then larger portion of 
flood used to pass along the new course, which is joined by the 
Dhanewa River further downstream. This new course had damaged 
both the canal alignments and increased the flood problem in the 
area. During the command-area intervention in the mid-eighties, 
the old course (b) was canalized and part of the floodwater from 
the new course was again diverted back to the old course. This 
worked quite well for few years but later on the major flow again 
started to pass into the new course. Farmers adjoining the new 
course desperately wanted to divert part of the floodwater to the 
old course again to save the farmland. 
In order to do this, a gabion weir was proposed to be built 
across the new course. However, farmers from the old course 
opposed the move to divert the flow back to the old course. The 
two channels lie in two different parliamentary constituencies (3rd 
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and 4*) of the Nawalparasi District and the design proposal quickly 
caught attention of the politicians. Part of the flood-affected area 
of the new channel also lies in the constituency no 4. For the MP 
of Constituency No.4, this was an unfavourable situation and he 
was interested to solve the problem in an amicable way. Finally a 
meeting was held between all the parties involved: WUA members, 
the VDC chief, local politicians including the MP from region 4, 
and the project staff including the Project Manager. After several 
rounds of discussions and negotiations, the meeting agreed to 
construct the weir, but with changes in the original design: reducing 
the height of the weir from 2.2m to 1.5m. The original design had 
proposed to divert about 40% of the floodwater, which required 
2.2m high weir from the river bed level. The IMTP consultants also 
favoured the idea to avoid conflict between two groups of farmers. 
The new course farmers were not satisfied fully with this new 
proposal, but they compromised with the plan. 
FIGURE 6.6 The layout of Jharahi diversion work 
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Construction started after the agreement. However, the old-course 
people were still not satisfied to divert the part of the flow. They 
started to disturb the construction work and sometimes even 
engaged in throwing stones to the labourers. The contractor 
stopped the construction work and said he could not continue the 
work Now another meeting was called among the relevant 
stakeholders, as in the first meeting. In this meeting the farmers of 
the old course made new demands: 
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• . protection of both left and right band of the old course 
• increase in the height of the nearby bridge across the old 
course 
• re-excavation of the old course should be done before the weir 
construction. 
These demands were not included in the AP, and the West 
Gandak Project office had no authority to decide over i t The co-
ordinators office in Kathmandu was not in favor of additional 
demands, and asked the West Gandak project office to further 
negotiate about these demands. After several rounds of 
negotiations between the old course farmers, the WUA and the 
West Gandak project office, it was finally agreed to carry out the 
protection of only the Right-Bank of the old course. However, left 
bank protection was rejected by the project office, being deemed 
unwanted, which the farmers agreed. The demand to increase the 
bridge height got solved politically. There was a program to 
upgrade the road by the Department of Roads and the Project 
Manager told the old course people that he would request them to 
do that job, which farmers agreed. The MP also supported his idea, 
and people were convinced by this. Accepting the last demand was 
not a problem to the West Gandak project office, as they had 
heavy machines in the office to carryout the excavation work. 
Agreeing these conditions, the construction work moved again. 
The MP of constituency No. 4 played crucial role in getting the 
disputes settled. 
However, the disturbance from the old-course people again 
started. But this time the situation was different, and the MP was 
not in the area. The new-course people had been very silent so far 
fearing that construction might stop. But then these people 
thought that unless they organized and confronted the old course 
people, the problem was not going to be solved. People across the 
border in India had also suffered from the floods of the new-
course, and wanted the diversion weir to be built. They also joined 
with the new-course people to confront the old course people. 
People from the new-course, together with the people across the 
border, then helped the contractor to finish the construction work. 
After this, the old-course people did not object to the construction 
work, as they became smaller in number and only asked to 
maintain the height of the weir at 1.5m as agreed in the early 
meeting. When I talked with farmers of old-course, they told me 
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that they had opposed the construction work just to ensure that the 
height of the weir would not be raised beyond 1.5m. 
Later on, some farmers found that the weir was not constructed 
as designed, and felt corruption had occurred in the construction 
process. The farmers blamed to all the actors involved in 
construction supervision: the WUA Main Committee, SMC and the 
West Gandak Project Office. Local farmers then asked the 
Director General of the DOI to make an inquiry about this. A two-
member investigation team was sent to examine the situation. The 
team found some alteration in the construction, but no action has 
been taken to anybody so far. The system was turned over to the 
users before the investigation. Common farmers criticized both the 
DOI and WUA for not taking any action against anybody involved 
in this process. Because of this event, all the actors: the West 
Gandak project office, the DOI, and the WUA Main committee 
and the SMC lost their credibility at local level. 
Both these cases show that a participatory process is not only 
about the methodologies and interactive consultation, but also 
involves conflictive negotiations. Problems generally are highly 
interconnected, and required to be represented and negotiated in 
different domains involving different actors and may need forceful 
actions. The relevant actors are needed to be identified at earlier 
stage, and then guide the process through negotiations. Both actors 
and domains can change with the change in the stages of program 
implementation. As the scale of the system increases, the 
dimensionality of the problem also increases. Efforts are thus 
needed to be made to bring different levels of the project 
environment together, and devise a win-win situation acceptable to 
all parties involved. 
6.4 EnsuringQuality of Construction 
I now turn to the construction implementation process of the 
design. During construction, farmers' input has the function of 
quality control, cost sharing and gaining of construction 
knowledge. These are often linked with the empowerment to local 
users. These are reviewed in turn, with arguments on how these 
must be conceptualized differently for participatory processes. 
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User involvement in quality control 
The term 'quality control1 is most often related with maintaining 
the design standards through direct user control in supervision of 
construction work. Beyond this, the quality aspect must also 
include the quality of the process. This means the process of 
tendering, contracting and users role in these processes. Both in 
fact represent dimensions of quality: the first concerns the quality 
of the materials and their final product, whereas the second is the 
quality of the process involved. They are not independent, as the 
quality of the final product depends on the process adopted. 
The quality issue has also triggered several questions regarding 
the efficacy of the participatory design process. It is often argued 
that even though participatory processes are adopted in making 
demand requests, and finalizing the action plan through joint 
problem analysis, the process of tendering, contracting and 
subsequent construction often has limited participation from 
farmers. 
The reason for this argument is that the implementing agency 
enjoys control over these processes because of financial rules and 
regulations and other administrative and institutional requirements 
of the donors and the Irrigation Department. Farmers usually do 
not have control over the funds, making them absent in the 
decision making process regarding tendering and contracting. To 
avoid this, in IMTP, the SMC (the board made up by four WUA 
members and the Project Manager) was made responsible for 
executing these activities. Many of the problems however, can be 
avoided if transparency of the process is maintained, which also 
ensures accountability on the part of the project to the WUA. 
The process adapted in KIS and PIS 
In the SMC meeting of both Khageri and Panchakanya, we first 
decided that the respective WUAs would be asked whether they 
would do the construction work by themselves or they preferred to 
employ a contractor for the purpose. Under the financial rule, 
whenever a WUA does the contracting job, it has to do the job at 
20.75% below the Engineer's estimate. The reason for this is that 
out of 20.75%, 15% is contractor's profit and 5.75% is the contract 
tax that the contractor has to pay back to the government When a 
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WUA does the job, it is neither given the profit nor does it have to 
pay tax to the government. 
In both the systems, the construction work was to be carried out 
at different stages and different package of construction contract. 
The contract jobs were not to a high amount, usually at a range of 
0.5 million to 2 million rupees. In both K3S and PIS, the WUA 
decided to get the job done by the contractor. The WUAs did not 
want to be involved in direct construction activities mainly for two 
reasons: 
• The job mostly included structural improvement works, which 
require good managerial skills. Even if they chose to do the 
construction work, WUAs would have to hire a third person 
with experience in executing construction work. 
• Previous experience had shown that structural works would 
not provide any profit to them. Usually, a WUA favours to be 
involved in earth-work only, which is manageable and 
sometime profitable (see chapter 5). But in this case, all the 
earthworks were to be done by the farmers as part of their 
voluntary contribution. 
With the approval of WUAs, tender calls were made in National 
newspapers to carry out the proposed construction work The 
interested contractors were asked to visit the construction sites and 
have discussions with the WUA before bidding for the contract. 
We had also decided that a meeting between WUA members, 
interested contractors and our technical team would be proposed 
and it was mentioned in the tender notice itself. But during the first 
stage of construction, the meeting could not be held due to 
difficulties in bringing contractors of different parts of the country 
together. The association of the contractors in the district liked this 
idea. They stated that they would make this type of meeting happen 
in future at their own initiative. 
The second attempt however was a great success. At this time, 
the WUA, our technical personnel and contractors held an open 
meeting in the office compound. Most of the contractors were 
from the same district, but some from adjoining districts. The 
association of contractors also welcomed this approach. Over the 
past several years, many of the construction works were being done 
by the WUA and this had decreased jobs for the contractors. They 
tried to utilize this opportunity to convince the WUA that they 
would favour good construction quality. The WUAs found this 
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meeting effective because they could clear their concerns at the 
earlier stage of the construction. 
This gathering was welcomed by all those involved in the 
construction. Meanwhile, we also thought that there should be 
workshops between the contractors, the WUAs, field technicians 
and consultants so that problem could be discussed and solved in 
an amicable way. We had planned at least one such workshop a 
year. However, again due to difficulty of arranging all the personnel 
in one forum we were able to organize only one workshop at the 
middle of the construction activities. At this workshop, the higher 
authorities of the DOI were also invited to make them understand 
the field-level problems. The co-ordinator of IMTP, his supporting 
staff and the consultants, also participated in this meeting. It 
initiated a dialogue between low -level technicians and the higher 
authorities, and also provided an opportunity to discuss problems 
together among the different parties involved - the WUAs, 
contractor, higher authorities and the field-level technicians. As 
explained in the case of the Khageri in the previous section, the 
change in the design configuration were in fact possible due to this 
workshop, as all became aware of the design problem. These 
efforts proved very useful in making the project environment 
stable. 
The documents of the tenders were opened in front of the 
WUA representatives and the SMC members. Under the financial 
rules and regulation, the lowest bidder was provided the contract11. 
A copy of the contract document was also given to the concerned 
WUAs. After signing of the contract, a joint committee of WUA 
and our technical staff was formed to supervise the construction 
work done by the contractor. From WUA side, there were four 
members in the supervision team: one from SMC, one from main 
committee and two from the respective BCs. A summary sheet 
showing the construction details was also given to the supervision 
team and to the concerned WUA. An initial construction meeting 
was also held between the contractor, quality supervision team, 
WUA and project technicians to discuss the different activities in 
construction. 
After the completion of the construction work, the payments to 
the contractor were made only after the approval of the SMC and 
the concerned BC. Upon completion of the construction work, the 
measurements of proposed works were to be taken in the presence 
of the concerned WUA members and SMC representative. In 
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Nepal, previously the joint signature of the WUA Chairman and 
the Project Manager were also tried in previous projects. But my 
experience is that these are not going to make farmers feel 
empowered. The more important thing is to develop a process 
through which the WUAs feel professionals are accountable to 
them, which is more related to transparency of functioning. Below 
I show how failure to maintain transparency caused problems to 
our team later on. 
The construction implementation was transparent to the WUAs 
as all the activities were jointly carried out. The design was jointly 
finalized, the construction works were joindy supervised and the 
awarding contracts were joindy decided. There were also timely 
discussions on status of the work progress between the concerned 
WUA the SMC and our technical team. Besides this arrangement, 
we had developed a format showing details of the construction 
works, the expenditure and progress, and provided it to the 
concerned BC, the MC and GA. With this information, we used to 
hold discussions between the concerned WUA, the MC and our 
technician. The VDC chiefs were also invited to this type of 
meeting. In this meeting discussions were held regarding the 
progress and problems in the implementation process. Altogether 
four such meetings were held during the construction, though we 
had targeted six such meetings. 
The idea behind these meetings was to provide information and 
discuss the problem with a larger group of people. In regular work, 
usually only the executives of the WUAs and SMC members were 
involved in decision-making process and GA and other members 
were less aware of the project activities. These meetings were able 
to provide the necessary information on project progress to the 
farmers, discuss the problems and get feedback. However, these 
were highly time-consuming exercises. Details of each and every 
construction activity including expenditure were to be prepared for 
separate branch canals. But it was transparent and the WUAs were 
satisfied with this process. 
These types of workshops to discuss project progress and 
expenditures with the WUIAs, GA and others were not mentioned 
in the project document. But we had started it at local level to 
develop trust and confidence with each other. However, at the final 
stage of the construction, our group lost interest in supporting this 
activity. This widened our misunderstanding with the Khageri 
farmers (in Panchakanya the construction was already over) and we 
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were charged with failing to maintain the transparency of the 
process. The mutual trust and confidence which we enjoyed over 
the years declined and the WUA Chairman of Khageri criticized me 
for failure to provide these details, and he raised this issue with me 
even after I left the project. 
The reason for our losing interest was different Working in 
participatory projects is challenging, as it requires bringing people 
with different interests, who are situated at different project 
environment levels, together in the program process. It takes time 
and effort. The technicians often have to face angry WUAs and 
farmers when they fail to meet their expectations. Technicians 
working in these projects often expect incentives in terms of 
training (especially abroad), which are generally present in the 
project proposals. Hope of such higher studies attracts them to 
work in these projects. In IMTP there were also provisions for this 
and USAID had allotted US$ 200,000 for the capacity development 
program. As I mentioned in chapter 4, none of our staff had 
previous experience of working this kind of project and we were 
told that training would be provided as the project moved on. But 
to my surprise, not a single training program aiming to improve the 
capacity of field-level technicians ever happened. 
None of our staff had a chance to participate in a training 
program or have opportunity of study tours aboard. Once one of 
our engineers was selected for Indonesia, but he failed his English 
Examination Test (this is a requirement on the part of USAED) so 
that he could not attend i t From the West Gandak, one 
Association Organizer had an opportunity to attend a study tour to 
Indonesia and its project manager had an opportunity to pursue 
Master's Study in AIT. Once I was also selected for a study tour on 
Mexico together with few other engineers. Permission for such 
tours needs approval of the Minister of Water Resources. At the 
final moment, our visit was cancelled and the Minister himself with 
secretary and two high ranking DOI officials made this visit 
However, I was unaware of this, and only came to know after it 
appeared in a local newspaper1 . 
The disputes in construction 
Despite arrangements made to ensure good construction quality, 
the outcomes were often otherwise. The problems were different 
190 Engineering Participation 
in different construction cases. The events below describe the 
challenges in maintaining the construction quality, and how we 
kept on changing the design as we moved forward. 
The WUAs were very cautious on the quality of the construction 
materials, as they had seen poorly constructed structures by the 
contractors. As soon as the contractor started to bring the 
construction material, disputes over its quality started. In Bi, the 
WUA would not accept the brick quality, claiming it to be second 
class brick. Under standard construction specifications, bricks are 
divided into three classes: first, second and third class. First class 
bricks are well burnt, red in colour and produce a metallic sound 
when clapped against each other. The third class types are over-
burnt, black and of irregular shape, and thus easy to notice. The 
confusion is always between the second class and the first class. 
Bricks were transported to the construction site in trucks in loads 
of 4-6 thousands and to guarantee quality of each and every brick 
was not possible. Immediately, a meeting was held between the 
contractor, our technical team and the WUA to find a solution of 
the problem. 
In this meeting, we decided that bricks used in the construction 
of the houses in the area would also be accepted here. The 
contractor was given a few samples that the meeting decided to be 
of the first class type and asked to bring the same quality. There 
were also problems relating to the quality of sand and stone chips, 
the other two construction materials. For these two, we made a 
decision that sand from 'Manahari' and stone chips from 'Jharahi 
would be accepted. These two places are famous for good quality 
of sand and stone chips in the nearby area. Finally, the major 
problem was in getting good-quality cement. In our local markets, 
filling and re-filling cement bags are very common. It was not 
possible to go for laboratory tests for carrying out small-scale work. 
There were no such laboratories in the nearby area. So we decided 
that if the setting was good, we would consider it as good quality 
cement. If not, we would considered it of poor quality and its use 
would be restricted . 
With all these initial confrontations, the construction activity 
moved smoothly. But as we moved ahead, we came across 
different problems. While the construction was going on, the Co-
ordinator office had arranged a training program on 'construction 
management and quality control1 for the members of the WUA 
main committee and the SMC. The trainees were taken to the 
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construction site in Bi to explain about the construction activities. 
The participants found weak mortar in brick joints in some places. 
The trainees then started shouting to their fellow friends who were 
supervising the construction about their failure to maintain the 
proper quality. Later on, an inquiry was set up by the co-ordinator 
of the IMTP to find out what actually had happened. The 
committee found that some of the construction was poorly done! 
The report further said that there was no ill intention from any 
party, but negligence on the part of the contractor. The ADB 
official in its mission visit also raised the issue of poor quality 
control and gave the report to the higher authorities including the 
Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) and National Planning 
Commission (NPQ. It was shocking to see poor outcomes despite 
sincere efforts. 
The problems were not only on the quality issue, there were 
other problems, which we never thought we would face. In B5, the 
contractor did good quality of work and there were no complaints 
about quality. But he could not complete the work. We came to 
know that the contractor was bankrupt: he had not enough finance 
to carry out the job. He ranaway after completing about 80% of the 
work and had not paid the labours, who were mosdy local farmers! 
The project office had the retention money, but it could not be 
given to any person without the permission of the contractor 
himself (according to the rule). There was no legal document 
stating who were employed by the contractor and whether they 
were paid or not. There was tremendous pressure from the farmers 
to solve the problem. But we could do nothing until we found the 
contractor.14 
All these successes and failures provided rich experience to the 
whole team. Based on this experience, we decided the following 
changes to our approach to carry out future construction activities: 
• Brick masonry was controversial so we decided to carry out 
construction only using concrete lining. 
• Design construction would be continued in a phased manner 
Even with these efforts, cheating from contractors could not be 
eliminated. In one case in PIS, the contractor was using two 
different-sized boxes for measuring cement and sand. The one 
used to measure sand and stone chip was larger than the standard 
one. Most often the contractors would be very sincere at first and 
obtain the trust of the team. It was at a later stage that they started 
cheating. In another event in PIS, the contractor made a very 
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inferior construction. It was in fact identified by a group of farmers 
who were not in the supervision team. This event even led to 
distrust between the WUA Chairman and farmers. The 
disagreement over quality of materials between two different 
groups of farmers in canal lining work continued, and also led to 
verbal fighting between them. Despite sincere efforts of the team 
to ensure high quality of construction work, the challenges 
continued ahead. 
In irrigation the construction phase is the key of the PTD, as the 
design gets transferred into the final product, which should be 
there for a long time to provide service. It needs huge investment 
and can not be removed or altered easily once placed. 
Transparency of the construction process is crucial to ensure good 
quality, which also helps to build up accountability between the 
WUA and the project 
User's contribution in technology development 
User contribution in technology development has always been an 
important element of participatory initiatives. In the past, 
'participation' in Nepal was limited to contributing voluntary labour 
in the construction process. The objective was to reduce the 
construction cost employing free labour. The argument for user 
contribution these days is put differently: to create a sense of 
ownership among the users. It is also believed that users' 
contribution to the technology development process makes the 
implementers more accountable towards the farmers. However, 
user financial contribution has been both confusing and 
problematic. Most often the targeted objectives are not met. Why is 
it so different and does it help to establish accountability between 
the users and the farmers? Some of these issues are dealt in this 
section. 
In IMTP, a controversy started at the earlier stage of program 
implementation over the higher percentage of contribution 
required compared to other projects, as explained in chapter 5. 
Though a contribution of 26% was required from the farmers, in 
PIS only 12% could be achieved, whereas in KIS and NWGIS 
these amount only to 10 %. This again raises several questions: was 
the construction completed when the farmers' contributions were 
less than agreed? Yes. The reason was that the items of works 
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included for farmers' contribution mostly included the externalities, 
that is, the system could functions smoothly even without their 
being done. For example in all the three cases, the works given to 
the WUA were canal shaping and reshaping and strengthening of 
the canal embankments. Farmers in most cases cleaned the canal, 
but they did not bother to shape and reshape in proper section. 
This however was not going to decrease the flow. Similarly, except 
at the points of immediate danger, farmers did not bother to re-
construct the embankments. These factors resulted in a lower 
percentage of financial participation. 
There are many factors why could the expected percentage not 
be achieved. In the case of IMTP, one major factor was that it was 
not demand-driven and farmers did not feel that the government 
would pull out of the program even they did not contribute as 
planned. They had also stated at the very first interaction meeting 
held in Kathmandu that contributing 26% percent was beyond 
their scope. The shorter time span was also another factor in not 
achieving the desired farmers' contribution. For example in 
Panchakanya, farmers were to contribute about NRsl.5 million to 
the system's development. This means a farmer with 1 ha of land 
had to contribute 56 days of work or equivalent cash, which is 
normally not achievable within two years' implementation time. 
TABLE 6.1 presents the contribution to be made in each of the 
three systems. 
TABLE 6.1 Required user voluntary contributions 
System 
Panchakanya 
Khageri 
WestGandak 
Contribution 
NRs 
Total in 
million 
1.5 
12.5 
10 
Required in 
Per ha 
3,400 
3,200 
1,200 
Contribution equivalent to 
manpower 
Total Verba 
25,000 56 
208,300 54 
167,000 20 
In the Table, the cost of a labourer is assumed to be NRs. 60 per 
day. The Table shows that in both Khageri and Panchakanya 
farmers with 1 ha of land had to provide about two months of 
voluntary contribution in two years of construction time. To find a 
month of free time in a year is not easy for a farmer. Another 
problem is that different farmers have different slots in the year 
and matching the free time of all farmers is not an easy task. In 
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large systems it is also very difficult to organize large numbers of 
farmers to provide voluntary contribution continuously. Co-
ordinating the voluntary mobilization at this scale also demands 
sound management on the part of the WUA. Voluntary 
mobilzation is a slow process and cannot be achieved in a short 
time span. 
Many farmers feel that their voluntary contribution to working 
in users groups should be included in the users' contribution.15 
These also come to of considerable amount. Table 6.2 presents the 
person involvement in man-days in the WUA meetings on the 
three systems in a year. In the Table, a participation efficiency of 
60% for the main canal and 50% for the branch canals is assumed 
in calculating the man-days. The computation is based on the 
review of WUA meetings between 1994 to 1997. The minute 
books of the systems show that about 20% of meetings were 
cancelled, and the same percentage of members were usually absent 
during the meetings (this percentage is even higher in NWGIS) of 
the MC. The percentage is lower for the branch canal committees. 
TABLE 6.2 Cost involved in the WUA meetings 
Systems 
PIS 
KIS 
NWGIS 
Mondays involved in WUA meetings 
MC BC GA of GA of 
MC lower 
canals 
108 240 45 500 
150 540 85 2000 
252 3600 172 
Total 
893 
2775 
4024 
Cost Equivalent 
Total Per ha 
NRs. Rs. 
71,440 158 
222,000 57 
321,920 37 
Source: WUA records. 
So if meetings held by the WUA in a year were converted into 
cash, it would come at substantial figure. For example in 
Panchakanya, the cost involved in WUA meetings in a year is NRs. 
71,440. This is almost about 5% of the total voluntary requirement 
(see Table 6.1). This cost is involved every year, but it is reflected 
nowhere. There is also personal involvement in conflict resolution 
and other WUA activities. A large input also comes from 
construction supervision work. In Khageri, it usually took 6 
months' time to complete construction on each branch canal, and 
four persons were involved in the supervision process. If this cost 
is calculated, it comes to Rs.50000. The voluntary contribution in 
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WUAs administrative activities so far has not been part of the 
construction contribution, though the amount is substantial. 
Despite constraints in achieving the financial contribution from 
the users, it must be given due attention in the technology 
development process, as it help to increase bargaining negotiating 
power to the local users, and can hold designers accountable to the 
quality of technology on offer. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The chapter has reviewed the key actions and processes of the 
PTD and explored how they build up to support future water 
management locally. It has shown that interactive design process is 
important, but not sufficient alone: it must be linked to an iterative 
process where project work uses and feeds back knowledge. 
Iterative processes allow experimental learning, such that action 
ahead builds on previous learning. Behind interactive consultation, 
PTD equally involves conflictive negotiations, where interests of 
the different parties involved have to be negotiated and translated 
in the design. As these actions and process involves range of actors 
situated at different project environment levels, the outcome of the 
process is highly dependent on how the project environment builds 
up and facilitates the technology development process. 
PTD is mostly seen as a technology development process 
through interactive design, but its scope is much wider than this. It 
forms the base for future local governance and management in 
different ways: providing service oriented water control, building a 
stable project environment and developing accountability between 
WUA and irrigation agency. 
It involves a series of joint actions for a long period of time 
bringing actors at different project environment together in the 
program process, and thus provides an opportunity to build trust 
and confidence among the key stakeholders. It thus helps to 
establish a stable project environment, which is essential not only 
to facilitate the technology development process, but also to 
sustain future local management Likewise, transparency in the 
process helps the irrigation agencies implementing projects to show 
their accountability with the local organization which is a key factor 
for future governance and management 
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The chapter also showed that PTD faces several constraining 
factors. At the local level, farmers' knowledge can involve biases. 
Farmers' knowledge evolves out of different contexts: sociotechical 
or holistic, experienced-based, historical and dynamic and sensitive 
to micro-level contextual diversity (Vermillion, 1990). These 
characteristics are always not positive, for example sensitivity to the 
micro level context may include vested interests or preclude 
system-wide perspective (ibid). Engineers often are not trained on 
how to feed back this knowledge in the design. The dynamic nature 
of institutions also poses a challenge to maintain participatory 
design, as ideas and preference changes with change in personnel. 
PTD involves actors in different areas of the project 
environment, facilitators must have a multi-actor perspective, 
understanding different aspects of representation and different 
attractions to participation. It needs to link different levels of the 
project environment into a single system, to allow flexibility and 
change. However, as the cases show, actors at the higher 
institutional layers often are not part of the change process, and 
keep themselves as controlling and supporting actors with decision 
making power vested to them, limiting flexibility and change at 
local level. 
Another issue lies in the accountability of the designers (Ashby 
and Spurling 1994) for their design. To my knowledge, there is 
hardly any mechanism by which designers are held accountable for 
the quality of the technology on offer. The bureaucratic processes 
require designers to be more accountable towards their agency than 
to the users for whom they are designing. There is no recognition 
on being accountable to farmers and at the same time there is also 
no punishment for-not being accountable to the farmers. 
These constraints do not necessarily limit the scope of the 
participatory design. Actors involved in the change process need to 
be aware of these factors, and act accordingly so as to achieve the 
best possible option in the given situation. 
Designing with farmers for service-oriented water control 
A key conclusion from this chapter has been that a participatory 
design process should not be seen on its own, but be viewed as a 
process to develop service-oriented water control. The service 
concept involved comes from the farmers, not from any external 
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blueprint of appropriate technology or institutions. Users have first 
to prioritize the type of service delivery pattern that they want to 
practice in the future. This requires both users and designers to be 
involved in system operation for a certain period of time, so that 
they gain knowledge on system constraints and opportunities. This 
initial knowledge investment can then form the base of the future 
design. This approach avoids presuming a particular set of 
institutions and technologies as suitable for farmers' management. 
Rather it provides an opportunity to test the compatibility of the 
existing technology and institutions in system management, and 
seek changes where required. 
In Khageri and Panchakanya, farmers familarized themselves 
with the existing technology, and then sought changes to suit a 
strong rotational pattern, resulting in only incremental changes in 
the water delivery technology. In Panchakanya only the gate 
configuration was changed whereas in Khageri, a few additional 
cross regulators were added and others re-sited to suit the delivery 
pattern. The limited discussion in West Gandak reflected the fact 
that users were not involved in the operation of the system, and 
lacked any idea of the type of service pattern and institutions 
feasible in the system. 
It is often argued that proportional divisions are more suitable 
to farmers' management (Pradhan, 1996 and Horst, 1998). The 
logic is that it is transparent and easy to maintain. But in these 
cases, farmers preferred to have different types of rotational 
practice and favoured adjustable tamper-proof gates. But they were 
also careful to avoid a larger number of gates and preferred this 
technology in the. main canal only. Inside the branch canals, on the 
other hand, they preferred ungated outlets. Farmers themselves set 
the criterion: they needed strong technical control in the main canal 
until they established strong social control among different branch 
canals. But inside the branch canals, farmers felt that local rules and 
regulations were enough to distribute water, and check structures 
needed were constructed temporally during the irrigation season 
only. 
There is also ongoing argument world-wide on whether system 
improvement should be done before or after the management 
transfer. There is no single answer to this. This chapter has shown 
that the important issue, however, is how to put service-oriented 
water control into practice for future water management. This 
requires both users and designers be involved in canal operation 
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and maintenance for a couple of irrigation seasons to gain 
understanding on system opportunities and constraints, before any 
design innovations are made. At the same time it is essential to 
adapt iterative and interactive design processes into a project 
framework linking different actors together in the learning process, 
that also allows flexibility in technical, institutional and financial 
norms set down in irrigation development work. 
Notes 
1
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the consultants were not involved in the 
design and construction processes. However, they used to give advice 
when asked. This particular consultant was not part of regular consulting 
team, and was hired temporarily. He was based in Kathmandu and visited 
the field to provide support when needed. 
2
 A structure to divert water from the canal to the stream/ or any drainage 
available 
3
 In trapezoidal sections, bricks are laid in parallel with the ground slope 
and the thickness of the lining is less than a vertical brick wall. This is also 
the reason why farmers favoured vertical brick walls. 
4
 Interestingly, I found it relocated, when I first visited the field in August 
1999 as part of this study. Farmers of B7 later learned that this shift was 
not going to alter their water delivery, and allowed the relocation. 
5
 In general, brick masonry sections (Type 1) are cheaper. But in this case, 
as huge construction work was going on in East Rapti Irrigation Project 
using brick masonry, the local brick factory increased the cost of bricks. 
This led to a situation in which cement concrete lining (Type II) became 
cheaper than brick masonry. 
6
 This was towards the end of the project when all parties had become 
confident with the previous design and avoided discussing with local 
farmers. In previous cases, there had been at least one discussion with 
local farmers' group. 
7
 Within this limit, the project manager at the field level can approve 
variations. 
8
 A structure constructed below the canal to pass the drainage water. 
9
 Both Nepal and India have Liaison Offices to look after bilateral issues 
in irrigation and flood control. The Indian liaison office is in Kathmandu 
and Nepal has its liaison office in Balmikinagar, where the Gandak 
Barrage is located. 
10
 There is a Standing Committee between Nepal and India to look after 
bilateral issues at policy level. Its members are high-ranking officers of 
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DOI and Ministry of Water resources of both countries. They generally 
meet once a year. 
11
 However, in large projects funded by the donors, generally contractors 
are evaluated on the basis of the technical as well as financial proposals. 
12
 However, this is not the exception, but the common phenomenon in 
the Department Much of the funds are usually spent on the visit of the 
higher officials and only a little reaches lower or implementing levels. 
Nobody remonstrates because of the dependence on higher levels on 
matters relating to transfer and other bureaucratic norms. 
13
 This was the only option for us. However, early setting does not 
necessarily mean good strength. The setting time of cement depends on 
chemical gypsum and can be reduced by increasing the gypsum content. 
14
 He never appeared in the office since then. 
15
 WUA members are not paid and work voluntarily. In overall project 
execution, they also work together in quality control and canal operation 
activities. They also spend considerable time in WUA meetings and other 
activities of WUA to decide on matters related to program execution. 
Shifting to ljocal Management: Strategies, 
Actions and Struggles 
The handing over of management to a WUA is recognized as a key 
event in future success giving not only formal stature, but also 
clarifying institutional rules to steer the future. This chapter looks 
at how both the project environment and wider social environment 
shape events and outcomes in the organizational debut of a WUA, 
and their future actions. While local policies shape the acceptance 
of WUA, once started the WUA itself can become a political 
institutions in the ways it involves law and wider government 
institutions to help it. Project workers committed to supporting 
change also have to be able to work with these struggles even when 
they bring greater stress. Farmers and WUAs are also strategic 
actors: problems and ambitions of wider context can be brought 
into the local process to express these convictions. A WUA is a 
new governance space which people will use for their concerns and 
ambitions. So, project support has to negotiate and mediate in 
these ambition and strategies. To illustrate these struggles and actor 
networks shaping WUA transformation, this chapter looks not only 
at the procedures of change, in each site, but also at key struggles 
that shaped the WUA and its relation with the project office, the 
wider political established and their members. 
7.7 Preparing for Transfer. Establishing the New Management 
Irrigation management handover is an important event and should 
be formally recognized (Smout, 1990), as it represents the end of 
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project support and beginning of the farmer-managed or joindy 
managed operation. This event provides opportunities to both the 
government agency and the WUA to negotiate the support needed 
to sustain future local management, and help avoid the likely 
second generation problems (Svendsen, 1997). Likewise, it also 
helps to clarify roles and responsibilities of irrigation agency, the 
WUA and local farmers, and minimize the disputes in future water 
management. 
Transfers can involve transfer of 'ownership' or of 'use right' 
over irrigation infrastructure and water. In most cases, the 
ownership lies with the state for both water and infrastructure, and 
only 'water use rights' and infrastructure are transferred to the 
WUA (as in Mexico and Turkey, see Svendsen, 1998). In many 
cases, farmers themselves resist ownership transfer (for example in 
USA and in Columbia, see Vermillion and Sagardoy, 1999) fearing 
that this will entail unwanted liabilities like financing the cost of 
rehabilitation and modernization, property damage and property 
taxes. 
In Nepal, it was not clear what the management transfer would 
entail, though it was allowed by the law (Chapter 2). Even near the 
end of 1997, When the Action plans were fully implemented the 
status of ownership of the transferred infrastructure, and terms and 
conditions of the transfer were still not clear to both WUAs and 
the project office. This was because the Water Resources Act 
(1992) and the Water Resources Regulation (1993) were also not 
clear on the status of ownership of the transferred systems. 
The Water Resources Acts and the Regulation failed to clarify 
these elements, as they were more concentrated on attracting 
private sector investment in hydropower, and paid less attention to 
the irrigation sector reform. Thus there were no guidelines 
regarding the type of documents to be prepared, and what rights 
and responsibilities were to be transferred to the WUAs. Moreover, 
as already agreed during the MOA signing (Chapter 5), in Khageri 
only the branch canals were to be handed over whereas in both 
West Gandak and Panchakanya, the transfer was to take place at 
system level. It was not clear how to proceed in these different 
situations involving full or partial transfer of the system 
management. 
Having reached the end of the project and there being no 
possibility to form new regulations to clarify the constraints of the 
existing rules and regulations, we decided to discuss it among the 
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relevant parties: the D D G in charge of the IMD, the coordinator 
of the IMTP, the consultants and the WUAs of the concerned 
irrigation systems. The consultant (who was previously with DOI) 
was then asked1 to prepare the transfer document through 
discussions with the above stakeholders. Ultimately, the following 
criteria were set for the transfer of the systems after detailed 
discussions and negotiations. 
Ownership status and conditions of the transfer 
The status of the transfer would be 'right to use' infrastructure 
only. That is, the WUAs were restricted from pledging the 
transferred structure, or from transfer of its ownership to others by 
way of sale, donation, exchange, or agreement otherwise. Damage, 
spoiling or change of structures that could lower the quantity and 
quality of water was also prohibited. However, changes in the 
structures and canal network could be made for the purpose of 
necessary maintenance and expansion. It was also decided that the 
WUA could not transfer the system again to another person or to 
any other organization. 
Together with the irrigation system, the transfer would include 
the property that was part of it: the lands, natural resources like 
forests along the canal, canal service roads and any other structures 
that previously belonged to the Irrigation Office responsible for 
the system. However, the forest resources along the embankment 
of the canals were the property of the Department of Forest 
(DOF), and the DOI had no authority to hand it over to the WUA. 
For the systems going under joint management like Khageri, only 
the resources under the concerned branch canal to be handed over 
would be transferred to the concerned WUA. 
Post turnover support 
The WUAs considered the issue of post-turnover support more 
important than the ownership issue. Kloezen (2002) documents a 
similar situation in Mexico. It was needed to boost the confidence 
of the WUAs to manage the system ahead. Two types of support 
needed to be clarified: the support for emergencies and the support 
for future development and expansion. . 
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The WUAs were especially concerned about the damage of the 
structures due to natural calamities, which could run far beyond the 
farmers' capacity. In most cases, damage needs to be repaired 
within a few days, so as to avoid crop failure, which requires sound 
financial conditions and intense management input This cannot be 
expected from newly established WUAs. In all of the three systems, 
there were fears among farmers as well as within the WUA on 
whether the government was going to abandon the system. To 
boost the confidence of the WUAs, the DOI needed to assure the 
WUA that it would help them at the time of need, and at the same 
time the WUA were required to assure the farmers that 
government would help in problems beyond their capacity. 
At first it was mentioned that any damages due to natural 
calamities beyond the capacity of the farmers would be repaired by 
the government, but with participation from the WUAs as 
specified in the Irrigation Policy. However, the problem here was -
what were the criteria to decide whether damage is beyond the 
capacity of the farmers? Farmers wanted specific criteria. The final 
solution was that if damages in the main and branch canal are 
greater than as mentioned below, the government would provide 
support in the reconstruction, but with the necessary contribution 
from the WUAs: 
• If unlined canals are damaged beyond 250-m length and lined 
canals are damaged beyond 50 m length 
• If the cross-drainage structures2 of branch and main canals are 
damaged such that they are unable to deliver the service 
• If the head works of the systems are washed away 
These conditions were in fact put forwarded by the 
Panchakanya farmers. They had came to this criteria considering 
the technical and financial constraints in carrying out the works 
mentioned above. 
Another fear of the farmers was future government support for 
system development and expansion, including extension of 
command area and increase in the water supply situation. This was 
not mentioned in the Irrigation Policy or other documents. 
Farmers wanted this clear before transfer arrangements were made. 
They argued that they should have these opportunities and 
government must provide support for them. 
There were now conflicting views between the government and 
the WUA. The government wanted to avoid any support to the 
WUA in the near future as their systems had been recently 
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improved, but the farmers wanted to be allowed to seek support 
even immediately after the handover. I tried to convince the WUAs 
that the government would not agree finance in near future as the 
systems had been supported recendy, and suggested a longer time 
frame before they ask for such help. The WUA leaders replied that 
they knew it, but they needed a shorter period to assure their 
farmers that the government would help in any future 
development. Ultimately, the WUA agreed a time period of five 
years, before which they would not seek government help for 
system development and expansion. 
The responsibility for future rehabilitation was not spelled out, 
and was assumed to be the government's responsibility. The reason 
was that in the Irrigation Policy the FMISs are also allowed to ask 
for government support and the DOI's major activity involves the 
rehabilitation and expansion of the FMISs. Once the systems are 
handed over to the WUAs, their status would also be that of the 
FMISs and they cannot be restricted from seeking support from 
the government for future rehabilitation. 
Another support to be cleared was about providing technical 
services to the farmers by the concerned irrigation offices. In 
Nepal, most operation and maintenance activities are carried out by 
the direct participation of users through voluntary contribution 
from the member farmers. They generally do not hire any outside 
technicians or contractors to supervise in technical affairs. 
Continued government support in this direction was thus needed. 
It was agreed that in case the WUA requires technical advice during 
repair and maintenance of the structures the user association may 
request the concerned Irrigation Office, who shall provide the 
necessary technical advice requested. 
WUA responsibility and authority 
The responsibilities of the WUA towards the farmer members are 
mentioned in their by-laws and constitution, and there was no need 
to repeat them in the transfer document. The WUAs major 
concern was that - they felt they were not empowered enough for 
resolving conflicts and raising funds from the users. In many 
instances their laws, by-laws, rules and regulations were not 
effective, and required support from wider political and 
administrative institutions where they felt unrecognized. 
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When WUA rules and regulations were insufficient to resolve 
disputes, they had to take them to the VDCs, DDC and the 
District Administration Office (DAO) depending on the nature of 
disputes. However, they found that they were not well recognked 
by these institutions and so demanded provisions in government 
Acts and Regulations to make these local offices provide immediate 
help to them in solving these problems. 
They were also concerned about the evasion of Irrigation 
Service Fee (ISF) by many farmers, and wanted to have strong 
rules and regulations to check this. There were two problems 
relating to collection of ISF. First, in all the three systems farmers 
with large land holdings were not paying the ISF, and WUAs were 
helpless to take any action against them. This problem was greater 
in West Gandak than in Khageri and Panchakanya, where the 
percentage of farmers with larger land holding is much higher, and 
high monsoon rainfall and land characteristics made it easier to 
evade paying the ISF. 
The WUAs were already empowered to set up their own rules 
and regulations, set up own operation and maintenance fee and 
collect it. Those who failed to pay the ISF were supposed to be 
sanctioned from the irrigation services. However, in practice, 
sanctioning a particular farmer or group of farmers from the 
service is difficult in irrigation because of its specific characteristics: 
• In unlined canals, where seepage and leakage are common, 
sanctioned farmers can have access to this water 
• Field to field irrigation is practiced in rice cultivation, and 
control of flow from one field to another is usually absent 
• Small farm plots, due to which water moves quickly from one 
plot to another belonging to different farmers. 
• Specific features of the land topography as explained in chapter 
2, due to which water applied to one field automatically reaches 
to adjoining field at lower levels. 
All three systems were also facing this dilemma, and fee 
collection had remained poor in these systems (will see in chapter 
9). The WUAs themselves put forward some innovative proposals 
to solve this problems aiming to bring the other institutions 
together in the process. 
The farmers' view was that the ISF, or any form of fee or fines 
imposed by the WUA, should also be linked with the other service 
sectors. They felt that the VDC, DDC, DAO, ADBN and the 
Agriculture Development Office (ADO) should also be brought 
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into the process of building WUA authority. The idea of involving 
these institutions was also being discussed within the Irrigation 
Department as they were direcdy related with farmers' affairs. The 
ADBN provides loans and credit to the farmers and the loan 
request (may) need to be certified by the ADO. The ADO is 
responsible for overall agriculture development in the district 
helping farmers in providing the necessary agriculture extension 
services. The VDC is the lowest political unit in Nepal - without its 
recommendation, one can not obtain a national identity card or any 
facility or services that the government provides to its citizens. The 
VDC is the unit where people register deaths, births and marriages. 
Land taxes are also paid in the VDC, and without paying the land 
tax, one cannot use the land for economic activities like in selling, 
taking loans or building houses. 
If services from these institutions were restricted after reporting 
of a fee violations by a WUA, one could not escape from paying 
the service fee. This required changes in the existing law, which 
was not possible at that moment. However, it was agreed to work 
in this direction in the coming years. Vos (2002) documents a 
similar situation in Peru, where the WUA considered the linkages 
between the different institutions, which provided an 'obligatory 
passage' as a key in fee collection. 
A need for a separate Irrigation Regulation was then realized, for 
two factors that were clearly lacking in the current acts and 
regulations. First, the terms and conditions of the transfer and 
second, to empower WUAs to collect the ISF and resolve conflict 
through wider political and administrative linkages. This regulation 
came only in 2000, but still failed to address the issues relating to 
ISF, though it clarified the terms and conditions of the transfer: 
• It failed to address whether government property like land, 
buildings and machinery could be transferred to the WUA or 
not (though these were already felt needed and done in the 
West Gandak in 1997). However, it granted the forest to the 
WUA, so that there is no need to contact the forestry 
department onwards 
• It failed to link the issue of ISF to other political institutions. 
Instead, it formed a committee under the chairmanship of 
concerned District Irrigation Office to decide and collect the 
ISF. The committee also consisted of WUA chairperson and 
the Chief of the Agriculture Office. It was also unclear whether 
this provision was applicable to the fully transferred systems. 
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• Instead of empowering the WUA, this kept power within the 
irrigation agency. 
The agreement over the terms and conditions discussed in 
above paragraphs prepared the base for management transfer to 
the respective WUAs. However, the transfer process faced further 
problems from the system and project environment, as discussed 
below. 
7.2 Handing over the System Management in Panchakanya 
After agreements over technical improvement and institutional 
development activities in the AP were over, the system was to be 
handed over to the WUA as per the MOU signed in 1995. The 
decision to take over the system from the government was made in 
July 1997 by the General Assembly of the WUA. However, before 
the formal agreement was signed with the government, farmers 
wanted some improvements in the branch canals too, which were 
not initially mentioned in the AP. An additional 0.8 million rupees 
was sanctioned by the government to carry out these 
improvements. With the completion of these work, the WUA 
organized a ceremony for the turnover of the system from the 
government. 
The ceremony for handover was held in the headworks of the 
system in January 1998. The handover document was signed by the 
WUA chairman from the farmers' side and by myself from the 
government side. The handover document included the system 
details, the length of main and branch canals, the map of the 
irrigated area, structures in the system and the property transferred. 
The PIS did not have any other properties like trees and land 
owned by the government, but only a small house at the 
headworks. The house was of no use to the farmers as it was quite 
remote from the farming community - the WUA later provided this 
house to a local NGO. The other conditions regarding post-
turnover support, and duties and obligation of the WUA as 
identified and agreed earlier, were also included in this document. 
The ceremony was chaired by the WUA Chairman and the 
Director General of the Department was the chief guest. All 
district-level politicians including the mayor of the municipality, 
were present in the ceremony. The Chairman and Secretary of all 
other irrigation systems under the IMTP were also invited. 
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However, Members of the Parliament from Chittwan were not 
invited to this ceremony, since the WUA wanted to keep the 
ceremony at local level only. Later on, one local MP complained to 
me about this, but the WUA had organized the ceremony and I 
was not involved in deciding whom to invite. 
I kept away from organizing this ceremony for fear that people 
might think I was influencing the WUA to takeover management 
responsibility. As an implementer, I always tried to convince 
farmers that the system would operate better under farmers' 
management while reassuring them that the government was not 
going to abandon the system after the turnover. But I never tried 
to influence their decisions. 
One group of farmers dissatisfied with the idea of turnover of 
the system to the WUA registered their opposition to the visiting 
dignitaries (the mayor, D G of DOI). They demanded continued 
government support in the system and wanted further structural 
improvement works. I was already involved in Panchakanya 
facilitating the transfer process for more than two years, but had 
not faced any opposition from these people earlier. When I asked 
these people about their opposition, they had no satisfactory 
answer to this. However, they were calm when other farmers and 
WUA members attending the ceremony started confronting them. 
Later I came to know that this opposition was more directed at the 
secretary of the WUA because of their political differences3. 
Once the agitation was over, the program began. The certificate 
of the handover together with the transfer document was handed 
over to the WUA Chairman by the DG. The WUA Secretary first 
briefed the gathering about the history of system, its expansion and 
participation in the IMTP and the achievements made so far. Other 
dignitaries including the Mayor, the coordinator of the IMTP and 
USAID representative, also addressed to the program. Many of 
them highlighted the successful end of IMTP in Panchakanya. I 
was not convinced with the words 'end' and 'success' being used. In 
my turn, I argued that it was not an end but the beginning. The aim 
of participation in this case goes beyond project execution. The 
way farmers would manage the system in future and get returns 
from it were yet to be seen. Of course, project execution was 
completed without many problems here, for which, one had to go 
back to its history of development and the past interface between 
the government and farmers. 
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The handing over ceremony increased recognition of the WUA at 
local level, and increased its confidence for future water 
management. 
7.3 Handing over System Management in Khageri 
In Khageri, only the branch canals were to be transferred to the 
WUAs. There were 9 branch canals and 4 minors together. As 
mentioned in chapter 5, the implementation of the action plan for 
different branches happened at different stages. Hence the transfer 
of the branch canals was also done in stages. As happened in the 
Panchakanya, more demands for improvement were asked by the 
WUA here also. It was agreed that if any major problems had been 
left out during implementation resulting decreased flow in the canal 
or if flow could be increased, would be considered even after the 
transfer of the system. However, most of the new demands were 
again for the lining of the canal, so no additional works was carried 
out at this late stage. 
The branch canals in Khageri had no property to be handed 
over except the canal networks. The date and venue of the handing 
over ceremony were fixed by the respective WUAs. Before the 
ceremony, the GA of the concerned branch committee gave 
approval for signing of the transfer protocol. In all these GA 
meetings, farmers were asking about future support and made 
additional demands for construction. Regarding additional 
construction, my reply was same - only if there were money left at 
the end out of the previously agreed AP, as there was no possibility 
of increasing the cost beyond that Because of these detailed 
discussions and stepwise approach, the progress of management 
transfer process was slow. The department was pushing me to 
move quickly, but I resisted. The slow stepwise approach was 
productive, because all the confusions in roles and responsibility 
were cleared with the farmers. However, my assurance for system 
improvement if there was remaining budget, increased farmers' 
expectations. At the end, these expectations were not met for 
which I had to face criticism from several WUA leaders. 
The handing-over ceremony was usually performed inside the 
command area of the concerned branch canals. It was usually a 
school building so that large numbers of farmers could gather. 
Besides the branch committee members and the farmers of the 
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concerned branch, the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary of 
the Main Committee were also present on the occasion. No 
outsiders, including the higher authorities from the DOI, were 
invited to attend the ceremony except VDC chiefs and DDC 
members, as it involved only the transfer of the branch canals 
management and their presence was not thought important As a 
result, only the field-level technicians including myself were present 
from the government side. The transfer document was signed by 
the Chairman of the concerned branch committee on behalf of the 
farmers and by myself on behalf of the government. 
However, the handover process was retarded due to the 
multiplicity of the problems outside the framework of the project 
There were conflicts between different farmers groups as well as 
between the government and the WUA: these made our efforts to 
transfer the management to the farmers collapsed almost at once. 
The events here show that problems are not necessarily inside the 
framework of project control but still affect the outcome of the 
process. Efforts to solve it require the bringing together of 
different institutions with different strategic actions in the program 
process. Two such events are explained below. 
Conflicts in branch no 5 
As mentioned in chapter 6, branch canal 5 (B5) was under the first 
stage of implementing the AP. This branch also had access to 
drainage water from adjoining higher land (see Figure 7.1). In 
Khageri, drainage water was used at several places to complement 
water sources to alleviate scarcity conditions. While developing the 
AP*for technical improvement work, there were more proposals to 
bring the drainage water back in the canal and farmers gave it first 
priority (chapter 5). B5 was also receiving drainage water since 
1992. There was a drainage channel and a canal crossing structure 
constructed to divert drainage water in the B5 canal as shown in 
Figure 7.1. 
When the technical improvement activity in B5 was over, 
farmers had their first experience of improved canal operation. 
Meanwhile in July 1996, a few farmers group (here after called 
opponent farmers), not belonging to Khageri system, blocked the 
drain inlet of B5. This drain was very helpful to Bs farmers, as they 
received water even when there was no supply from the main 
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canal. It put B5 relatively at an advantage over other branch canal 
farmers. This drainage was important for main system management 
too, as the water saved in B5 could be utilked in other branch 
canals. This blockage of drainage was politically motivated. 
FIGURE 7.1 Drain inlet arrangement to branch no 5 
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The drainage source lies outside the command area of the Khageri 
canal (the Khageri is a contour canal irrigating only left of its canal 
alignment), and the farmers who had blocked the drainage were not 
members of the Khageri WUA. The B5 farmers, together with 
branch committee members requested the farmers to unblock the 
drain and allow free flow of water. In reply, the opponent farmers 
said that the land with the drainage channel belonged to them and 
they would no longer allow the drainage canal from their land. The 
drain had been there since 1992: several such drains were 
constructed in Khageri and their legality was never challenged. No 
one knew why this issue was being raised now. 
The farmers of B5 made several requests with the opponent 
farmers to open the drain but without success. When the local 
community failed to solve the problem, it was brought to the 
attention of the MC, who also failed to convince the opponent 
farmers, so the matter was brought to our office. We had 
developed an understanding with the WUA for this procedure, so 
problems only come to our office after internal actions have been 
tried. The irrigation offices in Nepal have no authority regarding 
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the conflicts over such issues and we (the MC and project office) 
decided to take the matter to District Administration Office. A 
meeting was arranged between MC, Chief District Officer (CDO)4, 
Police Superintendent (SP) and the opponent farmers. Despite 
several requests by these higher authorities, the farmers did not 
agree to open the drain. They insisted that the land with the drain 
belonged to them, and argued that neither the government nor the 
Khageri farmers had the right to construct the drainage channel 
from their land. There was no way left after this, except to go in 
the court. 
It was already time for rice transplantation. Farmers were 
pressing to solve the problem quickly. Local farmers were asking 
questions like: if the WUA cannot solve a problem like this, what is 
the use of ongoing IMT? How can the WUA manage the system in 
future? I realized that going to court was not helpful at that 
moment, as a court case takes a long time. Farmers of B5 were 
pressing me that they would open the canal if I supported them. . 
So, I decided to talk again with District Administration and higher 
authorities in my own department. 
Both these authorities told me that if WUA and farmers 
favoured to open the drain, even forcefully, the administration 
would support their initiatives. So I told the farmers they could 
open the canal. However, the Bs farmers asked to do it in our 
presence only, as they were afraid of future legal consequences. We 
agreed to be present, and farmers and WUA members from B5, and 
the WUA main committee, in the presence of our technicians, 
finally opened the drain inlet. The opponent farmers were there, 
but instead of opposing our move, they were busy taking 
photographs. A few days later I learned that the farmers had filed a 
case in the District Court citing that their land had been forcefully 
occupied by the farmers of the B5. 
Interestingly, the farmers had not charged any of our office staff 
but only the members of the Branch Committee and some farmers. 
The drain was opened under the supervision of our technician, so I 
was surprised that they did not charge us. It turned out that those 
farmers who were charged were politically active in the area. I then 
sensed that this problem was not linked with drainage canal. The 
farmers did not charge us because if we were charged, the District 
Attorney would be involved from our side and there would be no 
need to hire a private lawyer5. It was clear that some farmers and 
members of B5 committee were the target of opponent farmers. 
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The members of the B5 branch committee and some other farmer 
members were then asked to be present in the District Court. 
Farmers in Khageri were now very much disappointed. Everybody 
questioning why they should support and participate in a program 
which was going to end in court cases for nothing. The ISF 
collection decreased rapidly and WUA could not function properly 
after this event. Farmers from other branch canals were also 
disappointed. I felt that the effort of 4 years was going to collapse 
at this stage. 
However, I was confident that the court would order the 
blockage to be opened. As per the customary law Act 1963 QAukki 
Ain, 1964), nobody can block natural drainage or canals, 
irrespective of land ownership. The problem was that the court 
case would take a long time. So I decided to talk about the matter 
with the District Judge directly. My intention was not to influence 
the court process, but to request an early judgement because of the 
sensitivity of the case. In one of the court proceedings, I requested 
all the parties including the lawyers from both sides and a 
representative from the court, to visit the site and see the problem 
physically. The judge agreed to visit the site himself together with 
both the lawyers6. In the next court proceeding, the judge declared 
that the drain cannot be closed and farmers of B5 have rights over 
the water. This was a great relief for all of us. Had we not won the 
case, the process might have collapsed at this stage. 
The Padampur resettlement program 
Another challenge that emerged pertains to resettlement of flood 
victims of the Rapti River in the catchment of Khageri River. In 
1992, just at the beginning of the IMTP, the Government made a 
decision to resettle the flood victims of Padampur village to 
Saguntole clearing about 540 ha of partially forested land there: this 
involved 10,200 people belonging to 1700 families (Source: 
Padumpur resettlement committee). Saguntole lies in the 
catchment of the Khageri River, and Khageri system farmers were 
concerned about the effects of this resettlement. At the beginning, 
Khageri farmers took no action, thinking it would not happen. 
However, the Government formed a high-level committee and 
started the resettlement program and there was a great concern 
among the Khageri farmers. They believed the program would 
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destroy the river catchment and affect the water supply regime of 
the Khageri River. They also feared upstream diversion by the new 
setders. Padumpur village and the Saguntole are shown in Figure 
3.1. 
The WUA members first tried to solve this problem through 
local political leaders, asking them to request the government to 
stop the resetdement program. But the DDC had already approved 
the resetdement program. The Chairman of the DDC was also a 
farmer from the Khageri command area. He stated that the DDC 
had approved it after reviewing the environmental impact report 
prepared by the Ministry of Local Development, which showed no 
serious impact from this resetdement program. When the problem 
could not be solved at district level, they took the problem to 
national level politicians. They even talked with two successive 
Prime Ministers, but that gave no solution. The government 
repeatedly told the farmers that an environmental impact study 
about the resetdement program showed no adverse affect on 
Khageri water supply. 
Finally the Khageri WUA filed a case in the Supreme Court of 
Nepal in March 1995 to stop the resetdement plan on 
environmental grounds, the first of its kind in the country. They 
charged that the resetdement would lead to the destruction of the 
catchment of the Khageri River and lower the water availability 
downstream. It now became a national issue. The politicians were 
then desperately seeking to setde the problem out of court as the 
verdict of the court to any side would have led to a lose-lose 
situation for the politicians. I was only the observer now, as the 
case was with national level politicians and in the Supreme Court. 
Farmers' attention now shifted to this issue, and the progress of 
IMTP rapidly slowed down and farmers no longer showed interest 
for management transfer. 
The politicians finally succeeded in convincing the WUA leaders 
to withdraw the case from the Court. But before that the Khageri 
WUA wanted a guarantee from the government that they would be 
provided with additional water supply. Now the ball again came to 
my court: I had to find a means by which Khageri could be 
provided with additional water. I was asked by the Minister of 
Water Resources to find possibilities within a week. Through the 
farmers, I came to know about a nearby stream, the Budhi Rapid 
(see Figure 3.1) from which we could augment to Khageri canal. 
Budhi Rapti was 2.2 Km away from the Khageri canal We 
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explored that possibility, but unfortunately, Khageri Canal was 
almost about 15m higher than the Budhi Rapti River, needing 
another lift scheme. 
I was never in favour of constructing a new lift scheme, as I had 
the bitter experience of running one. It demands both skills and 
resources and is not favourable to farmers' management. I shared 
my view with the department in Kathmandu and with the Water 
Resources Minister, who was also not in favour of constructing 
new lift scheme. However, the Prime Minister wanted this problem 
to be solved quickly, and the Water Resource Minister later agreed 
to go ahead with the proposal of the lift scheme. 
I prepared a pre-feasibility study report of the proposed scheme, 
listing several problems relating to environment - it had to be 
constructed inside the National Park as well as having likely 
problems in operation and maintenance. But I had no choice but to 
move ahead with the proposal, as without this, there would be no 
agreement between the government and the WUA and the Cabinet 
itself was in hurry to solve the issue. An agreement to this was 
made between the WUA and the government, in which the 
Minister of Water Resources, the Minister of Local Development, 
the State Minister of Water Resources and another Minister on 
Behalf of Prime Minister's Office signed from the government 
side. The WUA Chairman and Vice Chairman, the Chairman of 
DDC of Chittwan and the MPs representing the Chittwan signed 
on behalf of the Khageri. 
This politically setded negotiation however had a big impact on 
common farmers who believed that they were cheated by the 
government. The WUA also had no alternative except to 
compromise with the government, because it was equally difficult 
to prove in court that.the resetdement would decrease the available 
flow in the Khageri River. Many times, during the field visits, 
common farmers used to ask me about the effect of this 
resetdement program on water availability in Khageri in the long 
run. As USAID was also involved in the IMTP, it carried out an 
EIA of the resettlement program through a private consultant, who 
could not provide any concrete details on the impact of the 
resetdement It again carried another study on the impact of the 
resetdement program on the water supply regime, which also failed 
to quantify the impact. 
The root of the problem was in fact a lack of discussion about 
the resetdement program with Khageri farmers. Khageri farmers 
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knew the suffering of the Padumpur farmers and they also knew 
that in Chittwan District there was no land available other than at 
Saguntole. The Khageri farmers' fear was not so much for the 
upstream diversion, as for the destruction of the forest-land after 
resettlement. A topographic survey of the area later showed that 
there was no possibility of water diversion from the Khageri and its 
tributary to the planned resetdement area. The fear was that the 
newly resetded people could inflict massive destruction of forests 
for their livelihoods, which could affect the water supply regime of 
the river. If the Khageri people had been consulted, and 
participated in an action plan for resetdement program and 
catchment area, there could have been an amicable solution of the 
problem. 
The dilemma was that the Khageri farmers never knew what 
was going on in this resetdement program and what effect it would 
have, and how they could minimize the effect of the resetdement 
The Ministry of Local Development was implementing the 
resetdement program through a high-level resetdement committee 
which included members from the local land revenue office, 
District Administration, DDC, and Forest Department. Neither the 
Irrigation Department nor the WUA of KIS were represented in 
the committee and never knew what was going on. The 
government advocates participatory policies in all development 
fields, but in this, the affected people never knew what was 
happening. 
The ADB also showed concern over the situation in Khageri, as 
it was the major funding agency in the IMTP. In its successive 
mission visits during 1996/1997, ADB representatives asked the 
government to prepare an action plan for the resetdement program 
and guarantee that it was not going to have any negative impact in 
the functioning of the Khageri. It even suspended all the 
reimbursement of the expenditure made in IMTP unless the action 
plan for resetdement was presented to them. The ADB was 
particularly concerned over the process of the resetdement 
programme, which was going on without any detailed plan. There 
were only maps showing the division of the land. The ADB 
mission raised the issue with the NPC and MOWR7. 
After strong opposition from the ADB, a meeting was held 
between the Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation Department, 
Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Local Development, the high level 
committee for resettlement and our project office. The meeting 
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was organized by the NPC to discuss about the preparation of a 
detailed plan for the resettlement and to discuss how to minimize 
the degradation of the Khageri River catchment. It also discussed 
on how Khageri WUA could be involved in the future catchment 
protection and the resettlement program. However, there was no 
budget available to prepare such a plan and a lack of co-ordination 
between the different ministries. The Local Development Ministry 
implementing the program did not pay attention in preparing the 
action plan for resettlement, as it thought that the irrigation 
department only needed it to satisfy the ADB. The Forestry 
Ministry had already provided land and took no further interest. 
There were no further meetings of this kind. However, such a lack 
of co-ordination is not uncommon in Nepali bureaucracy. 
The resettlement program was still continuing during my last 
visit in November 2001. It was originally planned to be completed 
in five years, but was slowed by a lack of funds. The total cost of 
the resetdement program is Rs. 300 million, but only around RS.10 
million was allocated per year. The setders were given marginal 
land in Saguntole, and were to be compensated for their lands in 
Padumpur. Since the Committee had insufficient funds at its 
disposal, it tried to compensate by giving more land. This led the 
Committee to demand 300 ha additional land from the 
government, which the government later approved. 
Every farmer in Khageri feels insecure about their future and are 
expecting the lift system to be constructed as agreed by the 
government But there has been little progress in this direction too: 
It is still at the detailed study level. On the other hand, the 
resettlement program is moving slowly, and is not being done in 
planned way. The DOI has its own problems of getting 
reimbursement from ADB. Therefore it became rather a tragic 
incident These events reduced farmers' interests towards the joint 
management activities. However, all the branch canals had already 
been transferred to the WUA. As will be seen, the WUA have been 
maintaining the system without any deterioration, but there is no 
progressive achievement either. 
7.4 Handing over in West Gandak 
The dynamics of the transfer process was much wider here as it 
involved transfer of the entire large system. The case here also 
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shows how problems are interconnected, and involve a range of 
actors at different project environment levels with different 
strategies and interests in participating in water management, and 
come to shape the management transfer process. 
In the West Gandak the handover was to occur at two levels: at 
lower level, which would involve transfer of the branch and minor 
canals; and at the main canal level. This section first reviews the 
handing over of the lower order canals, and then the dynamics of 
main system management transfer. 
Handing over of branch and minor canals. 
Available documents and interviews with WUA and the project 
office technicians show that the handing over of the branch canals 
were overshadowed by the concentration at the main system level. 
There are no documents or protocols signed showing that 
particular canal system (branch or minor) had been handed over to 
the WUA. Documents of the West Gandak project office show 
that the handover of these branches was done by means of a letter 
from the project office only. First, upon completion of the 
construction works as agreed in the AP, the concerned BC used to 
forward a letter mentioning that the construction activities were 
over and they were ready to take over the system management. The 
project office then used to issue a letter notifying the committee 
that responsibility of operation, maintenance and resource 
mobili2ation had been handed over to them with no details 
attached. This means .that only the committee members of 
concerned canals knew about the handover of the canals. For 
example there were 23 members in the Mangharia Toli committee. 
There are more than 1200 farmers in the Mangharia minor and 
only 23 farmers made the decisions and knew about the handover 
decision. 
There were two reasons for this limited discussion regarding 
branch canal transfer. The first is that the branch canals had no GA 
(see Chapter 4), so there was no discussion with wider groups of 
people. The joint planning process had a similar dilemma. Second, 
all the other actors - the co-ordinator, the local project office and 
the consultant - paid attention to the main system only. Elsewhere, 
upon handover, the WUA was also to be provided with the details 
of the system, its functional status, canal operational rules, their 
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right and duties, and post-turnover support that they could receive 
from the government. Such documents were missing there. 
The IMTP was being co-ordinated by the same unit in the DOI 
and was being supervised by the same consultant group, but they 
did not pay attention to this in the West Gandak. After signing of 
the MOA in 1996, meant for the transfer of the whole system, no 
real focus was given on what was happening inside the branch 
canals. 
However, the branch and minor canal WUAs also never asked 
for these documents. Many farmers in the area say that the WUA 
members themselves were involved in the construction activities, 
and never asked for the documents: instead were in hurry to 
recommend that construction had been done to their satisfaction. 
The payments to the contractor were to be made only after the 
recommendation of the WUA. In this way, all the branch and 
minor canals were handed over upon the interest of few members 
engaged in construction. 
The IMTP was being co-ordinated by the same unit in the 
Irrigation Department and was being supervised by the same 
consultant group, but they did not pay attention to this in the West 
Gandak. After signing of the MOA in 1996, meant for the transfer 
of the whole system, no real focus was given on what was 
happening inside the branch canals. Yet many of the Gandak 
branch canals are larger than the Panchakanya system, or branch 
canals of the Khageri: the largest has the command area of 1300 ha 
(see Table 3.9). 
Handing over of the main system to the WUA 
At the main canal level, however, the decision to take over the 
management from the government had to be approved in the 172-
member GA. Before this, the MC had to make the decision first 
and draw up the agenda in the GA meeting for approval. Only then 
could the WUA enter into the agreement with the government to 
take over management responsibility. At the MC level, two 
opinions were put forward regarding the taking over of the 
management responsibility from the government. One group was 
not in favour of taking the responsibility, feeling it was too eady to 
do this. People had just begun to learn about the management 
activities, ISF collection was still below than 30% and its rate was 
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five times lower than required (see chapter 9). Their idea was thus 
to stay with joint management and take up the responsibility of 
main canal management gradually over a period of few years. 
The other group favoured takeover of the full system 
responsibility. They thought the system had enough resources to 
meet the operation and maintenance cost. They were talking about 
the forest resources, road tax collection and the land property of 
the West Gandak. There was an understanding with the 
government that these properties would be handed over to the 
WUA together with system handover. 
Many WUA members told me that the consultants and project 
authority also encouraged this group to takeover the main canal. 
Some farmers even claimed that the project office told the WUA 
that if the main canal was handed over, some WUA members 
would be given the opportunities to visit a foreign country as in the 
past8. However, the consultants and project officials of the time 
told me that they never made this type of commitment. 
However, it cannot be denied that the project authority -
including the central co-ordinating office in Kathmandu - were 
interested to hand over the system. This could provide advantages 
in dealing with the donor community to show that they managed to 
handover a system of this scale. The interest of the project 
authority, and ambition of key leaders in the WUA, finally won the 
batde and the MC decided in favour of taking over full 
responsibility. Later on, the GA also approved the takeover, as 
decisions in the GA were usually dominated by the MC members. 
When the MC made the decision, the chairman was not present 
and the meeting was presided over by the Vice-Chairman 
(according to the rules). The chairman told me that he was on a 
private visit. However, other people told that he intentionally 
avoided the meeting so that he could escape the controversy 
regarding whether to takeover the system or not. 
After the GA approval, the MC organized a ceremony on 
January 1998 for the transfer of the system from agency to WUA. 
The Director General of the DOI was chief guest of this 
ceremony. The Chairman of the MC himself presided over the 
ceremony, although absent during the decision on takeover. The 
Director General handed over the certificate of transfer to the 
chairman. Interestingly, the document specifying the terms and 
conditions of the transfer was not present at the ceremony. 
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The band over arrangement 
The management transfer certificate was handed-over to the WUA, 
but as mentioned, necessary documents were not prepared at the 
rime of transfer. According to project officials and consultants of 
the rime, it was agreed with the WUA that the terms and 
conditions of the transfer would be decided later on. 
The WUA made several visits to Kathmandu to finalize the 
conditions of the transfer. They had to come to Kathmandu as the 
West Gandak Project Office in the field was not in a position to 
setde issues regarding the transfer of government owned 
properties. The following conditions were finally agreed between 
the DOI and the WUA: 
• Transfer of both management and right to use of main canal 
and the associated structures 
• Right to use the land under the main, branch, tertiary, and field 
channels and some of the buildings owned by the government. 
There were about 50 ha land in total. 
• Operation and maintenance and right to use the bulldozer, 
loader, dump trucks, and vehicles. 
• A sum of Rs. 8.5 million for the period of three years to assist 
in operation and maintenance activities and during which the 
WUA had to gradually increase its resources. 
• Control of forests including those in the canal embankment 
and flood protection dykes. 
• Right to collect tax from the canal service roads and houses 
built among the canal embankments. 
• A small unit office to support the WUA in technical affairs. 
However, handing over the canal forests and authority to collect 
the tax from the canal service roads and houses, was beyond the 
authority of the Department of Irrigation. There were more than 
126,000 trees (according to the inventory made at the time of the 
forest transfer) along the canal alignment The WUA expected to 
raise part of the maintenance cost out of the forest resources. The 
canal service road is also one of the major road links with the 
national highway and the District-headquarters. There was high 
potential for collecting a service tax out of this road through a toll 
arrangement with a manned barrier. Likewise along the side of the 
canal and service road, people had occupied the land and started 
business. Housing construction on canal banks was illegal, but 
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removing them was impossible for political reasons. Instead of 
removing them, the WUA planned to raise funds out of this. 
Many of the issues were resolved over time. The transfer of 
forests was made possible due to the influence of the MP of the 
area. Forest resources were with the Department of the Forestry 
P O F ) and handing this to the Gandak WUA required D O F s 
approval. The DOI requested the D O F to hand over the forest 
resources to the WUA. Incidentally, the Forest Minister then 
happened to be a close friend of one of the MPs of the Gandak 
area. The MP himself was in a powerful position, as chief of the 
Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament9. It was through his 
influence that the forest was handed over to the WUA, rather than 
the DOI. 
The issue of authority over the road tax collection was resolved 
through the effort of the project office and the WUA themselves. 
When the WUA started collecting tax from roads and houses along 
the canal embankment, residents and public transporters 
complained to the District Administration Office. The DAO 
questioned the WUA and the Gandak project office regarding their 
authority to raise such taxes. The WUA and the project office 
explained to the District Administration about the ongoing 
management transfer policy and that a law allowing collection of 
such taxes was in the making. Finally the District Administration 
decided not to object and WUA started collecting such taxes. 
Other issues were inside the domain of the DOI. The 
Government allotted the budget as agreed. A small unit office 
consisting of an engineer and an overseer was kept to help the 
WUA in technical affairs. Otherwise, the Gandak Project office 
was to be merged with the District Irrigation Office of the 
Nawalparasi District (finally merged in 1999). However, the 
transfer protocol was still not signed because of the conflict 
between the DOI and the WUA regarding the transfer of the heavy 
machinery, which the government had promised to hand over to 
the WUA (see Chapter 8). 
Because of the disagreement over the transfer of heavy 
machinery, the document specifying the conditions of handover 
was never signed between the WUA and the DOI. On the other 
hand, WUA has received other support as agreed. 
With all these dynamics going on in the system, how has the 
NWGIS matured under the new management? The results so far 
are disappointing, and party politics are now blamed for the failure 
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of the new management. But, is it party politics only that restricted 
the development of new management? In the following chapters, I 
argue that the DOI itself was key actor in the wider politics that 
occurred the West Gandak: its interest to get a quick success 
without realizing the technical and organizational complexity, has 
been a root cause of the management collapse. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Handing over irrigation management creates new forms of local 
governance and not just local task management, in which both 
social rivalries and resource management problems will be areas of 
struggle. Political rivalries will often surface in struggles for new 
governance, which are not easily addressed by simple consultative 
methods. Often actions are strategically timed, without word of 
problems in earlier stages of change. Without recognition of the 
scope of political action, the structured and supposedly democratic 
procedures of consultative irrigation management transfer may be 
little more than paper. By negotiating the weakness and gaps in 
policy, WUAs first developed by struggling against factors (and not 
being dominated by them) that helped give WUAs power for 
further action when the project could not immediately help — as in 
Khageri - they lose relations and WUAs struggle further for action. 
If a project pushes to hard and fast without proper negotiation - as 
in West Gandak then other weaknesses emerged. WUAs as new 
form of local governance, became entwined in politics because 
from their creation they are shaped by political systems of 
government — and need their wider support (but not domination). 
The chapter also showed that how' process of policy 
implementation were driven by local negotiations and decisions. 
The relative success or failure of these local process also were 
shaped by the wider politics of other local struggles with the 
Government or the preferences of the project actors. 
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Notes 
1
 He was in regular contact with all the system managers as well as the 
higher officials in the department and the WUAs of the different 
irrigation systems, and was thus assigned this job. 
2
 Cross-drainage structures comprise aqueducts, siphons, culverts and 
other related structures 
3
 I came to know that they were from two different rival political parties, 
including one opposed to the government who organised this protest, and 
this difference was reflected in this ceremony. The demonstrating group 
wanted to show the public that the WUA was unnecessarily taking the 
burden from the government. 
4
 CDO is the chief administrative officer in the district and heads the 
DAO. 
5
 In Nepal, when government offices are charged for their action, the 
district attorney fights the case on behalf of the government office. 
6
 I have never come across a case where the judge has visited the problem 
site in person before deciding the case. He told me that he was interested 
to see the problem himself because he was involved in several conflicts in 
water issues in the past. 
7
 The issue of resettlement and displacement has been of growing concern 
for donors (see Dwvedi, 1999; Cernea, 1988 and Cernea and McDowell, 
2000). 
8
 As mentioned in Chapter 4, in 1994 a few WUA leaders from systems 
where joint management was being implemented, were given the 
opportunity to visit Philippines: two of the them were from West Gandak. 
9
 It is considered to be the most powerful committee in Parliament, which 
oversees government expenditure. 
8 
Organisational Change and Involution 
The policies and projects for transferring irrigation management in 
Nepal were aimed at creating new local organisations to manage 
irrigation. This thesis has argued that such functionality first 
depends on their wider evolution and recognition as a new form of 
local governance, in which their political capabilities will also 
evolve. This chapter reviews the evolution of the new organisations 
after their handing over. It reviews how elections and new 
committees were used to bring change in functioning of the WUA, 
but also how WUA representatives networked in wider politics and 
told actions that both defended their systems and built their 
recognition. It also examines how internal personal agendas and 
power politics stifled some new management options, rather than 
creating a new management force. The relation between technology 
and institutions is partly seen here in the forces shaping 
institutional evolution, but the everyday interactions in water 
management and the new institutions is studied in the next chapter. 
The chapter shows that local governance needs actions beyond 
the local level (but see Ostorm, 1992) and political accountability1 
of the actors (Kloezen, 2002). Organization needs legitimacy and 
power for local credibility and acceptance. These build up through 
visionary leadership that allow local rules to expand and develop 
future visions, and with recognition from wider administrative and 
political institutions (Chapter 7). These are often related in political 
action, and organization will continue to seek resources and 
legitimacy externally for their survival. The WUAs thus acts as a 
platform to increase local social and political power, and people use 
their social status and political power to be elected in the WUAs 
and use this status further to expand their economic and political 
networks for the system sustainability (ibid). However, chosen 
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structure and administration and processes involved make a 
difference to their evolution, in which project support plays a role. 
The participatory processes of IMTP did influence initial 
conditions and options to build functional and representative 
institutions, and project failures in the IMTP did shape initial 
weaknesses in new local management. 
8.1 Changes and Evolution in Pancbakanya 
The Panchakanya WUA evolved as a two-tier organization: the MC 
at system level and the BC at the branch canal level. The GA, the 
policy-making body of the WUA consisted of 45 members elected 
from the constituent branches and outlets on the basis of area 
under irrigation — one member to represent in the GA from 15 
bighas (10 ha of land) under irrigation. The MC constituted of 13 
members including the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary and 
the Treasurer. These four executives were to be elected from 
among the GA members whereas the 9 chairpersons of the 
constituent BCs were to be ex-officio member in the MC. 
The second election of the WUA was held in May 1996. As in 
the first election members in the MC and BC, including the four 
executives of the MC were selected by consensus. One of the 
engineers from the project office was the election officer during 
this election. However, the WUA used to prepare all the necessary 
documents to hold an election, like preparation of the voter list and 
time and venue of the election. 
The same persons were re-elected in executive posts, as farmers 
found this group most balanced in terms of power sharing, and 
were satisfied with them for their negotiations with the 
government. All the executive members in the WUA were active in 
other parts of local social and political life. The Chairman was well 
respected as he negotiated with the government during 
rehabilitation and expansion in 1974 and 1988. He had been in 
leadership from the beginning of the (informal) WUA formation in 
1988. He had been Chairman of the District Farmers Association 
in the past, and a supporter of the major political party, the Nepali 
Congress. Farmers wanted to keep him as Chairman because of his 
significant involvement in many arenas of power. 
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The Secretary was from the United Marxist and Leninist (UML) 
party, another major political party in Nepal. He was equally active 
locally in other social affairs. He was trained by the project in 
maintaining the accounts and other administrative jobs, and was 
equally knowledgeable in water distribution and the constraints of 
the system. The Chairman and the Secretary are the two most vital 
posts in any WUA. Here, they were from two large but rival 
political parties and farmers saw this as a strength of the WUA. 
The Vice-Chairman was selected from the native Tharu 
Community and had a strong base within that community. The 
treasurer was a schoolteacher and well respected locally. Local 
farmers appreciated the balance between political and ethnic 
groups and that all members were active in several areas of local 
social life. Farmers also found the WUA successful in negotiating 
the Action Plan and subsequent rehabilitation. 
Changing WUA configuration 
Before the third election, there were several changes in the WUA 
structure. The changes were made immediately after the system was 
handed over to them in December 1997. There were two reasons 
behind these changes. First, to match the WUA with the changes in 
the structural attributes and operational plan brought through the 
IMTP intervention. Second, to increase women's involvement in 
the WUA. 
The changes in operations (see chapter 9) brought new 
management requirements to the organization. The increased water 
availability, as a result of improvement work which controlled the 
massive seepage led to a gradual increase in the irrigated area, 
especially during the spring season. This required more 
management input on the part of WUA, especially in co-ordinating 
the water distribution inside the branch canals (will be discussed in 
section 9.1). This necessitated the formation of outlet groups below 
the branch canals. The increased water supply also made the eighth 
branch canal, abandoned before, interested to join the WUA and 
so it had to be included in the system. 
The WUA also found a problem in co-ordinating water 
distribution among the 10 direct outlets, which receive water 
directly from the main canaL which did not have their own 
committees to look after the water management2. The oudets were 
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at different locations in the main canal and their committees (the 
two BCs looking after these outlets) had failed to maintain the 
water distribution inside the outlets. Instead of two BCs 
representing the 10 oudets, the WUA realized that it would be 
better for each oudet to have its own oudet committee to distribute 
the water below the oudet. 
The WUA took the initiative to have a greater role for the 
women in the WUA for three reasons: time, donor requests and 
women themselves. The ADB, the USAID and the government 
wanted a wider role for the women in the WUA. Local women 
groups were interested to join the WUA, because of the 
recognition of the Panchakanya WUA locally. 
The Panchakanya WUA office was established in January 1996 
and since then its local recognition increased. Since its 
establishment, its executives (or representatives) were invitees in 
the local or district level functions like the Municipal Assembly 
meetings, Ward meetings, and other public forums. The local 
Municipal office also later on negotiated (finally agreed in February 
2001 only) with the WUA to rent its land on the headwork to start 
the weekly market Some locals were also contacting with the WUA 
to start a fish hatchery in the reservoir upstream of the headwork 
(final agreement made in March 2001). The DAO also started 
targeting its training activities at the WUA. 
In Chittwan, women groups were very effective in controlling 
alcohol abuse, and in creating awareness among villagers about the 
importance of primary education and personal health care. It is the 
district with the highest women literacy rate in the country and 
recendy, a study (published in a local newspaper) shows more girls 
attending primary school than boys. Women riding bicycles, both 
young and old, is common in Chittwan, a rare phenomenon in rest 
of the country. As the WUA became an established institution, 
women also wanted a wider role in it. 
The new WUA structure and elections 
Because of these new requirements, the constitution of the WUA 
was changed in December 1997 by a general Assembly meeting 
immediately after the system hand over. I was also invitee in this 
GA meeting. 
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This new structure was intended to bring as many persons as 
possible under the umbrella of the organization so that people 
would know about the WUA and pay the ISF. The number of GA 
members was increased to 110 up from 45. Besides one 
representative per 10 ha area, executives (Chairman and Secretary) 
of the concerned branch, outlet groups were also made GA 
members. Women representatives were allotted 20% of the GA 
seats. Details of the debate on how to increase female membership 
are given in Box. 8.1. The numbers of MC members were increased 
from 13 to 16. Separate outlet groups were formed for the 10 
outlets taking off from the main canal. Their representation in the 
MC was kept at two, as in the past. Out of the 16 members in the 
MC, 10 were from the eight branch canals, with one extra seat each 
for branch canals 1 and 5 because of their larger command area. 
Two members were from the 10 oudet committees and one 
women representative was to be elected by the GA. The remaining 
three were the executives of the WUA: the Chairman, vice 
Chairman and Secretary and were also to be elected by the GA. 
The post of the treasurer was removed, and the job was transferred 
to the WUA Secretary. 
The third WUA election was held after this amendment in 
October 1998. The same persons were again elected as Chairman 
and Secretary of the WUA, and 50% of the members were the 
same as in the old committee. The Chairman, who was elected by 
consensus, wanted to be relieved this time, as he thought he was 
too old for the post in his mid- seventies, and had been Chairman 
for so long. But later, he agreed to retain the post as all farmers 
wanted him to stay because of his earlier contribution. The 
Chairman told me that he also decided to stay because this post has 
given him social and political status: everybody in society respects 
him. He is also known among the DOI authorities, the NGOS and 
INGOS working in the Nepal irrigation sector. Though too old to 
expand his political career, this post has provided him an 
opportunity to retain his symbolic value within the society. 
There was however balloting for the post of the Secretary. A 
supporter to the Nepali Congress Party (the same party as the 
Chairman) stood against the then Secretary, who was from the 
Communist party. But the sitting Secretary won the election. 
People favored him again because the same pair (the Chairman and 
Secretary) had worked for the last years to the satisfaction of the 
farmers. Farmers see this combination as the strength of the WUA, 
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and that it works effectively because of the dynamic leadership of 
these two persons, belonging to rival political parties. Shukla et al. 
(2000) also cast a doubt whether the WUA could work if these two 
people left the WUA. 
Box 8.1 The GA meeting to change WUA structure 
The meeting was held in front of the WUA office. At the beginning, 
the Secretary explained about the need to change the WUA 
configuration. He explained that as the system is just handed over, 
they needed to bring more people into the GA so that they would 
know about the WUA activities and pay for the system. He also 
explained why they needed to form the oudet committees to help 
implement the strong rotational pattern. The members knew the 
Secretary as the man involved in system operation as well as in fee 
collection from users. So the members accepted his explanations, and 
his proposal for the new structure with oudet committees was passed 
without much discussion. 
Then a debate began in how to increase the women members in 
the WUA. It was interesting to observe that all were in favor for 
increasing roles of the women in the WUA, but nobody was clear on 
how to do this. Everybody knew the obstacle: the membership was 
based on land ownership which was attached to men. One of the GA 
members said that they should transfer part of their lands to their 
wives and encourage them to become members. But this was not 
practical, everybody laughed at him for being too emotional. Another 
option, tabled by another member was to let the male and female 
decide who would be member from the house. The discussions 
continued up to the evening with no solution to the issue. 
The meeting continued on the second day, although I was not 
present. I learned from the Secretary that they made a provision such 
that the member can transfer part or whole of his share (in 
Panchakanya 1 ha equals to 60 shares) to anyone and recipient could 
then be a member to the WUA. This opened the door for women to 
be member s of the WUA without owning land in their name, but it 
still requires to get concession of the share from their husband. 
However, the structure prepared at the time of the third election 
proved cumbersome, as there were too many members involved in 
different tiers of the organization. Hardly any meetings were held 
in lower order committees. The numbers of members were thus 
lowered after another amendment in 2000, although the structure 
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has remained the same. The change in the membership numbers of 
the WUA in successive election is shown in Table 8.1 
TABLE 8.1 The changing WUA membership arrangement 
Committee 1" 2* Third election Fourth election 
election election Oct 1998 Jan, 2001 
May May M F Total M F Total 
1994 1996 
MC 
BC 
Outlet 
canals 
Outlet 
groups 
GA 
13 
45 
-
-
45 
13 
45 
-
-
45 
15 
32 
40 
105 
72 
1 
8 
10 
30 
38 
16 
40 
50 
135 
110 
14 
35 
8 
0 
22 
1 
21 
20 
78 
67 
15 
56 
28 
78 
89 
Source: WUA Records. M: male, F: Female 
The table shows that lower order committee members are now 
dominated by women representatives. According to the WUA, the 
women members were more effective in convincing the farmers to 
pay the ISF and creating awareness among the farmers to keep the 
canal clean and not to encroach the canal. The present structure of 
the WUA is shown in the Figure 8.1. 
The composition of the WUA as a result of the changes are 
summarized below: 
• The WUA now has three tiers of organization: the MC at 
system level; BC or outlet committee at the next lower level; 
and outlet groups below the branch committee. However, ISF 
collection is done by the MC only and branch and outlet 
committees only carry out water operations within the branch 
or outlets. 
• The MC members are formed from representatives of the eight 
branches and 10 outlet committees. The executives of the MC 
are to be elected by the GA. Besides, a woman member would 
also be elected by the GA as a MC member. 
• Each BC and outlets has 5 members with one compulsory 
woman member 
• The GA includes executives of branch and outlet committee 
besides, the elected members. 
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FIGURE 8.1 The present WUA in panchakanya 
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The fourth WUA election was held in January 2001, after the 
second amendment in its constitution. The Chairman and the 
Secretary were again the same persons, showing continued support 
from the farmers. The secretary is now paid (Rs.1500 per month) 
for performing the administrative and finical management of the 
WUA. 
The Panchakanya WUA has expanded its adrninistration and 
structure, for which the project support played a crucial bringing 
better water delivery and operational preferred by the farmers. The 
changing structure has allowed institution to reform itself as seems 
best for the organization and its members. The PIS had already a 
visionary leadership in place, shaped by the existing local social 
norms, that was accountable to its members addressing local 
concerns and needs, which further added legitimacy and power to 
the WUA. The next chapter will further show how this was able to 
deliver positive changes in water management 
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Increasing roles for women in Panchakanya WUA 
The reasons for the initial lack of women's involvement in the 
WUA processes is that there was no guidelines and framework for 
this in the project. Of course, there were sentences like 'women 
involvement would be given due attention' and 'they would be 
encouraged to involve in the WUA' in project papers and 
documents. The Irrigation Policy also states that at least 20 % 
women representation was required in the WUA. But in practice, 
this was not being done at the beginning, when no system had a 
single woman in the MC. 
But implementers like me have a different dilemma. I was hardly 
aware of the issue at first because of my technocratic background 
and bureaucratic orientation. Once two USAID officials, on a 
mission to the project, asked me why there were no women in the 
WUA. I had never thought about the question nor had an answer. 
But from my own perception, I told them that activities like water 
distribution and system maintenance are likely to be a male job. I 
continued to believe this until I read Zwartveen, 1995 and realised 
that all activities of irrigation could be shared by men and women). 
It was only during the GA meeting in PIS (se Box 8.1) that I 
could understand the problem behind women's' participation in the 
WUA, in that a water right is attached to land right mostly owned 
by the male head of the family. There were several 
recommendations for women involvement by the consultant, 
donors and also policy papers by the government, but removing 
this major hurdle has been nowhere mentioned3. 
In Panchakanya, the change in constitution made it possible to 
increase the numbers of women representation in the WUA, as 
seen from Table 8.1. But the real change in their activity came only 
after the involvement of an N G O in helping the women to form a 
group and move ahead. In October 2000, the NGO formed a 
committee called the "Women Helping Group' to help women 
members take an active role in irrigation management activities. 
According to the Secretary of the WUA, the group was formed 
through the joint effort of the WUA and an NGO called "Women 
Plus'. I came to know later on that the ADB had supported the 
N G O for promoting women's role in Panchakanya. The structure 
of this group is shown in Figure 8.2. 
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FIGURE 8.2 The structure of the Women Helping Group in 
Panchakanya 
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In the Figure, the function of the training and income generation 
group is to increase the income of members through capacity 
development in agriculture by means of training and credit 
facilities. To start the credit program, the group has already opened 
a bank account. The function of the resource mobilization 
committee is to help the WUA in collecting the ISF by raising the 
awareness among farmers to pay for the system. The subcommittee 
for operation and maintenance was created so that the operation 
and maintenance activities below the main canal would be gradually 
taken over by these groups. The administration sub committee was 
meant to carry out the daily administration of the helping group. 
According to the WUA, this group has been effective in 
convincing the users to be members of the WUA and pay ISF as 
well as creating awareness among the farmers about the importance 
of canal cleaning and maintenance activities. I observed an active 
involvement of this group during the fourth election in Jan 2001. 
The 60% representation in the present WUA (considering all the 
tiers, see Table 8.1) would not have been possible without the 
involvement of them. 
The WUA report prepared by the Secretary of the WUA in 
December 2001, mentioned that the increase in the membership of 
the WUA, ISF collection and the maintenance fee in the years 
1999/2000 and 2000/2001 (see section 9.2) have been due to effort 
of the women's helping group. I also saw a 500m long tertiary canal 
constructed with the initiation of this group. The WUA say that 61 
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new members joined the system after this construction. I had also 
two more opportunities to observe for myself the activities of this 
group in the Panchakanya. 
The WHG is now getting support from the other government 
institutions and NGOs especially in training and capacity 
development activities. Immediately after their formation, they 
were given seven-days training on canal management, leadership 
development, office administration by the NGO. As part of the 
training and awareness program, the group also organized an 
awareness program inside the command area for keeping the canal 
in proper condition. There were about 500 women in this 
campaign, and they travelled from head to tail of the main canal 
telling the farmers not to encroach the canal embankment, nor to 
throw remains of dead animals, broken glass, plastics and other 
wastage in the canal. Local farmers feel that this awareness 
program has helped to keep the canal clean. When I visited the 
system later on, I did not find much change in the condition of the 
canaL but for two visible changes: nobody now put his buffalo into 
the canal and encroachment of the canal embankment had reduced. 
On April 2001, the women's group asked the WUA to call for a 
GA meeting of the WUA. The reason was that part of the springs 
in the catchment were diverted by the adjoining farmers which had 
caused the decreasing water supply at the source. This was peak 
season for the early paddy transplantation and I was there to see 
the canal operation in this season. Due to ongoing training and 
capacity development activities the women members were in 
regular contact with each other and they able to call the meeting 
quickly. The recendy completed awareness campaign had also 
encouraged the groups to call the GA meeting where they decided 
they would visit the field and took necessary action. Two days after 
the GA meeting, the WHG organized themselves and together 
with the WUA, moved to the catchment and dismanded the 
diversion made by the farmers to divert the springs. The farmers 
said that they would not repeat this in future. 
The problem of land ownership is not going to be solved in the 
near future. Talks are ongoing in Nepal regarding women's rights 
over the property of their parents. The newly changed legislation 
has made it clear that daughters would also share property with the 
sons, but has to be returned once she is married. Further discussion 
about this is beyond the scope of this book. But it seems unlikely 
that the majority of women will have land ownership in the near 
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future. That means WUA will continue to be dominated by men 
unless they intentionally enable female representation. 
The Panchkanya arrangement for transferring share concessions 
is one step ahead in resolving the problem. But the head of the 
family has still to transfer the concession. This has worked in 
Panchakanya because of a relatively aware and educated society. 
Formation of a separate Women's Group and taking part in 
irrigation can also be another approach. This group can involve 
itself to other income generating activities besides involving 
themselves in the irrigation activities, or encouraging the women to 
involve in the WUA. 
8.2 Changes and Evolution in Khageri. 
Khageri has not seen the level of changes in structure and 
responsibility as Panchakanya. There has not been much change in 
water availability scenario to drive change, nor demands for water 
users for different representation. Indeed, there has been ongoing 
concern over water scarcity, especially given the resettlement 
struggle. 
By January 1999 there had already been four elections in the 
Khageri since its first in 1993. I had just become involved with the 
Khageri at the time of second election in January 1995. The 
representatives at all the levels of WUA, the MC and BC were 
chosen by consensus this time: previously, the three executives 
were selected through balloting. The same persons were again 
selected for the executives of the MC. 
The GA members who elect the executive posts cited three 
main reasons for the selection of the same group of people as 
executives. The first was that these people had two years' of 
experience in the WUA. It was time to negotiate with the 
government for the management transfer arrangement and the 
presence of the same group was considered essential so that they 
could put into practice what they had learned and experienced in 
the first term. The two-year term was realized as a very short 
period to gain experience. 
Also farmers were satisfied with the way the WUA had co-
ordinated with the agency in system operation and maintenance. 
They gave the example of how the WUA saved Rs. 365,000 rupees 
out of the contract with the government and kept in the bank 
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account (chapter 4). Thirdly, farmers felt that the committee was 
able to maintain the equitable water distribution and were 
accountable to the farmers. Just after the formation, the MC took 
control over the operation of the system from the government. 
The WUA had decided to do so thinking that unless they had 
control over the main system operation, equitable distribution 
among the branches would not be possible. According to local 
farmers, the MC worked hard to maintain the equitable water 
distribution in the system4. 
Though elected by .consensus, all of the executives and the 
members had political attachments with either the Nepali Congress 
or the Communist party. The six members from the Branch Canal 
Bi to B& were from the Communist party whereas the remaining 
six members were from the Nepali Congress party. The three 
executives were all from the Nepali Congress party, as this party 
had majority support in the WUA. Likewise, almost all the 
members were already attached to other organizations and were 
visible in wider society. Usually, they were members of the primary 
school board, the forest group, the local political party or their 
affiliated institutions5, or the local Red Cross society. 
However, I never found any single incident of (party) political 
domination in the Khageri during my stay in the years ahead. The 
decisions in the MC and in GA were always unanimous despite 
their political differences, though it required several rounds of 
discussions and negotiations. From the beginning of the action 
plan preparation (chapter 5) to the different Court cases described 
in Chapter 7, the WUA was always united. 
I was present at the third election in January 1997 as an observer 
from the project office. The administrative support for holding the 
election was also provided by our office as in Panchakanya. This 
time there was no consensus for the posts of Chairman, Vice 
Chairman and the Secretary and election (by ballot) was held. In 
the past elections, these posts were held by the Nepali Congress 
party whereas the 12 MC members were equally divided between 
the Congress and Communist party. In this election, the sitting 
Vice-Chairman showed his desire for the post of Chairman. A well-
educated man and owner of a boarding school, he claimed to 
provide better leadership in the WUA. However, the existing 
Chairman was also interested to continue the post. Since both of 
them were from the same political party, the Vice-Chairman 
abandoned his idea to run for Chairman at the very last moment of 
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the election. Besides this, many farmers opined that the Vice-
Chairman had insufficient time for the WUA if he became the 
Chairman, as he also runs the boarding school. This forced him to 
abandon his plan to run for the post of Chairman. 
But this time, the Communist party decided to fight for the 
posts of the executives as these were always taken by the Nepali 
Congress. Because of this, there was no consensus and election 
(through ballot box) was held for these posts. The previous group 
again won the election. Farmers already knew that the old group 
would win because the GA was dominated by supporters of the 
Nepali Congress party. One member of the WUA who was 
supposed to be a Communist party supporter told that they knew 
they would lose the election, but still they nominated their 
candidates to boost their identity in the society. 
In the fourth election, in January 1999 the same persons were 
elected as Chairman and Vice Chairman, but the Secretary was 
changed this time6. He however, belongs to the same political 
party. Since the last election, the tenure of the members of the 
WUA members has been also increased from two to four years. 
The need to change the tenure had already been felt by the WUA 
since the time of second election, as a two-year tenure was found 
too short to build plans and programs and a vision for the future. 
However, it was not changed then as many farmers thought that 
the initial phase provided an opportunity to a wider group of 
people to be represented in the WUA, and learn about the 
participatory process and the irrigation system. Only after the third 
election was the constitution of the WUA changed to a four-year 
tenure. 
Here also the same persons are elected in the executives post of 
the WUA in successive elections. But there are sign of change in 
that the secretary is replaced now. It is interesting to observe why 
the same group is re-elected over and over again. There are two 
factors explaining this. First, why do farmers keep on choosing the 
same persons and the second is that why do leaders seek to retain 
their posts? 
About the first question, farmers in Khageri believe that the 
leadership in the WUA have been working well They give the 
example of the way the leadership pressed the government on the 
resettlement issue. The WUA was also able to establish a network 
with the National Park (the first few kilometres of the Khageri 
canal lie in the National Park) and other government offices in the 
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district. The national park authority has already supported the 
Khageri system with more than a million rupees. As the main canal 
was not transferred to the WUA in Khageri, the canal embankment 
forest was also not handed over to the WUA. But the WUA 
convinced the District Forest Office, and took control over the 
forest resources since 2000. The WUA also regularly organizes 
workshops inviting all the district level offices to establish network 
for future co-operation. 
In parallel, farmers are also satisfied with the current water 
allocation practices, which will be dealt in next chapter. The survey 
by Wallingford (2001) shows that there is strong support for the 
WUA in Khageri as shown in Table 8.2. A 72% of the farmers 
agree that the committee does a good job and 80% of the farmers 
agree that there is a good co-operation between the committee and 
the farmers. Likewise, the agency personnel are also supportive of 
the WUA: 87% say that there is good co-operation between the 
DOI and the WUA and 84% say that WUA gets advice from the 
agency as needed by them. This suggests that all parties are 
accountable to each other in their functioning. 
People want to stay in the WUA is because of the social 
recognition and opportunities it provides them for further career 
opportunity. The WUAs in Chittwan are recognized as separate 
organization with their own identity. Once, when the Prime 
Minister was in Chittwan to address a function (can not recall the 
date), the WUA Chairman of the Khageri was also invited on to 
the stage to sit near the Prime Minister. 
The Chairman of this WUA was also elected the president of 
the Nepal Federation of Irrigation Water Users Association 
(NFIWUAN). He is now Vice-President of the INPIM Nepal 
chapter. The Vice-Chairman is a graduate, and owner of a boarding 
school. For him too, it has been a place for the development of 
leadership. With the Chairman now engaged in the NFIWUAN, 
the Vice Chairman has been responsible for the running of the 
WUA. Local people believe that he wants to continue in the WUA 
because he has also bright political career ahead. 
Changing WUA configuration 
As in Panchakanya, the two-tier organization here is also now 
gradually changing into a three-tier organization, adding the outlet 
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committee below the BC. The need to form the outlet committee 
here is also guided by the new management requirement and the 
process of outlet committee formation has been on the farmers' 
own initiative. Besides, the problem in holding the GA meeting 
inside the branch canals has also necessitated the formation of the 
oudet committee. 
TABLE 8.2 Farmers perception on their WUA in KIS and NWGIS 
Is There a WUA 
Are you a member of the WUA 
Is There a GA meeting 
Does the committee do a good 
Job 
Is there good co-operation 
between fanners and the 
committee 
Is there good co-operation 
between WUA and DOI 
Does the WUA get advice from 
the DOI if necessary 
How Active is the WUA 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Yes 
No 
Don't Know 
Most 
members 
Only a few 
members 
Only 
committee 
Only 
Chairman 
Don't Know 
KIS 
94 
0 
4 
53 
41 
4 
57 
37 
4 
72 
16 
10 
80 
7 
11 
87 
4 
7 
84 
3 
11 
42 
45 
0 
0 
11 
NWGIS 
92 
8 
0 
19 
78 
4 
38 
62 
0 
20 
80 
0 
23 
77 
0 
25 
75 
0 
30 
68 
2 
27 
16 
0 
5 
52 
Source: Wallingford 2001 
The WUA here also gradually shifted towards the implementation 
of strong rotational practices (see chapter 9). With this, the branch 
canals always receive the full discharge within it: the duration 
however, depends upon the type of delivery whether it is weekly 
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rotation or the sectional rotation. Delivery from the branch to the 
outlets also accordingly shifted towards the sectional rotation. 
However, the outlets did not have any committee, and the BC 
members had difficulty in co-ordinating the water distribution 
among the outlets. 
On the other hand, the farmers below the outlets had also two 
problems. First, they lacked the information on when their 
irrigation turn came. Second, they were also having difficulty in co-
ordinating water distribution inside the outlets. So the outlets of 
the branch canals formed outlet groups to co-ordinate water 
distribution among the farmers as well as to co-ordinate with the 
branch committee. 
Another reason for the formation of the outlet committee has 
been the administrative one. In Khageri, each branch canal has 
their own GA to form policies regarding the system management 
within the concerned branch canal. The GA members of the 
branch canals are the farmer members of that particular branch. 
According to the constitution of the WUA, at least 50% of the 
member farmers must be present to hold the GA meeting in the 
branch canals (it is the same for all the branch canals). For example 
in branch canal 1, there are 860 households and at least 481 
members are required to be present to hold the GA meeting. 
Organizing a meeting with such a large group of farmers and 
arriving at conclusions was found practically impossible. This 
problem has been there since the formation of the WUA. During 
my stay between 1995 to 1998,1 remember, only in few instances 
that the GA meeting of the branch canal could be held7 at the first 
call of the meeting and the same trend has been continued. Most 
often it was cancelled for lack of a quorum. 
So BCs tried to change this arrangement through the 
development of the Outlet Committees, such that only the 
executives of the oudet committee are made members of the GA 
of the BC. During my fieldwork, many branch canals were forming 
the outlet committee and it was over in B2 B^, B ^ and B7. 
However, these outlet committees are so far are not included 
officially inside the structure of the WUA, and the process for this 
is still being discussed in the MC. The other structure of the 
organization has remained the same so far. 
The MC of the WUA has its office at Shivanagar and employs a 
regular office secretary and a peon8. The responsibility of the office 
Secretary is to look after day to day aclministration and record 
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keeping. The MC meets regularly on the first day of each (Nepali) 
month. Informal meetings are also arranged depending on the 
need. 
The Khageri WUA has also matured to its administration and 
structure. A WUA can not be designed as an apolitical body, party 
politics often enter in the leadership selection, as it increases social 
recognition to both leaders and the political party. However, these 
are not necessarily problematic, the main issue is how the 
leadership maintain accountability to the farmers and to the agency 
and vice-versa. The Khageri also shows how external support and 
networking play role in the evolution of the WUA. 
8.3. Changes and Evolution in WestGandak 
In Chapter 4,1 explained how the first election in the West Gandak 
was dominated by the party politics, and this has continued in the 
NWGIS since then. People in the area say that the second election 
of WUA was more dominated by the party politics than the first. 
One JT (Junior Technician) of the NWGIS, who was directly 
involved in the election told me that most of the local political 
figures including the Member of Parliament were present during 
the election to influence the voters in favour of their concerned 
political parties. 
The candidates for the post of Chairman of the MC also used 
loudspeakers, printed pamphlets and hired vehicles to campaign on 
their behalf. On the day of the election, the GA members (who 
were the voters) were provided with transportation facilities by 
each candidate. There were three candidates for the post of the 
Chairman and only one of them used motorbikes: the others hired 
jeeps. Local people said that each of the candidates for the post of 
the Chairman spent more than fifty thousand rupees in the 
campaign. It is also said that there was a large crowd inside the 
West Gandak office compound where the election was being held. 
The police were called in to maintain (likely) violence at the time of 
election. Local people recall that it was like an election for a 
Member of Parliament. 
New persons were elected in the post of executives of the MC 
including the Chairman. Local people say that all the executives 
were from the Sadhvabana party, which had a stronghold in the 
area and a majority in the GA of the WUA. However, by the 
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constitution itself, the GA members were not allowed to contest 
for the posts of the four executives. They were to be selected from 
the 35 member representatives of the MC: as this was also 
dominated by only 19% of the command area, the selected key 
figures could easily capture the posts. 
The increased influence of the party politics at this second 
election was due to two reasons. The first is that the rehabilitation 
activities were about to begin. That means the Chairman would 
have access to resources and being the Chairman one could 
influence the priorities in the improvement work. Another reason 
is that the WUA was also looked at as a platform to build a political 
career. To be a president of the WUA in the West Gandak is to be 
farmers representative for the 22 VDCs and it cover 2 
parliamentary constituencies. There was no organization of the 
scale in the area that could provide opportunity of leadership for 
such a large group of people. This made the Gandak a WUA very 
attractive venue to aspire for the future political career. 
Change in WUA configuration 
By the time of the third election (February 1998), the WUA 
themselves realized that the WUA structure was ineffective. The 
lower-order committees, that is the ToHs and UpatoHs were almost 
non-existent Shukla et al (2000) notes that people aspired to be 
elected in the upper tiers of the WUA only, nobody was willing to 
work in the lower tiers. Because of its unitary configuration 
(chapter 4), representation in the lower committee was acquired to 
fight for the upper-tier post or support the candidate belonging to 
his party. 
Another problem was that mostly the MC meetings used to be 
cancelled for lack of a quorum and even when held, only a slim 
majority was present. This was mainly because of its unequal 
representation. As explained, about 19% area covers more than 
68.5% of the MC membership. This area hardly had any problems 
of water availability and even in difficult years, they managed to get 
water as they are small canals directly drawing water from the main 
canal Table 8.3 presents the WUA attendance and the type of 
decisions made by them. 
The Table shows that there has been very low attendance in the 
WUA meeting. That is to say, only few individuals were making the 
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decisions in the WUA. Another point the Table shows is that the 
WUA has not seen itself as an organization responsible for water 
management, as there are hardly any discussions on canal operation 
and water distribution. 
TABLE 8.3 Members attendance in the main committee meeting 
Meetings 
Held 
against 
the target 
60% 
Average 
attendance 
in the 
meeting 
55% 
Presence 
of key 
personals 
60% 
events 
when more 
than 85% 
were 
present 
20% 
Type of discussions 
0& Financial 
M matters 
20% 50% 
Conflict 
s/others 
30% 
Source WUA minutes books. 
Meantime, with the handing over of the system management, a 
new water delivery pattern was designed in the West Gandak (see 
Chapter 9). According to this plan, the main canal was divided into 
four sections to co-ordinate the water distribution in each of these 
regions areas. Accordingly it was also necessary to form regional 
committees of the WUA. Because of all these new requirements, 
the structure of the West Gandak was also changed before the 
third election was held. 
The first and most important change made in the WUA was the 
formation of a 'Management Committee'. The committee would be 
formed out of the members of the MC representing all four 
different canal regions, and would look after the system O&M. In 
this new model, the MC members would be called a 'board of 
directors' and the Management Committee members were to be 
selected by them. The concept of the Management Committee was 
generated by the consultant, as it was found impossible to move 
ahead with the large number of MC members (now called the 
board of directors). This new structure was aimed at changing the 
WUA towards a management model similar to the American 
Model (Freeman, 1989) and practice in Mexico (Kloezen, 2002) in 
which the board hires managers and technicians to carry out the 
daily activities of the canal O&M However, the difference here 
was that they were again from within the WUA body and thus 
could not escape from wider politics within the WUA. At the same 
time they too lacked knowledge of canal O&M. 
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The Management Committee was designed to look after the daily 
management tasks of the WUA. It would contain five members 
among which one would be appointed as manager. The others 
would look into legal, financial administrative and technical matters 
of the WUA. With the formation of this committee, it was also 
decided that the regular meeting of the WUA (or the board of 
directors as now called) would be called only once in two months 
instead of a regular monthly meeting. 
Another major change was made from then on: the GA 
members were also allowed to stand for the posts of Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman, previously restricted. This had been the weakest 
point in this WUA and had resulted in limited participation in the 
leadership. With the executive committee assuming the daily 
management of the WUA, the post of the Secretary was removed 
from the WUA. The MC members (now called Board of Directors) 
was increased to 39, adding four women representatives9 and the 
total number of Board of Directors may increase to 41, if the 
Chairman and the Vice Chairman are elected from within the GA 
members. Another change made was the addition of the four 
regional committees to look after the water distribution inside the 
four regions. The new arrangements of the WUA is shown in 
Figure 8.3. 
The third election of the WUA was held in February 1998. The 
election this time too was shaped by Party politics. However, 
Shukla et aL (2000) note that the influence of political leaders were 
less this time as compared to past. The reason, according to local 
people was the completion of the system improvement activities. 
Yet the money spent and the type of campaign using printed 
pamphlets and loudspeakers were same as in the previous election. 
The lower tiers of the organization have remained the same as 
presented in chapter 4, and are not shown in Figure 8.3. 
Both Chairman and Vice-Chairman again changed, and both of 
them were high-level political leaders in the district. The Chairman 
was from the Sadvabhana party, as was the past Chairman. Local 
people say that the past Chairman was not favoured by his party 
because of two reasons. First, he had already been elected to the 
post of the Chairman of the VDC. Second, the current Chairman 
had recendy shifted to this party from another rival political party. 
He had no public post and so he was favoured for the post of the 
Chairman in the WUA. 
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FIGURE 8.3 The New WUA structure in West Gandak 
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The Vice-Chairman was from the Communist Party. He had stood 
for MP in the last Parliamentary election and lost. This shows that 
even national level politicians prefer to be in the WUA of West 
Gandak. As the post of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman were 
now to be elected out of GA (after the change in constitution), we 
can also see how power is divided between two rival political 
parties, which used to be limited to particular political parties in the 
previous elections. 
From this time, the WUA board was to hand over its 
responsibility to the five members Management Committee which 
was to be selected by the Board of Directors. The person selected 
for the post of Manager of the Management Committee was the 
first Chairman of the WUA. It is interesting to see a past Chairman 
assuming the post of the Manager. But he shared his view that the 
Manager would be now the most important person, visible to the 
farmers and because of this he accepted the post. But this Manager 
was from different political party, from both Chairman and Vice-
Chairman who did not transfer the power to the Manager. He left 
the job after few months, as he did not receive the support from 
the key figures in the WUA. 
Organisational Change and Evolution 247 
A new Management Committee with a new Manager was then 
selected from the board of directors. In my fieldwork in West 
Gandak, I found this manager very committed to his work and was 
interested to improve the situation in the West Gandak. He tried to 
implement the new water distribution practices and timely repair 
and maintenance of the canals and structures. But he too could not 
work. The WUA Board of Directors were supposed to give the 
necessary authority to the Management Committee regarding 
finance and administration, which they never handed over. They 
feared loss of power. The major problem to the manager was that 
there was no money with the WUA, as there was no mechanism to 
collect the ISF from the farmers (se Chapter 9). The situation was 
such that he was blamed by the farmers for not being able to run 
the canal, whereas he had neither the authority nor the resources to 
perform management activities. So after about a year, he also quit 
the job. 
The first Chairman, who was made Manager of the WUA first 
time was again made the manager. The same person was requested 
this time to work as Manager as he had the experience of the 
system more than others. For him, it was again an opportunity to 
establish his position in the WUA and society. 
The new structure however, could not bring any change in the 
service but increased the complexity of management The reasons 
were: first the Board of Directors never handed over the authority 
to the Management Committee, fearing loss of power. Papers 
relating to past expenditures and income and other administrative 
processes were never given to this Management Committee. 
Secondly, the Management Committee had no resources to 
carryout O&M activities except the fund provided by the 
government, which was not enough. They were also not able to use 
this money due to lack of authority. Thirdly, they were again from 
within the Board of Directors, not professionals having knowledge 
manage the system. 
In next chapter, I will show that the attempt to improve the 
irrigation management through WUA development and the system 
improvement could not bring change in West Gandak, for which 
Party politics has often been blamed. However, I disagree: despite 
the influence of the party politics, there was considerable strength 
inside the WUA. Except the present Chairman, the past two 
Chairman were common farmers with marginal land holdings. The 
present Vice-Chairman is also from a lower caste group and a 
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subsistence farmer. Though the socially and politically active 
people were in the WUA, they were not landlords and a local elite 
Because of the scale of the project as compared to Khageri and 
Panchakanya, a wider political influence in the WUA is not 
unexpected here: a comparatively rural society and lower political 
awareness, divisions in caste and ethnicity further helped political 
influence in the WUA. But its failure I argue, is due to poor project 
structure and lack of accountability and policy gap of the 
government as explained below: 
According to the government, they had handed over the system 
because of the strong demand from the WUA. But I found no 
reason to justify belief that the WUA could operate and maintain 
the system. At the time of handing over, only 29% of the farmers 
were the members in the WUA (according to the Audit report 
1997/1998). Poudal (1998) reports 35% membership in the WUA 
at the time of handing over. That means a majority of the people 
were still not members in the organization. The data in Table 8.2 
also supports this, as only 19% said they were members of the 
organization. The Table also shows the low recognition of the 
WUA in the society. 
The WUA, who was supposed to takeover the management 
responsibility had so far (until at the time of handing over) no 
experience of system O&M. So far it was only involved in 
construction supervision activities. Besides, the WUA here was 
constantly changing, and no one had knowledge about the system. 
It was only at the time of handing over that a need to form a 
Management Committee to look after the operation and 
maintenance was realized. But this too, was from within the MC, 
and could not function. 
Since its formation in 1993, there was no increase in ISF rate 
and its collection efficiency. As it will be seen in chapter 9, the 
collection efficiency was about 21% and the rate of ISF was eight 
times less than what was required to operate and maintain the 
system. There was no planning on how the system O&M cost 
would be generated. For the WUA, this is the most conflictive role 
which they definitely wanted to avoid. 
In this situation, what led the government to believe the WUA 
was capable to manage the system? The organizational and 
managerial requirement to govern and manage water in such a 
complex system environment was overlooked, and this led to the 
collapse of new governance. 
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8.4 Exploring Future Prospects: the Development of the WUA 
Federation 
Despite the different dynamics of IMTP in irrigation systems, the 
creation of the WUAs and handing over of the system 
management also gave these WUAs an opportunity to develop into 
a National Federation. The Irrigation Policy mentioned that the 
government would promote a federation of the WUA at the 
national level: this turned into reality with the implementation of 
the IMT in large irrigation systems. The federation of the water 
users association was born in 1999 during a national level INPIM10 
seminar. 
The INPIM Nepal Chapter organized a three-day seminar to 
review the status of IMT in the country in November 1999. The 
meeting was inaugurated by the then Deputy Prime Minister (who 
was also looking after the Ministry of Water Resource) and 
participated by professionals from DOI, officials from Ministry of 
Water Resources (MOW), professionals, academicians and 
consultants involved in irrigation development in the country. I 
was also present in this meeting and was partly responsible for 
arranging it as it was held in Chittwan. The WUA leaders from 
different irrigation systems where the joint management program 
was being implemented were also participants of the program, as 
were key INPIM representatives11. This was the first occasion in 
which large numbers of WUA leaders of many irrigation projects 
were together. They utilized this opportunity to form a federation 
of the WUAs at National level. During the workshop itself, they 
formed an adhoc Committee of the federation which was chaired by 
the Chairman of the Khageri12. 
The Federation later got support from Ford Foundation 
through a local NGO, which arranged a workshop in Rajapur to 
discuss the future course for the federation. The constitution of the 
federation was completed by 2000 and got registered under the 
name of "National Federation of Irrigation Water User's 
Association, Nepal' in March 2000. The federation held its first 
election in April 2000 during a national level conference of its 
members. By that time there were already 37 district level 
committees as its members. The federation is also supported by the 
DOI in its capacity development programs. The federation has 
taken part in INPIM seminars and other international conferences 
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However the objectives of the federation are not fully clear. In 
Colombia, for example, a WUA federation emerged with a clear 
vision to prepare the WUA to take over management of the 
irrigation district from the government (FAO). The federation is 
financed by the member WUAs and it hires lawyers to assist with 
transfer negotiations and engineers for technical problems. The 
objectives here are clear: the federation would increase the ability 
of farmers to lobby more effectively for their interest before the 
government agencies and in political fora. The Federation in Nepal 
immediately came under N G O funding and its own resource 
collection mechanism has not evolved yet. There is a provision that 
each district committee of the federation would pay the fee, but it 
has not been effective. Likewise, how and where it would represent 
farmers has not become clear. 
A further drawback, pointed out by many professionals is that 
the federation, by its constitution itself, originally restricted many 
of the WUAs to become the members. The constitution originally 
allows that only those WUAs who are registered with the 
government (registered under the Water Resources Act) to become 
members. This provision has been changed now allowing any 
WUA to become member in the Federation. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that institutions are dynamic, that changes 
in one water control areas bring change in another: this brings new 
management requirements. Project support makes a difference in 
facilitating the change and supporting the administration structure 
for organizational expansion. Project support can ensure that new 
organisations have clear information on their systems, and clear 
responsibilities at the time of transfer need to present at all system 
levels. Projects need realistic expectations of the WUAs they work 
with, and projects should be valued for their response to the WUA, 
rather than the targets of donors. 
Both local social structure and wider external support play a key 
role in shaping the local governance, which been often ovedooked 
in institutional design principles. While local social dynamics shapes 
the pattern of leadership and its recognition, the wider support 
from external political and administration help execute decisions 
and get support for water management, that also adds to local 
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credibility and acceptance. The WUA therefore will continue to 
develop economic and political network among the different 
WUAs themselves and among the WUA and other political 
institutions. Farmers' effort to develop the Federation of the 
WUAs was in search on this direction. Because of these wider 
political activities embedded in organizational evolution both at 
local and external level, people use their already earned social and 
political status to be represented in the WUA and use this position 
to expand their social and political network. As we saw in all the 
cases how farmers used their social status to be elected in the WUA 
and how they used it to get wider recognition. The Khageri 
chairman got elected president of the federation because of being a 
chairman of the Khageri. On the other hand, Khageri is recognized 
to wider society because its president is chairman of the federation. 
There is a need to change the official view on the WUAs as non-
political, non-partisan bodies looking after the water management 
activities. They are delegated governance roles, and to be effective 
in organizational development and water management, they need 
to evolve local governance and execute decisions not only on 
water, but on production and through this, livelihood and welfare. 
It must thus be looked as an organization that provides power to 
bargain and negotiate with the government and with other agencies 
and provide an opportunity to build up social and political career. 
Because of these opportunities, party politics also often enter in the 
WUA development process. However, they may not be always 
dominant in all affairs as shown by both Khageri and Panchakanya. 
The dominant role of party politics can be problematic too, as 
shown in the Case of West Gandak, especially when there is lack of 
accountability between the key actors involved: the irrigation 
agency, local users and the WUA. The political activity needed to 
sustain local governance have to be accepted, rather than ignored 
in program design. 
Notes 
1
 Political accountability here is seen as how providers of irrigation service 
are liable to show that they have followed agreed upon arrangements for 
decision making, user representation, leadership selection and equity and 
democratization targets (kloezen, 2002). 
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2
 In the previous WUA structure, the 10 direct outlets from the main 
canal were divided into two different BC (one committee for outlets 1 to 
5 and another for outlets 6 to 10) to represent them in the MC. 
3
 There are few discussions in the DOI regarding women's role in the 
WUA, and only occasional seminars and workshops. To carry out 
research on women's involvement in irrigation, the USAID hired a 
foreign and a local consultant, who were based in the project office in 
Chittwan. In one of the training programs, I requested the team to come 
up with some recommendation to represent women better in irrigation 
design under prevailing socio-economic conditions, and find what legal, 
institutional or other actions are required for this. Their report gave the 
same recommendations on better representation and involvement in 
decision making, but no practical means to achieve this! To my 
knowledge, there are rare cases in which both male and female of the 
household are given membership in the WUA. 
4
 The Khageri was under joint management, but canal operation was 
carried out by the WUA themselves, but with financial support from the 
DOI. 
5
 Each political party has their own sister organizations representing 
farmers groups, youth groups, women groups, student groups etc. 
6
 The secretary was very gentle, older than others, but less dynamic 
compared to chairman and vice chairman and he was intentionally 
removed. 
7
 I was always invited to the GA meetings of the branch canals, I 
personally attended many of them and when I was out of the office, one 
of our engineers used to participate in the meeting. 
8
 A lower clerk employed for cleaning and maintaining the office as well 
as to carry notices and deliver letters. 
9
 Here too, the women members were included to address the donor 
concerns 
10
 INPIM stands for International Network for Participatory Irrigation 
Management, originally based at the World Bank. 
11
 These included Geert Diemer from central INPIM unit and Raymond 
Peter, Additional Secretary at the Irrigation Ministry in Andhra Pradesh 
Sate of India (now executive secretary of the INPIM) 
12
 The federation quickly got attention in the meeting, and donors quickly 
showed their interest to support it ahead. 
Changing Irrigation Management Practices 
After turnover, the WUA had to face the various challenges that 
their system environment brought to irrigation management. The 
changed practices were partly a reflection of the skills and 
knowledge they took care to develop technical water control and 
operational and financial accountability. However, they also 
depended on the political accountability, and credibility, that the 
WUAs built up with their members, and with the DOI. Project 
support through action around technology, tried to translate 
concerns over the system environment in practical design for 
improved water delivery and operation acceptable to farmers, and 
to build the skills, resources and accountability needed to sustain 
water management. However, poorly executed programs without 
due understanding of system environment, undermined change, 
resulting in failures cosdy to users needs and the program process. 
The chapter describes the changes in water supply and 
operation, changes in maintenance status and financial sufficiency. 
These three are studied here as they help explain the different water 
control elements (Mollinga, 1998) and financial accountability 
(Kloezeon, 2002) that shape local water management. 
9.1 Water Supply and Canal Operation 
Panchakanya 
Canal operation in Panchakanya was joindy done even before the 
initiation of the IMTP. A Dhalpa was assigned by the government 
to look after gate operation and water distribution from the main 
canal. He was supported by the then informal WUA in carrying out 
his activities, especially in the monsoon paddy season. There was 
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no allocation schedule for the monsoon paddy, but during winter 
seasons they used to rotate water among the branch canals. There 
were no written rules and the Chairman used to decide the time of 
rotation. 
A new principle for water distribution has been put in practice 
since 1998 considering the possible water available at the sources 
and the cropping pattern in the command area. The operational 
rule is ad hoc, developed from the experience of the WUA. 
However after the system transfer, water measurement and 
calibration activities were performed to make the WUA and the 
work force, which is called the Katyadal, to understand the water 
availability at the canal intake. The rule is as follows: 
• If the discharge at the main canal entry is above 1000 litres, all 
the branches and outlets gates are open and all will get 
continuous flow. 
• If discharge falls to between 500 to 1000 litres, the command 
area will be divided into two sections and rotation is applied 
• If the discharge falls to 300 to 500 litres, the water will be 
rotated between three sections 
• If the discharge is less than 300 litres, hourly schedules are 
implemented for each branch canal. The time depends on the 
si2e of the canal and may vary between 9 to 24 hours. 
The first two rules are only applicable in the monsoon season, 
whereas the last rule applies in spring. The third rule is applicable 
to both spring and monsoon season (depending on rainfall). If the 
water availability is above 1000 litres, nobody worries about water 
and all the gates are opened. In the second scenario, the rotation 
period is kept at four days whereas in the third situation, the 
rotation period is reduced to two or three days. The fourth option 
is only for early (spring) paddy and spring maize as water 
availability is usually below 300 litres during this period. 
In all the distribution patterns mentioned above, we can see that 
an effort is made to concentrate water to a particular canal reach 
when the discharge decreases. The concerned canal reach is always 
provided with full discharge, but the time of its allocation varies 
with canal flow. This shows that farmers prefer to have a higher 
discharge within a short time period, rather then a lower discharge 
for a longer duration. Fanners say that this increases water use 
efficiency for several reasons. First, as the water flow is 
concentrated in a limited area only, seepage loss is low compared to 
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distribution over -wider areas. Second, when the canal runs with 
higher discharge intensity, flow velocity is also higher compared to 
conditions of low flow. This again reduces the total seepage 
volume. Thirdly, farmers have to work for a shorter duration to 
obtain the same volume of water. 
This distribution pattern tends to be similar to the Warabandi 
system of water distribution in the design of protective irrigation in 
India (Narain, 2003) and Pakistan where outlets are operated in 
'either or' conditions. That is: either they have full discharge or 
none, with a fixed rotational interval. However, the difference here 
is that it is attempted to keep the discharge the same with varying 
time allocation. This makes the management task more challenging 
here than the Warabandi distribution pattern, as it involves 
adjustment of the schedule in accordance with the flow availability. 
The time of rotation is decided by the MC, on recommendation 
from the workforce called the Karyadal. The Karyadal records the 
discharge at the intake and reports it to the MC. Depending on 
water availability, the MC decides which pattern to follow. The 
Karyadal consists of two members who are selected by the WUA 
from the farming community. They were trained in canal operation 
and discharge measurement by CADI after the handing-over of the 
system management. They are paid (Rs. 1500 a month) by the 
WUA and report directly to the Secretary of the MC, who 
supervises the Karyadal. 
The real challenge for canal operation in Panchakanya is the 
spring season. In monsoon, there is no water shortage in the 
command area at present and the WUA also say that they have no 
complaints about water shortage. In winter, Panchakanya farmers 
hardly care for water. Wheat is not popular here and lentil is the 
most preferred crop in winter. According to farmers, field moisture 
is enough to grow lentils and irrigation is harmful. In spring, maize 
and paddy are the predominant crops and farmers prefer to 
cultivate paddy. Because of the limited flow at this time, they plan 
the irrigation schedule in advance for the spring in which each 
farmer has to announce which crop he wants to grow to the outlet 
groups concerned, which pass the information on to the Branch 
Committee (BQ. The BC submits it to the MC. Once the demand 
from the all networks have been collected, the MC decides which 
branch can cultivate what area with what crop, where restrictions 
are put in the area under early paddy. But the division is made in 
proportion to the command area of the branch canals. 
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This mode of canal operation is working, but the WUA faces the 
problem that more farmers are now interested to grow early paddy. 
The water discharge at the source varies from 250 to 400 lps 
between March and May, the period when early paddy is grown. 
Their experience shows that they cannot increase the eady paddy 
beyond 100 ha with this flow. For spring make and vegetables they 
put no restriction on the area, as their irrigation requirement is 
quite low. Therefore they are now thinking of a new strategy. 
Instead of transplanting early paddy in different branch canals, they 
now plan for yearly distribution (only for early paddy), such that 
the upper half command area would receive water for the first year 
and lower half the second year. This again is targeted to minimise 
the water loss in the process of conveyance and distribution. 
The implementation of this new rotational plan has been made 
possible due to the increase in the discharge in the main canal and 
the matching of water distribution technology to implement the 
rotational schedule. The presence of three check regulators in the 
main canal and the gated structure at the head of the branch canals 
make it possible to practice this type of delivery from the main 
canal to the branch canals. The reason for the match of technology 
and the delivery pattern is that, as explained earlier in chapter 5 and 
6, the users in the Panchakanya system with their prior experience 
of canal operation, had similar ideas on water distribution and the 
rehabilitation was based on considerations of these rotational ideas. 
Farmers say that water availability for the system has increased 
more than two-fold. To find out the impact of the lining 
improvement, I measured discharge during July and August 1999 at 
the same point where I had carried out measurement in 1994 
(chapter 3). This location is 1.2km downstream of the intake. 
Comparison of flow at this point and flow entering the headwork 
(there is already a flow measuring gauge at the intake) showed that 
there was no seepage from this zone, where there used to be a 50% 
seepage loss prior to canal improvement work. Canal discharge at 
this location was now always higher than 1000 lps for these 
periods. My previous experience is that during the month of July, 
discharge at this location was never above 465 lps. I did not check 
the discharge in spring, but more than seven-fold increase in spring 
paddy area (Box 9.1) is cleady an indication that there has been a 
substantial increase in springtime water availability. 
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Farmers perception regarding water supply and system operation 
Farmers' perceptions regarding the present supply condition and 
operational pattern are shown in Table 9.1. 81% of the farmers 
believe that water is adequate in the monsoon seasons. The 
percentage saying water is adequate in winter is greater, 85%, as 
irrigation is not important because of lentil cultivation. Only 40% 
of the farmers say that water is adequate in spring, saying water at 
the source as the constraint for this. 
TABLE 9.1 Farmers perceptions of 
Item 
Percentage judging 
supply to be 
adequate during 
Percentage judging 
distribution to be fair 
Main constraints in 
different seasons 
Percentage judging 
supply/operation of 
main system to be 
Monsoon 
Winter 
Spring 
Between 
branches 
Along 
Branches 
Monsoon 
Winter 
Spring 
Acceptable 
Poor 
Percentage judging supply/operation to 
be better compared with five years ago 
Percentage judging supply/operation to 
be same compared with five years ago 
Percentage judging supply/ operation 
to be worse compared with five years 
ago 
water supply 
PIS 
81 
85 
40 
85 
75 
Water 
shortage 
86 
10 
72 
22 
3 
and system operation 
KIS 
48 
8 
15 
66 
60 
Water 
shortage 
Water 
shortage 
Water 
shortage 
83 
10 
10 
68 
15 
NWGIS 
55 
30 
0 
13 
18 
Operation 
Operation 
Operation 
21 
74 
5 
21 
74 
Source: Field Survey and Wallingford, 2001. 
A majority of the farmers believe that the distribution is fair among 
the branch canals (81%) and a little lower percentage (75%) feels it 
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is fair inside the branch canals. This shows that the present practice 
of canal operation is satisfactory to the farmers. At the same time 
almost all the farmers in the command area agree that present 
operation is far better than it was under government management 
(before 1994). The rapid increase in the collection of service fees 
and farmers willingness to contribute to the increasing service fees 
also indicate that the allocation is satisfactory to the farmers. 
The operational plan in Khageri 
The Khageri system requires intensive management input during 
monsoon paddy cultivation, running from July to October, due to 
high fluctuation in the river source. Prior to the joint management 
program in the system (before 1993), water allocation and 
distribution was the responsibility of the CIP. The engineers and 
overseers used to prepare the water distribution schedule in the 
office and the gate operators were responsible for gate operation. 
The gate operators say that there were informal farmer groups in 
branch canals, who used to help implement the designed schedule 
of water distribution. The CIP personnel used to consult these 
groups about the schedule, but large numbers of farmers never 
knew about the distribution schedule. According to farmers, water 
distribution was unequal, those at the head receiving more water 
than the tail-enders. Owing to water shortage, a weekly rotational 
schedule was in practice. 
After the formation of the WUA in 1993, it took control over 
the canal operation from the government I found this the most 
interesting feature of the IMT activities in the Khageri when I 
joined the NLIO in 1994 and got involved in canal operation 
supervision in July 1995: what encouraged the WUA to take over 
the operational responsibility of the main canal at a time when they 
had hardly any knowledge of the system? The MC members later 
on told me that they saw two advantages. First, if they were not 
involved in the main system operation, the MC had hardly any 
other job to do, as the activities inside the branch canals were the 
responsibility of the branch canals. Second, it would give them full 
control over water delivery and there would be no conflict between 
the agency and themselves in matters of water distribution. So, they 
decided that they would make the operational decisions themselves, 
and the CIP gate operators would implement it. Although no 
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agreement was made over it, it became practice for the decisions 
on canal operation to be made by the WUA, while the government 
continued to pay for the cost of operating the main canal. 
The WUA used to base their decision regarding water 
distribution on the recommendation of the canal operators. When I 
became involved in July 1995 - my first involvement in the process 
of joint supervision of canal operation - I was struck by the 
experience of some WUA members. They talked in terms of 'litres', 
'cusecs', and 'centimetre' to denote canal discharge. They told me 
that they developed their knowledge by sharing the experience with 
the gate operators, and from the water measurement training the 
DOI gave to them in 1993. 
There were nine gate operators in the system, six of them from 
within the farming community itself and four who were from 
outside the district, and had been there already for more than 
twenty years. Because the operators were locals and familiar with 
the WUA, it was easier for the WUA to work together with them. 
Four of the operators used to work inside the command area while 
the rest worked in the main canal and in headwork operation. Eight 
of the gate operators were permanent whereas one was on contract 
with the government. In the monsoon season, about equal 
numbers of labourers were hired to support the gate operators. 
In 1996/1997, the WUA formed a canal supervision committee 
to look after canal operation in the main canal. It was co-ordinated 
by the Secretary of the MC and there were three other WUA 
members from three canal sections (the main canal is divided into 
three sections for the purpose of water distribution) and one 
technician from NLIO. The supervision team was converted into 
the main canal work force, the Katyadal, in 1998 and were trained to 
carry out canal operation activities. In Panchakanya, the Katyadal 
were different from the WUA committee members, but here they 
were from within the WUA. The reason was that the three 
members had good knowledge of the system, its constraints and 
the operational rules. They were directly involved in canal 
operation for the last five years. So the MC was interested to 
continue with the same group of people as a work force. They were 
also interested to stay, as the Karyadal were to be paid from the 
government O&M fund of the main canal. 
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Present allocation and distribution 
Presently, the MC decides the water distribution schedule for the 
main canal and the Karyadal implements it. The Karyadal supervise 
the gate operators and the labourers, and are fully responsible for 
the operation of main canal. They visit the different canal sections 
and listen to complaints from the farmers and from the branch 
canal representatives. Any changes in the distribution schedule are 
done upon the recommendation of the Karyadal. They decide the 
type of delivery by measuring the flow depth at Devnagar, which is 
at 9km downstream from the headwork and from which the 
command area starts. The distribution pattern in the Khageri is 
based on the flow available at this section, with three types of 
schedules: 
• Continuous delivery: When the water level is more than 1.8 m at 
the escape structure in Devnagar the cross regulator gates are 
lifted to avoid any obstruction in the canal flow. All the branch 
canal gates are also opened to allow water to entry freely into 
the branch canals. Inside the branches water is rotated among 
the outlets at a seven-day interval. 
• Rotational delivery: When the water level at Devenagar is between 
1.4 to 1.8m, a weekly rotational schedule is practiced on the 
branch canal forming two different groups, each receiving 
supply for seven days. Inside the branch canals, the 
distribution pattern is a section rotation, in which the branch is 
divided into two or three sections depending upon canal length 
and water is rotated accordingly. 
• Section rotational schedule: When water level reduces below 1.4 m 
at Devnagar, sectional rotation is enforced among the branch 
canals. Under this schedule, the main canal is divided into three 
divisions. The first division receives water for four days, the 
second section for five days and the last section for six days. 
Higher days for tail-end areas are meant to compensate for 
more conveyance loss and travel time. Whenever there is 
section rotation, a branch canals also practices section rotation 
inside the branches. The rotational schedule now practiced in 
Khageri is given in Table 9.2 
From the Table 9.2 it can be seen that as the discharge drops in 
the main canal, the delivery pattern also changes. The principle is 
to concentrate the available flow at particular canal section by 
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varying the time, as we saw earlier in Panchakanya. In the first 
pattern, water is plentiful and allowed flowing freely in the canal 
network. In the second pattern, water is rotated between different 
canals within a seven-day interval. As the water availability falls 
further, sectional rotation is applied. In this type of rotation, the 
canals at the first section receive water only after an 11-day interval, 
the middle section receives it at a 10-day interval and those at the 
tail receive after a 9-day interval. 
TABLE 9.2 The changed water distribution schedule in Khageri 
Flow 
regime 
h>1.8 or 
Q>8 
1.4<h<1.8 
or 4<Q<6 
h<1.4or 
Q<4 
Type of 
scheduk in 
MC 
Continuous 
flow to 
branch canals 
Weekly 
rotation 
among the 
branch canals 
Sectional 
rotation 
among the 
branch canals 
Details of schedule 
All branch canal gates are 
opened and no checks 
provided in the X 
regulators 
7-day rotation among the 
branch 
group 1: Bj.Bj.Bs.Dfc, 
group 2: Bi,B2,B4,B6w, Nfe, 
U3M* 
Group 1: Bi3233 for 4 
days 
Group 2: B^fisfitcfij for 
S days 
Group 3:B6„fiiMiM2Mi, 
M, for 6 days 
Schedule inside the 
branch canals 
rotation among 
the outlets 
Sectional 
rotation among 
different canal 
reaches. 
Sectional rotation 
among the oudets 
h is water level expressed in meters and Q is discharge expressed in m3/sec 
The MC functionaries said that they have found the schedule 
effective in ensuring equitable water distribution. Because of the 
uncertainty of water supply at the intake, the MC functionaries 
meet frequently to work out the irrigation schedule matching the 
supply situation at the source with an irrigation schedule based on 
recommendation of the Karyadal. Only the Karyadal has the right to 
adjust the gates (both cross-regular and head regulator). 
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The canal operation inside the branch canal is entirely carried out 
by the concerned BCs. They hire labour for water distribution for 
four months, who are assisted by either the Secretary or Chairman 
of the BC (depends on who is active in that particular branch). The 
distribution among the oudets of the branch canals is made 
according to their allocation from the main canal. Inside the 
outlets, farmer themselves decide on how to divide the water 
among them. Now many branch canals are in the process of 
forming oudet committees for water distribution inside the oudets. 
Only two permanent gate operators remain in the system at 
present, as many took retirement after 2000. The gate operators 
were to be relieved earlier together with the management transfer. 
But the problem was that they were permanent employees and 
there was no provision to relieve them unless they retired by the 
age limit In 2000, the government brought an early retirement 
program with financial incentives, which the gate operators took1. 
The additional labour requirement to operate the main canal is now 
filled temporarily. 
Farmers'perception on canal operation 
The farmers' perception of canal operation and water availability is 
presented in Table 9.1. It shows that the majority of the farmers 
share the view that water is not adequate, identifying the limiting 
supply at the source. The percentages agreeing water to be 
adequate are only 48%, 8% and 15% for monsoon, winter and 
spring season. In chapter 3, I explained that Khageri has a major 
supply problem at the source. As there were no additional sources 
to augment the flow, attempts were made to improve the situation 
through canal lining (chapter 4, 5). The new lining and the 
introduction of the rotational schedule has increased the total 
irrigated area for both main paddy and spring paddy, but the 
changes do not attain the level seen in Panchakanya. 
About 66% of farmers consider distribution to be fair along the 
main canal and 60 % share the same view within the branch canals. 
The higher percentage of farmers agreeing fair distribution along 
the branch compared to those within the branch indicates that the 
MC, through the Karyadal, has been able to maintain a fair 
distribution among the branch canals. The MC had tried several 
options to make branch distribution fair, whereas the branch 
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committee are now implementing strong rotation through the 
newly formed outlet committees and are still to arrive at an 
acceptable delivery pattern. 
At the same time 68% share the view that supply and operation 
has been the same over the last five years. The majority, 83% say 
that the present supply and operation plan is acceptable to them. 
The figures here suggest that operational performance has not 
declined over the years and farmers consider the present allocation 
satisfactory. On the other hand, there are no significant 
improvements in the water availability situation. 
West Gandak 
The Gandak system was designed to provide continuous flow up to 
the tertiary blocks and rotation among the farm ditches. However, 
as explained in chapter 2, it used to run on an ad hoc basis mosdy 
upon the experience of the canal operators. With the handing-over 
of the system in 1997, a new water distribution pattern was 
developed for the system by the consultancy firm involved. The 
main canal was divided into four divisions and each division was 
allocated a fixed water share, as shown in Table 9.3 
TABLE 9.3 Water share for different canal regions in NWGIS 
Region 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Total 
Work 
force 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
Ana 
in ha 
1577 
2883 
1733 
1159 
73522 
Main 
MC 
7 
5 
9 
5 
Canal Offtakes 
Minor Branch 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
-
SFD 
4 
-
1 
1 
Water 
Share /ps 
2016 
2883 
2242 
1300 
8441 
Source: Neupane (1998) 
Water measuring gauge stations were established at the beginning 
of each region to measure the flow, such that a fair share of water 
goes downstream in accordance with the above plan. All branch 
and minor canals inside each region were then supposed to have 
their separate water scheduling arrangement. But according to 
Poudel (1998), water measurement activities were confined to only 
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the first two regions. The WUA say that the operational plan was 
developed only for a few selected canals, and was unclear to them. 
Another proposal by the consultant was to test different rotation 
schedules among the regions when the water shortage occurs as 
shown in Table 9.4. According to this two different types of 
rotation schedule are proposed. In the first arrangement, region 1 
and 3 get water for few days, after which supply is shifted to region 
2 and 4 for the same duration. The rotation cycle is then repeated. 
Upon the second arrangement, region 1 is grouped with region 2, 
and region 3 with 4 for rotation purposes. The period of the 
rotation as well as the type of arrangement (out of two different 
groupings) were to be selected by the farmers testing different 
alternatives and adopting their preferred schedule. 
This Table does not say anything about the conditions under 
which the rotation has to be followed and the delivery plan for 
different branch canals under the rotation. It only says: if the 
discharge is less, test the rotation and adapt the feasible one 
suitable to them. The system thus did not have any delivery pattern 
at the time of handing over, and appropriate delivery patterns had 
to be developed by the WUA over time. 
TABLE 9.4 Typical proposed 
Region / 
rotational schedule 
2 3 4 
First Arrangement 
First turn 
Second turn 
O 
C 
C 
O 
O 
C 
C 
O 
Second Arrangement 
First turn 
Second turn 
O 
C 
O 
C 
C 
O 
C 
O 
O: open; C: Close 
A five-member Karyadal was formed to look after the operation of 
the main canal. The four divisions were made after discussing with 
MC, considering 8km length as the most appropriate for one 
Karyadal member. The main duty of the Karyadal was to carry out 
water distribution activities from the main canal to the branches in 
accordance with the schedule inside their region. The members of 
the Karyadal were selected from among the farming community 
representing each region. A co-ordinator was selected to co-
ordinate the water distribution activities across the regions. The 
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Karyadal were trained on basic rules and regulations of the canal 
operation. They were provided with a bicycle and supposed to be 
supported with additional labourers as required (during busy canal 
operation like in monsoon) in performing their duties. 
For the branch canals, distribution schedules were proposed for 
selected branch canals only and the rest had to rely on their 
judgement and find suitable delivery patterns over time. The 
branch canals were also asked to form a Karyadal to distribute water 
inside the branch canal. According to the WUA, a total of 219 
farmers were trained to work as Karyadal from branch canals. 
But the reality turned out differendy. No new management 
regime could get established in the system, which ran under 'no 
management'. The Karyadal quit the job after few months as they 
were not paid by the WUA. The Karyadal were supposed to be paid 
NRs. 1500 (US$ 22) per month but were not paid by the WUA due 
to lack of funds. As explained in section 9.4, the WUA could not 
establish mechanisms to collect the fees from the farmers and was 
totally dependent on the Government funds provided as part of 
the post turnover support. Part of the funds provided by the 
Government were utilized for paying staff other than the Karyadal 
like - peons, drivers, mechanics, operators and office watchmen. 
Any remaining money after paying these staff was used for cleaning 
the canal. This staff previously worked with the West Gandak 
project office and were now retained for operating the machines. 
They were mostly from the same area and could influence the 
WUA for their job continuity. On the other hand, the project 
officials also wanted them to continue as they had sympathy for 
them. So neither the WUA could generate money from the farmers 
nor were they able to utilize the government fund to pay for the 
Karyadal, who refused to work for the WUA. Once the Karyadallefr, 
nobody was responsible for canal operation in the main canal. 
I spoke to all of these Karyadal members including the co-
ordinator. They had good knowledge of canal networks and 
operational methods, and were very angry with the Board of 
Directors (the previous M Q for not being accountable to the 
farmers. They had even agreed to work for half the amount agreed 
previously, but the Board of Directors did not pay any attention. 
The 'Management Committee' formed later also could not bring 
any change due to lacking funds. The 'Management Committee' 
were regularly paid, but no attention was given to paying the 
Karyadal. They blamed both the Board of Directors and 
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Management Committee for the poor functioning of the main 
canal. Inside the branch canal, there was no single person for water 
distribution as branch KaryadaJilso quit their jobs. 
Another problem with the system's operation was that the 
system maintenance was completely neglected after handing over, 
for lack of a repair and maintenance fund. This resulted in the main 
canal capacity being reduced by sediment build up. According to an 
overseer, the canal discharge in the monsoon paddy season (June-
September) after the first year of transfer itself never exceeded 5 
m3/s. The de-silting in the main canal was carried out just before 
the main paddy season and only part of the head reach section was 
cleaned. The de-silting was done out of the money provided by the 
government as post turnover support. 
The situation deteriorated further in subsequent years. When I 
first arrived into West Gandak in August 1999,1 was ama2ed to see 
the main canal almost filled up with silt. One technician told me 
that the discharge in the main canal was only about 3000 litres per 
second. There was not a single person - except a gate operator at 
the intake of the main canal - to look after water distribution in 
such a large canal network. Whoever wanted water used to 
organize in groups, come to the main canal to divert water into 
their respective branch canals The same situation continued 
throughout my field-work period. 
To establish the volume of flow in the main canal, I carried out 
measurements at the head reach from June to October 2000. The 
maximum discharge in this period never exceeded 2.3m3/ s against 
the design discharge of 8.5m3/ s. This gives an indication of the silt 
deposition in the main canal. Because of the low flow in the main 
canal, the tail-end areas hardly receive any water. The Germi Minor 
at the tail received water only eight times during the whole canal 
operation period in 2000. Confrontations between the head-end 
and tail-end farmers over the distribution of water were common 
in the absence of authority over the water control, with one 
example outlined in Box 9.1. 
Farmers perception on canal operation 
Table 9.1 shows that about 55% of farmers feel water is adequate 
for them during monsoon, and 30% during the winter. Farmers 
think that sediment build up is the main problem. Despite no 
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management arrangements for water control the number of 
farmers considering water to be adequate is high, as the monthly 
water requirement of West Gandak is quite low as compared to its 
design discharge as shown in Table 9.5, which clearly shows why 
this sense of adequacy is possible. 
Box 9.1 Confrontation in Water Distribution 
Once I observed a daily confrontation between the farmers of Germi 
tailend minor and the Nandapur Head-end minor. It was during the 
wheat irrigation season (March 2000), and there was no water flowing 
in the tail portion of the command area. The Nandapur farmers, who 
were at upstream usually blocked the cross-regulator gates to stop 
water flowing downstream and downstream farmers from the Germi 
Minor used to come once the water was blocked to open the gates. As 
soon as these downstream farmers returned back, the Nandapur 
farmers used to close the check gate again. Sometimes there were 
verbal confrontations between these two groups. 
Once the Nandapur farmers lowered down the cross gate and 
dismanded the gate structure such that it became impossible for the 
downstream farmers to lift it again. Farmers from Nandapur made 
several efforts to lift the gate but failed. In the field, I could see that if 
the Germi farmers did not get water within the next few days, the 
crop could die. One day, we were returning from the Germi minor 
and saw hundreds of farmers to trying to lift the gate, but without any 
success. This time we could not stand back. I knew that the project 
office has equipment to lift the heavy gate. I talked with the 
technicians there, and succeeded in getting the lifting device at the 
site. The check gate was lifted and fixed at the top. After five days, the 
Nandapur farmers had again succeeded in moving the gate down, 
blocking the water again. The crop was saved but the problem 
remained the same. 
Such incident were frequent in the area. There was neither rule nor 
the person to carryout the water distribution. Fanners used to 
describe the situation as " who has the stick owns the buffalo. 
As can be seen from the Table 9.5, the monthly water requirement 
is far less as compared to its capacity of 8500 lps. The discharge of 
2300 lps in the monsoon period and that of 1400 lps in winter 
season can still meet about 50% of the water demand for these 
seasons. The balance can be provided from groundwater. In spring, 
nobody says that they have adequate water. The reason is that in 
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April, the barrage is closed for operation by the Indian Authorities 
for about a month for the purpose of maintenance. My experience 
in Khageri and Panchakanya was that farmers were very sensitive in 
water distribution arrangements. But here nobody - the farmers, 
WUA or the technicians - were concerned in the delivery schedule 
and operational plan. 
/ 
2.0 
TABLE 9.5 Water requirement in m3/« in West Gandak 
F M A M Ju J! Ag S 0 N 
3.0 3.1 4.5 3.1 5.8 5.8 2.3 5.3 6.0 1.4 
D 
2.0 
Source: Silt Consult (1989), Neupane (1998) 
From the Table 9.1 it is also seen that only 13% of the farmers see 
distribution from the main canal and 18% from the branch canal as 
fair. This low percentage despite the other higher percentage 
agreeing that water is adequate, shows the lack of a distribution 
mechanism in the system. A majority of the farmers say that the 
supply and operation is worse than five years ago when the system 
was Government-run. 
9.2 Canal Maintenance 
Panchakanya 
Maintenance in the PIS involves cleaning out canals and reservoirs, 
greasing and fixing gates and the maintenance and repair of 
damaged structures. The cleaning of the reservoir is not a regular 
activity: the WUA cleaned it once after the handover using the 
heavy machine provided by the DOI in an operation worth NRs 
170,000 raised by the WUA itself. According to the WUA, the 
construction of the silt flushing escapes during the previous 
rehabilitation has stopped further siltation of the reservoir. 
The MC prepares the annual plan for maintenance activities. 
Before such planning, the main committee inspects the whole 
command area and discusses with the concerned BC about the 
maintenance requirement. The MC then prepares the maintenance 
plan and puts it before the GA for the approval. Usually the plan 
prepared by the MC is approved by the GA. The review of the 
WUA maintenance plan since the handing-over shows that the 
maintenance activities only include cleaning of the main and branch 
Changing Irrigation Management Practices 269 
canals. Since the canal lining and gates are newly rehabilitated, there 
has been no maintenance cost involved in maintaining them so far. 
Instead, much of the expenditure has been on the expansion of the 
command area by constructing new canals and structures. The 
expenditure and activities carried out in each fiscal year are shown 
in Table 9.6. The activities included here are only those beyond the 
regular canal cleaning activities. 
TABLE 9.6 WUA expenditure in maintenance and expansion 
FY Activities . WUA Expenditure 
1997/1998 2km new canal construction, repair of Rs.52,297 
500 m canal section, 
1998/1999 Reservoir cleaning, new RCC lininglOm Rs.103,514 
1999/2000 10 numbers of additional gates in main Rs216,016 
canal outlets, reservoir cleaning, 
2000/2001 Pipes for Road crossing, change of gate Rs86,392 
configuration 
Source WUA records 
The high expenditure in 2001 is due to the greater outlay in 
cleaning the reservoir. The Table shows that additional 
construction activities are still going on. During my field-work, I 
was struck when I saw several new gates being installed by the 
WUA. During the previous rehabilitation, we had not provided 
gates in the 10 outlets considering them to be small, and able to be 
closed when needed by the farmers using mud. But the WUA 
found it necessary to put the gates to maintain the rotational 
schedule, as they found water theft when closed the outlets by the 
mud and grass. 
The current maintenance status and farmers'perception 
The result of the asset survey (Table 9.7) shows that the system has 
been maintained well after the transfer. About 10% of structures 
have minor defects requiring maintenance, and about 8% of the 
main canal was found defective requiring cleaning. The defect in 
the structure was a joint crack in the under-ground pipe section. 
Inside the branch canals, the percentage of defective structures is 
higher: 22%. This shows that maintenance in the branch canals is 
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neglected more than at the main level. The reason is that 
maintenance responsibility of the branch canal also lies with the 
MC, which is more focused on the main system. The farmers inside 
the branch are also said to give priority to main system 
maintenance, as problems insides the branch canals are considered 
not serious enough to affect the flow in the canal. This level of 
maintenance requirement can be expected, as the asset survey was 
done in August, by which the canal had already been running for 
more than six months continuously. 
TABLE 9.7 Summary of infrastructure condition (from Asset Survey) 
Schemes 
PIS 
KIS 
NWGIS 
System 
Level 
Main 
Branch 
Main 
Branch 
Main 
Branch 
Structures 
defective 
10 
22 
23 
14 
36 
40 
Structures 
requiring 
Maintenance 
r/») 
10 
22 
21 
11 
16 
23 
Structures 
requiring 
Improvement 
0 
0 
2 
3 
20 
17 
Canal length 
defective 
M 
8 
12 
13 
23 
52 
54 
Source: Wallingford (2001) and field survey 
Interviews with the farmers also gave similar results regarding the 
system condition, and their perception about system maintenance 
is presented in Table 9.8. About 88% of the farmers consider main 
canal condition good or reasonable, where as only 68% consider 
the condition of the branch canal good or reasonable. Farmers 
agree that there has been significant improvement in the main canal 
maintenance status over the years, where as fanners agreeing the 
improvement in the branch canal has been less as compared to the 
main canal. 
Khageri 
The responsibility for branch canal maintenance lies with the 
concerned WUA, and that for main canal lies joindy with the 
NLIO and MC. According to the MC, they share 15% of the cost 
of main canal maintenance with the NLIO. This mostly involves 
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cleaning out the main canal, greasing and fixing of the gates and 
structure protection works. In the branch canal, the maintenance 
mosdy involves cleaning the canal as the newly lined canals have 
been in any need of maintenance so far. 
TABLE 9.8 Farmers 
Assessment of condition 
Percentage of farmers considering 
Main 
Branch/Secondary 
Field Channels 
Conditions compared 
condition better 
Main 
Branch/secondary 
Held channels 
Conditions compared 
condition same 
Main 
Branch/Secondary 
Field Channels 
Conditions compared 
condition worse 
Main 
Branch/Secondary 
Field Channels 
with 
with 
with 
five 
five 
five 
perception on canal conditions 
PIS ns bWGIS 
current condition good or reasonable 
88 69 
72 88 
90 68 
years ago. Percentage 
82 7 
43 14 
14 9 
years ago. Percentage 
14 63 
50 72 
80 68 
years ago. Percentage 
4 25 
7 8 
6 7 
28 
26 
38 
considering current 
0 
0 
0 
considering current 
24 
19 
30 
considering current 
76 
81 
52 
Maintenance status 
Maintenance is not well done 
Better or same as compared 
five years 
Work now is worse 
to 
20 50 
75 44 
0 50 
81 
34 
65 
Source: Wallingford (2001) and field survey 
The asset survey (Table 9.7) shows that about 23% of the canal 
structures and 13% of the canal section in the main canal are 
defective. However, out of 23% defective structures, only 2% 
require improvement and the rest require maintenance. Likewise 
inside the branch canals, 14% of the structures are found defective, 
out of which 11% require maintenance and 3% require 
improvement The defective canal length in the branch canal is 
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23%, higher than in the main canal. The structural defects both in 
the main canal and branch canals mosdy involve scour around 
structures. As this situation does not affect the flow in the canal, it 
has been neglected by the WUA. The high percentage of defective 
structures in the main canal compared to the canal condition 
reflects that Government funds provided for maintenance are 
insufficient. 
The problem in the canal sections is mostly weaker bank 
sections and weed growth at the banks in both main and branch 
canals. These defects were not affecting the hydraulic performance 
(no obstruction to the flow of water) and thus have been ignored 
by the farmers. At the time the survey was carried out, the canals 
had already been running for about 2 months and minor problems 
were bound to occur as the period is the main rainy season. 
The survey was carried out in Bi, Bs and Mi in which 
improvements were completed by June 1996. The survey shows 
that over the 4 years period, the condition of the canal and 
structures has not deteriorated. This is also reflected by farmers' 
perceptions (Table 9.8). In Khageri, 69% of the farmers consider 
the present condition of the main canal good, the percentage for 
the branch canal is 88%. A majority of the farmers also feels that 
system condition has remained the same over the years. However, 
while 50% of farmers share the view that maintenance is not done 
properly, the same percentage say it is done properly. A majority of 
farmers say that they help to clean the branch and field canals (75% 
and 67%). However only 39% of the farmers feel that maintenance 
was adequate last year. 
There are no major constraint in the system presently. 
Wallingford (2001) notes that maintenance (by farmers) does not 
constraint operations at present, nor is likely to do so for the next 
few years. But maintenance has been deferred, especially at the 
main canal. 
West Gandak 
Maintenance tasks in West Gandak are challenging, requiring both 
financial and technical resources. The major maintenance activity is 
the de-silting of the main canal and of branch canal systems. As 
explained in chapter 6, a silt ejector was constructed to control silt 
entry in the canal system. But it could not work as designed due to 
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poor location of the structure. The requirement for canal desilting 
has thus remained same. 
All of the farmers interviewed agreed if the silt in the canal were 
cleared properly, more than 50% of the problem in the West 
Gandak system would be solved. It is estimated that about 800,000 
rupees are required annually to clean up the main canal. Likewise, 
cleaning of branch canals also requires same amount of money in 
total. The cleaning activity requires heavy equipment like 
excavators and dump trucks, but available machines in the systems 
are old and require maintenance regulady. Under the agreement 
with the government, the equipments were supposed to be 
transferred to the WUA which was not done, due to agency 
concerns explained in chapter 7. But use of the machinery have 
been provided to the WUA. 
Another major problem with the system is flooding, which 
occasionally causes heavy damage to canal networks. The 
magnitude of flood damage is often beyond the WUA capacity. 
For the smooth operation of the systems, the repair of canal 
breaches needs immediate action. On average, it requires about 
Rs.l million annually to solve this problem. Under the Indo-Nepal 
Agreement, the drainage channels and associated structures are to 
be maintained by the Indian Authority looking after the barrage. 
However, the quality of their maintenance has been poor, they only 
remove weeds from the channels. 
Beyond these two problems, it is also required to maintain a 
large numbers of structures like canal siphons and other water 
delivery structures. These also require about 1.5 million rupees 
annually. These figures suggest that the system needs more than 3.5 
million rupees annually, or about Rs. 400 per ha for O&M (see 
annex 3). The cost does not involve cost for future rehabilitation 
(which is supposed to be carried out by the government with a 
fixed percentage of farmers' contribution). After the hand-over, it 
was agreed that part of the cost would be provided by the 
government as a post turnover support, and part of it would be 
generated by WUA through ISF and other resources. However, 
WUA resource generation did not take place and Government 
funds were insufficient to maintain the system. This resulted in 
continuous system deterioration. 
The only maintenance activity carried out since the handover in 
the West Gandak is maintenance of the service road and desilting 
of part of the head reach of the main canal. These are also 
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performed out of the fund provided by the government. The rest 
of the maintenance activities in the main canal and inside the 
branch canal are overlooked. The maintenance activity is so 
neglected that even minor problems have now become major 
problem in the system. One such incident is described in Box 9.2. 
Box 9.2 Neglect of maintenance 
Once I observed a small breach in the Bishnuganj branch canal. It was 
in February, the winter irrigation season. The location of the breach was 
about 1.3km downstream from its intake point with the main canal. The 
canal was drawing a small discharge (about 200 Ips) at the time and if 
the flowing water were not stopped, it could induce larger damage. I 
was thinking that it would be solved by evening. When I came to the 
place the next day, I was surprised to see that the canal was not closed 
and the section had breached many times more than the day before. 
Back in office, I told the situation to the WUA manager. He told me 
that he had no money to get it repaired. I thought that the whole 
section could collapse next day if the canal is not closed. I again visited 
the place next day. This time, the whole canal section had collapsed! 
This branch is the largest branch in the system and the MC 
Chairman is also from this branch. In the following rainy season, the 
section was further damaged and this time the canal service road was 
also washed out blocking any movement along the canal. The canal 
section is not repaired yet The service area below this point, about 
1000 ha, has not received irrigation water since then. 
The repair of the canal section now requires about a million rupees. 
If the water in the canal had been stopped on the first day it would have 
needed only two labourers to repair the bund. There are several places 
where the clean-up and repair of the canal and bunds have not been 
done. The WUA simply have no funds to do it problem. The 
accountability of WUA towards the farmers does not exist here. 
The present maintenance status 
One can estimate the situation in West Gandak on the basis of the 
above discussions. The result of the asset survey (Table 9.7) shows 
36% of the structures in the main canal and 40% in the branch 
canal to be defective. Of the defective structures in the main canal, 
16% require maintenance and 20% require improvement In the 
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branch canal, 23% require maintenance and 17% require 
improvement. The identified problems -with the structures both in 
the main canal and branch canal concern scour around structures, 
damage of protection works and cracks in structures. The damage 
is mostly due to floods, rather than ageing. However, the structures 
are still in a position to deliver water. But failure to correct the 
defects will inevitably bring failure to the structures in the future. 
The asset survey also shows that the condition of the canals is 
worse as compared to the structures. The percentages of defective 
length in the main and canal and branch canal are 52% and 54% 
respectively. The problems identified are sediment build up and 
slippage of the canal embankment. These problems have arisen due 
to lack of routine maintenance. This indicates that problems inside 
the branch canals can still be improved with farmers' own effort: 
but unless conditions in the main system are improved, it will be 
meaningless for the fanners to initiate improvement inside the 
branch canal. 
Farmers' perception on maintenance (Table 9.8) also shows 
similar results. Percentages of farmers agreeing the present 
condition of the canal is reasonable are 28%, 26%, and 38% for 
main, branch and tertiary channels respectively. Nobody agrees that 
the system condition is better than before and a majority (76%, 
81% and 52% for main branch and tertiary canals) say the situation 
has worsened compared to five years ago. 
9.3 Financial Sustainability 
A major objective of irrigation management reform in Nepal is to 
develop financially viable local organization to finance future 
system operation and maintenance. This section studies practices 
and mechanisms in achieving financial sustainability, and shows 
how they are shaped by accountability of the WUAs in delivering 
water services and in financial administration, and legal and policy 
support from the government 
Fanchakanya 
The collection of the ISF in Panchakanya was started in 1995, 
immediately after the formation of the WUA. The rate of the ISF 
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was Rs. 60 per ha per year, which was the Water Tax rate of the 
Government. Prior to this, there was no collection of the ISF but 
farmers used to provide voluntary contribution of 3 labour days 
per ha to clean the main canal once in a year, with minimum of 
lday contribution for those having less than 0.35 ha of land. 
Cleaning and maintaining the branch canals and tertiary canals was 
again carried by the concerned BCs mobilizing voluntary labour. 
The ISF was increased to Rs. 90 per ha per year in Sept 1996 by 
the WUA. There were two reasons for this. First, most of the canal 
sections were lined and repairing and maintaining them would 
require cash. Likewise, the gates were to receive greasing from time 
to time for their smooth operation. From their experience, the ISF 
of Rs. 60 per ha was not going to be enough. Second, many 
farmers used to send aged persons or children t to clean the main 
canal, as working age groups were out in search of jobs or 
education. Mobilizing people was another problem. The Chairman 
told me once that some farmers work only three to four hours a 
day and he had to shout and run after them all the day. Many 
farmers raised concerns that the voluntary contribution was not 
equal, some working more than others 
Immediately after handing over the system in December 1997, 
the ISF rate was again increased and another service fee, the canal 
maintenance fee, was introduced. The ISF was increased to Rs. 150 
per ha for rice and Rs. 75 for other crops. The maintenance fee was 
separated from the ISF such that it would be used only for the 
cleaning and maintenance of the main canal. This fee of Rs. 300 
per ha per year was collected against the three labour contributions 
to be made by the farmers. The canal maintenance fee was 
introduced so that the WUA could clean and maintain the main 
canal employing hired labourers expecting better quality of work. 
However, the WUA decided that the labourers would be hired only 
from among the member farmers. This provision was done so that 
money would remain within the farming community and needy 
farmers would benefit by this policy. Outside labours were to be 
hired only if the local farmers were not available. 
According to local farmers, the quality of maintenance work in 
the main canal improved a lot after this new arrangement With the 
improved quality of the work at the main canal, the branch canal 
users also preferred to do the same. Instead of cleaning the branch 
canals through voluntary labour, they also decided to clean up the 
branch canals by collecting money at the rate of Rs.150 per ha: this 
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started from 1999. A farmer with 1 ha of land in Panchakanya now 
pays Rs. 600 ($ 8.0, at 2001 prices) per ha if he cultivates two rice 
crops (300 for the maintenance and another Rs 300 as ISF) or Rs 
525 if he cultivates rice and one other crop (Rs 300 as maintenance 
fee and 225 as ISF). 
The different types of fees and their collection over time in 
Panchakanya are shown in the Table 9.9. The membership fee is 
Rs.10 and has to be renewed annually where as the share fee is Rs 
90 per ha and is to be paid only once and does not need to be 
renewed. The other sources include grants if any provided by the 
NGO, fees paid by researchers3 and any other incomes. It also 
includes the entry fee paid by newcomers. The high amount of 
other sources in FY 1997/1998 and 1998/1999 have been due to 
the entry of large numbers of new farmers, who were charged of 
Rs. 500 for entry in the WUA. They were charged high amount of 
entry fees as they were not involved in paying contributions in the 
system rehabilitation program. 
TABLE 9.9 Fee collection 
Types of Fee 
Membership/ 
Share fee 
ISF 
Canal MT 
Fines/ 
Penalties 
Other sources 
Total 
1995/ 
1996 
5.45 
12.87 
4.62 
10.71 
33.65 
1996/ 
1997 
27.89 
22.07 
16.33 
66.29 
in NRs 000 in the 
1997/ 
1998 
15.27 
42.87 
82.98 
47.88 
189.01 
1998/ 
1999 
13.43 
51.25 
74.68 
67.37 
206.74 
Panchakanya. 
1999/ 
2000 
10.26 
63.09 
85.08 
15.70 
8.00 
182.14 
2000/ 
2001 
10.49 
75.98 
119.28 
6.17 
5.59 
217.53 
Source: WUA records (as per October 2001). * system handed over 
From the Table 9.9 it can be seen that total income of the WUA 
has increased almost six fold in 2000/2001 since the beginning of 
the collection in 1995/1996. Of the different fees, the ISF and the 
maintenance fees are the two permanent sources of the WUA. The 
Table also shows that there has been an increase by almost 15 
times in the total collection of these fees combined together. 
The WUA now claims that 450 ha are under irrigation in 
monsoon paddy. However, only 360 ha (80%) has obtained the 
share and membership of the WUA, and of this, only 259 ha paid 
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ISF for the monsoon rice in 2000/2001. That is, the collection 
efficiency is only 59% for monsoon rice. The WUA say that many 
farmers in the monsoon paddy evade paying ISF saying that they 
do not use the canal water. Because of the excess rainfall and land 
characteristics described in chapter 3, evading ISF in monsoon rice 
is possible. The WUA demands that unless the government brings 
a new law attaching the ISF with other fees, it is not possible to 
increase the collection efficiency of the ISF. According to the 
WUA, collection for winter and the dry crops has never been a 
problem, as the irrigated fields are visible to the eye. Upon failure 
to pay the ISF, the WUA can easily apply sanctions to the farmer as 
spring crops, especially paddy, can not grow without irrigation. The 
collection efficiency for winter and dry crops has always been 
100%. 
Despite the problems of collection in the monsoon season, the 
changes in fee collection are encouraging. The question now is 
what makes the Panchakanya farmers agree to pay more for 
irrigation? There are three reasons for this. The main reason is the 
increase in the irrigated area in spring season (see Box 9.3) 
especially paddy. Earlier they used to grow spring maize under rain-
fed conditions instead of early paddy. Second, the canal 
maintenance activities are carried out by hiring the labourers from 
within the member community. Thus the needy farmers can work 
and take back the money they paid earlier and can even earn more. 
The third reason is the transparency maintained by the WUA. The 
income and expenditure of the WUA are always presented and 
discussed in the GA meeting once in a year. Likewise the annual 
maintenance plans are also discussed and passed by the GA 
meeting. Though there is not much discussion or questions on the 
agenda prepared by the MC, this process has made farmers believe 
that things are going well within the WUA. There is also annual 
auditing by an external auditor whose report is made open in the 
GA meeting4. 
Another question is whether the Panchakanya is financially self-
sustaining to carry out future O&M activities. My own estimate for 
the O&M cost in the Panchakanya is Rs.l 80,000, that is Rs. 400 per 
ha (J 5.4 at 2001 exchange rate) assuming a command area of 450 
ha. That is, the present collection rate is already higher than 
required. If the WUA is able to increase the ISF collection 
efficiency for monsoon paddy and the maintenance cost, then its 
current rate can be decreased. If the rate is kept constant and the 
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efficiency is increased, the WUA would be in a position to finance 
the part of the rehabilitation cost in the future. 
Khageri 
In Khageri, the O&M cost of the main canal is the responsibility of 
the government. There is an understanding that the WUA will bear 
15% of this cost. Besides this, decisions regarding canal operation, 
including the main canal, are carried out by the WUA. The 
responsibility for fee collection lies with the BC, and the MC is 
entitled to receive 20% of the collection from the branch canals. 
The WUA is also required to pay the Government 25% of its 
collection according to Irrigation Policy5. But this has not been 
done in the Khageri so far, and the government has no asked for it. 
The collection of ISF in Khageri is only for one crop, monsoon 
rice except for Bi and part of B2 where early paddy is cultivated. 
The spring and winter crops are cultivated under rain-fed 
conditions. The ISF rate is Rs. 60 per ha per crop and collection 
was started from 1993/1994. Before this, farmers were not paying 
any service charge to the government, though under the law, they 
were supposed to pay Rs. 60 per ha per crop. 
Beside the ISF, each branch canal carries out the canal cleaning 
and desilting work employing voluntary labour. The rule for this is 
different from branch to branch, but the average rate is 3 days 
labour per ha of land as in the case of Panchakanya. The ISF 
collection over the years in Khageri is given in Table 9.10. It can be 
seen from the Table that there has not been any increase in the ISF 
rate and its collection. 
The unwillingness of the Khageri WUA to increase the rate of 
ISF is due to two reasons. The first is that maintenance cost for the 
main canal is to be provided by the Government and farmers have 
to pay only 15% of the cost. This cost is collected from different 
branch canals whenever required. The branch canals thus need to 
collect what is required to maintain their respective branch canals. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Khageri branch canals are 
constructed in well-defined ridges without any cross drainage 
structures and the command area is safe from flooding and 
inundation. Inside the whole command area of 3900 ha, there is 
only one aqueduct6 (in Bi). Likewise, there are no check or cross 
regulators inside the command area that are needed to operate and 
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maintain. Except the Bi, all the canal networks run only for four 
months in a year. 
TABLE 9.10 ISF collection in Khageri over the years. 
Year 
1993/1994 
1994/1995 
1995/1996 
1996/1997 
1997/1998 
1998/1999 
1999/2000 
2000/2001 
ISFinNRs 
89,474 
107,213 
92,638 
105,316 
126,794 
93,731 
96,355 
Ongoing 
Collection efficiency1 
53.2% 
63.81% 
55.14% 
62.68% 
75.47% 
55.8% 
57.16% 
Source: WUA records. 
Thus the O&M requirement of these branch canals is very low as 
there are no major structures to operate and maintain. The only 
maintenance task that a branch canal has to carry out is cleaning 
and reshaping the canal and cleaning weeds. The cleaning is done 
once in a year before the start of the monsoon season and is done 
by employing labour contributions as mentioned above. The 
cleaning of the tertiary canals below the branch canals are again 
done by the farmers themselves - a tradition since the construction 
of the system in 1967. Considering the maintenance requirement of 
the branch canal, the present rate of the ISF has been found 
sufficient. 
In the Fiscal Year (1997/1998) the GA of the Khageri decided 
to double the ISF from Rs 60 to Rs 120 per ha. I was present in 
this meeting and there was a heated discussion on this. The GA 
and the MC had decided to increase the rate, considering that they 
would take over the main system management in future and this 
rate increase was in preparation for this. At the time of this GA 
meeting, there was an agreement with the government and the 
WUA about constructing a new lift system for augmenting the 
Khageri canal (see chapter 7) such that its monsoon crops would 
be guaranteed and at the same time it could irrigate in winter and 
spring season. Under the agreement, the WUA had to takeover the 
O&M cost of the proposed lift scheme too: hence the move to 
increase the ISF. 
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However, the branch canals, who were the actual collector of the 
ISF were not convinced by the argument Many fanners believed 
that they were cheated by the government in the Saguntole issue. 
They said they would not accept the increased cost just to be 
prepared for a future they were unsure about. Another reason for 
their objection was that out of the collection, they had to give 20 % 
to the main committee and 25% to the government. Though they 
had not given any money to the government so far, they had to 
prepare for this. Payment to the Government was also not clear, 
whether they should pay on the basis of the Government rate of 
Rs. 60 per ha or on the basis of the new rate. If they were to pay on 
the basis of new rate, why should they collect more just to give it to 
the MC and the Government? 
So efforts to increase the ISF could not materialize in practice. 
On the other hand, I observed a new rift between the BC and the 
MC regarding the payment to the MC during my fieldwork in 2000. 
The BCs are now saying that the MC should not collect 20% from 
their collection. Their reason is that since main canal O&M is 
financed by the government, and the contribution to be made by 
the MC to this is also paid by the BCs, the MC has no right to 
collect the 20% from them. The MC share of 20% is mostly for 
administrative cost, including the payment to office Secretary and 
clerk employed by the WUA, printing, holding GA meetings and 
other likely expenditures. The BCs feel that the MC should bear its 
administrative cost mobilizing other resources like the forest and 
land resources handed over by the government rather than fees 
paid by the BCs. Since 1999/2000, the MC has not been able to 
collect its share from the branch canals. 
However, farmers share the view that collected money is spent 
fairly. Both MC and the BCs submit their income and expenditure 
to the concerned GA. But unlike Panchakanya, there is no annual 
maintenance plans here, as inside the branch canals, the 
maintenance is so far only for canal cleaning and there is no need 
to plan for it. For the main canal, the Government allocation is not 
based on what is needed in the system. Though the engineer 
looking after the Khageri told me that he makes a plan with the 
WUA before submitting the budget proposal with the government, 
the amount they get is always less than they asked for. The financial 
expenditures of the WUA here too are audited by the registered 
auditor and its reports are made public in GA meetings. From my 
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previous experience and present observation, I have never heard of 
any financial irregularities inside the WUA. 
Problems in fee collection 
The data in Table 9.10 show that the collection in the Khageri is 
around 60%. The major problem in collecting the ISF is the same 
as in Panchakanya: many farmers evade it by saying that they do 
not need the canal water. The WUA complain that because of the 
excess rainfall, it is practically not possible to monitor who is using 
the canal water and who is not in the middle and lower terraces. 
The BC here also told me that unless the issue is addressed legally, 
the collection of the ISF is not going to be increased. 
During July and August 2000 and 2001,1 observed this problem 
in Bi, because it had all types of field the Tandi, the Ghol (see 
chapter 3) and the land in between. I found that 44 bigba (29 ha) of 
land did do not need canal water and had access to drainage water 
in both years, whereas 257 bigba (170 ha) relied totally on canal 
water. The rest had access to water from the higher fields. 
According to the WUA, most farmers belonging to this group 
evade paying the ISF. The ISF collection records agree with my 
finding: only about 185 ha has been paying the ISF in Bi since 
1994. 
The branch canals in the Khageri also face a similar problem to 
Panchakanya in mobilizing voluntary labour for cleaning the canals. 
A process has begun here too to collect money to clean the branch 
canals, instead of labour mobilization. The Mi, at the tail end, 
collected Rs. 300 per ha starting from 2000 for the cleaning of the 
canal, separate from the ISF. The B7 Chairman also told me that 
they have decided to collect a maintenance fee, as in Mi. The Mi 
case has attracted attention from other BCs too, who think to do 
likewise. In Mi, because of the presence of large numbers of ex-
Army persons, mostly from the British Army, the maintenance fee 
collection worked quite well. The Secretary told me that the 
amount collected was more than required and they have put 
surplus in their bank account. It remains to be seen in Khageri how 
this expands into other branch canals. 
The Khageri also shows a policy void in the Nepal's 
management reform program, and how the large systems benefit 
from this policy weakness. The policy states that only systems 
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lower than 2000 ha would be transferred to a WUA. It is silent on 
who would pay the cost of larger canal networks, and is considered 
as the Government's job by the farmers. This has led to a situation 
where large systems are still subsidized and farmers pay low costs 
while in smaller systems farmers have to pay more for irrigation 
water. For example in Khageri farmers are paying Rs. 60 per ha per 
crop and are contributing about Rs. 100 worth of voluntary labour, 
whereas farmers are paying as high as Rs. 600 per ha in 
Panchakanya. 
The intention of the policy behind separating the area limit is 
that larger systems are technically complicated and the 
Government has to continue with their management But the cost 
of system operation and maintenance per hectare generally does 
not depend on the scale of the system but on its system 
environment. The cost per ha in large gravity irrigation systems is 
usually less than the smaller systems (personal experience), but 
larger systems are more subsidized than the smaller ones. This 
factor so far has been overlooked but is slowly getting attention. 
Some farmers already raised this issue in Panchakanya. Instead of 
separating the management domain by area, the policy should have 
made a provision that the O&M cost has to be borne by the users. 
Then users should be given the choice about which part of the 
system they wanted to take, and which part they wanted to 
continue under Government management, but with their payment. 
West Gandak 
The resource mobilization in. NWGIS has remained poor. There 
has been neither increase in ISF-collection, nor any progress to 
mobilize funds from other resources transferred from the 
Government. These failures can be attributed to the lack of proper 
mechanism within the WUA to collect the ISF, as well as conflict 
and corruption within the WUA. 
Unlike Khageri, the West the West Gandak is fully transferred 
system. That is, its O&M has to be born by the WUA out of the 
system: so I first explain the O&M requirements and the plan at 
the time of handing over to meet these costs. 
I found no documents/study reports regarding actual 
requirements for O&M costs in West Gandak. In both Khageri 
and Panchakanya too, we did not have any studies of this but for 
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different reasons. In Panchakanya, the WUA was one step ahead of 
us, in deciding the ISF and collecting maintenance fees to get 
prepared for the future. In Khageri, the main canal was to be 
managed by the Government: maintenance of the branch canals 
was simple and done through voluntary contribution. But for 
systems like West Gandak having such challenging operational and 
maintenance requirements, clear planning for the future 
management should have been prepared and agreed upon. 
In 2000, at the time of the asset survey, I estimated costs for 
actual O&M requirement, which is Rs. 400 per ha (considering the 
command area of 8700 ha). This does not include the cost of 
repairing the flood control dykes which should be separated from 
canal O&M. This cost also does not include the cost involved in 
cleaning the lower order canals like the SFDs and MFDs, which is 
done by the farmers themselves. This is in agreement with other 
studies for Terai schemes8. The WUA executives, the DOI and 
consultants thought the forest and transferred properties would 
generate most of this cost But according to the local people, the 
forest and other resource could provide Gandak about Rs. 600 
thousand a year. This means, the Gandak farmers were still 
required to generate Rs. 2,900,000 (see annex 3) through the ISF 
collection. 
On the other hand, there was less possibility of bearing part of 
this cost by contributing voluntary labour like in Khageri for two 
reasons. First, because of the larger canal section and heavy annual 
sedimentation, cleaning of the main canal and the branch canals 
requires heavy machinery. Secondly, there is no tradition of 
collective effort in cleaning canals in the past9. 
Despite no proper transfer protocols, the government had said 
that It'would provide Rs: 850,000 (chapter 7) annually for three 
years as post turnover support to the WUA. Even with this 
government support, and expected resource collection from 
transferred properties, the WUA still needed to collect Rs.2, 0 
50,000. They were thus required to pay Rs.235 per ha (assuming 
8700 ha command area) at the beginning and increase it to Rs. 330 
per ha after withdrawal of government support. 
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The reality 
In fact the WUA could neither increase the ISF rate nor improve 
its collection efficiency. Collection from other sources also declined 
due to financial irregularities and corruption. As usual, the 
Government remained the sole financier of O& M cost of the 
system. The resource contribution by the government and the 
collection of the internal resources by the WUA is presented in 
Table 9.11. In the Table, government contribution is presented 
only after 1997/1998, that is, after the handing-over of the system's 
management. Before this, rehabilitation activities were ongoing and 
operation and maintenance costs were not separated. There has 
been no financial audit in the WUA since 1999/2000, thus the 
collection from other resources after this could not be established. 
I observed that collection from forests (sale of wood), road tax and 
land tax still goes on, but details are not available. The WUA say 
that this collection level is along the same lines as in 1998/1999. 
TABLE 9.11 Resource Mobilization in NRs. 000 by WUA of NWGIS 
Year Govt. Fund ISF Forest Road Land 
for O&M Resources Taxes Taxes 
inNRS
 Collection (%) 
1993/ 
1994 
1994/ 
1995 
1995/ 
1996 
1996/ 
1997 
1997/ 
1998 
1998/ 
1999 
1999/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2001 
850.00 
1,250.00 
1,600.00 
1,700.00 
124.44 
87.05 
98.40 
185.66 
97.34 
29.89 
0 
0 
21.5 
15.08 
17.05 
32.17 
16.86 
5.18 
0 
0 
143.40 
65.72 
62.67 
43.73 
37.20 
16.22 
Source: NWGIS project office and WUA Audit Reports 
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The data for the ISF in the year 1993/1994 also includes the 
collection of 1992/1993. I consider the initial ISF collection 
encouraging, as in the first year of the WUA formation itself, about 
21% of farmers were paying despite lack of membership 
documents and water use planning. However, after that there was 
neither increase in rate nor in collection efficiency of ISF. There 
was slight increase in the FY 1996/1997, just before the handover 
but for different reasons analyzed later. 
There are several reasons for the poor fee collection in the West 
Gandak. These include lack of transparency and accountability, lack 
of policy and regulations regarding maintenance cost recovery in 
the legal framework, lack of mechanisms to collect the ISF and 
poor service delivery. 
Three have been reports of financial irregularities and even cases 
of corruption within the WUA in recent years. The principal 
scandal is with the forest resource. Under the transfer agreement, 
the WUAs were allowed to sell the dead and broken trees along the 
canal embankment. In 1998, just after turnover, the WUA hired a 
contractor to manage the forest resources. The contractor paid Rs. 
105,000 as part of its deposit to sell the forest materials. However, 
the government objected to the hiring of the contractor: according 
to the community forestry rule, the forest resources were to be sold 
only to community members, and a contractor should not have 
been involved. The contractor was relieved from the job later on, 
but there was no record of how much he generated from the 
pruned forest materials. 
After this, the selected board members were assigned to look 
after sale of the forest materials. However, only a fraction of the 
money earned out of this was deposited in the WUA bank account! 
The audit report for fiscal year 197/1998 shows that the Rs, 
178,000 from sale of forest materials was not deposited in the 
bank. The matter was then brought to the DAO and the DFO. An 
enquiry was made to find out who had not deposited the money 
from the forest sale, but without resolution. Actually, 19 persons 
were involved in the selling forest, and it was unclear who was 
responsible at what level for the irregularities. The persons 
involved in this sale told that the villagers used to take away trees 
without their notice during the night and early morning. They 
claimed that it was not them who cut and sold the forest. Farmers 
believed this failure of the DAO to resolve the issue was due to 
political connections of the Board members. According to farmers, 
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each political party was blaming the other for this situation, but 
none was in a position to take any action. 
This event had a very negative impact on local farmers' feeling 
towards the WUA. In an another case, it was found that about Rs. 
9500 was not deposited in the WUA from the Road Tax collection. 
Likewise, some of the BC members collecting the ISF were found 
not depositing the money in the WUA account. Upon hearing this, 
those who were paying the ISF also stopped paying fearing that the 
money would be misused. One To/i representative, who was also 
charged with not depositing the money in the bank account once 
told me that he does not feel sorry for this, as those in the MC 
have earned far more than him. 
There have been also charges of corruption in expenditure of 
fund provided by the government: both farmers and the WUA say 
that agency personnel are also involved in this and I came across 
two such cases. In the first case in 1997/1998, an overseer and a 
Board of Director was given 90,000 rupees for buying a gear box 
for the gates at the intake. It was later found that inferior quality 
material was bought at almost half the price. The WUA blamed the 
technician for this. The technician was later transferred without 
investigation. 
In another case Rs 45,0000 was spent on canal de-silting in 
1999/2000 out of the Government fund. However, the de-silting 
was done poorly and farmers objected to the DAO, which has not 
been resolved so far. The estimate for the works was prepared by 
the technicians of the DOI and executed by the WUA employing 
machinery. The records show that the heavy machinery had been 
mobilized for up to seventeen hours a day and payments of fuel 
and for operator were accordingly made, which can never be 
possible practically. When I asked one of the operators of the 
machine whether it is true that he worked for 17 hours a day, he 
simply laughed. He told me that he did what he was told by the 
WUA member involved in supervision and by the technician. The 
operators as well as the technicians are also charged with the 
corruption in the DAO. Any visitor in NWGIS now hears about 
financial irregularities and corruption in WUA, not the irrigation 
and water management practices. 
The confusion behind the ISF and lack of legal support in its 
collection has been discussed chapter 7. The poor collection of ISF 
in West Gandak is also a result of the poor policy framework, due 
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to which neither the WUA nor the irrigation agency gives attention 
in the ISF. 
There are no established mechanisms in the system for the 
collection of the ISF. There are no records regarding the members 
and their land holding, and it was never clear to the WUA who 
should collect the ISF and how it should be collected. Poudel 
(1998) notes that the ISF collection in the beginning was done by 
the FOs (chapter 4) hired for the organizing activities. The FOs 
had prepared the membership lists for the different canal sections 
for the election of the functionaries. The same list was used later 
for collecting the ISF and no effort was made to revise the list in 
later years. On the other hand the collection made by the FOs was 
not even enough to pay for their salary for four months because of 
poor collection and low rate of the ISF. 
When the FOs were relieved after WUA formation, the 
responsibility of the collection of the ISF was then given to the ToH 
and Upatoli (see chapter 4). It was decided that the person 
collecting the ISF from these committees would be given 10% of 
the collected amount. But many of them could not decide who 
would collect the money, as no members wanted to do this Those 
who started collection complained that it was difficult to monitor 
the irrigation application in the monsoon season and they also did 
not have correct list of farmers. They also found their payment of 
10% too low for the job. The WUA later decided that the person 
collecting the ISF would get 20% of the collection and the MC 
would not realize any contribution from the lower order 
committee. Otherwise, the lower committees here also were 
required to pay 20% of their collection to the MC. But this also 
brought no change in the ISF collection, because of lack of a 
member list. 
Can farmers afford to pay? 
In all the three cases presented, there were no fees collected before 
turnover: and any payment to maintain the system is an additional 
fee to farmers. Box 9.3 summarises changes found in production 
after IMTP10. In all cases it was found that there has been no 
increase in crop productivity as such, only from expanded irrigated 
area, and increase in early paddy area in both Panchakanya and 
Khageri. That is, the program has brought benefit to farmers who 
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had no access to water before whereas for many farmers, who had 
access to water before, it brought no change. The new farmers will 
be willing to pay, whereas for those whose situation is unchanged, 
may be reluctant to pay, unless forced by other means. The lower 
collection of ISF in monsoon season in both Khageri and 
Panchakanya is also due to this fact. 
Box 93 Changes in irrigated production 
The following points are summarized from interviews with farmers and 
the ADO, and other reports. 
Panchakanya has seen considerable change in cropping patterns. 
The areas growing spring paddy has increased from 12 ha in 1995/6 to 
105 in 200/01 and irrigation in monsoon paddy has increased from 265 
ha to 360 ha. In Khageri, farmers report that as a result of canal 
improvement, it was possible to grow early paddy in 100 ha additional 
area. Kalu ct al. (2000) also show increase in eady paddy area by more 
than 150 ha. At the same time, there has been increase in irrigated are 
by about 10 to 15 ha at the tail end of the command area of each 
branch canals. Combining all, about 300 ha additional land has now 
access to irrigation in monsoon season in Khageri. In West Gandak, 
due to reduced canal supply, the access to irrigation in monsoon paddy 
has decreased to 4000 ha area from previous records of 7300 ha area. 
There has been no change in the cropping intensity in all the schemes. 
The reason is that even in absence of irrigation water, farmers cultivate 
under rainfed condition. 
High increase in crop yield in Panchakanya has been reported for 
both eady paddy and monsoon paddy by the monitoring report and 
Ghimere et al, 2000 (from 3.5 to 4.8 for monsoon paddy and from 3.6 
to 6 t/ha for early paddy between 1995 to 2001). But my interviews 
suggest present average production rate is 3.9 t/ha for monsoon rice 
and 4.2 t/ha for spring paddy. Fanners give credit to not only to 
improved water availability scenario, but also a switch towards high 
yielding variety crops. In West Gandak, despite the poor performance 
of the canal system, the crop yield has not been affected. The reason is 
that for monsoon rice they depend on rainfall and in winter and spring, 
farmers are switching to ground water to irrigate the wheat and 
sugarcane. 
Studies made so far show that cost needed to maintain the system 
is only a fraction of the benefit derived from irrigated agriculture. 
According to the HR Wallingford (2001) study, the net financial 
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return per ha at 2000 prices is Rs. 5532 for Khageri and Rs. 6099 
for West Gandak. This study is based on irrigated and un-irrigated 
conditions for wheat and main paddy only, the two predominant 
crops in the area. The limitation of the study is that it assumes a 
crop yield difference of 25% and 33% for monsoon paddy and 
wheat between irrigated and un-irrigated condition. Farmers agree 
in case of West Gandak, but in Khageri, farmers say rain-fed rice 
production is as low as 40% of irrigated levels. 
A study by NISP for Sunsari Morang Scheme (66000 ha) and 
Kankai Scheme (8000 ha) in the Eastern Terai shows the net 
benefit for these schemes is Rs. 12552 and Rs. 27,669. Thus, since 
the agroecological and market conditions in Terai areas do not 
differ substantially, these two studies have quite different results. 
However, both figures suggest that paying of ISF of an average of 
Rs. 400 per ha is still less than 10% of the net income generated 
form irrigation services, even at the lower profit level of the 
Wallingford study. The question in Nepal is thus not whether the 
farmers can afford to pay for the irrigation or not, but how it can 
be collected. In Panchakanya farmers easily pay up to Rs. 600 per 
ha if they receive a good irrigation service. Initial collection of ISF 
in Khageri and farmers views in West Gandak also suggest that 
farmers are willing to pay fees, but do not do so for the several 
factors discussed earlier. 
9.4 Conclusions 
Most often, the IMT programs haven been implemented together 
with the project support to facilitate water management change. 
The changes and outcomes presented in this chapter has shown 
that, this depends on how they can translate opportunities and 
constraints in practical design and provide better working 
condition to farmers. In Panchakanya, the technical change 
brought about by the project could work as catalyst in the 
evolution of the new management bringing better water availability 
and new production options, with valuable crops that help achieve 
financial self sufficiency and acceptable management practices. Its 
smaller size also made change easier. The WUA thus acquired the 
necessary skills, generate the resources and maintain accountability 
in service delivery. Khageri too arrived at suitable delivery pattern 
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which a large majority of farmers considered acceptable. Though 
maintenance issues are overlooked here due to lack of resources, 
this is more to do with legal and administrative gaps, than system 
constraints. The IMT Project did not bring any visible changes in 
West Gandak that could provide better working conditions for 
farmers. The WUA could neither acquire the skills nor generate 
resource or maintain accountability in service delivery. 
These variable outcomes suggest that project support does not 
necessarily provide incentives to local organization, it depends on 
the approach of the project. A critical issue in a participatory 
approach is that designers are needed to build familiarity with the 
local system environment. They are limited in their instrumental 
purpose if proceeding without adequate learning of system 
environment, and can then fail to bring the desired change in 
infrastructure water delivery and institutions - as happened in West 
Gandak. 
Project support when it proceeds with system learning, the key 
to participatory development, forms only a base for future 
management. Sustaining water management beyond project 
launching depends on wider water control dimensions: socio-
political, organization and technical, which are dynamic, and 
continuously bring new challenges in management continuum. 
Local organization need to adapt to the ever changing environment 
to sustain water management, build up necessary skills, generate 
resources and develop accountability between the key actors. This 
also needs legal, political and often further financial support from 
wider administrative and political institutions. 
Notes 
1
 This reform targeted to reduce total number of civil servant in the 
government from 115,000 to 77,000. The ADB is funding this program 
providing extra incentives for those taking early retirement. 
2
 The area planned here is less than the potential command area of the 
system, 8700 ha. According to the consultant, this target was set after 
discussion with the WUA and field level technicians. 
3
 Any out side researchers have to pay Rs. 1000 to acquire information 
about the system. If it also involves help from the WUA members, Rs 200 
per hour is charged for the lectures and Rs 150 per hour for the field visit. 
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4
 Under the law, registered organizations in Nepal have to carry out an annual 
audit by a registered auditor and its report has to be made public. 
5
 Where the responsibilities of main canal and headwork lies with the 
Government, the WUA is required to pay 25% of its ISF to the 
Government. 
6
 Structure constructed above a stream/drains to carry the water. 
7
 Irrigated area varies in Khageri from year to year depending upon 
rainfall. Here average irrigated area is assumed, which is 2800 ha. 
8
 NISP Irrigation subsidy study (2000) Phase II reports mention typical cost for 
operation and maintenance for medium and large Terai schemes to be Rs. 670 and 
270 per ha. 
9
 Poudal (1998) mentions that at the beginning of group formation, many 
branch and minor canals especially at the head end (from MCi to MC n) 
attempted several times to clean their canals themselves but did not 
succeed. Only in selected MC blocks, where there were farmers with a hill 
migration background, was this successful. 
10
 It is very difficult to gather valid and reliable data on changing 
production in rural Nepal: even IMTP and government reports caution 
about unreliability of data. There are some studies on agrarian change, for 
examples by Ghimere et al (2000) for Panchakanya and Adhikari et al 
(2002) for West Gandak, but these also use secondary sources. 
10 
Conclusions 
This thesis attempted to explore the scope and challenges of 
participation in the engineerability (makability, Halsema, 2002) of 
irrigation. It began with the objective of contributing towards 
irrigation management reform in Nepal, and promotion of 
participatory approaches in intervention policies and practices and 
participation in irrigation water management I did not limit myself 
on only one context of participation, but rather tried to explore 
different contexts and domains of participation to provide a 
comprehensive review on participatory methods to build new 
irrigation organisations, the participatory nature of new 
organisations, their experiences in transforming local irrigation 
management practices, and the gaps and weaknesses in government 
policies supposed to empower these new organisations. The 
research involved revisiting work that I was earlier involved with as 
an engineer: with the hope that information from our action could 
help the design of future programs to transform local water 
management. Despite the challenges, the methods used were able 
to bring new information on governance change and show the 
dilemmas in participatory approaches. Although involved in 
studying my own professional colleagues, I have never been 
victimised for these findings. 
This chapter presents the core findings of the study, with 
reference to its four interlocking themes. The chapter ends with 
exploring future research agendas and path ahead for future 
irrigation development in Nepal. 
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10.1 The Evolution of New Forms of Irrigation Governance 
The process of irrigation management reform in Nepal was 
initiated by the government and users were not consulted about 
their future role in water management They were required to 
participate in the processes whose agendas were already set by the 
government However, users rather viewed the WUAs as a 
platform to increase their economic and political power to bargain 
and negotiate with the government and other institutions linked to 
water management Their commitment towards the reform process 
was further accelerated by the climate of political decentralization 
in the country, as WUA development began parallel with the 
beginning of the multi-party democracy in the country. The thesis 
showed that all the WUAs have been able to use their political 
dimensions especially to bargain and negotiate with the 
government and other institutions as needed. However, they have 
quite different outcomes in terms of their management 
performance. 
In Panchakanya, there has been improvement in water 
availability, increase in irrigated area and change in cropping 
pattern. Local people believe in their organization: the WUA is 
accountable to its members and is financially capable to take up 
new management responsibilities. In Khageri, there has been 
improvements in water delivery schedules, an increase in irrigated 
area, and change in cropping pattern, but not on the scale seen in 
Panchakanya. The system falls short in financial viability. However, 
farmers have strong support to their organization, which has 
fought battles externally to defend system water supply. Whereas in 
West Gandak, the new management arrangement is dysfunctional. 
The WUA has lost its credibility and acceptability at local level. 
Attempts to improve system performance through local 
organization here has been rather disappointing resulting in 
frustration and demoralization of the local community. 
Incidentally, the scale of change in these systems is in parallel 
with their service area: the Panchakanya is the smallest among the 
three with 600 ha area and has better outcomes in terms of service 
delivery whereas the West Gandak, the largest with 8700 ha 
command area, has experienced in management incompetence. 
However, these variable outcomes cannot be looked at simply with 
respect to their area, but also at the challenges of regulation and 
control of the wider environment (both socio-political and the 
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physical-technical) of system management which are discussed 
below. 
Local political dynamics 
The thesis has shown that how local social and political dynamics 
influences the institutional arrangements and the management 
regimes. In Panchakanya, the new institutional arrangements were 
shaped by the users prior experience of collective action: a social 
capital to start with. Beginning management reform here was thus 
like "beginning with champions' (Groot, 2002). In Khageri, 
different groups of farmers had different access to water resources, 
and management reform began with a conflictive environment. 
However, because of relatively educated and politically conscious 
society, different groups of farmers were able to negotiate new 
management arrangements and provide continuity in them. Both 
WUAs were accountable to their users and thus enjoyed local 
credibility and acceptance, which further strengthen the legitimacy 
and power of these WUAs. Whereas West Gandak had different 
societal relations. Users were more dependent on powerful political 
figures in their everyday lives. Party politics dominate the WUA 
agendas and no accountability mechanism could emerge between 
the users and the WUA, rather the WUA became a platform for 
political parties to check their strength in the society. 
Local socio-political dynamics have often been excluded in the 
design of the new institutional arrangements. A community is often 
assumed as homogeneous with solidarity and harmonious 
relationships among farmers, which fails to recognise power 
relations and socio-political dependence in the society. Instead of 
trying to fit the institutions to a set of designed guidelines, the 
existing socio-political structure can guide new institutional 
arrangements. 
External support and networking 
The thesis showed that local organization does not stand on its 
own, they are part of external non-local environment and its 
recognition by wider governance organisations is essential for the 
sustainability of the system. WUAs thus continue to struggle to 
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gain legitimacy and power through external support and 
networking. All the WUAs presented in this thesis tried to expand 
their networks and get support from other economic and political 
institutions (though at varying degree of success), such as the 
VDCs, DDCs, administrative offices and NGOs involved in the 
agriculture sector. The formation of the federation at national level 
was also aimed at expanding their recognition to wider world and 
increasing their legitimacy and power at local level. 
This study has shown that external support has values in several 
other ways. First, when WUAs are recognized by external 
institutions, their legitimacy at local level also increases. Secondly, 
support from external institutions also help implement internal 
rules and regulations of the WUA. Thirdly, wider networking is 
also essential to increase their negotiating and bargaining power. 
Most of the debate on local organization however is confined at 
local level only, forgetting how these locals need external support 
for their survival (see for example Ostrom, 1992, Wade 1995). The 
thesis shows that no single organization is capable of managing 
complex process like irrigation management and problems are 
solved only when they are represented in different domains and 
this equally holds true for the WUA too. In order to be able to 
govern and manage irrigation water, the WUA must be able to gain 
control over the resources they need (finance, equipment etc) and 
have influence over the external environment They should be able 
to bargain and negotiate with other agencies that affect their 
functioning. 
As building economic and political networking also increases 
individual economic and political power, people thus use their 
social status and political affiliation to be elected in the WUA and 
also use their status as WUA executives further to expand their 
economic and political power. The WUA also acts as springboard 
to aspirant politicians to jump further in their political careers. In 
all the three cases, the WUA members, especially the executives 
were the persons who were already active in other parts of their 
village and political life. They got elected in the WUA through this 
social recognition and used their status of WUA executives further 
to expand their economic and political network. Kloezen (2002), 
Narain (2003) documents similar dynamics in Mexico and India. 
Support from the state has been also given less attention in the 
current debate on local organization, and state is most often seen as 
constraining factor for the local governance. However the thesis 
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showed that empowerment to WUA would not come into effect 
unless visible support is provided by the state. In countries like 
Nepal, only the political and administrative institutions of the state 
are seen as source of power. Common farmers do not believe in 
the authority of the newly established local organization. Because 
of this situation, only granting autonomy to the WUAs and 
empowering them with Acts and Regulation is not helpful to 
establish local governance. The state must provide visible support 
(action oriented) to local organization to help it execute rules and 
regulations, such that people believe in the authority of the WUA. 
State has also visible role in making local organization to be 
recognized by other political and administrative institutions. 
Besides boosting the recognition of the WUA in the wider world, 
the state also has an important role in the settlement of unspecified 
rights and major disputes (Ranjan, 1997), as clearly reflected in this 
study. However, the state's active role should not limit the right of 
local users to craft and implement the new institutional 
arrangements, but work as background support for the emergence 
of local governance. 
Both elements the local socio-political dynamics and wider 
support and networking needed to sustain local management show 
how political actions are embedded in local governance. The only 
difference is that when the organization is functioning, its political 
character is shadowed, whereas when it fails to function, its 
political activities become visible. Political actions are not 
necessarily problematic, but are needed to sustain the local 
organization. Thus as argued in chapter 1, WUA should also be 
viewed as a political body against the often-assumed non-partisan, 
non-political body. 
However, there is need to separate between two different areas 
of politics: everyday politics and party politics. As shown in this 
thesis, everyday politics is part of the organizational evolution and 
essential to mange and govern irrigation water. When party politics 
dictate the agendas of everyday politics, it begins to be problematic. 
Restructuring of local organization 
Type, size and membership of an organization have got 
considerable attention in literature of the WUA design (Patel and 
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Lele, 1996). This study has shown that this depends on the 
management pattern of the WUA and physical layout of the canal 
systems. The WUAs presented in this study were designed as multi-
tiered associations with varying si2es in the lower unit of the WUA 
structure. However, the size and structure of these WUA changed 
together with the management transformation process, because of 
the new operational requirements. In Panchakanya, the WUA 
changed itself from two-tier to three-tier organization, with groups 
formed even up to 5 ha oudets. Like wise Khageri also turned from 
two to three tiered organization with a lower unit of about 20 ha. 
In both the systems, the needs for groups at lower level were 
determined by the changing operational requirement at lower level. 
However, the lower order groups are confined only in water 
distribution activities. West Gandak also tried to change its 
management style adding a separate management committee and 
four regional committees, because of the new field level situation. 
The size of the group however depends on the management 
model of the WUA. The WUAs presented in this thesis are 
operating in Tarticipatory model', and farmers groups at lower 
order canals were needed to co-ordinate the daily water 
management activities. However, examples from Mexico (Kloezen, 
2002), Columbia where WUA function on "Management model1 
show much larger group size, as the everyday management of these 
WUAs are performed by the hired professional staff. The size of 
the group is thus function of management model and daily water 
management arrangement, which differs from system to system, 
and there can not be any optimal size of the group suitable to local 
management. 
The WUAs presented in this thesis were based on their 
hydraulic boundary. However, in Khageri and Panchakanya, 
representation in the MC was also balanced in terms of 
geographical area. However, in West Gandak the WUA was solely 
based on hydraulic considerations, which resulted in a highly 
unequal representation, which has been also one of the reasons for 
the non-functioning of the WUA. This shows that the 
organizational design, though are based on hydraulic boundary, 
must also equally consider the geographical or political boundary 
within the network characteristics of the particular systems. 
The thesis presented two different ways of structuring the 
WUAs: the unitary and federated model. It shows how power and 
control of local organization are concentrated to a few powerful 
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people in a unitary model, whereas in federated model politics of 
organization are distributed in federal linkages. Out of the three 
WUA presented, Panchakanya exhibit partly the unitary and partly 
federated character, the Khageri is structured in federated model 
whereas the West Gandak is a perfect example of an unitary model. 
Because of its unitary character in West Gandak, the lower tiers of 
the WUAs were almost non existence, as membership to lower 
tiers are seen as only a means to jump in the MC. Organization 
design has to consider how the power of the organization can be 
distributed and how one tier of organization can be held 
accountable to other. In this connection, structuring a WUA in a 
federated model offers better potential than the unitary model. 
10.2 Institutional Reform and Participatory Development Process 
Participatory and process-based intervention emphasizing 
participation of stakeholders and social learning has been widely 
called for (Bond and Hulme 1995; Rondinelli, 1983; Mossee et al. 
1998; Brienkohoff, 1996) in recognition of the political and 
interactive nature of development intervention, however, the thesis 
showed that they fell short in real practice. Though efforts have 
been made to shift away from blueprint towards the process 
approaches, in reality, blue-print ideas about project planning and 
implementation dominates the intervention, and learning and 
participation are mostly confined at local level of project 
implementation. The thesis further showed how the hierarchical 
organizational structure, lack of organizational learning, shorter 
time frames, failure to link the project with the broader 
development objective all posed barriers to IMTP proceeding as a 
process based intervention. Participatory process-driven 
approaches in Nepal have become a sort of 'good theory, poor 
practice'. There is a need for fundamental changes in the way 
projects are designed and implemented to achieve participatory 
development in real world situation. 
IMTP as a process intervention 
The IMTP implementation was designed to be participatory, but in 
reality the design of its framework began in usual top-down 
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fashion: it was shaped by the donors, consultants and the higher 
authorities in the IMD of the DOI (see chapter 3). The design of 
the participatory trajectory was not a bottom up process, even the 
field level project managers and the fanners were not aware of the 
framework, although key actors in the implementation process. It 
was only after field level managers and WUAs at local level raised 
concerns about the implementation process, that a meeting was 
organized in Kathmandu to discuss the framework. Though 
interaction later altered and redesigned some of the framework, it 
was a compromise, rather than a best alternative. However, it was 
not fully top-down: actors at local level had had considerable 
flexibility to redesign and adopt change, especially in the 
technology change process. 
The limitation however was that participation was taken in a 
very narrow sense: as communication between actors at local level 
only. Actors at central level, the donors, the higher authorities and 
the consultants shaped the implementation framework, and 
managers at local project level were asked to implement it, 
collaborating with the water users at the local leveL The focus was 
thus on 'single system only* with no realization of related system at 
other levels. The actors at higher institutional layer decision making 
considered themselves as contextual factors and set aside from the 
change process. So the development of wider coalitions and 
shaping the process out of mediation and negotiation as demanded 
by the participatory process (Mahanty, 2002, Lewis, 2000, 
Brienkohoff, 1996) could not become the agenda in the IMTP. 
Because of this situation, the processes meet resistance at the time 
of management turnover process. 
Despite this, actors at local level negotiated, altered and 
redesigned elements of the designed framework as required. But 
this only was not enough to manage the change process as many of 
the decision making power was concentrated at the senior level and 
those implementor at the local level were junior and less senior 
staff, with accountability towards the seniors. These powedess 
representatives (Groot, 2002) had no mandate and capacity needed 
to make commitments or negotiate agreements to bring about 
overall change. Neither they were in a position to build coalitions 
and networks essential for the change process beyond local level, 
which limited the outcome of the change process. 
The hierarchical structure of DOI and the institutional 
arrangement with in it also limited the innovation and flexibility in 
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the process. Despite a decade of advocacy towards participatory 
process-driven approaches, the working process has not changed 
fundamentally in Nepal. Though authors like Korten strongly 
argues for use of existing permanent institutions and their capacity 
building to facilitate participatory process, they have often 
remained as controlling actors than the facilitating one as shown in 
this thesis. Uphoff s work in Sri Lanka also argues that an irrigation 
bureaucracy are not necessarily the constraining factor in 
implementing the participatory learning process, but sprit of Gal 
Oya has not continued there after. The issue for future is thus not 
only the irrigation management reform, but also the bureaucratic 
reform needed to facilitate participatory processes. 
Another key issue here is the role of engineers, who have 
remained the key actors in designing and implementing the change 
process. I myself was responsible in leading the change process in 
both Khageri and Panchakanya and as mentioned in chapter 1, had 
both success and failures. As per my own learning, the issue here is 
not whether engineers can lead the change process or not, but their 
orientation, commitment and organizational culture. There are two 
problems facing engineers in internalizing participatory approaches 
in their working. First is that education of irrigation engineers is 
still dominated by hard scientific approaches. Second, irrigation 
bureaucracies are still short of in internalizing soft approaches, and 
participation and reform are more seen as justifying further 
investment in irrigation sector. Unless the culture of the 
organization changes, it is very difficult to change individually. 
Irrigation engineering profession thus needs change both in current 
working practices and university training of the new generation of 
engineers, to recognise that knowledge and expertise from other 
disciplines is equally important in informing irrigation design 
processes. 
The project approach and institutional reform 
The use of 'project approach' has been criticised for participatory 
initiatives, for providing narrow space for participation and 
learning (Van Dam, 2000) and authors like Uphoff even argue for 
abandoning the project concept to focus on social learning and 
institutional building. Contrarily, projects are an increasing element 
of development activity: there has been a decrease in a state activity 
302 Engineering Participation 
and much of that activity has been turned into projects-a process 
of projectization (Wield, 1999). Despite criticisms, no effective 
alternative to projects has emerged and they are likely to remain a 
tool for translating policies into program actions (Cernea 1991) and 
call to make more learning oriented has been given wider attention 
over the years (Hulme, 1995; Honadle and Rosengard, 1983; 
Rondinelli, 1983). 
The management transformation process presented in this thesis 
were facilitated and supported through a (participatory) project 
framework. It had two component: developing institutional 
capacity of the local organization and facilitate technical change to 
provide better working condition to the farmers. The materials 
presented in the thesis show that both in Khageri and 
Panchakanya, the WUA's were able to gain control over the 
process and technical change provided visible support the WUA. 
Whereas Gandak fall short in capacity development, neither 
technical change could provide visible support to local 
organization. In the first two cases, the local organizations have 
been able to sustain the reform beyond the project phase, whereas 
it collapsed after the project phase. These variable outcomes 
suggest that a critical review is necessary about the project 
approach to institutional reform. 
The criticism to project approach in maintaining participatory 
approaches are mainly due to its time bound activity (mostly 
shorter time frame) and rigid planning process. However, the first 
problem is due to our failure to separate between development 
objectives and projects, while the second is more to do with the 
approach of the project than the project itself. Project approaches 
do not necessarily limit the scope of participation. A clear 
distinction between project and the broader development objective 
of which the project is a part is required. Equally important is that 
the dominant image of projects as a technocratic exercise must be 
replaced with a image that recognize project as arenas of conflict, 
bargaining and trade-off and in which data and technical tools have 
the potential to clarify likely outcomes and shape arguments 
(Hulme, 1995). 
Whether based on top-down technical exercise or participatory 
process based ways, projects are confined within a time frame and 
shorter time frame has been often assumed as the major shortfall in 
managing the projects in participatory ways. However, time alone is 
not the issue, the important issue here is one needs to separate 
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projects and development in rime continuum. Development is an 
ongoing social process, which can not be confined to a time 
boundary. Whereas projects are only part of the broader 
development process, and have objectives of providing support to 
sustain the development process. IMTP had objective of 
decentralization and self-governance: to initiate and sustain user 
participation in local water management. Both users and facilitators 
at local level were less familiar with this objective, and took IMTP 
more as system rehabilitation project. The wider development 
objective was thus lost and project was focused on much narrower 
issue of technical improvement works. So the project design and 
implementation must be linked to broader development process. 
PTD and its scope in irrigation innovation 
The current irrigation management reform lay emphasis on 
participatory design construction of the technology to provide 
better working condition for the farmers. The underlying 
assumption for adopting PTD has been that it creates ownership 
feeling among users and produces technology compatible to 
farmers' management The thesis identified several major 
constraints in current approach to PTD in large-scale irrigation 
systems. The first is about the way criteria and preference is 
incorporated in the design process. The thesis has showed how the 
way users' construct their ideas and priorities are shaped by the 
project structure and by their over expectation on what technology 
can do for them. 
A second constraint comes from lack of initial learning of the 
system environment. In chapter 1,1 mention that irrigation systems 
are sociotechnical systems and technology of the system shapes 
and is shaped by ecology and society. Design should thus begin 
considering both the human and the physical dimension of 
irrigation systems The strength of participatory design depends first 
on what people, both users and designers, know about the system, 
and its opportunities and constraints. Only then can an interactive 
design process be maintained. In both Panchakanya and Khageri, 
farmers were familiar with their system opportunities and 
constraints and were able to interact with the engineers in the 
design process. Whereas in West Gandak, lack of knowledge about 
system opportunities and constraints by the farmers limited the 
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outcome of the PTD. Both the farmers and the engineers thus 
need to learn about their system, the people, the technological 
system and the environment. However in irrigation, such learning 
can not come unless one is directly involved in the management of 
the technological system. This initial learning is essential for 
technology and institutions, and their complementary evolution. 
The design process also has a political nature. The PTD 
considers participation as a communication between the designers 
and the engineers (see also Scheer, 1994). It is true that users and 
the design engineers are the key actors in shaping the design 
process, but when design gets implemented in the field, it enters a 
multi actor environment and the design is contested between 
different actors, especially in the construction phase. Adopting 
changes and maintaining flexibility is not always possible at local 
level, and require approval of higher authorities and donors. These 
actors at different decisions making level are not involved in daily 
design process, but are crucial to maintain the participatory design 
process. Participation then goes beyond the communication and 
calls for accountability between the different stakeholders and 
demands effective meditation and negotiation between the various 
actors. The thesis showed how failure to maintain the 
accountability resulted a conflicting situation between the users and 
the NLIO. Like wise the Gandak case showed how design is 
challenged while implementation in the field. 
PTD as a means to achieve service oriented water control 
I have argued in the thesis that participatory design and 
construction should not be seen on its own, but rather be used to 
achieve service oriented water control. Discussion in chapter 5 and 
6 show that design for achieving service oriented water control has 
three central characteristics: initial learning, defining service and 
interactive and iterative design construction. 
The design begins with the initial learning of the system 
environment by both users and the designers. They learn about the 
water supply regimes, the technical features, the prevailing practices 
of system operation and maintenance and identify their 
opportunity and constraints in transferring irrigation practices. In 
parallel, they learn about the different water users groups, their 
social relation and its shaping of water management They gain this 
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through directly being involved in the system operation and 
maintenance. This initial investment in learning about the system 
constraints by both designers and the future users prepares the 
base for the future design process. As shown in chapter 5, this 
initial investment has also another value. It does not necessarily 
calls for the radical change in the existing technology in favour of 
the particular set of new technology. It gives opportunity for the 
farmers to test it, find its constraints, change or modify it as per 
their operational plan rather than to freeze them in favour of new 
structures. 
With their experience of water management practices through 
initial learning, the users would then define the service pattern they 
want in future management. The thesis also shows that only early 
experience is not sufficient to shape the design. The process of 
design should then follow iterative and interactive process, such 
that learning can be accommodated throughout the design 
process1. By iterative I mean, the design process should be carried 
Out in different phases such that the learning can be 
accommodated. By interactive design I mean both the users and 
the designers discuss communicate and negotiate until the best 
feasible options are found. Participatory design demands 
innovative actions both from users and designers. 
10.3 Matching Technology and Institutions in Irrigation Management 
The study has shown that only including technical rehabilitation 
component in the reform process is not enough to support the 
local organization, it needs broader understanding of technology, 
pattern of its service delivery and requirement of use. As 
demonstrated by the study, the design of the technology influences 
the organizational capacity to operate and maintain the system. 
Technology change to support institutional reform thus should 
consider both the institutional capacity as well as the management 
objective of the local organization managing the irrigation system. 
In both Khageri and Panchakanya, the process of technical 
change was guided by both organizational capacity and 
management objective of the WUA. Users in both the systems 
preferred to have different kinds of rotational delivery pattern 
depending on water availability across the seasons. They thus 
choose to continue with the manually adjustable gated water 
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distribution technology, but with their re-location and modified 
technical characteristics to suit new water delivery requirement. 
The resulting technology was thus in accordance with the rotational 
delivery system preferred by the users. The design also considered 
the institutional capacity of the WUA. Both the systems were 
extensively developed system with fewer water control structures 
and canal networks. No radical changes in the existing technology 
were made, and changes made were incremental to meet the new 
field level situation. As discussed in chapter 6, the design tries to 
maximize both technical and social control so as to keep the 
number of control structures to minimum in the systems. As a 
result, the overall technology was simple to operate and required 
less number of operators and less cost to operate and maintain, at 
the same time was in accordance with farmers' management 
objective. 
The West Gandak had complex canal networks with large 
numbers of water control structures to operate and maintain placed 
during the command area intervention. The system also used to 
suffer from heavy silt deposition in the main canal requiring high 
cost for annual repair and clean up of the main canal. However, the 
technical improvement work largely failed to recognize the 
requirement of use of this technology to the WUA, and was 
focused only on remoulding of the existing old structures. Though 
efforts were made to improve canal siltation problem through the 
construction of a silt ejector, it could not function due to poor 
location of the structures. Operation of the system continued to be 
constrained by the large number of check structures and silt laden 
water. Haslema (2002) has shown the challenge in managing such 
silt-laden water under unsteady flow condition. The WUA has 
neither the expertise nor the resources to operate and maintain this 
complex canal network. Because of failure to deliver the necessary 
service, the WUA lost their credibility at local level which in turn 
weakened their leadership. 
Plusquellec (2002) has highlighted the importance of technical 
change to support the institutional reform. With examples from 
Mali (Office du Nigier, see also Musch, 2001), and Australia, he 
shows how combination of technical changes with institutional and 
policy reforms have largely contributed to the success of the 
reform programs. The materials from this study (from Khageri and 
Panchakanya) also show that technical change can provide an 
incentive to local organization to take up the management 
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responsibility. But this study also shows that the main issue is not 
inclusion of technical change, but its design process, which must be 
guided by the management objective and institutional capacity of 
the local organization. The critical issue is the design, as many 
management and institutional problems are self-inflicted wounds 
that could be minimized or eliminated with proper designs and 
operational patterns (Burt, 1999). Horst (1998) also considers the 
design as the crux to the irrigation management and views 
management reform without due attention on irrigation technology 
as cosmetic surgery. However, the paradox is that the design 
approaches for technical change to support institutional reform 
have been less debated so far. 
The debate on technology design has confined in three areas 
presently. The first one concerns with modern water control 
systems (see for example Plusquellec, 2002; Burt, 1999) and favour 
automated water control mechanism. However, the use of such a 
technology in Nepali context is out of question because of the 
physical characteristics of the irrigation systems and its farming 
practices. Irrigation systems in Nepal are supply-oriented run-of-
river gravity systems and experience high variation in water flow 
within and across the seasons. 
Researchers like Horst and Pradhan (1996) on the other hand 
argue for simple and transparent technology to local organization 
and favours simple ungated proportional distribution structures for 
local management But such a bias towards a particular type of 
technology can have several problems. First, it may need 
demolition of existing technology to set up a new technology 
demanding huge financial resources. Secondly, this radical change 
would bring entirely new technology with new service 
characteristics, which users may not be familiar with and can be 
quite different from users preferences. As shown in this study, 
farmers in both Khageri and Panchakanya preferred to stay with 
manually adjustable gated technology, which they found more 
suitable to implement a strong rotational pattern. However, they 
were also careful not to increase the number of control structures. 
In both the system farmers tried to maximize both technical and 
social control and fit technology accordingly. Farmers' choices of 
service pattern are driven by ease of operation, workable 
institutions and water availability. These are dynamic, and differ 
from system to system. There can be thus no universal rule that a 
particular set of technology is suitable for all situations. 
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The third area involves the 'participatory approach' in design 
innovation and tools like PTD are promoted to help arrive locally 
specific design. The process of technical change presented in this 
study was also based on PTD. It is not biased to any particular 
form of technology as in the past two cases, and aims to provide 
methodologies for technology development in accordance with 
users skills, knowledge and requirement. However, as shown in this 
study, lack of understanding of technology and its requirement of 
use by both designers and the users, and other practical limitation 
of adopting participatory approaches has limited the scope of PTD 
in its use and outcomes. Considering these limitation on the 
current design process, I introduced the concept of 'service 
oriented water control' as a strategy of technical improvement to 
support the institutional reform. Such a concept is not biased 
towards a particular technology, it help to find technologies that 
match with organizational capacity and management objective of 
the local organization. This can vary from automated to simple 
proportional water control structures, determined by the WUA 
themselves. 
Water availability and agroecology 
Institutional arrangements are also shaped by the demands of the 
physical environment It demands particular skills and resources on 
the part of the local organization to manage the externalities 
created by the physical environment. It also affects the water 
supply regime and hence the management arrangement. As shown 
in this thesis, both Panchakanya and Khageri are free from the 
threat of physical environment like flooding, inundation and canal 
siltation. This resulted in low management input on the part of the 
WUA. The West Gandak has more complex bio-physical 
environment demanding more resources and skills on the part of 
the WUA. Its canal networks and associated structures are most 
often damaged due to flood and inundation resulting in higher 
annual maintenance cost The system also suffers heavy canal 
siltation problem which again adds to higher maintenance cost. The 
WUA however lacked the institutional capacity to cope with the 
challenge of this bio-physical environment 
Water is the key input to crop production, and its availability 
ultimately shapes users willingness to participate in water 
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management This study has shown that major factors affecting the 
water availability have been the temporal variation of rainfall, river 
regime, land topography, condition of technology, and aquifer 
conditions. One dilemma is that that irrigation systems in Nepal 
have very low potential to irrigate in winter and spring seasons as 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Thus attempts to reform irrigation 
management in Nepal have give particular attention to increase 
water availability situation during winter and dry season. 
As there is direct relationship between water availability and 
management arrangement, scholars on collective action have tried 
to link relation between them through the concept of 'relative water 
scarcity', which is considered as a favourable condition to initiate 
and sustain collective action. However, the above discussions show 
that the simple relation between the collective action and water 
availability is not helpful. Scarcity can vary across the season, can 
result from several environmental and technical constraints and can 
be mediate through alternative sources like groundwater and 
technical intervention (se also Vincent, 1999 on how technology 
relates to water scarcity). The relationship is much more complex, 
it needs broader understanding of different environmental and 
technical considerations on how they provide opportunities and 
constraints in making water available to farmers field. 
10.4 The Failure of Blueprint Policy Approaches 
Irrigation sector reform in Nepal has involved several policy 
measures and legal changes. These changes aimed at improved 
operation and maintenance, reduced government expenditure and 
improved performance of irrigated agriculture. It hoped to create 
new institutional roles and responsibilities for governmental 
personnel and expanded decision-making role for water users in 
new WUAs. The case studies presented in this thesis show that the 
overall results of the policy implementation with respect to ISF, 
institutional strengthening of the WUA and improved operation 
and maintenance has been less than expected. A careful review in 
the policy and legal framework is required to support the 
organizational evolution. 
The thesis shows that one of the most inconsistent factors in 
initiating the management reform has been the weak legal 
framework itself, especially in clarifying future financing of system 
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management. It failed to address how the newly established WUA 
would generate and finance future operation and maintenance of 
their irrigation systems, which is the crucial element of the reform 
and decetralization process. Though the WUAs have been given 
autonomy over to assess and collect the irrigation service fees and 
decide on their expenditure, there was no directive on such fees 
would be assessed and charged, and legal powers given to the 
WUAs to execute this sensitive issue. 
Because of this policy gap, both the implementers and WUAs at 
local level did not pay attention on future financing of the 
operation and maintenance of the system. Irrigation Service Fee 
(ISF) till then was NRs. 60 per ha per crop, which was only about 
20% of the operation and maintenance cost required that time. 
Farmers in all the systems started with this cost and continued with 
i t The newly established organizations were not in a position to 
increase the ISF because of socio-political reasons, and felt it 
impossible to increase the ISF without government intervention 
and continued support. Over a period of five years nobody paid 
attention to increase the ISF rate and improve its collection 
efficiency. 
There is also another paradox in the policy. The policy states 
that systems below 2000 ha in the Terai and 500 ha in the hills 
would be transferred to the WUA. Thus in larger systems, canal 
networks smaller than 2000 ha would be transferred to the WUA in 
joint management. The larger system will thus continue to enjoy 
heavy subsidy for irrigation management whereas the smaller ones 
have to depend on their own resources. This disparity will 
definitely invite conflict in future. Instead, the policy first should 
ensure that the total cost of system management should be borne 
by the farmers irrespective of their size. It is then up to the users to 
decide up to which part of the system they want to retain under 
their control and which part they want to be jointly managed with 
agency, but with financing from themselves. 
The irrigation management transfer in Nepal also involved 
transfer of system properties like canal land, service roads and 
forest resources. For example in West Gandak, the canal 
embankment trees were handed over to the WUA and the WUA 
were also authorized to collect the tax from the canal service roads 
and other land properties. Though these could provide good 
incentives to the WUA to pay for system management the reality 
turned out otherwise and the results were disappointing. Such 
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transfer of properties has raised questions. Is it appropriate to 
subsidy the irrigation sector from other sectors like the forest, and 
if it is going to subsidy the irrigation sector, what about its own 
sustainability? 
Another issue is that by involving the WUA in other lucrative 
sector like forest and service road tax collection, the WUA's 
interest in canal management may be lost and at the same time they 
try to avoid resource generation within the irrigation community. 
This is what happened in the West Gandak, where WUA neither 
could mange the outside resource nor was able-to generate its own. 
While there are arguments for multi-function organisations, Uphoff 
argues that irrigation organisations must succeed in the single 
purpose task of water management first, before it can be successful 
in multiple functions. Involving the WUAs in sectors other than 
water management may not always be productive, it can jeopardi2e 
the WUA's interest in water management in one hand and lack 
skills to compete with more professionally competent private 
sectors on the other (Brett 1996). 
10.5 The Future Ahead 
It has been now almost a decade and half that participation in 
irrigation water management has been the driving theme in 
irrigation intervention in Nepal. However, participatory process 
based intervention to support evolutionary organization have been 
confined only at local level interaction, with less room for learning 
and flexibility. Institutional reform and the decentralization of 
irrigation management functions as envisaged have been less able 
to meet the expanded management objectives. The participatory 
approach has been used for the continued survival of the DOI 
rather than promotion of self-governance and empowerment to 
farmers groups. Despite the present shortcomings in adopting 
participatory approach in irrigation water management, there can 
not be, however, going back from the participatory approach. The 
issue for Nepal thus is not whether to have participation or not but 
is how they can be made effective, such that future water 
management can be developed and sustained locally. This 
institutionalizing and operationalizing participatory approaches in 
irrigation water management needs rethinking from both the 
irrigation department and the local organizations. This demands for 
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the change in current working practices from doer to supporter in 
irrigation management. 
Shifting the agency from implementor to a facilitator also calls 
more responsibility on the part of the local organization. As shown 
in this thesis, the WUA's so far has been more visible in their 
political mode than on functional. They have proved effective in 
bargaining and negotiating with the government in getting the 
resources as well as on other agendas when they found others' 
actions threatening to their livelihood. They have however, fall 
short in everyday management, especially in contributing for 
development and management of irrigation systems, which may 
weaken their control over management in long run. The newly 
formed national federation of the WUAs, the NFIWUAN has a 
crucial role to play on it. It should initiate a process through which 
the users would pay the cost of irrigation development and 
management, whereas the department would transfer its control 
over the process to the users. The WUAs have to realize that 
unless the cost are financed by themselves, they would not be able 
to increase their bargaining and negotiating power with the 
government and other funding agencies. 
Parallel with the decentralization of irrigation management at 
local level, the process of decentralization and empowerment of 
local political bodies like the District Development Committees 
(DDCs) and Village Development Committee (VDCs) has been 
also gaining momentum. More recently, the control of the natural 
resources within the district has been given to the DDC and it has 
been also made responsible for the implementation of the 
development activities inside the district. Much of the role to the 
DOI on irrigation development at local level has now been 
transferred to the DDCs, and the DOI has now changed its 
structure as per the decentralization policy. The functioning and 
sustainability of the WUAs will also depend on wider networking 
and support from the VDCs and DDC. On the other hand, these 
political bodies may try to gain control over the WUAs. It remains 
to be seen how the WUAs will struggle to keep their autonomous 
status in this changing context, and we need to know how this 
changing local governance structure will affect irrigation 
governance: a key area for future research. 
However, whatever changes take place in local governance 
structure, user participation in irrigation water management will 
continue to remain central to irrigation sector development in 
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Nepal. I hope the understanding on local organization and 
participatory support processes presented in this thesis will help in 
engineering participation, with more participatory engineers and 
WUAs in the future. 
Notes 
1
 In this thesis I am dealing with design in the process of rehabilitation, 
where previous experience of the users is available and very important to 
shape the design. However, in new design cases one has to follow both 
iterative and interactive design processes. 
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The MOA format showing terms and 
condition of the transfer processes and 
arrangement1 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
BY AND BETWEEN 
THE DEPARTMENT OF IRRIGATION 
OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL 
AND 
THE .WATER USERS ASSOCIATION 
This Memorandum of Agreement is executed and entered into this [date] 
of {month/year] at [place of MOA signing] by and between. 
The DEPARTMENT OF IRRIGATION OF HIS MAJESTY'S 
GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL, with its principal office at [office address] 
hereinafter called DOI, 
and 
the .WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a water users 
association registered in accordance with the Water Resources Act, 2049 
and the Water Resources Regulation, 2050, hereinafter called the 
association. 
WHEREAS, DOI has built, operated and maintained the 
Irrigation System, hereinafter called the Irrigation 
System, which covers the area shown on the map attached as Annex 1 to 
this Memorandum of Agreement; 
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WHEREAS, the member of the Association use the Irrigation System for 
irrigation water; 
WHEREAS, DOI and the Association wish to jointly under take certain 
repairs and improvements of the Irrigation System, as outlined in the Plan 
of Action attached as Annex 2 to this Memorandum of Agreement- and 
WHEREAS, it is intended that the Association will operate and maintain 
[certain parts of] the irrigation System after these repairs and 
improvements have been completed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows: 
A. Establishment of Subproject Committee 
1. There will be a Subproject Management Committee (hereinafter called 
the SMC) consisting of (a) [name of DOI official] as Subproject Manager, 
and (b) [names of Executive Committee member, which should number 
between three and seven] being the Executive Committee elected by the 
[Main Committee] [General Assembly] of the Association for this 
purpose. 
2. The Subproject Manager will act Chairman of the SMC. 
3. The SMC will be responsible for supervising, coordination and 
monitoring all activities undertaken under the Plan of Action. 
4. The SMC will meet as frequently as necessary, but at least [once a 
month]. The Chairman of the SMC will arrange for written minutes of 
each meeting to be prepared and provided to all SMC members. 
5. The Subproject Manager will be responsible to keep DOI informed at 
all times of the status of activities under the Plan of Action. 
6. The Executive Committee will be responsible to keep [the Main 
Committee of] the Association informed at all time of the status of the 
activities under the Plan of Action. 
B. Implementation of Plan of Action 
1. The rehabilitation, improvements and related training activities to be 
undertaken by DOI and the Association are as described in Part I of the 
Plan of Action. 
2. The responsibilities of DOI, the Association and the SMC for 
implementing the Plan of Action are as described in Part 11 of the plan of 
Action. 
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3. The estimated costs of the rehabilitation and improvements to be 
undertaken by DOI and the Association are as described in Part 111 of 
the Plan of Action. 
4. The cost-sharing arrangements between DOI and the Association for 
such rehabilitation and improvements are as described in Part IV of the 
Plan of Action. 
5. The Association will mobilize resources to satisfy its share of the costs 
of such rehabilitation and improvements according to the plan described 
in Part V of the Plan of Action. 
6. The tentative timetable for implementing the Plan of Action is as 
outlined in Part VI of the Plan of Action, which is subject to the 
conditions set forth in Part C below. 
C. Sequencing of Rehabilitation and Improvements 
1. Emergency maintenance and repairs (described in Part (A) of the Plan 
of Action) may be undertaken immediately. 
2. Essential structural maintenance, catch-up maintenance and system 
calibration (described in Parts 1 (B), (Q and (D) of the Plan of Action) 
may be undertaken only after the SMC confirms in writing that all of the 
following activities have been completed by the Association of DOI, as 
the case may be: 
(a) The Association has adopted all necessary and appropriate rules and 
regulations; 
(b) The Association has set up a record keeping system, including 
accounts and one or more registers of Association members; 
(c) The SMC has conducted a "walk through" of the Irrigation System to 
identify needed rehabilitation and improvements; 
(d) DOI has completed all necessary diagnostic surveys and studies 
relating to the rehabilitation and improvements to be undertaken; 
[Other conditions can be added, if appropriate, relating to members' 
registration and payment of registration fees; members' contributions to 
the cost of the rehabilitation work; etc.] 
3. System improvements and improvements to canal service and farm-to-
market roads (described in Parts 1 (E) and (F) of the Plan of Action) may 
be undertaken only after the SMC confirms in writing that all of the 
following activities have been completed by the Association of DOI, as 
the case may be: 
(a) The Association is enforcing its rules and regulations; 
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(b) The Association is keeping accurate and complete accounts, water 
delivery records and records of registration fees and other payments made 
by Association members; 
(c) At least .[should be more than 50] per cent of households using the 
Irrigation System have registered as members of the Association and have 
paid the applicable registration fee; 
(d) The Association has prepared operation and maintenance plans for the 
Irrigation system, and a related budget, Which are satisfactory to the 
Subproject Manager; 
(e) The Association has calculated an irrigation service fee (ISF) based on 
the budget referred to in Subsection (d) above; 
(f) The Association has collected at least [must be 40 or more] per cent of 
the ISF due from users of the Irrigation System for the period {specify 
period of time to which payment relates]; 
{Other conditions can be added, if appropriate.] 
D. Procurement 
1. The SMC will supervise and monitor all procurement activities in 
accordance with the Plan of Action. 
[Add other provisions, if needed, to clarify the responsibilities of the SMC, 
DOI and/of the Association for certain types of procurement— e.g., civil 
works contractors, equipment, labor and materials.] 
E. Construction 
1. The SMC will supervise and monitor all rehabilitation and 
improvements undertaken under the Plan of Action. 
2. The SMC will review the progress of such activities regulady, and will 
modify the scope of work, implementation arrangements and/or timetable 
as needed, in consultation with DOI and [the Main Committee of] the 
Association. 
3. The SMC will monitor closely the quality of rehabilitation and 
improvement work performed under the plan of Action, and will 
prompdy take all necessary steps to correct and defects of deficiencies 
noted in such work. 
{Add other provision, if needed.] 
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F. Commissioning 
1. Upon completion of each phase of rehabilitation or improvement work 
under the Plan of Action, the SMC, with assistance from DOI, will 
conduct a joint survey necessary steps to correct any defects of 
deficiencies noted. [Add other provision, if needed.] 
G. Management Transfer 
1. Upon written confirmation by the SMC that the rehabilitation and 
improvement work outlined in Part 1 of the plan of Action has been 
completed and commissioned, DOI will transfer [specify scope of 
transfer— e.g., responsibility for routine operation and maintenance of the 
Irrigation System, excluding headwork's]" to the Association, provided the 
Association has met the following additional conditions: 
[List here any additional conditions for transfer, such as the election or 
appointment of a special Association committee to oversee O&M; 
specified improvements in record keeping and collection of ISF; 
completion of specified training courses offered by DOI; an audit by DOI 
of the Association's accounts and other records; etc.] 
2. Such transfer will be carried out as follows. 
[Depending on the type of transfer, list and steps DOI must take to make 
the transfer effective under applicable law and regulations—e.g. any 
approvals that must be obtained, notices of filings that must be made, etc.] 
H. Ongoing Responsibilities 
1. Following the Management transfer described in Part G above, the 
Association's responsibilities will include: 
[Depending on the type of transfer, list here the Association's ongoing 
responsibilities in the areas of operation, maintenance, monitoring, further 
repairs and improvement, record keeping, collection of ISF, reporting to 
DOI, etc.] 
2. Following the management transfer described in Part G above, DOI's 
responsibilities will include: 
[Depending on the type of transfer, list her DOI's ongoing responsibilities 
in the areas of operation, maintenance, monitoring, technical assistance, 
further repairs and improvements, audit and inspection, Specify any 
limitation or conditions on further financial assistance.] 
1. In the case of partial management transfers, it may be useful to refer to 
marked sections of the map included as Annex 1: in the case of legal 
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ownership transfers, it may be useful to refer to an additional Annex 3, 
which would include a detailed list of the land plots, irrigation facilities an 
equipment being transferred. 
I. General Provision 
1. DOI will (a) have the right to inspect all rehabilitation and 
improvement work undertaken under the Plan of Action; (b) have the 
right to conduct inventories of all equipment, tools and materials it has 
provided or financed for such work; (c) have the right to periodically audit 
the accounts, registers and other records of the Association; and (d) 
provide the Association with any training and other institutional support 
needed for the Association to carry out its responsibilities under the Plan 
of Action and this Memorandum of Agreement. 
2. The Association will (a) maintain accurate and complete records of all 
contributions made by its members (whether in cash, labor or kind) to the 
cost of the work undertaken under the Plan of Action; (b) hold in a 
separate account any cash raised for such purpose; (c) safeguard and 
conduct inventories of all equipment, tools and materials used by the 
Association for such work; (d) have the right to inspect (through its 
Executive Committee) any equipment or materials supplied by DOI and 
any work Undertaken by contractors engaged by DOI under the Plan of 
Action; and (e) make its officers and members available for any meetings 
and training activities scheduled by the SMC. 
3. The cost required to repair any equipment or facilities damaged due to 
the negligence of DOI (including its employees and contractors) or the 
Association (including its members, employees and contractors) shall be 
bome by the negligent party. 
4. DOI (through the Subproject Manager) and the Association (through 
its Executive Committee) will take all necessary steps to involve members 
of the Association in all phases of activity under the Plan of Action. In 
particular, DOI and the Association will ensure that women are given full 
opportunities to receive training and participate in all other activities 
under the Plan of Action. 
5. DOI and the Association will take all necessary step to make available 
any land and facilities required to carry out the Plan of Action. 
6. If a joint bank account is to be established, include a provision here for 
opening the account; authorizing designated representatives of DOI and 
the Association to operate the account, making initial deposits into the 
account, and making withdrawals form and replenishments to the 
account] 
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7. This Memorandum of Agreement (including the Plan of Action) may be 
amended only by a writing signed by the authorized representatives of 
both parties. 
8. This Memorandum of Agreement is subject to the applicable laws, 
regulations and policies of His Majesty's Government of Nepal. 
[Add other general provision, if needed.] 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have here under signed this 
Memorandum of Agreement as of the date written above. 
DEPARTMENT OF IRRIGATION 
BY-
NAME: 
Title: 
WATER USER ASSOCIATION 
BY 
NAME: 
Title: 
BY-
BY-
NAME: 
Title: 
NAME: 
Title: 
[Include as many signatures as required under the Association's 
constitution or by-laws.] 
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PLAN OF ACTION 
FOR 
IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
(Include a System Map) 
I. Scope of Work and Related Training 
[For each relevant category below, describe in detail the work to be done, 
including the materials and technology to be used and the location of the 
facilities to be maintained/repaired/improved.] 
A. Emergency Maintenance and Repair 
[Work under this heading may include repair/reconstruction of flood-
damaged irrigation structures; repair of irrigation structures in an 
advanced state of deterioration, and minor civil work to remove 
bottlenecks in irrigation and drainage systems.] 
B. Essential Structural Maintenance 
[Work under this heading may include maintenance and repair of flow 
control and conveyance structures; and reconstruction of guide bunds at 
headworks.] 
C. Catch-up MViint-frn^nrp 
[Work under this heading may include removal of sediment and weeds 
from and branch canals; and reconstruction of canal banks and drainage 
networks.] 
D. System Calibration 
[Work under this heading may include calibration of flow control 
structures and establishment of a network of flow measuring points.] 
E. System Improvements 
[Work under this heading may include construction of sediment settling 
basins; redesign or relocation of diversion works; lining of main or branch 
canals; re- excavation or extension of tertiary canals; improvement of 
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drainage networks; provision of additional flow control structures of flood 
protection dikes; and other improvements to the water delivery and 
drainage systems.] 
F. Improvement of Canal Service and Farm-to- Market Roads 
[Work under this heading may include grading and graveling of canal 
service roads, and improvement and expansion of selected village roads in 
the vicinity of the Irrigation System.] 
G. Training 
[Identify here any additional training needed by Association officers 
and/or members in order to participate in the maintenance, repair and 
construction work described above, and to operate and maintain the 
irrigation facilities after they have been repaired and improved.] 
II. Division of Responsibility 
(For each category of work described in Part 1 above, excluding training 
specify the responsibilities of DOI, the Association and/or the SMC in 
the following areas: (a) surveys and studies; (b) detailed designs (if 
needed); (c) detailed cost estimates; (d) Preparation of tender documents 
(if needed); (e) hiring of civil works contractor (s) (if needed); (f) 
Procurement of equipment and construction materials; and (g) carrying 
out of rehabilitation and/or improvement work.] 
III. Cost Estimates 
(For each category of work described in Part I above, excluding training, 
provide a breakdown of estimated costs.] 
IV. Cost- Sharing Arrangements 
[For each category of work described in Part I above, excluding training, 
specify the contributions of DOI and the Association (Which may be in 
cash, labor, kind or a combination of these) to the estimated Costs.] 
V. Resource Mobilization Plan 
[Describe the Association's Plan for mobilizing the cash, labor and/or in-
kind contributions identified in Part IV above.] 
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VI. Timetable 
[Include here a tentative timetable for completion the work described in 
Part I above, bearing in mind the institutional development activities that 
must be carried out by the Association before certain types of work can 
be undertaken (see Part C of Memorandum of Agreement.] 
Notes 
1
 Source: Project Administration Memorandum, Irrigation Management 
Transfer Project, Asian Development Bank. 
Appendix II 
Mean Monthly Hydrological and 
Meteorological Data in Chittwan 
J F MA M JU ,/L 
Rain Fall in mm (Average annual rainfall is 
17 13 21 46 140 
Temperature ° c minimum 
8 9 12 17 21 
333 
average 
24 
556 
24 
4? S 
1947 mm) 
399 
24 
311 
24 
0 
83 
23 
N 
6 
19 
D 
15 
12 
Temperature ° c maximum 
22 25 31 35 35 34 32 33 32 31 27 23 
Relative Humidity 
97 90 72 57 68 77 84 84 85 84 90 97 
Source: RTDB, DOI; CEMECA Consult (F) LTD (2001) 
For simplicity, data are put in round figures. 
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Appendix III. 
O&M cost Computation for West Gandak at 
the time of handing over. 
This does not involve cost of cleaning the farm ditches and flood damage 
repair cost which generally requires Rs. 100,0000 annually. The data 
presented are based on discussion with the technicians involved in system 
operation and maintenance. 
Maintenance Requirement 
Total cost for desilting of main canal 
Total Cost for desilting of Branch canal 
Maintenance of Branch and Minor Canal Structures 
Operational Cost for Main and Branch Canals 
Total cost required to maintain the system (A) 
Cost per ha (For a command area of 8700 ha) 
Possible Income 
Rs. 800,000 
Rs. 800,000 
Rs. 1,500,000 
Rs. 400,000 
Rs. 3,500,000 
Rs. 402 per ha 
Forest Resources 
Income from other sources (land and road tax) 
Government support (first three years from 1998) 
Total income (B) 
Deficit to be borne from the farmers (A-B) 
Cost per ha for farmers with government support 
Cost to be raised by farmers when government 
Support stops 
Cost per ha without government support 
Cost per ha assuming a collection efficiency of 60% 
Rs. 400,000 
Rs. 200,000 
Rs. 850,000 
Rs. 1,450,000 
Rs. 2,050,000 
Rs. 235 per ha 
Rs. 2,900,000 
Rs.333 per ha 
Rs.555 per ha. 
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Summary 
The government of Nepal introduced Irrigation Management 
Transfer programs in the agency-managed irrigation systems 
during the 1990s. These programs was driven by several factors, 
including donor preferences for less state and more private sector 
involvement in the water sector, and involved promotion of Water 
Users Associations as a devolved organization for irrigation 
management. Poor system performance and increasing 
dependency on government for irrigation management, and 
successful tradition of the FMIS in the country has also inspired 
the program. The design implementation processes for this and its 
outcomes has so far received little analysis, while its understanding 
is crucial for future irrigation management reform in the country. 
The thesis attempted to fill this gap so that future water 
management can be better supported and sustained locally. 
The study analyzed an intervention program in the Terai Region 
of Nepal to transfer irrigation management functions to the users. 
This program involves both institutional reform and technical 
rehabilitation. Key aspects of these policies, and the research sites 
of this study, are given in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. The study 
analyzes both processes, and also explores how organizational 
evolution and water management has materialized in practice. 
These process and outcomes of change were studied in three 
irrigation systems, of different size, degrees of water scarcity, 
336 
Summary 337 
objective of this study is not to suggest specific conditions that 
facilitate management change and assure achievement, but to 
improve understanding of change processes that translate policies 
on the ground. It also hopes to contribute to better understanding 
of participatory processes, in how they can be practiced beyond 
just instrumentalist perspectives. 
Much expectation existed on the efficacy of participatory and 
process-based projects to facilitate irrigation management change. 
The thesis showed that participatory projects can help build up 
organizational evolution and bring water management change 
when they proceed with adequate learning of the system 
environment This can translate its opportunities and constraints in 
practical design and build a stable project environment guiding the 
project process. Otherwise, it would lead to costly failure of the 
program process. However, such processes can form only the base 
for new management regimes, which is further shaped by different 
water control dimensions - which are dynamic - and a local 
organization has to continuously adapt with change in new 
environment, which also requires further policy and legal support 
to such organizations to govern and manage irrigation water. 
The conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1 discusses how 
participation can involve different domains and contexts in 
engineering participation in irrigation, in both the building of new 
institutions and design of technology. It introduced different 
domains and context of participation to show different objectives 
and aims of participation. There is a need to understand the 
clashes they can bring between people with different aims and 
objectives of participation. This helps explain policy as process 
where people reshape water management around new policy 
instruments and their own objectives to give both intended and 
unintended outcomes. To understand water management activities, 
it introduced the concept of the system environment to understand 
the elements of systems involved in water management (both 
physical/technical and social). It explained how technology shapes 
(and is shaped) by these environments and argued how 
understanding of action around technology plays a key role in 
transforming irrigation practices. 
Chapter 2 describes the history of irrigation development in the 
country, the current irrigation policies and ongoing management 
reform and its implementation framework. It explained how the 
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state got involved in irrigation development and its problematic 
role, and the shift of focus towards local management and policies 
driving them. The chapter showed how the ongoing IMT program 
has tried to address different dimensions of water control - the 
technical, organizational and socio-political - and included different 
development contexts of participation in its program design. 
Despite its comprehensive nature, the program however had 
several practical limitations from unclear legal provisions, on how 
they rely on external actors to shape local norms and rules to 
govern and manage irrigation water. 
Chapter 3 uses an agroecology approach to trace the evolution 
of systems studied - the interventions to take water for irrigation 
and distribute it and the resultant agriculture and agrarian 
conditions. It discusses the opportunities and constraints of the 
systems for evolution of new systems of effective water control 
with complementary technical, organizational and socio-political 
control. The initial organization of the WUAs was presented in 
chapter 4, which also briefly describes farmers' reactions to 
government decisions to transfer irrigation management functions 
to them. It explained that farmers' support to new irrigation 
institutions was not only to obey government decisions but also 
for their hope to get better water delivery and operation. 
The chapter described both structures as well as the dynamics 
of WUA development. It showed how unitary WUA model 
concentrates power and authority towards the Main Committee, 
weakening accountability among different tiers of organization, 
and argues for structuring in a federal structure so that power and 
authority of local organization can be distributed in federal 
linkages. It also argued that a WUA cannot be designed simply on 
the basis of design principles that supposedly provides governance, 
but needs broader understanding of local socio-political and 
physical environment, and how to transform them in organization 
design. 
Chapter 5 and 6 together describe the participatory technology 
development (PTD) process to improve technical water control to 
provide better working conditions for farmers. Chapter 5 describes 
the initial planning process and development of an action plan and 
subsequent agreement over it It shows that farmers are 
knowledgeable and capable actors, but expectations and ambitions 
need to be negotiated, and projects should not raise unrealizable 
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expectations in local fanners. Likewise, one should not depend on 
efficacy of the participatory tools promoted, rather search for 
different tools and actions that can help diagnose the problem 
situation. 
Chapter 6 describes design and construction processes to create 
the technical water control wanted by farmers. It describes in detail 
the discussions and choices, to show what levels of negotiation, 
support and patience must go in participatory planning. It shows 
how the project environment facilitating the technology 
development process shapes the outcomes of the actions and 
processes. Quality control, as well as construction of chose 
structures is emphasized as critical to building farmer satisfaction. 
Farmers did not object to flexible gate structure despite their 
management requirements, but often tried to minimize their 
number: they also hired in staff to operate these gates. A key point 
drawn from this chapter is that that PTD should not taken on its 
own, but rather be viewed as a means of achieving service oriented 
water control for future water management Its scope should not 
be limited only on technology innovation process, but also to build 
coalitions among relevant stakeholders, which is key not only to 
facilitate participatory process, but also to sustain water 
management beyond the project launching. It also helps build 
accountability between local agencies and a WUA for future water 
management. 
Chapter 7 describes the handing over of the irrigation 
management functions to the WUA and shows how the project 
environment and wider social environments shaped the events and 
outcomes of the organizational debut of the WUAs. Handing over 
not only brings new water management conditions, but also creates 
new forms of governance where both social rivalries and water 
management will be key areas of struggle. Without recognition of 
political actions, and wider support from the government and 
administrative institutions, the supposedly democratic nature of 
consultative irrigation management transfer would be no more 
than a paper. 
Chapter 8 describes the changing governance structure for local 
management It shows how WUA evolve when supported in their 
administration and structure. WUAs as a new form of governance 
try to acquire legitimacy and power from both internal and external 
support,. They thus provide a platform to build social and political 
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power. This political dimension has to be accepted in program 
design rather than ignored. 
Chapter 9 describes changes in water management practices and 
how they faced continued challenge from their system 
environment. While project support built up partial knowledge and 
skills to manage the system and bring better technical water 
control, they alone are not sufficient to shape future water 
management. Local organizations need to adapt with the ever 
changing water control environment to support water 
management, build up necessary skills, generate resources and 
develop accountability between relevant stakeholders. This also 
needs legal, political and often financial support from wider 
administrative institutions. 
The general conclusions of the thesis are drawn in Chapter 10, 
revisiting the four inter-related themes of the study. Future 
organization design needs to consider both governance and 
structure, and necessary actions beyond local level to build up their 
legitimacy and power. Project support, if it proceeds with learning 
of system environment and translation of its opportunities and 
constraints in practical design, can provide incentives to local 
organization to take up water management. Technology 
commands a central role in transforming irrigation practices, 
shaping (and being shaped by) the system environment. Thus 
technical change to facilitate management reform must be based 
on the future service requirements of the users. Project support 
only forms the base for new management. Done well, participatory 
action around technology helps build the recognition and 
capabilities of WUAs and the engineers who will work with 
farmers, and acceptance of new irrigation schedules and 
management requirements. Done badly, it it can be simply the 
means for an irrigation department and ambitious WUA officials 
to further there own interests rather than those of farmers. As 
WUAs emerge as a new form of local governance, they still need 
wider legal and often financial support for their longer-term 
sustainability. 
Samenvatting 
Gedurende de jaren negentig van de vorige eeuw 
introduceerde de Nepalese overheid Irrigatie Management 
Transfer programma's (IMT) in de door irrigatiediensten beheerde 
irrigatiesystemen. Deze programma's zijn voortgekomen uit 
verschillende factoren, waaronder de voorkeur van donoren voor 
minder staats- en meer private-sectorbetrokkenheid in de 
watersector, en de bijbehorende promotie van 
watergebruikersassociaties (Water Users Associations, WUAs) als 
nieuwe bevoegde organisaties voor irrigatiebeheer. Slechte 
prestaties van systemen en succesvolle tradities van door boeren 
beheerde irrigatiesystemen in het land waren mede 
aanmoedigingen voor de programma's. De processen voor 
implementatie van ontwerpen hiervoor, en hun uitkomsten, zijn 
tot op heden weinig geanalyseerd, terwijl het begrip hiervan 
cruciaal is voor verdere hervorming van irrigatiebeheer in het land. 
Deze thesis tracht dit gat te vullen, zodat toekomstig waterbeheer 
lokaal beter ondersteund en gedragen kan worden. 
De studie analyseert een interventieprogramma voor de 
overdracht van irrigatiebeheerfuncties aan de gebruikers in de 
Terai-regio in Nepal. Dit programma betrof zowel institutionele 
hervorming als technische rehabilitatie. Belangrijke aspecten van 
dit beleid en de onderzoekslokaties van deze studie worden 
gegeven in de hoofdstukken twee repectievelijk drie. In de studie 
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hoe organisatorische evolutie en waterbeheer zich hebben 
ontwikkeld in de praktijk. Deze veranderingsprocessen en hun 
uitkomsten zijn bestudeerd in drie irrigatiesystemen die verschillen 
in grootte, mate van waterschaarste, operationele complexiteit en 
niveau van voorgaand lokaal irrigatiebeheer. De inspanningen voor 
deze processen worden bestudeerd in de hoofdstukken vier tot en 
met zeven; de uitkomsten van institutionele veranderingen en 
nieuwe waterbeheersveranderingen worden bediscussieerd in de 
hoofdstukken acht en negen. De doelstelling van deze studie is niet 
om specdfieke voorwaarden voor te stellen die beheersverandering 
faciliteren en succes verzekeren, maar om het begrip te verbeteren 
van veranderingsprocessen die beleid vertalen naar de praktijk. 
Verder draagt deze studie hopelijk bij aan een beter begrip van de 
mogelijkheden voor het in praktijk brengen van 
participatieprocessen die verder reiken dan slechts 
instrumentalistische perspectieven. 
Er bestonden hoge verwachtingen van de uitwerking van 
participatieve en proces-gebaseerde projecten om veranderingen in 
irrigatiebeheer te faciliteren. De thesis toont aan dat participatieve 
projecten kunnen bijdragen aan de opbouw van organisatorische 
ontwikkeling en waterbeheer kunnen veranderen als zij vergezeld 
zijn door een adequaat bewustwordingsproces van de 
systeemomgeving. De mogelijkheden en beperkingen hiervan 
kunnen vertaald worden in een praktisch ontwerp en een stabiele 
projectomgeving opbouwen voor de begeleiding van het 
projectproces. Anders zou een kostbare mislukking van het 
programma het gevolg zijn. Echter, dergelijke processen kunnen 
alleen de basis vormen voor nieuwe beheersregimes welke verder 
vormgegeven worden door verschillende, dynamische, 
waterbeheersdimensies. Een lokale organisatie moet zich 
voortdurend aanpassen aan een veranderende omgeving, en dat 
vraagt verdere beleids- en wettelijke ondersteuning. 
De thesis bestaat uit tien hoofdstukken. Het conceptuele 
raamwerk, opgenomen in hoofdstuk een, bediscussieert hoe 
participatie verschillende domeinen en contexten binnen de 
techniek van irrigatie kan betrekken, zowel in het opbouwen van 
nieuwe instituties als in het ontwerp van technologic Het 
introduceert verschillende domeinen en contexten van participatie 
om de verschillende doelstellingen van participatie aan te tonen, 
alsmede de noodzaak tot het begrijpen van de confrontaties die 
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kunnen bestaan tussen mensen met verschillende doelstellingen. 
Dit helpt verklaren dat beleidmaken een proces is waarbij mensen 
waterbeheer hervormen rondom nieuwe beleidsinstrumenten en 
hun eigen doelstellingen, met verwachte en onverwachte 
uitkomsten. Voor een goed begrip van waterbeheeractiviteiten 
introduceert het hoofdstuk het concept van de systeemomgeving, 
die bestaat uit zowel physische/technische als sociale elementen. 
Het legt uit hoe technologie vormgeeft aan, en vormgegeven wordt 
door deze omgeving en beargumenteert hoe het begrip van actie 
rond technologie een sleutelrol speelt in de ttansformatie van 
irrigatiepraktijken. 
Hoofdstuk twee beschrijft de geschiedenis van 
irrigatieontwikkeling in het land, het huidige irrigatiebeleid, de 
lopende beheershervorming en het raamwerk voor implementatie 
hiervan. Het legt uit hoe de staat betrokken raakte in 
irrigatieontwikkeling, hierin een problematische rol verwierf, en de 
aandacht verschoof naar lokaal beheer en het achterliggende 
beleid. Het hoofdstuk toont aan hoe het lopende IMT-programma 
getracht heeft de verschillende dimensies van waterbeheersing -
technisch, organisatorisch en sociaal-politiek - te behandelen en 
verschillende ontwikkelingscontexten van participatie in zijn 
programmaontwerp insluit. Ondanks de veelomvattende aard had 
het programma verschillende praktische beperkingen door 
onduidelijke wettelijke voorzieningen. Bovendien werd voor het 
vormgeven van lokale normen en regels voor beheersing en beheer 
van irrigatiewater vertrouwd op externe actoren. 
Hoofdstuk drie gebruikt een agro-ecologische benadering 
om de evolutie van de bestudeerde systemen te analyseren. Het 
betreft hier de interventies voor de allocatie en distributie van 
water voor irrigatie en de resulterende landbouw en agrarische 
omstandigheden. Het bediscussieert de mogelijkheden en 
beperkingen van de systemen voor de ontwikkeling van nieuwe 
manieren van waterbeheersing met de bijbehorende technische, 
organisatorische en sociaal-politieke beheersing. De 
oorspronkelijke organisaties van de WUAs wordt gepresenteerd in 
hoofdstuk vier, waar ook kort de reacties besproken worden van 
boeren op de overheidsbeslissing om indgatiebeheertaken aan hen 
over te dragen. Het hoofdstuk legt uit dat boeren de nieuwe 
irrigatie-instituties niet alleen ondersteunden om te voldoen aan 
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overheidsbeslissingen, maar ook omdat ze hoopten op betere 
waterbezorging en operatic 
Het hoofdstuk beschrijft zowel de structuren als de 
dynamiek van de ontwikkeling van gebruikersorganisaties. Het 
toont aan hoe een unitair WUA-model macht en autoriteit 
concentreert bij het hoofdcomite, en zo het afleggen van 
verantwoording tussen de verschillende niveaus binnen de 
organisatie verzwakt Het pleit voor structurering in een federate 
structuur zodat macht en autoriteit van lokale organisaties 
gedistribueerd kunnen worden via federale verbanden. Tevens 
beargumenteert het dat een WUA niet eenvoudig ontwikkeld kan 
worden op basis van ontwerpprincipes waarvan aangenomen 
wordt dat ze voorzien in bestuur, maar een breder begrip van de 
lokale sociaal-politieke en fysieke omgeving vraagt, alsmede de 
transformatie daarvan in een organisatieontwerp. 
De hoofdstukken vijf en zes beschrijven samen het proces 
van participatieve technologieontwikkeling (participatory 
technology development, FED) voor de verbetering van 
technische waterbeheersing, en uiteindelijk betere 
arbeidsomstandigheden voor boeren. Hoofdstuk vijf beschrijft het 
oorspronkelijke planningsproces, de ontwikkeling van een 
actieplan en de daarop volgende overeenstemming daarover. Het 
laat zien dat boeren kundige en capabele actoren zijn, maar dat 
verwachtingen en ambities onderhandeld dienen te worden, en 
projecten geen onrealiseerbare verwachtingen bij boeren mogen 
scheppen. Op dezelfde manier moet men niet afhankelijk zijn van 
de uitwerking van gepromote participatieve gereedschappen, maar 
zoeken naar verschillende gereedschappen en acties die de 
problemen kunnen identificeren. 
Hoofdstuk zes beschrijft ontwerp- en 
constructieprocessen om de technische waterbeheersing zoals 
boeren die wensen, te bewerkstelligen. Het beschrijft gedetailleerd 
de discussies en keuzes om aan te geven welke niveaus van 
onderhandeling, ondersteuning en geduld noodzakelijk zijn in 
participatieve planning. Het laat zien hoe de projectomgeving — die 
de tecnologieontwikkeling faciliteert - vormgeeft aan acties en 
processen. Kwaliteitscontrole en de constructie van gekozen 
kunstwerken worden benadrukt als kritiek voor het opbouwen van 
tevredenheid onder boeren. De boeren hadden geen bezwaar tegen 
flexibele schuiven, ondanks de bijbehorende vereisten voor beheer, 
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maar probeerden vaak het aantal hiervan te minimaliseren. Ook 
huurden zij werknemers om deze schuiven te bedienen. Een 
belangrijke conclusie uit dit hoofdstuk is dat PTD niet op zichzelf 
staat, maar beter beschouwd kan worden als een middel voor het 
bereiken van dienstverlening-georienteerde waterbeheersing. Het 
bereik hiervan zou niet beperkt moeten blijven tot een 
technologisch innovatieproces, maar ook coalities tussen relevante 
belanghebbenden bouwen. Dit is noodzakelijk voor het faciliteren 
van het participatieve proces, maar ook om waterbeheer voort te 
zetten na de lancering van het project. Dit draagt bij aan het 
afleggen van verantwoording tussen lokale instellingen en WUAs. 
Hoofdstuk zeven beschrijft de overdracht van 
waterbeheerstaken aan de WUAs en laat zien hoe de 
projectomgeving en wijdere sociale omgevingen de gebeurtenissen 
en uitkomsten van het organisatorische debuut van de WUAs 
vormgaven. Overdracht brengt niet alleen nieuwe 
waterbeheersomstandigheden met zich mee, maar creeert ook 
nieuwe vormen van bestuur, waarbij sociale concurrentie en 
waterbeheer belangrijke onderwerpen van strijd zullen zijn. Zonder 
erkenning van politieke acties, en zonder algemenere 
ondersteuning van de overheid en overheidsinstituties, zou het 
democratisch bedoelde en consultatieve IMT niet meer dan een 
apieren initiatief blijken. 
Hoofdstuk acht beschrijft de veranderende structuur voor 
bestuur van lokaal beheer. Het toont aan hoe WUAs zich 
ontwikkelen als zij ondersteund worden in hun bestuur en 
structuur. WUAs, als nieuwe vorm van bestuur, proberen 
legitimiteit en macht te verwerven uit interne en externe 
ondersteuning. Tevens creeren ze een platform voor het 
opbouwen van sociale en politieke macht. Deze politiek dimensie 
kan beter geaccepteerd worden in het programmaontwerp, dan 
worden genegeerd. 
Hoofdstuk negen beschrijft hoe veranderingen in 
waterbeheerspraktijken voortdurend geconfronteerd worden met 
uitdagingen uit de systeemomgeving. Projectondersteuning bouwt 
gedeeltelijk kennis en kunde op voor het beheer van het systeem, 
met betere waterbeheersing als resultaat, maar dat alleen is niet 
voldoende voor de vormgeving van toekomstig waterbeheer. 
Lokale organisaties moeten zich aanpassen aan de immer 
veranderende waterbeheersingsomgeving, de benodigde kunde 
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opbouwen, hulpbronnen genereren en verantwoording 
ontwikkelen tussen de relevante belanghebbenden. Dit vereist 
tevens wettelijke, politieke en in veel gevallen financiele steun uit 
algemenere overheidsinstituties. 
De algemene conclusies van de thesis worden getrokken 
in hoofdstuk tien, waar de vier inter-gerelateerde thema's van de 
studie herbezocht worden. Toekomstige organisaties moeten zowel 
beleid als structuur overwegen, alsmede de noodzakelijke aeries die 
verder reiken dan het lokale niveau om legitimiteit en macht op te 
bouwen. Projectondersteuning kan, mits het samengaat met 
bewustwording van de systeemomgeving en de mogelijkheden en 
bepeikingen daarvan in praktisch ontwerp, aansporingen bieden 
aan lokale organisaties om waterbeheer op te nemen. Technologie 
eist een centrale rol op in de transformatie van irrigatiepraktijken 
en geeft vorm aan (en wordt vormgegeven door) de 
systeemomgeving. Daarom moet technische worden op de 
toekomstige behoefte aan diensten van gebruikers. 
Projectondersteuning vormt slechts de basis voor nieuw beheer. 
Als het goed gedaan wordt, draagt participatieve actie rond 
technologie bij aan de erkenning en capaciteiten van WUAs en de 
ingenieurs die met boeren zullen werken, en acceptatie van nieuwe 
irrigatiesystemen en vereisten voor beheer. Als dit echter slecht 
gedaan wordt, kan het simpelweg de weg bereiden voor een 
irrigatiedepartement en ambitieuze WUA-vertegenwoordigers om 
hun eigen belangen te behartigen, in plaats van die van de boeren. 
Als WUAs uitgroeien tot een nieuwe vorm van lokaal bestuur, 
hebben zij nog steeds algemenere wettelijke en in veel gevallen 
financiele steun nodig voor duurzaamheid op de langere termijn. 
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